tv National Security Officials Testify on Threats CSPAN January 29, 2019 8:00pm-10:29pm EST
working with our cable affiliates as we explore the american story. coming up next on c-span, a look at global security threats to the u.s. that's followed by discussion on the political situation in venezuela after the national assembly recently declared nicolas maduro's presidency illegitimate. on capitol hill today, national intelligence director told lawmakers it was unlikely that north korea would give up its nuclear weapons and production capabilities while testifying before the senate intelligence committee. he was joined by several officials to testify about potential threats to the u.s., including the cia director and fbi director. other topics included a ron, cyber threats and foreign efforts to influence u.s. elections in 2020. this hearing is just under two and a half hours.
> >> i'd like to call this hearing to order. i'd like to welcome our witnesses today, director of national intelligence, dan coats, director of the central intelligence agency gina haspel, director of the defense intelligence agency general robert ashley, director of the federal bureau of investigation chris wray, director of the national security agency general paul nokasoni and director of national geo spatial
intelligence agency robert cardillo. i'd also like to welcome the committee's two newest members who in typical senate fashion are not here yet, senator ben sasse of nebraska and senator michael bennet of colorado. they are both great additions and i look forward to working with them and with you to fulfill the committee's critical oversight mandates. before i go to my formal remarks, i want to extend my condolences of this committee to general ashley and his workforce at the defense intelligence agency as well as general nokasoni. on january 16th a dia employee and a naval chief krip tolling technician were killed in northern syria alongside two other americans.
this is a stark and sobering reminder of the dangerous work that the men and women of the intelligence community do around the world on crap of the country every single day, often with no public acknowledgment. we thank you for your leadership of this community and more importantly for what your officers do and the sacrifices they make on behalf of our nation. this committee has met in open forum to discuss the security threats facing the united states since 1995. the nature, scale and scope of those threats have evolved greatly over the last 25 years. hostile nation states, terrorist organizations, maligned cyber actors and even infectious disease and natural disasters at different times have been the focus of the intelligence communities' efforts. our intelligence officers have repeatedly proven themselves equal to the task of refocusing, reconfiguring and relearning the business of intelligence to keep pace with a threat landscape that's never static. when this nation was attacked on september the 11th counterterrorism rightly became our nation's security focus.
the intelligence community responded by shifting resources and attention. we learned the ways of our new enemy and we learned how to defeat it. we're now living in yet another new age, a time characterized by hieber war far, all occurring within a context of a world producing more data than mankind has ever seen. tomorrow it's going to be deep fakes, artificial intelligence, a 5g enabled internet of things with billions of internet connections on consumer devices. what i hope to get out of this morning is a sense of how well prepared the intelligence community is to take on this new generation of technologically advanced security threats. countering these threats requires making information available to those who can act and doing so with speed and
agility. sometimes the key actors will be the federal government, other times it will be a city, many times it will be a social media company or a startup or a biotech firm. i see a world where greater collaboration between government and the private sector is necessary while still protecting sensitive sources and methods. we have to share what we can, trust who we can and collaborate because we must. the objective of our enemies has not changed. they want to see the united states weakened if not destroyed. they want to see us abandon our friends and our allies. they want to see us lesson our global presence. they want to see us squabble and divide, but their tools are different. i don't need to remind anyone in the room when this country's democracy was attacked in 2016, it wasn't with a bomb or a missile or a plane, it was with social media accounts that any 13-year-old can establish for free. the enemies of this country aren't going to take us on a
straight up fight because they know they would lose. they're going to keep finding new ways of attacking us, ways that exploit the openness of our society and slip through the seams of a national security architecture designed for the cold war. what this means is that we can't afford to get complacent. we can't find comfort in being good at doing the same things that we've been doing for 50 years. those who would seek to harm this nation are creative, adaptive and resolute. they are creating a new battlefield and we have to -- we've been playing catch up. defeating them demands that we as members of your oversight committee make sure you have the resources and the authorities you into he had to win. director coats, i would appreciate your perspective on how to best strike the balance between satisfying existing intelligence requirements and preparing the ic to take on the technological challenge of the future. i'd like to recognize that this will be director cardilla's last appearance before the committee.
robert, since 2014 you have served as the consummate ambassador for nga and this committee thanks you for your more than 35 years of honorable service to nga, the intelligence community and more importantly to the country. i will close here because we have a lot of ground to cover today, but i want to thank you again and more importantly your officers for the selfless sacrifices that help keep this nation safe. yours is an exceptional mission in that so few will ever truly know how much you do in the service of so so many. before turning to distinguished vice-chairman i'd like to highlight for my colleagues at the committee we will be convening again at 1:00 p.m. this afternoon promptly for the afternoon for classified continuation of this hearing. please reserve any questions that delve into classified matters until then and don't take it offensive if our witnesses find the need to delay
their answers to questions that might be on the fringe for the closed session. with that i turn to the vice-chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me also welcome our witnesses. let me extend my condolences as well for your loss. let me also echo what the chairman has said, robert, about your service, your leadership at nga, your willingness to always push, push, push and your recognition that in many ways we need to change our models and how we make sure we use better use of our commercial and other partners. today's open hearing comes at an important time for our nation and the world. as i look over the witnesses' statements for the record, i'm struck by the multiplicity of threats our nation continues to face. from new clets like cyber and online influence, to those that were more familiar with, like terrorism, extremism, police officer operation of wmb and
rogue actors like iran, north korea and regional instability. we have also seen -- see on a regular basis, daily basis with some of the news yesterday an increasingly adversarial stance of major powers like russia and china. at the forefront of our nation's defenses against these threats stand professional men and women of the intelligence community whom you represent. it is, i believe, uncon shen nabl that some of these men and women and in particular to the fbi, department of homeland security, state department and others were forced to work without pay for five weeks because of the government shutdown. this is no way to run a country. we count on the intelligence and law enforcement professionals to protect us. we cannot ask them to do so with no pay and facing threats of eviction or losing their health insurance.
the method of running government via shutdown rank manship must come to an end. the myriad of threats we face must also be placed -- must also be faced in tandem with our allies and partners around the world. as former secretary of defense mattis wrote in his resignation letter, quote, while the u.s. remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve the role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies. i think that is a lesson we all need to take to heart. of the multiple threats we face i would highlight two that i hope we can especially dive into. first, russia's use of social media to amplify divisions in our society and to influence our democratic process. this is an area that i know was highlighted in our worldwide threat hearing last year and the
concern that we and the ic that russia would continue its malign activities to try to influence the 2018 elections. while we did see russia continue to try to divide americans on social media, and we saw cyber activities by unknown actors targeting our election infrastructure in 2018, the good news is, general nakasoni, i commend you, i think we did a much better job. the request he is how do we prepare ourselves for 2020? how do we make sure that we're organized? what is the ic's role in fighting this disinformation threat and how can we build upon public/private partnerships with online social media companies in a way that works for both sides? this is a problem as the chairman has mentioned with the question around deep fakes and other areas that technology is only going to make more difficult. the second issue i would hope that you would all address today is the threat from china,
particularly in the field of technology. i think we all saw the justice department announcement yesterday about huawei. i have to say as a former entrepreneur and venture capitalist i long held the view that an economically advanced china would eventually become a responsible global citizen that would join us the world trade organization and whose system would ultimately be liberalized by market-based economies. unfortunately what we've seen particularly in the last two or three years is the opposite. with the consolidation of power by the communist chinese party and with president xi emphasizing nationalistic tendencies in an ago testify posture towards those nations on china's periphery, and an economic policy that seeks by hook or by crook to catch up and to surpass the united states, economically, especially in the areas of technology like ai, machine learning, biotech, 5g
and other related to prioritize which threats are of greatest importance. i first would like to mention election security. this has been and will continue to be a top priority for the intelligence community. we assess that foreign actors will view the 2020 u.s. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests. we expect them to refine in re capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences and efforts in previous elections. on the heels of our successful efforts to protect the integrity of the 2018 midterm elections we are now focused on incorporating
lessons learned in preparation for the 2020 elections. i would now like to turn to the variety of threats that currently exist and may materialize in the coming year. i'd like to begin with the remarks on what i would describe as the big four, china, russia, north korea and iran. all of which pose unique threats to the united states and our partners. china's actions reflect a long-term strategy to achieve global superiority, beijing's global ambition continuing to restrict freedom of its citizens while strictly enforcing obedience to chinese leadership with few checks on president xi's power. in efforts to diminish its influence and extend its own political and military reach. beijing will seek to tout a chinese strongman auto crazy and a implicit clerntive to democratic model and institutions. using its intelligence and influence apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages over its competitors, including, especially the united states. china's pursuit of intellectual property, sensitive research and development plans and the u.s. person data remains a significant threat to the united
states government and the private sector. china's military capabilities and reach will continue to grow -- we make sure that we can do everything we possibly can to bring the intelligence necessary for a policy makers to this committee and others relative to what decisions they might have to make given this ever-changing world we're facing right now. toldg my tenure, i have our workforce over and over that our mission was to seek the truth and speak the truth. we worked to enhance and agree with and enforce that mission on a daily basis. i want our people to get up in the morning to think that this is what our job is, despite the , our missiontics,
is to keep our heads down, our focus on the mission that we have to achieve in order to keep american people safe and our policymakers aware of what's happening. of people efforts sitting here at this table and all of our components is not public tolic for the know about. we continue to value our relationship with this committee in terms of how we share information, how we respond to your legitimate questions that ,ou bring to us and task for us we value very much the relationship that we have with this committee. my goal is to responsibly convey to you and the american people in this unclassified hearing the true nature of the current environment.
i'd also like to refute you to my statement for the record for a more complete threat picture. stated in my recent remarks during the release of the national intelligence strategy, we six never get changes in the domestic and global environment that have resulted in an increasingly complex and uncertainty world. we must be ready to meet 21st century's challenges and recognize emerging threats. the composition of the current that's we straight is a constant next of competitors, regional and nonstate actors using a variety of tools in overt and subtle ways to achieve their goals. this scale and scope of the various threats facing the united states is likely to further intensify this year. challengeeasingly a to prioritize which threats are of greatest importance. i would like to mention election security.
a topill continue to be priority for the intelligence community. we assess that foreign actors will view the 2020 u.s. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests. we expect them to refine in re capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each other's experiences and efforts in previous elections. on the heels of our successful efforts to protect the integrity of the 2018 midterm elections we are now focused on incorporating lessons learned in preparation for the 2020 elections. i would now like to turn to the variety of threats that currently exist and may materialize in the coming year. i'd like to begin with the remarks on what i would describe as the big four, china, russia, north korea and iran. all of which pose unique threats to the united states and our partners. china's actions reflect a long-term strategy to achieve global superiority, beijing's
global ambition continuing to restrict freedom of its citizens while strictly enforcing obedience to chinese leadership with few checks on president xi's power. in efforts to diminish its influence and extend its own political and military reach. beijing will seek to tout a chinese strongman auto crazy and a implicit clerntive to democratic model and institutions. using its intelligence and influence apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages over its competitors, including, especially the united states. china's pursuit of intellectual property, sensitive research and development plans and the u.s. person data remains a significant threat to the united states government and the private sector.
china's military capabilities and reach will continue to grow as it invests heavily in developing and fielding advanced weapons and beijing will use its military clout to expand its footprint and complement it's broadening political and economic influence as we have seen with its one belt, one road initiative. as part of this trend we anticipate china will attempt to further solidify and increase its control within its immediate sphere of influence in the the
south china sea and its global presence further abroad. whereas with china we must be concerned about the methodologile and long-term efforts to capitalize on its past decade of a growing economy and to match or overtake our superior global capabilities. russia's approach relies on misdirection and ob fuse accusation as it seeks to diminish our standing in the world. even as russia faces a weakenening economy, the kremlin steps up its campaign to divide western, political and security institutions and undermine the post world war ii international order. we expect russia will continue to wage its information war against democracies and to use social media to attempt to divide our societies. russia's attack against ukrainian naval vessels in november is just the latest example of the kremlin's willingness to violate international norms, coerce neighbors and accomplish its goals. we also expect russia will use cyber techniques to influence ukraine's upcoming presidential election. the kremlin has aligned russia with repressive regimes in cuba, iran, north korea, syria and venezuela. and moscow's relationship with beige something closer than it has been in many decades. the kremlin is also stepping up its engagement in the middle east, africa and southeast asia.
using weapon sales, private security firms and energy deals to advance its global influence. regarding north korea, the regime has halted its provocative behavior related to it's wmd program. north korea has not conducted any nuclear capable missile or nuclear tests in more than a year. and it has dismantled some of its nuclear infrastructure. as well kim jong un continues to demonstrate openness to the denuclearization of the korean peninsula. having said that we currently believe north korea will seek to retain wmd capabilities and unlikely to give up nuclear representative weapons and production capabilities because its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime survival. our assessment is bolstered by our observations of some activity that is inconsistent with full denuclearization. while we assess that sanctions
on exports have been effective and largely maintained north korea seeks to mitigate the effects of the u.s. led pressure campaign through diplomatic engagement, counterpressure against the sanctions regime and direct sanctions evasion. now let me discuss iran. the iranian regime will continue pursuesing regional ambitions and improved capabilities even while its economy weakens by the day. domestically regime hard liners will be emboldened to challenge rival cent rifts and we expect unrest in the iran in recent months. tehran kinning to sponsor terrorism as the recent european arrests of iranians operatives plotting attacks in europe demonstrate. we expect iran will continue supporting the houthi in yemen
, they threaten u.s. forces and allies in region. iran maintains the largest inventory of ballistic mitchells in the middle east. while we don't believe iran is currently undertaking activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. iranian officials have publicly threatened to push the boundaries of the restrictions if any don't gain the financial benefits it expected from the deal. iran's efforts to consolidate influence in syria and arm hezbollah have prompted israeli airstrikes. these actions underscour score our concern for long-term stability in the region. and all four the states mentioned kbh, russia, north korea and iran are advancing cyber capabilities which are low cost and growing in potency and severity. including threatening minds and machines in an expanding number
of ways. stealing information, attempting to influence populations or developing ways to disrupt critical infrastructure. as the world becomes increasingly interconnected we expect the actors and others to rely more and more on cyber capabilities seeking to gain political, economic and military advantages over the united states and its allies and partners. now that i've covered the big four i'll quickly hit on some regional and transnational threats. in the middle east president assad as largely defeated opposition and is seeking to regain control over all of syrian territory. remaining pockets of isis and opposition fighters will continue we -- we assess to stoke -- to stoke violence as we have seen in incidents happening in the idlib province of syria. focusing on retaking territory while seeking to avoid conflict with israel and turkey.
we assess turkey is in midst of revolution of identity making it difficult to manage in the the next five years. turkey will see the pkk and related kurdish groups as the main threat to their sovereignty. president erdogan u.s. turkey recommendations will be important but not decisive for ankara. in iraq, the underlying political and economic factors that facilitiesed isis persist. an iraqi shia militant to further entrench in the role of the state with the assistance of iran will increase the threat to u.s. personnel. in yemen where 75% of the population is reliant on foreign assistance neither side of the conflict seems committed to end fighting. and the humanitarian impact of the conflict in 2019 will further compound already acute problems. in saudi arabia public support
for the royal family appears to remain high even in the wake of the murder of journalist jamaul khashoggi and the kingdom's involvement in the yemen conflict. in south asia the region will be potentialed on turmoil surrounding afghanistan's presidential election, ongoing negotiation was the taliban and taliban's regional attack we assess near the afghan government more taliban will be able to gain a strategic advantage in the war in the coming year. current efforts to achieve an agreement with the taliban could play a key role in shaping the direction of the country in the coming years. supported byps pakistan will continue to take advantage of their safe haven in
pakistan to plan and conduct attacks on neighboring countries. concerned about pakistan's continued development and control of nuclear weapons. in africa several countries face significant challenges that threaten stability which could reverb rate throughout the region. libya remains unstable in various groups -- and various groups are supported by a variety of foreign actors and competing goals. in the democratic republic of congo a new government will be challenged to deal with ongoing violence by multiple groups and the outbreak of ebola in the country. and instability is growing in sudan where the population is country at the direction of the country and the president's leadership. in europe political economic and social trends will complicate efforts to push back against autocratic tendencies. meanwhile the possibility of ha a no deal brexit where the uk
exits without an agreement remains. this would cause economic disruption that could weaken the uk and europe. we anticipate that the evolving landscape in europe will lead to additional challenges to u.s. interests as russia and china intensify their efforts to build influence there at the expense of the united states. in the western hemisphere flagging economies, migrant -- migration flows, corruption, narcoticic trafficking and anti-u.s. autocrats is will challenge u.s. interests. venezuela is at a cross roads as its economy faces craters. contributing to the unprecedented movement for venezuelans. we extent russia abchina and to some extent cuba will try to exploit the situation for access mostly to venezuelan oil. we assess mexico under
leadership with pursue cooperation with the united states as it tries to reduce violence and address social and economic issues. but authorities still do not have the capability to fully address the production, flow and trafficking of the drug cartels. high crime rates and weak job markets will continue to spur westbound migrants from el salvador, guatemala and honduras. to close my remarks i would like to address several challenges spanning the globe. i mentioned the increased use of cyber capabilities by neverious actors but we must be mindful of the proliferation of other threats beginning with weapons of mass destruction. in addition to nuclear weapons have heightened concerns about chemical and biological weapons. assessing that north korea, russia, syria and isis have all used chemical weapons over the past two years which threatens international norms and may por
tend future use. the threat from biological weapons has become more diverse as they can be employed in a variety of ways and development is made easier by dual use technologies. we expect foreign governments to expand use of space based recognizance, communications and navigation systems and continue training and equipping the military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold many u.s. and allied space services at risk. space has become the new global frontier with competition from numerous nations. terrorism remains a persistent threat and in some ways positioned to increase in 2019. the conflicts in iraq and syria have generated a large pool of skilled and battle hardened fighters remaining dispersed throughout the region. while ices is nearing territorial defeat in iraq and syria, the group returned to it's guerilla warfare roots, plotting attacks and direct supporters worldwide. isis intent on resurging and
still commands thousands of fighters in iraq and syria. meanwhile al qaeda is showing signs of confidence as its leaders strengthen networks and encourage attacks against western interests. we saw this in kenya as there a hotel was attacked. excuse me. talking too fast. this is important because both the chairman and vice chairman stated this and it's something that i think is a challenge to the ic and the american people. the speed and adaptation of new technology will continue to drive the world in which we live in ways we have yet to fully understand. advances in areas such as artificial intelligence, communication technologies, biotechnology and material sciences are changing our way of life. but our adversaries are also investingive heavily into these technologies and they are likely to create new and unforeseen
challenges to our health, economy and security. mr. chairman and mr. vice chairman and members of the committee, this becomes a major challenge to the ic community to stay ahead of the game. and to have the resources directed toward how we need to address these threats to the united states. we look forward to spending more time discussing this issue as both you have raised. with that i'll leave it there. we look forward to answering your questions about these and other unmentioned threats. >> director coats, thank you for that very thorough testimony. every year this hearing has geographically increased. this year you left no region of the world untouched with a concern we might have. and this year especially the threat landscape continues to increase from a standpoint of the tools used.
i'm sure that much much that will be the subject of questions both this morning and this afternoon. i want to acknowledge we have a distinguished group with us, joining us this morning from austria who come from their government and i'm not going to ask them to stand or anything, not to distinguish them out of the group, but we are delighted to have them with us, being part of the united states senate today. i want to notice members that you will be recognized by seniority for five minutes. we intend to do one round. and i would say sorry to senator sass and bennett because they will be last. had they been here on time they would have heard the great comments i made about their addition to the committee. >> the they still would have been last unquestionably. this committee requested to
reports that detailed the leveraging of u.s. social media companies in the 2016 election. sources,peaking to under your current authorities, with the ic be able to contact the same analysis and produce comparable finished intelligence? >> thank you very much for the question and thank you for your recognition of chief petty officer kent. in terms of the work that was done by the two organizations that the senate select committee on intelligence had asked, they looked at an internal study with a number of social media groups which is something as you know is outside our authorities. but was very, very effective for us. as we prepared for the 2018 mid-terms we took a very, very close look at the information provided there. we understood our adversary very well and understood where their
vulnerabilities also lie. >> good. is it the ic assess that these countries continue to use u.s. social media platform as a vehicle for weaponizing disinformation and spreading foreign influence in the united states? >> yes, that's certainly the fbi's assessment, not only the russians continued to do it in 2018 but we have seen indication that they continue to adapt the model and that other countries are taking a very interested eye in that approach. >> general nakasoni? >> it's certainly nsa's assessment as well mr. chairman. >> an area of increasing concern is how the production, storage and usage of data is a national security issue. in 2013 ibm estimated that we were producing 2.5 billion gigabytes of data every day. that growth has not been linear. ibm similarly reported that 90%
of the world's data had been created in the last two years. that data is now being aggregated, curated to enable and enhance data hungry algorithms. how much of a concern should we have about protecting data from foreign adversaries? i'll turn to director wray and general nakasoni on this again. >> i think it's a great concern. certainly we see strong interest from a computer intrusion dimension, both from nation states but also from criminal hackers and increasingly the two in a blended threat way. we see nation states enlisting the help of criminal hackers which just is a form of outsourcing makes it even more of a menace. it's something that we're extremely focused on and should be a high priority. >> general?
>> concur with the importance of data. it's the coin of the realm today. if you think the power of data not only for information that it can provide us but also as you indicated the weaponization of it, we is see our daefrpss very we see ourries -- adversaries very interested in procuring data. and obviously as director wray mentioned this is something we're very railroad focused on as well as the national security agency. >> i'll throw out to who ever likes to answer. whatever applications of big data by foreign adversaries have you most concern today? >> well, certain -- certainly china has the capacity and the resources to be able to do a lot. but that has not deterred other major nations like russia and others to be aggressive in doing this. you have identified this as a significant threat. we are awash in data. we have to understand how or adversaries use that data against our interests. and how we can prevent that from happening.
as well as use it for our own purposes relative to know what is going on around the world and what influence efforts are being thrown at the united states. so that is why we are hold as a very, very high priority, as you mentioned in your opening statement, in terms of how we resource our community -- intelligence community with the kind of tools and weapons needed to address this issue. >> i was just going to add that as the challenges of encryption become bigger and bigger on the sigant side we are more and more dependent on human sources and the more big data can be it exploited by adversaries the harder it is to recruit and retain human source. i suspect director haspel may have a view on that as well. >> director haspel. >> i think director wray captured that exactly. and i would just add from the cia perspective that a big focus
for us is finding out how our adversaries are using big data against us and sharing that with our partners. >> i'm going to exercise the chair for just a second for one last question. and this is your opportunity to recruit. your agencies do cutting edge research on every technology you could imagine. from classic spy craft like disguising to communications technology that would blow james bond and q branch away. what pitch would you make to those in school now or perhaps those working in tech? and looking to serve a greater purpose that they should come apply their engineering degrees, coding skills and creativity and work in the ic? show less text 00:41:17 director >> i would say there is nothing
more rewarding than protecting the american people. and we have seen with some of our smartest high-tech folks irk think of one office in particular where two of our brightest stars with great talent briefly left for what they thought would be greener pastures in the the private sector and was pleased to see them both independently come back eight months later when they realized the grass was browner. >> if i could mr. chairman i would have probably asked to you release the tape of what you just said. and in terms of really how innovative and how creative and the opportunities that the folks in the ic get a chance to engage in, far outstrip anything you see in a hollywood movie. the other thing i would add to that is imagine when you get up every morning that your task and your responsibility to is to defend the hopes and dreams of 320 million americans. and that's that we relish the opportunity to do that every single za. -- day. and people would want to join that team. >> chairman, our mission sells itself when we talk to to our people. i would offer as we talk to young people at the national security agency i saw a big
data, artificial intelligence, machine learning, cloud computing in bases like baghdad and kabul and supportsing our forces long before we called it that. that's the point we emphasize to our people. if it's cutting edge, we'll do it at the national security agency. >> robert? >> we're proud of the -- our ability to recruit some of the talent you just described. we don't do it often on fiscal terms. we do it on psychic terms. serving something greater than oneself for a cause to protect the nation and our interests is one that both attracts and retains the life blood of our agency, which is our people. >> director haspelle you want to take a shot at selling something not many people know about? >> well, like my colleague, cia officers come to langley for the mission and stay because of the mission. and it's really about being part of something that's bigger than yourself.
and in terms of advanced technologies, it's a chance to be on cutting edge and make it different. >> well, let me just conclude by saying that this the disciplines that come out of higher education and community colleges today, all of those disciplines are applicable to the agency that sits before us today. and there should be no student that doesn't look at this as a way to apply what they've learned or the degree that they have. that didn't used to be the case. it was all specialized. but now it applies to everything. director coats. >> as someone of an older generation who has to turn to his grandson to get the tv on the right channel, i'm continually amazed as i get around the country talking to colleges and graduates and people that are in these s.t.e.m. positions and studying of their incredible talent. they bring those kind of talents and skills to our agencies as you have heard.
and it is extremely rewarding to see the young people who know they could have a better financial deal or settled lifestyle easier, so forth and so on, they want to serve this country. and they see this as meaningful. and it exceeds what financial gains they could get on the outside. and plus they're able to do some really cool stuff in all the agencies which we can't talk about here. but it is attractive to tp but their commitment to the country and commitment to the mission as has been demonstrated here is pretty -- is awfully rewarding when you go out and see what these young people and what they're willing to do for the country. >> i thank all of you. vice chairman. >> well thank you, mr. chairman. and i agree that the people who work with all of you are extraordinarily special americans.
and the mission is critically important. i would personally add one other item. that if they work for the united states government they actually ought to be paid on time. and i question -- i've seen the number of federal employees who have gone five weeks plus without pay. i'm not sure many folks in the private sector would show up five weeks plus without pay on an ongoing basis. and while i'm appreciative of the fact that particularly the fbi that your agents will be reimbursed, i do worry, the fbi has a number of contractors. under our current setting they will come out of this five-week plus, 35-day shutdown with nothing to show. and if we cannot guarantee that the people that work for the united states government are
going to be not used as hostages for either side of the political debate then i think our ability to recruit and retain will down dramatically. i don't know if director wray you want to make a comment or maybe just punt. but it's something i saw fbi agents, homeland security agents, air traffic controllers working double shifts and then going and driving an uber. i'm not sure i want somebody showing up maintaining the safety of our airways with four hours of sleep. but i'd be happy to hear comment there. >> needless to say we are assessing the overall impact of the shutdown. but what's clear is that it was incredibly negative and painful for the 37,000 men and women of the fbi and their families. but i will also say that i could not be more proud of their professionalism and their dedication to not let balls drop but to keep charging ahead across all the various program areas during that time.
certainly when you talk about contractors we are very dependent just like every government agency on contractors for a range of services. and we want to make sure that aspect of our operations doesn't get disrupted. >> folks on both sides of the aisle will look at how we might make sure -- particularly on the well priced contractors, the folks cleaning the bathrooms or serve the food don't have to come out of the 35-day shutdown with no compensation at all. let me start my first question director wray and director coats. and this is the chairman -- the chairman alluded to it. we talked about it. the emerging challenge around social media, particularly the fact, whether russians or other foreign entities, that try to. -- try to masquerade as americans. they build large fallen things.
-- followings. this problem will get exponentially hard are as we move to deep state technology. a lot of policy implications. how do we the sort through that ? how do we work with our social media partners to put americans on alert about the volume of foreign-based activity, bots and others who are pretending to be others going around as americans, so they're not able to manipulate the election process and build social divisions. >> this is a particularly vexing and challenging problem. i think it's going to require a holistic response. certainly at the fbi through the foreign influence task force and all our field offices we are trying to work much more closely not just with our intelligence community partners, especially general nakasoni and the nsa. but also as you say with the
private sector. i will say one bright spot twaen -- bright spots between 2016 and 2018 is how much more cooperative we are working with the social media companies. an awful lot that has to be done by them in this space. and there were a number of success stories, only some of which we could ever share, where the social media companies based on tips that we provided were able to take action much more effectively, much more quickly to block and prevent some of the information warfare that the russians were engaged in. i think we're going to see more and more of that. but now that we have momentum we're looking forward to growing that partnership. >> and i think you would agree some companies have done well, some have not done as well. i think we need to continue to explore this. and just businessic notional -- basic notional ideas where we don't get to first amendment challenges where americans ought
to have the right to know whether they're communicated with by a machine or a bot versus an actual human being. and some of the research by some folks we looked at, in a which it may be a little more positive says the vast volume of traffic on the far left and the far right in terms of political discourse in social media is actually not americans but foreign based bots. there may not be as many crazies out there as it seems. editorial comment but i think we have a long way to go. >> if i could add one thing to support director wray's remarks. having served on the committee and gone through the frustrations of the interaction and information sharing with the private social media companies, we've seen a significant progress with that. many of us have sat down. our tech teams are working with
their tech teams. i can't say that has worked with every social media company. it significantly better. this information we can provide them that's in their benefit. fact thatstress the we need to work together to protect our people from the influence abroad and threats to the american people. having made some trips to several of these companies, with the openness and willingness to see what we can do while protecting privacy rights but also ensuring security. >> think you bring much. first of all let me say that i'm always astounded in this committee and the foreign relations committee with the volume of issues that we have to deal with. i think your opening statement director coats indicated how -- how difficult this is to process all of this and to deal with all of this.
and your statement for the record that all of you joined in again lays this out for us, telling us the kind of volume we have to deal with. and we're certainly only going to scratch the surface here today. but i want to focus on something that doesn't get as much focus as i think it should. we have seen the days every time we pick up media or turn on the tv they are talking about russia and their ham handed efforts to affect things in the world. and certainly it's a concern. but in my judgment -- and i think many others -- the real concern is china. we're approaching the end of the first fifth of the 21st century and if we learned anything, it's the last few decades have convinced us that china in the 21st century as we proceed through it is going to be a major competitor of ours in every way that there is. obviously economically and militarily, culturely and in
that culturally -- culturally and in every other which. and look, this is going to happen. we're living in the 21st century. communications and transportation are so different than what they were. and we as the united states are going to woind up having to -- windup having to compete like we never have before with a -- a gorilla that's starting to get about the same size we are. and as a result of that we're going to have to learn to deal with that. the thing i really want to focus on is how we are going to deal with that. we're americans. we have always competed. we can compete. we innovate. we create, we manufacture we do the great things we do that have really led the world. but we can only do it if we are operating under a rule of law. and that is something that is greatly missing at the present time as china tries to compete with us. the poster child for me is a local company we have a in idaho. micron technology. most of you heard of them, the
second largest manufacturer of memory in the world. and they have had a recent case where chinese nationals stole intellectual property. and then took it back to china and are suing micron in china in a -- through a state-owned entity and a state-owned court in front of a state-owned judge. and this is the kind of thing we can't have. i had a spirited discussion with the chinese ambassador about this as he attempted to defend the undefendable. and his suggestion was that, well things aren't as advanced in china as they are here. i get that. they've come a long, long, long ways in a few decades. but if we're going to -- if we're going to do this and keep the world order in right side up , china is going to have to develop their rule of law and live by it much better than what
they have recently. we just saw again the indictments against the huawei official. and in defense of the department of the justice, department of treasury and others, they've indicted the chinese people that have affected micron. the question i have for you is after listening to the chinese ambassador i'm not wholly convinced that their efforts are going to be as robust as they need to to be to get china right side up when it comes to rule of law. and when i'm talking about the rule of law, i don't just mean covert theft but what i call the overt theft, where they require theirsses to divulge information before doing business in china and then restricting them in china. and all of this causes us real difficulties as we attempt to compete. director coats, i wonder if you could address that or assign it to somebody there at your panel. what do we see in the future?
how can we try to get our arms around this to do something? >> i'll start but i'd like to turn to director wray relative to what was just released yesterday which pointed i think in the direction of what you were talking about. but frankly, while we were sleeping in the last decade and a half china had remarkable rise in capabilities that are stunning. a lot of that was achieved -- a significant amount was achieved by stealing information from our companies by inserting chinese in certain of our labs, bringing back technological stolen properties which china engaged. you can talk to any number of everything from automobile manufacturers to sophisticated software as well as r&d for military and general ashley can speak to that on the military side.
i think we could go down the panel here and discuss for a significant amount of time the kind of actions china has taken to gain support to become a competitor but also to gain superiority and what they are doing and how they spread it around the world through the belt and rode initiative and a number of other initiatives. it's a serious issue has to be to be dealt with. you are on target in terms of saying rule of law and international norms and fairness in trade and engagements is not the chinese model. to counter writ to ebb counter -- to counter writ, we have to expose it. it was exposed yesterday relative to communications. director wray can talk about that. we have alerted our allies they are second guessing and questioning their initial responses to china, oh it's a great market, we need to get over there. don't worry about anything else except selling our product.
they're finding in re product has been duplicated by the chinese and sold for half the price because they didn't have to spend the money on research and development. so it is -- we are working with. thee are working with vice-chairman and with the committee to try to be as transparent as possible with our .ompany we have been traveling around the united states meeting with ceos and others. -- ie dialing up a program think i ought to stop right there and the rest of this needs to go to a secure setting, in terms of how we are dealing with this. i would love to turn to director what we aree to doing. >> senator, i completely share your observations. i would just say that one of the things that the american people i think are now sort of waking
up to understand, is that the lines between the chinese government and the chinese communist party are blurred if not erased. the lines between the chinese and the state-owned enterprises are the same. the line between the chinese government, and, ostensibly, private companies for all the reasons you described, and especially the line between lawful behavior and fair competition, lying, hacking and cheating and stealing. one of the things that i've been most encouraged about in an otherwise bleak landscape is the degree to which as director coats alluded to american companies raking up. american universities raking up. our foreign partners are looking up to it is one of the few engagethat i find when i in the agency and of the hill, there seems to be more consensus inn i have ever seen before
my career. i think that is positive and we need to build on that. >> do either of the generals have -- general ashley. general ashley: yes, sir. you laid out the problem very well. what's been highlighted this is not just a u.s. issue, it is a global issue. when you think about the internet of things, the nature of global business, and how corporations are integrating. and if it touches a company in australia who may have a relationship with a company in the united states, they would become connected. from a military standpoint, when you look at the major acquisition from a defense intelligence agency one of the things we put against in is supply chain risk management, threat analysis. when the dod looks for acquisition, we do the diligence and research for those companies, but the challenge is getting more and more complicated. because they either buy it, steal it or they can build it. but the nature of that business
is that you have white labeling, where you don't have to disclose the relationship. semi-conductora chip, a piece of software ostensibly from your company , when it may have been manufactured by a chinese company. we need to bring our partners in and make sure they are doing the same due diligence, whether it us or with other protocols. >> senator heinrich. >> thank you, chairman. director coats in this hearing last year you testified you would recommend minimal access to classified documents to anyone without a permanent security clearance. made that statement with regard to reports of multiple holders of interim security clearances in the white house and now we are hearing reports that dozens of times, the white house overruled the career f.b.i. experts responsible for adjudicating security clearances, granting top security clearances to white house officials.
would you till recommend limited access to testify documents to those white house officials that the f.b.i. experts recommended in a begin in top-secret clearances? >> i do support the providing all the information necessary for not only the white house but for all of our branchs relative to providing security clearance. they have those authority to do that. we issue guidelines in terms what have ought to be adhered to. >> i understand that. i want to know, do you think that the white house should take seriously the recommendations of those f.b.i. experts? >> to my knowledge they do take seriously. it is their decision based on a whole number of factors. we have seen every administration issue clearances based on how they assess what is provided.
our job is to provide them the best information we have relative to security clearance processes so that they have the full picture of them when they make the decision. >> speaking of the full picture, last year we passed the secret act. as the director of national intelligence, do you think it's problematic that the administration has not complied with a portion of that law requiring the white house to report on its process for conducting security clearance investigations? >> i'm not aware that that has happened. i'd be happy to look into that. >> i would appreciate that. director wray, as i mentioned we are seeing public published reports at numerous times the white house that is simply overruled career fbi experts responsible for judeadjudicating -- for adjudicating those
clearances. in your view, were there valid reasons for why the f.b.i. experts' advice was overruled so many times? >> i think there may be some confusion about the way the process actually works. in the context of providing background investigations, what is called an isp or the investigative service provider. we do it at the request of whoever the requesting entity is. in this instance the white house. we do not actually make recommendations when we are the other about the clearances. the decision about what to do based on those facts is entrusted by long-standing process to the requesting entity. ,o, we provide the information but then they make the call. >> thank you, director. director coats i want to come back to you for a moment. your office issued a statement recently announcing that you had submitted the intelligence community's report assessing threats to the 2018 midterm elections. to the president and to appropriate executive agencies. our committee has not seen in
the report. and despite committee requests following the election, that the odni brief the committee on any identified threats, it took odni two months for us to get a simple oral briefing, and no written assessment has yet been provided. can you explain to me why we haven't been kept more fully and currently informed about russian activities in the 2018 election? >> director coats before you respond let me acknowledge to the members that the vice chairman and i have both been briefed on the report. it's my understanding that the report at some point will be available. >> yeah, the process that we're going through, are two 45-day periods. one for the ic to assess whether there was anything that resulted in a change of the vote or tampering with the machines. what the influence efforts were and so forth. we collected all of that.
the second 45 days, which we provided to the chairman and vice chairman, and with d.o.j. as to whetherking there is enough information there to determine what kind of response they might take. we are waiting for that final information to come in. >> so the rest of us can look forward to reading the report? >> i think we will be informing the chairman and vice chairman of that decision. >> that is not what i asked. while the rest of the committee have access to the report, mr. chairman? >> let me say to the members, i make the same commitment i always do that anything that the vice-chairman and myself are exposed to, we will make every request to open so that all members can see it. it is vitally important, especially on this one. a pointwe are not to
that negotiations need to start. it is my hope that once the final 45 day window is up, that a report will be made available probably to members only. >> that would be my hope as well. >> thank you. director wray, as we keep talking about china, using the academic community and universities, commercial esther, forced transfer of intellectual traditionale intelligence work that they do, and the like, is it fair to say , just lookinges at that scale and scope of the threats, that it poses the most significant counterintelligence ,hreat this nation has faced perhaps in its history, but probably in the last quarter century? >> i hesitate to speak categorically about the entire course of history. >> let us look at it for the
years? >> i would certainly agree with you, senator. as i look at the course of my career, -- i still think of myself as a little young -- that chinese counterintelligence threat is more diverse, more vexing, more challenging, more comprehensive and more concerning that any counterintelligence threat i can think of. >> in that realm, would it not have anse that we would more coordinated approach to educate and prepare all the departments and agencies of government as well as businesses, universities -- just the scale and comprehensive nature of the threat, would not help to have some high-level coordinated approach to be it would to prepare all these different entities in our economy and our society to deal threat?s >> we are working careful with the committee, particularly senator warner and senator burr. was have engaged with us in
terms of putting a program together to do that. i will turn to general ashley for his comments on that, also. >> the fact that we are having this discussion. since 2014, 13 universities have close down the confucius institutes. countrywide come i think there were about but my previous 100. comments about the global issue. have close about 13 in the u.s., there has been a 22% increase globally in asia, europe and other places. about 320-plusly institutes globally. the education is getting off from the u.s. standpoint, it is trending the right way slowly, but again, it is a global problem. we're as weak as the relationships with some of the partners subject to influence. >> this is now where i make the obligatory church. senator warner and i have created a bill of critical
technologies to help coordinate the response to the threat across the board. i know everybody on the committee is interested in the topic. i want to switch gears for a moment and maybe ask this of director coats as well. if we look at the situation in venezuela, people know that it is important and now it is topical, we have had 3 million mierpgts flow into columbia peru . peru and ecuador it is projected to be 10 million by the end of this year. a rival number to what we've seen in syria, and most certainly has had a destabilizing effect on colombia and other countries, to the point where -- many few nations -- very few nations could taken one within immigrants in one shot, not to mention that quickly. imagine two million on the impact on government budgets, health care systems and the like. we know from department of justice filings and sanctions from treasury that their government doesn't just tolerate
drug trafficking come a given the protection of government, and many high-level officials are active participants in narco trafficking. we know they have a relationship , long-standing relationship with iran and hezbollah. we know they have openly and repeatedly at least maduro has invited pugin to establish a rotational or permanent presence in venezuela, thereby creating a russian military presence in the western hemisphere. in fact, they flew about a month ago two russian nuclear-capable bombers into the caribbean sea. , what all these factors is happening in venezuela -- we care about democracy and human rights, but when you add these things together, the migratory impact on regional partners, how it spills over to the united -- theirhere relationship with iran and hezbollah, the drug trafficking,
base for russia, is in that important to the united states fall andmaduro regime be replaced by a democratic and more responsible government? >> i think everything you said has been very open to the american public in relation to the situation in venezuela. our job is the intelligence committee is to provide the information you talked about in terms of the , andt in venezuela throughout the region, and of the threat that evolves from that. the decision is to how to address that, and obviously is a decision by the executive branch and the president, ultimately with the support of the national security council. obviously face a dire
situation that has enormous consequences. i think no one is more aware of that than you. you have been pursuing that, they were almost ready to invite you into the intelligence themunity, given information you can provide us. yous remiss in a not naming a position especially with the threat on china. with venezuela it's a very tenuous situation right now as you know. we have taken steps in terms of recognition of the opposition as the legitimate president of, of venezuela. yesterday, the treasury department announced oil sanctions against a ventas on on guess the ventas oil company. so steps are being taken and we have a lot of support from a lot
of allies. as i said, it is a fluid situation and i think hopefully, we will successfully resolve it assistance of the venezuelan people. we do assess and i'll turn to general ashley here, the influence of the military on that decision. the influence of the venezuelan military on that decision is key to what direction we might go in. >> so i would say that everything you laid out is correct. we expect to see another 2 million refugees adding to the 3 million that are left the region. the relationship that they have with russia, china, iran, is a longstanding one, preexisting. the reference you maid to the tu -- the reference that you made to the 160 blackjacks, this is the third generation of that, the strategic bombers. in 2008, ande was 2013, then recently. we can talk more in closed session about where we see russia and china going with
their greater inability. in the open press what you have seen thus far is nothing more than vocal support that's coming out of moscow and china, but there is a relationship there from a military standpoint in the way of training. lots of venezuelan officers go to russia for training. there is a reciprocal relationship for equipping them as well. >> thank you, mr. chair. in light of senator rubio's comments i'd like to note a caution -- he listed refugee flows, human rights abuses and corruption, there are lots of countries in the world who meet that description. our right or responsibility to generate regime change in a situation like that, i think is a slippery slope. i have some caution about what our vital interest are, and whether it is our right or responsibility to take action to try to change the government of another sovereign country. havesame description would
led us into much more active involvement in syria for example, five or six years ago, in other parts of the country. i wanted to note that. senator burr, i loved your opening statement, it was very thoughtful. and you came one a wonderful formulation for, i think, a mission of this committee. it reminded me of my old high school football coach who put it somewhat less elegantly, he said he wanted us to be agile, mobile, and hostile. i think that may be a less elegant way to put the same principle. on huawei, it seems to me they have to decide they are either going to be a worldwide telecommunications company or an agent of the chinese government. they can't be both. and right now, they are trying to be both. and i think the world's customers, which the chinese are certainly sensitive to, are the best enforces of that principle.
haspel, one question, is iran currently abiding by the terms of the jcp --cjcpoa their nuclear activities? >> senator, i think the most recent information is the iranians are considering taking steps that would lessen their and seek to jcpoa, pressure the europeans to come through with the investment and trade benefits that iran hoped to gain from the deal. >> but since the departure from the deal, they have abided by the terms. you said they are considering, but at the current moment? >> yes, they are making preparations that would increase their ability to take a step back if they make that decision. so at the moment, currently they are in compliance, but we do see
them debating within themselves as they fail to realize the economic benefits that they hoped for from the deal. >> thank you. our envoy from afghanistan has talkshat the basis of the with afghanistan is that they would event afghanistan from terrorg the base of groups. that was the reason for our intervention. do we believe them? are they capable of that? did they learn something from having given safe haven to osama bin laden? do we believe that there is a mindset change that could be enforceable or at least, a reasonable expectation? director haspel? senator,haspel: yes, and you are referring to recent and fresh news that's come out
on the ambassadors very intensive efforts, particularly over the last eight days in doha , where he has been engaged with the taliban in talks to achieve a framework. >> do we believe the taliban will do it? >> because we have infected ivere damage on al qaeda, think, however, all of us on this table would agree that it is important we maintain pressure on the terrorist groups that are there. peacere were an eventual agreement, a very robust monetary regime would be critical and we would still need to retain the capability to act in our national interest if we needed to. >> thank you. another note, director coats, in yourioned introduction, which i think is a very important point, it may be the big news of right now what is going on, increased cooperation between russia and
china. for a generation, that hasn't been the case. that could turn out to be a big deal in terms of the united states. if those two countries begin to work together systematically, it could be a big problem for us. one more quick question. director wray, you are doing a on of monitoring and working the intervention in our election process. wednesday we are worried about is a deep, fake reviews, defined with the used and energy to create essentially a false of an apparent speech by a candidate, where different words are coming out of their mouth than what they actually said. ,f in the next two years particularly in the year preceding the deal in the next election, your agency determines that this is happening, and that it is sponsored by foreign entity, will you inform the
candidates who are the victims ?f this, the committee's my concern is that it is one thing for the intelligence committee to know this is andening, but if they don from the people being victimized or attacked in this way, i think blunts the effectiveness of the intelligence. >> senator, we have a fairly established protocol to determine whether or not we have information that is reliable immediate enough, and actionable enough to be a would to notify a victim. the d.o.j. has a set of guidelines for that. they have recently been expanded to provide us with flexibility in the foreign influence or malign influence o arena, which this would be a permutation of, and we expect to follow the process. >> i hope you review the process, because telling the
world of a malign influence one month after the election it doesn't do anybody any good. inope that can be reviewed, terms of letting people know as soon as possible when there is a credible evidence of a foreign deep fake, or any other kind of cyberattack on a campaign. >> to be clear, i wasn't. >> talking about a post-election process. the protocol i am talking about is where the actionable piece of it comes into play, the ability to be a little contact, just like we do in the cyber arena. >> i just want to be sure our policies keep pace with the magnitude in a celebrity nature of the threat. >> to your point about agility, adapt aso be would to technology adapts. we would expect our fallen adversaries in the malign influence base to keep adapting as well. >> we want you to be agile and mobile, maybe not hostile. thank you. >> general ashley has a comment.
>> back to your comment on huawei. while release to make a decision about the direction they want to take with regards to supporting the chinese government, or as an independent business. that thelenge is decision does not lie with huawei, it lies with the president xi jinping and the way they are starting to centralize greater the management of those businesses. ,herein lies the challenge where you see a decentralization and execution of capitalism but really have this authoritarian capitalism in the way the government provides oversight inputs rose rules in place to make it very problematic for businessmen to operate without providing information back to beijing. >> and i think the market has to tell them that it is not acceptable. >> agreed. >> thank you. >> senator collins. , directorr haspel
coats describe this morning a russia that is aggressive across all fronts. did the cia have any concerns actions toreasury's ease sanctions on companies associated with the close putin --y oleg their associated with a close within in terms of his ability to retain some informal control. this isn't a typical american company that we're dealing with. >> senator collins, i don't think i'm expert enough to comment on b treasury's decision, but what i will say is that we work very hard to make sure that every agency and all of our senior agency leaders understand putin's methodologies and what he will do andto try to
-- to try to see what he believes is russia's place in the world. moscow continues to grapple with the effect of western sanctions. there have been severe sanctions placed on them. think as an intelligence committee both director wray and i were pleased with the decision to expel 61 russian intelligence officers that had a tremendous impact on their ability to harness information in our own homeland. our job is to mature everyone understands putin's efforts to influence locally and to enhance world's our status in the , and we will continue to support treasury as they look to impose sanctions. i think treasury has been very, very aggressive on the sanctions part. c.i.a. raisehis
any concerns about the treasury plans. >> no, but we supported all intelligence regarding the oligarch in question versus the aluminum company that you are referring to, we provided the intelligence. sen. collins: let me switch to a different issue and that is syria. let's assume that if we depart from syria, the assad regime takes control of northwest syria and eastern syria, which, i think, is a reasonable scenario. should this happen, what kind of threat would they united states and its allies expect from the thousands of extremists who are still currently fighting in those areas of syria such as isis? , to start collins with the last part of your question, everyone at this table is working very hard to make sure we can finish the defeat
isis campaign, and also that we understand the foreign fighter picture in eastern syria and that we do not allow the foreign fighters captured to return to the battlefield. it is accurate that isis has suffered significant leadership losses and near total loss of territorial control. but of course, they are still dangerous, which is your point, they are the largest sunni terrorist group and the command thousands of fighters in iraq and syria. i think the stance in the administration and supported by is intelligence community that will work very hard to mission.at another example of where we must maintain a very robust monetary regime and retain the ability to into syria should we need to. sen. collins: director coats, you looked like you wanted to add to that.
director coats: it just to make the point that while we have defeated the caliphate, with a couple little villages left, we should not underestimate the ability of terrorist groups, , andcularly isis affiliated groups with al qaeda and other terrorist groups, that they are operating not simply on what takes place on the battlefield that gives them strength or weakness, but they are operating on the basis of a theocracy, if theology, and ideology that we will continue ,o see for perhaps years ahead in various places of the world. insee those who were engaged syria moving to other ungoverned spaces. andee the tentacles of isis
al qaeda tactics in different places in the world -- north africa, philip means, we just saw that take place. isis claiming credit for that. isis will continue to be a threat to the united states. we will have to continue, as director haspel said, to keep our eyes on that, and our interests in the realization that this terrorism threat will continue for some time. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for welcoming me to the committee. i apologize for being late. i also want to say what a privilege it is to hear your testimony this morning and to know that the agents and officers who work with you when -- are at their posts keeping this democracy safe. reminder to me what it stakestake -- what is at
when our partisan politics cannot even keep government open . you guys are still doing your work. it is an inspiration to me. in that spirit actually, director coats, i wanted to start with something which you ended with. an observation about concerns that the ic has about political uncertainty in europe and the ability for european democracies to pushback on what you described as autocratic tendencies. could you say a little more about that? >> clearly, europe has seen russian aggression in hybrid ways. significant cyber incidents in trying to influence not only their view of our alliance, but their own view of their own alliance within europe, seeking to sow division between
countries and between europe and the united states. it's interesting that some time ago at a meeting with nato intelligence officials, the by then was raised director, did any of the 29 countries of europe not be russian influence -- not see russian influence in their country's political processes? not one person raised their hand and said i have not seen that. all 29 have seen some type of influence from the russians, so it's a persistent threat and pervasive threat that the au needs to address. and we address it with them through our nato coordination. but i think the warning is there. i think the nations are aware of the threat. that threatensues
some of the alliance, the coalition. yetey is a member of nato they were having some issues. they are a very near strategic point -- geostrategic point in the world. i don't know if i'm directly answering your question. >> what about within the domestic politics of those countries? the autocratic impulses, whether aligned with russia or not aligned with the? >> i think there is a lot of arinessss -- w about aligning with russia. we have seen some countries leaning in that direction, raising issues as to the strength of the alliance.
a lot of that is related to the economy to trade matters, to a number of issues beyond just the military. >> in the minute i have left, director, if it is ok, i would like to switch to potential dual use capeabilities that china may attain through its road initiative. recently, there were reports press pakistan for military access. i'm concerned about data access control through digital infrastructure in countries around the world. what is the ic's assessment of potential dual use access and what threats do they pose to u.s. interests, and where? >> well, you can look at the globe. it's called one belt one road and is global. you can look at the map and see a lot of strategic places where china has real interest in perhaps a dual effort to not only provide infrastructure
loanrt, long -- support for ports, airports, roads, a lot of infrastructure. loans to help with their economy. but also interests in placing strategic military positions. we have seen that take place off the horn of africa. we have seen china. if you look at the spots where they are engaging in, you see geopolitical and military aspects. so it is dual. i would like to turn to general ashley to give you a better detail of what that looks like. a classifiedk in session about the nature of the .elationship with pakistan in terms of dual use technologies, there is a multitude of things out there. it is not just the belton road initiative -- the belt and road
initiative, it is the way they are investing. part of that is how they are garnering intellectual capital globally. but think about quantum from a communications standpoint, computing standpoint, sensing standpoint, what those advanced sensors could do. if you look at genetics, bioengineering -- there is a multitude of things. the way it gets into human engineering, it is about how they cure diseases. that, the flip side of there is a plus and a negative side. there's agricultural aspects that are positive, but could have a negative impact as well. so there's a number of things where they are investing that have dual use capabilities that will really mature over the next course of a decade. >> thank you, chairman. thank you for what you do and the important service that you
provide in securing our freedom and the freedom of lots of other people. general ashley, i know that we lost a someone from st. louis in syria, as part of your defense intelligence operation, and certainly, we reach out to their family and to the families of all who serve who put themselves at that level of risk. director, actually i saw over the weekend talked about small satellite ada, but all the commercial imagery available. as you have come from what is your last likely appearance in this job before this committee, if there is a legacy you are leaving, it is bringing the commercial data community in, in a way that we articulate advantage of what is out there that we don't have to produce ourselves. but as we do that, what concerns do you have about cyber activity that might in some way in fact that data, or the data that we
get in other places? how do you describe your concerns about cyber as it relates to commercial data? and the other geospatial data that we produce ourselves that may be disrupted before it gets analyzed with information that is not really there? >> thank you, senator for the question. i don't think there's a more important issue on my desk, or i offer, the desk of my colleagues here. and that is, at the heart of our profession is integrity, credibility and reliability. that's how we get invited to meetings. that's how we get invited back to provide a sense of confidence to those we serve, to help them make decisions. what you just described is both an opportunity, that's the connection with new partners, nontraditional sources, small and large companies and universities, etc.. everyone of those connections is also a threat or risk because if i am plugged in to this new
,ource, to gain a benefit understanding and coherence, i am also plugging into every aspect of vulnerability that they have. so we work on this very hard. i count on the experts at nsa n.s.a. and f.b.i. on the digital domain and hygiene that is necessary. also as was brought up before on this issue of deep fake, as technology advances, and it will, i do worry about, as a community that needs to seek the truth and speak the truth, in a world in which we cannot agree on what is true, our job becomes much more difficult. so to go back to your question, we have to do a better job of projecting what we do so that when we do show up, you have the confidence. you know where it came from, you handled it, you know
who did or did not affect or manipulated. it's an issue that's in the center of my desk and all of our concerns. >> in your plans -- one more question for you, director -- in your plans for geospatial, the development of that new facility replacing the 75-year-old facility in st. louis, which is fully redundant, with what happens in springfield, virginia, i think 40% of the space in that plan is unclassified. the intelligence committee work in an unclassified environment, and how would you kill great success in your future view of how that works -- how would you calculate success in your view, of how ?hat works
>> the short answer is, very carefully. i'll expand. 4 years ago when i stepped into this privileged position, i challenged our team to think differently about the value proposition in a world that is much more open now, in which there's many more sources of information. some good some not so good. so i coined the phrase, "we need to succeed in the open." i modified that with some help of my teammates. i said, what we need to do is succeed "with the open." and to your point about the new campus in st. louis, it is much more than an infrastructure project. i think of it as a new canvas. it is almost a hundred acres. we can reimagine it and part of that needs to be engagement with that open community in a way that's protected and knowing about who and what we're plugging into. so we couldn't be more excited about the ability to take the opportunity we have now in the st. louis to redefine that value proposition in a more open world and more connected world.
in a world we're taking on sources that we know and sources that we need to double and triple check. so the 40% you referenced is just an estimate that we have now. we just want to build into that infrastructure, knowing that we will have to work, not just in, but with the open, so that is why we laid out that marker at the beginning. >> general, how does this fit into what you do, the whole idea individual, personal geography, all the things we did not used to have access to, that we have access to now, not only using it, but using it in confidence? think your initial question with regards to data security is important in terms of how we ensure the integrity and assurance of the data. the director and men and women nga have to leverage every single day, in support of
a number of different requirements. whether it's policymakers, forward forces, deployed. our job is to make sure that data is well protected and we can rest assured that when we leverage it, it's the right time , at the right place, and the right data. >> thank you. could justrman, if i add, robert is finishing up a 30-plus year career of a working with the intelligence community. he is one of our crown jewels and we hate to see him moving out to may be greener pastures and is your times. he has been a terrific partner with the team and we just want to recognize his contributions. best-dressed of any of us on the panel this morning. [laughter] > >> he> does that every time have i just wanted to let you .now that
senator harris? sen. harris: thank you, mr. chairman. i join my colleagues in thanking you for honoring the oath they have taken and often with great sacrifice. this question is for the directors about north korea. what is the current state of the threat from north korea? and perhaps with could start with director haspel. >> briefly, of course, the regime is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the united states. it is positive that we have managed to engage them in a dialogue. they have taken some voluntary measures to close a site, dismantle a site, but ultimately, the objective is to
lessen that threat by getting them to declare the program, and ultimately, dismantle the program. i think others can probably add to that. sen. harris: director coates? i affirm what director haspel has just said. we continue to go into this situation eyes wide open. we want to employ the best assets we can to understand what the koreans are thinking and what they are doing. we have capabilities that we can talk about in a secure session in terms of how we gatther that information and assess that. to give to our policymakers and to give to the negotiating partners, relative to where we are going with north korea. we hold to the stated premise that denuclearization is the goal which has to be achieved. i will just say that we want to ensure the american people and everybody listening here that we are fully engaged in providing
the essential intelligence needed relative to the negotiations that are going on. sen. harris: and in this setting , ever since you have it in the position that have been in, that the threat in terms of their ability to strike the united states has diminished in any way? >> i think the assessments we have made up to this particular point hold, obviously as myi -- obviously, as i mentioned in my opening statement, that over the past year, we have not seen any evidence -- they have not seen nuclear missile testing or launching. that is the position we are in now, but again, we keep open eyes and open ears to what exactly is going on. >> so the technologies that they demonstrated from a standpoint that showed a capability to have an icbm function still exists. there's still a substantial pill
-- substantial military capacity that kim jong-un wields. 70% of his forces are along the dmz. so the capabilities and threat that existed a year ago are still there. sen. harris: thank you, general. director haspel, north korea has obviously a terrible record of human rights and deeply isolated from the international community. this is the result of many policies, intentional, probably. you believe that north korea the legitimacy that comes with direct diplomatic engagement with my united states? >> yes, i think our analysts would assess that they value the dialogue with the united states, and we do see indications that kim jong-un is trying to toward some kind of better future for the north korean people. of. harris: are your error
any intelligence suggesting that his behaviors and -- are you aware of any intelligence suggesting that his behavior has improved and the human rights record has improved, in any substantial way over the last couple of years? >> it's obviously something we monitor to the degree possible. i do think that a vision for north korea that further brings them into the community of nations would have a positive effect on our ability to influence them on important things like human rights. sen. harris: met over the last couple of years, have you seen any change in their behaviors? point tothink i can any specific change over the last couple of years. sen. harris: thank you. director coats, i would like to talk to you about social media. do we have a written strategy for how we will counter the influence operations that target social media in the united states? >> we are fully engaged in that issue. we have regular communication among the various sectors of the
intelligence community. much of that is shared both verbally and in written form. so there's a written strategy? not a written single strategy, but we're always looking at how we can best address this. it is a fluid situation. we had an earlier discussion relative to our engagement with reverend sector social media companies. us, dorris: can you tell you have any intention of having a written strategy that will be agreed to and understood by all members of the intelligence community as it relates to the collective responsibility and individual responsibilities for addressing foreign influence on social media in the united states? >> as i said, it's a fluid situation. we are making significant progress on that in terms of one specific written strategy, something that has to be looked
at in a continuum of change. i'm not exactly sure why a written strategy would give us anything more single strategy that would have to be modified daily. but you can be assured that it is a top priority, as we have talked about before. it is something we are working on and seen significant -- and we have seen very significant progress. when you go back and read the transcript of what we talked about before, you would understand it. sen. harris:, i actually have the transcript of february 13 of 2018, when you and i had this discussion at our last worldwide threats hearing, or at least a previous one. when i asked you then, would you provide us and would there be a written strategy for how the ic is dealing with these threats. so can you tell us has there been any advancement on that point since february of 2018?
>> i'll be happy to get back to you with that. sen. harris: thank you. >> senator cotton? >> you were referring to 2017? 2018.arris: >> ok, thank you. senator cotton. >> thank you all very much for your appearance and service to our nation and the men ask women -- the men and women who work in your organization serving our country. we have talked a lot about huawei today and the potential threats they pose. let's just make this concrete for americans watching at home. you can raise your hand, if you respond yes to my questions. how many of you would use a telecom product made by huawei ?nd zte >> senator, i would think we would talk about these kind of things in closed session. these are not all yes and no answers.
i think if there is information here, it would be better described in a closed session than an open session. >> like a professional who has once been on a debate stage and not like raise your hands questions. i will simply say for the written record that i saw no hands go up. while i'll defer to the closed session -- i suspect if i asked a fairer question, which is how many would recommend that people who are not heads of an intelligence agencies like your neighbors or church members, or high school friends, there would also be six no votes of confidence. director coats, the house intelligence committee voted by voice vote, which i presume it by person, to send several dozen transcripts and investigation into russia's interference in our 2016 election so they could release those pending your classification review. where does that review stand? >> another issue which i would like to discuss in a closed session. >> thank you. director haspel, we have spoken
some about isis today and the threat of isis if they were to reform. one ongoing threat from isis is that the syrian democratic forces have a number of detainees from isis. do you know how many detainees the sdf currently hold? could you turn your microphone on, please? >> sorry about that. senator, we do know the number. in this forum, i will say they have hundreds of foreign fighters. the ic as a whole is working very, very hard to make sure we know who they are, returned to their country of origin, and to make sure that even as isis continues to make gains against , -- in the valve failed the battlefield, that these foreign fighters are not able to return to the fight. i can be more specific this afternoon in terms of exact
numbers. >> could you speak broadly about the types of detainees? are we talking about foot sol makers?soldiers, bomb >> all of the above, senator. >> so it would be very bad for our nation if those detainees were released. >> i think it would be. the intelligence committee has taken great pains to categorize and make sure we know who these individuals are. we are working closely with foreign allies to do just that. >> thank you. director haspel, i'd like to turn our attention to rushsia. attention to russia. i know you have a lot of experience with that. president putin has publicly stated that they are working on novel, nuclear weapons systems like a nuclear-power cruise missile and underwater torpedo. last year he announced the test , which he vehicle called a continental strategic system. is it the case that these systems are being designed to specifically evade the treaty?
detailn go into more this afternoon, i am sure general ashley would like to add , but i believe some of these systems have been in development long before the new start treaty. >> general ashley -- long before star treaty. >> general ashley? >> if i could go back to huawei , when you look at the technology, i think huawei is a good example. the other complexity is the question really is do you know what's in your phone? do you know who provided the chips, software, everything that goes in your phone? we're tracking everything you just addressed in terms of putin. i'm not sure if any of that violates the new treaty. the russians are in compliance , and as you know, they can
deliver 1550 in war heads and 800 in the latter category in terms of other systems. i am not aware that this violates the treaty. i will take that one for research as well and we may be able to get that to you in closed session this afternoon. >> so even if the systems don't violate the new star treaty, the past administration has said that russia is violating the intermediate range nuclear skies treaty, the open treaty, the chemical weapons convention, the vienna document , and it no longer is adhering to any of the other initiatives. is there any treaty that russia has the are currently adhering to? >> the russians would have a different interpretation, but i do believe you are correct in terms of the state department's assessment of russia's compliance in those treaties. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. i want to apologize to all our distinguished panel.
had a major hearing in the finance committee. i will start with the matter of saudi arabia and the late mr. khashoggi. i am very concerned that the d recordstatement for the rarely mentions of the threat posed by saudi arabia to the rule of law around the world. director haspel, the senate unanimously passed a resolution stating its belief that the crown prince was responsible for the murder of journalist jamal khashoggi. is that correct? >> senator, we can go into a little more detail this afternoon, but as you know, during the fall months, we spent a significant amount of time providing written products on our assessment of what happened to mr. khashoggi. as you know, and as the saudi
regime itself has acknowledged, 15 individuals traveled to istanbul and he was murdered at their consulate and it was a premeditated murder on 2 the october. trial in saudi arabia, i believe, has begun. but in terms of further detail on our assessment of involvement, i'll hold it to the afternoon session. >> respectfully, madame director, the senate unanimously passed a resolution that the crown prince was responsible. was the senate wrong? >> senator, it's my job to provide the intelligence to support the senate's deliberations, and i think we have done that very adequately in this case, and we will continue to do that. and we continue, by the way, to follow the issue very closely. >> a question for you, director wray and maybe other panel members. in my home state, there are alarming indications that the saudi government has helped
saudi nationals accused of serious crimes flee the country. this strikes us as an assault on the rule of law right here in the united states. my question for the director, director wray, will you look at this and come back with any suggestions about what the it do?might and just so you know, what has troubled me so much is what looks like evidence of that the saudi government helped these individuals who have been charged with really serious crimes in my home state, rape, helped them with illicit passports, possibly the prospect of private planes to get out of the country. will you look at this and come back with any suggestions about
will you look at this and come back with any suggestions about what the bureau can do here? >> i had the chance to visit the portland field office, not only to meet with all of our employees, but our state and local partners. i would be happy to take a close look at anything you want to send our way. sen. wyden: could you get back to meet with them 10 days? oe are trying to up the ante t really get these people back. my sense is, like a lot of other things, people have a full plate. i requested travel records. we will be in contact with your office. i request a response within 10 days to show this is the priority that is warranted. >> senator, we have a lot of priorities, but i would be happy to look at the information and work with your office. sen. wyden: we have a lot of diaries -- of priorities, but
the notion saudi arabia can say it is above the law. that is what it looks like to the people of my home state, is just unacceptable. you and i have talked about matters before. both of us have strong views. that will certainly be the case here. let me ask one other question for you, director haspel and director coates, to change the russia. to donald trump met privately with vladimir putin and no one in the u.s. government has the full story of what was discussed. director haspel and director coa ts, would this put you in a disadvantage position in terms of understanding russia's efforts to advance its agenda against the united states?
then i'm out of time. thank you for letting me have the response. clearly this is an issue we ought to talk about this afternoon. i look forward to discussing that in a closed session. to me, from an intelligence perspective, it is it wouldl 101 that help our country to know what vladimir putin discussed with donald trump. >> when i reflect on the number of people who lost their lives as a result of man-made causes of world war ii, by some estimates as much as 39 million people when we introduced the atomic bomb in nagasaki and howshima, and think about much more efficient we have gotten when it comes to killing
each other potentially. i wanted to ask you about weapons of mass destruction and counter proliferation. mutuallyeory behind assured deterrence is the so-called rational actors, russia, china, for example, would use nuclear weapons because they realize what the be,equences of that would we have less than national -- than rational actors. thinking about north korea, certainly pakistan and india are staring at each other, both of whom have nuclear weapons. spending asre not much time as we need to be focusing on what is the most lethal threat to our nation, and
also to the world. let me ask you specifically about russia. russia continues to be in breach of the terms of the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. most recently our nato allies concluded russia is in the process of developing a grounded launch cruise missile that is a direct threat to euro-atlantic security. i personally think it is important for us to adequately fund nuclear modernization programs, including the development of a low yield warhead, and enhance the active abilities of critical missile-defense systems. china is not bound by the standards imposed by the inf treaty, further putting the u.s. in a compromising position. thector coats, does intelligence community asses that a complete withdrawal from
the u.s. of the inf treaty would pose a significant security risk to the united states? is there,: that risk whether we see russia within the bounds of the restraints or we don't, because we know russia has violated the terms of that treaty and has the capability. withdrawal or not, they will still have that capability, that is correct. sen. cornyn: director haspel, if the u.s. withdraws from the inf treaty -- and i welcome anyone's -- will-- does the russia place missiles in cuba, or place pressure in some other way?
senator, perhaps we can go into more detail this afternoon -- we see russia is concerned about our withdrawal. we see ways they can push back due to their own concerns about our forward posture in eastern europe. i think i will leave it there for now and we can elaborate this afternoon. i will ask if general ashley would like to add something. their actions are not consistent with the ground launch cruise missile you spoke about. it has already been fielded operationally. their actions and what they would do, i think, would be symmetric do anything we did to move additional capabilities forward. those symmetric actions we can talk about in closed session.
sen. cornyn: would anyone on the panel care to talk about my statement on the production of a low yield warhead? i don't know who would be the appropriate person. gen. ashley: the comment of whether we should be developing? i will leave that to the policymakers. what you alluded to is our ability to kill and some of the weapons we developed. the strategy we have heard from the past in the russians whether or not a rational actor would use those weapons in the field. though russians have a first use policy. the threshold through they think the kremlin would be at risk is whetherld drive that, that is an escalade torry control measure they would put orycalat e -- an
control measure they would put into place. specifically,s the threshold is pretty high. you look at great power conflict, it flat lined after world war ii. things have taken place in the world order that have been the outgrowth. the other thing that has come to bear on keeping great power conflict at bay is the development of nuclear weapons. sen. sasse: thank you to all of you for being here. you lead and represent a community of folks who have family disruptions. on the half of this committee and the american people, thank you. when you were confirmed for the armed services committee, i asked you whether or not russia
or china suffered a sufficient response to their cyber aggressions to warrant behavior change. you said they have not. in a classified -- a nonclassified setting, how would you answer that question today? >> the way i would answer the question is first of all, a lot has changed since you and i talked last year. from our work collectively across the government, we have been able to show effectiveness against -- primarily in this case the russians as we look at midterm elections. whether that spawns long-term behavior change is yet to be determined. this afternoon we can talk more about the things we have seen. sen. sasse: thank you for your work on that. i know director coats will give us briefing this afternoon as well.
i know many on the committee have been anxious to get a full report of the successes. i would like the site whatever portion of that we can declassified for the american people to know the successes of your community, i would urge that declassification where possible. director wray, can you talk about threats we face with the long-term tech race against china? and domestically, looking at chinese actions within the united states, how do you rank those priorities? dir. wray: i think china writ large is the most significant counterintelligence threat we face. we have economic espionage investigations, for example. that is one piece in all of our field offices. a number of those -- the number
of those has doubled over the past three or four years. almost all of them lead back to china. sen. sasse: do you have anywhere near sufficient resources for all those investigations? a lot of us used to ask director comey about jihadi threats. we were told as long as the u.s. is partnering with allies in syria to kill jihadis, he felt there were sufficient domestic resources for counterintelligence. for counter espionage purposes, are you sufficiently resourced? >> if congress were to trust us with more resources, i can assure them they would be put to good use. sen. sasse: we have talked about deep fix. -- deep fakes. 17 agencies is not the way anyone would design our agencies oftentimes youut
create more complexity when you try to get rid of the duplicative functions we have across agencies. when you think about the catastrophic potential to trust and markets from deepfake attacks, are we organized in a way where we can possibly to and fast enough deepfakes attack? >> we recognize emerging technologies and the speed which that threat increases. we clearly need to be more agile . we need to partner with our private sector. oureed to resource activities relative to dealing technologiesnown and unknown technologies, which
we know we are going to be here anytime soon, because it is a flood of technological change. it poses a major threat to the united states, and something the intelligence community needs to be restructured to address. we are in the process of transformation, which incorporates six major pillars that we have to put resources and activity against, and fast. artificial intelligence, private sector partnerships, data management, acquisition agility, all six of these are major issues which we have to transform. we cannot rely on status quo. we are the best in the world, but we have to stay the best in the world. we've got real competitors. technology is giving them the opportunity to shorten that gap very significantly.
we have a dedicated commitment to this transformation, it is called i.c. 2025. what do we have to be in 2025, let alone 2020? we are using that throughout all 17 agencies in terms of how we have to adapt to that. that is a major change this i.c. has to go through. we are fully intend on making it happen. -- intent on making it happen. sen. sasse: director haspel, are you confident we can respond fast enough? tsrector haspel director: coa captured it well. although the i.c. is unwieldy in certain respects, i don't think in my 34 your career i have seen better synchronization or collaboration to stay abreast of the technological challenges. sen. sasse: i hear that. i have been reading intel, and
the pace of great game -- up u --ded game the barrier of entry to deepfake s technology is low. they will be able to destabilize markets very rapidly. we need to not just think about i.c. 2025, but 2021, 2019. >> if i could go back to the question from the opening chairman on data. how do you get deepfakes that are really good? lots of data. that is how you train your algorithms. the ability to protect that information, to preclude the training of those algorithms to where you can't tell the difference. our challenge is, how do you build the algorithm to identify the anomaly? every deepfake has a flaw, at
least now they do. sen. sasse: thank you. >> i just want to make one final brief and commend director coats on the ongoing efforts to make sure we get through the backlog on security clearance reform. the chairman and i have worked on this very hard. we appreciate the progress that has been made. i think we are down to about 500,000. we can do much better. my hope would be, particularly any federal employee that might have had some level of credit dinging due to the shutdown would not be penalized through that security clearance process. -- again, that they had no ability to remediate was
our responsibility. >> you have played a major role in all of this. we have made some progress. it is not fast enough. the shutdown deferred some tasks that we could have accomplished if the process was opened. hopefully we won't have to go through that again. >> let's try it over here. i thank the vice-chairman for his comments. i promised you ample time for nutrition in between sessions. ur testimony.or yo the intelligence community righted itself on making the impossible happened. you go where others cannot. you find what cannot be found. you discover and create.
this committee has been privileged to see behind closed doors some of the truly fantastic innovations that are the products of your drive to accomplish impossible missions. sometimes these comes from the minds of in-house geniuses. sometimes they are the fruits of successful collaborations with contractors. these public-private partnerships have always been at the core of american success stories. however, as with any good competition, our adversaries have watched carefully, and they seem to be catching up. director coats, you note in your statement for the record that for 2019 and beyond, the innovations that drive military and economic competitiveness will increasingly originate outside of the united states as the overall u.s. lead in science and technology shrinks. the gap between commercial technologies evaporates and foreign actors increase their
efforts to acquire top talent and intellectual property via licit or illicit means. innovation as a global race -- is a global race. we have to think about how to foster innovation at home, mitigate risks and maintain our competitive edge. if we concede the innovation globalot only our competitiveness, but our national security will be at risk. we need to make sure we are monitoring and acting on threat information as soon as possible and getting the information to the people that need it the most. federal government should educate the private sector on the threats and enable a regulatory environment that enables innovation. in turn, the private sector needs to be constructive with partners. we need each other, and only through collaboration can we
gain our lead. the architecture of government must change, and our partnerships must grow. in closing, please convey this committee's gratitude to the men and women of the intelligence committee for the work they do on a daily basis. the american people should know their hard work, dedication, and innovation were crucial to protecting the democratic principles on which we stand. although the threats we now face our dynamic, varied, and numerous, i am confident the intelligence community will continue delivery on their mandate to deliver uncertainty -- deliver certainty in an increasingly uncertain world. this hearing is adjourned and we will gather again at 1:00. clacks] [chatter]
host: new york has five new members and its congressional delegation, all of whom are democrats. representative alexandria ocasio-cortez joins the house as the youngest member of congress at age 29. she defeated longtime representative and then-chair of the house caucus joe crowley last summer. voters in new york's 22nd
district elected anthony brindisi to congress. he served seven years in the new york state assembly. before that, he was an attorney in private practice. representative antonio delgado was also an attorney, but also had a brief career as a wrapper, releasing -- a rapper, releasing one album after graduating harvard law school. max rose elected to represent the 11th district. he previously served in the u.s. army, including leading a platoon in afghanistan, where he was wounded by an ied, earning a purple heart and bronze star. representative joseph morelle he joined the house a few weeks ahead of his classmates after winning a seat in the 116th congress and an election to fill the seat of congresswoman louise slaughter for the remaining weeks of the 115th congress. congressman morelle served in
the state assembly and 1991. new congress, new leaders. watch at all on c-span. >> here is a look at live coverage wednesday. on c-span, the house is back 9:00 a.m. eastern to consider a bill giving civilian employees a pay raise. on c-span2, british prime minister theresa may takes questions on brexit from numbers of the house of commons. that is followed by house speaker nancy pelosi and education secretary betsy devos in a council funded by christian colleges and universities. later in the senate returns for work on a middle east policy bill that provides assistance to israel and imposes new sanctions on the syrian regime. there is more live coverage on c-span3 with foreign diplomats from chile, paraguay, and the european union on the political situation in venezuela. house and senate negotiators meet to avert another potential
government shutdown by coming up with a bipartisan border security proposal before temporary government funding expires on february 13. weekend, the c-span cities tour takes you to california. with the help of our comcast cable partners. twoe are the largest, one, or three in the nation for agriculture. we are the largest county in the nation for dairy products. as a result of that, we have a lot industry that is based on agricultural needs. >> saturday on book tv at noon eastern, a visit with a local author as he shares stories of the county's most notable western criminals in his book. >> the county was remote.
it had the mountains right next door, which made great hideouts for people on the run. werewamps, for example, also great hideouts for people on the run. if you are going to practice criminal activity, you want to be able to do that without getting caught. so it made tulare county pretty convenient for outlaws to hide out. >> and on sunday at 2:00 p.m. on american history tv, we'll explore the city and history of the region's agriculture and its impact today. watch c-span's cities tour of visalia, california new eastern on c-span 2's book tv and sunday 2:00 p.m. on american history tv on c-span3, working with cable affiliates as we explore the
american story. >> next, a look at the political unrest in venezuela after the national assembly declared nicolas maduro's presidency as a legitimate. since then, the u.s. and several other countries have recognized juan guaido as the interim president. former u.s. ambassador to venezuela william brownfield, and venezuela's newly designated ambassador, discuss the situation at the center for city to and international studies. -- for strategic and international studies. this is under an hour and a half.