tv Foundation for Defense of Democracies Discussion on Missile Defense CSPAN March 16, 2019 4:13am-5:29am EDT
use of the death penalty across the u.s., as california becomes the latest state to end the practice. mark trumbull on the idea of a wealth tax been discussed by some progressives. and former administrator of the national highway traffic safety administration discusses drunk drivers and prevention. be sure to watch "washington journal," live at 7:00 eastern this morning. join the discussion. ♪ next, a discussion about the u.s. missile defense strategy and current threats to the homeland, hosted by the foundation for the defense of democracies. this is just over one hour. cliff: welcome to the foundation for defense of democracies. i'm cliff may. i'm fdd's founder and president,
and i'm pleased you could join us this morning for a conversation on america's teringe strategy, couns and defending threats from iran and north korea. with release this week of the administration's 2020 defense budget request, we thought it an important time to discuss the iranian and north korean ballistic missile threats and how the department of defense can best respond. fdd has for many years been covering the missile threats from these rogue regimes, but we are pleased today to meet under the purview of fdd's newly launched center on military and political power. cmpp seeks to promote on a bipartisan basis better understanding of the strategies, policies, and capabilities necessary to effectively deter enemies of the u.s. and our allies, and make sure we have the capability to decisively defeat any who are not deterred.
cliff: cmpp provides rigorous, timely and relevant research and analysis. we have a senior group of former u.s. officials who are serving on our board of advisers which is chaired by hr mcmaster. before we begin by way of housekeeping i should note that today's event will be livestreamed. and we are live on c-span. many thanks for those who came out today to be with us. and for the many others who are joining in remotely. i encourage guests here and online to join in on today's conversation on twitter @fdd. i also encourage you to check out the website. we can now be found at fdd.org. there you can find the latest research and subscribe to receive information on our latest research projects and experts. i'd also ask that you silence your cell phones and with that i'm about to turn the conversation over to my colleague, brad bowman. brad, as you may know, is senior
director of fdd's center on military and political power, which you can follow on fdd underline cmppp. brad previously served as at national security adviser in the u.s. senate and active duty u.s. army officer, pilot and assistant professor at west point. with that, brad over to you and thank you. brad: thank you, cliff. as cliff mentioned i'm brad bowman with fdd center on military and political power. i want to welcome each of you here in the room today. welcome those of you watching online, as well as those watching on c-span. the focus of our event this morning is iran and north korea's missile threats, and how the dod should respond. to explore this important and timely topic, we have an impressive panel that i'd like to introduce now, beginning with rebecca heinrich in the middle, a senior fellow at the hundred -- hudson institut, where she specializes in nuclear deterrence and missile defense
and proliferation. she previously served as adviser on military matters to representative trent fraengts. david maxwell, closest to me, senior fellow at fdd a 30-year veteran of the united states army retiring in sow as a special forces colonel with his final assignment on the military fact ultimate teaching strategy at the national war college focusing on security developments on the korean peninsula. on the far end is benham ben taleblu. he has closely tracked a wide range of particularly on iran as nuclear program and i'm eager to get the conversation started. quickly, let me set the scene in hopes of providing useful context and catalyzing our discussion. as many of you may know earlier this year, the trump administration released the 2019 missile defense review. the missile defense review reiterated what the national
said, saying we confront a more complex and volatile security environment than we have seen in recent memory. and certainly the missile threat is part of that. the overall conclusion of the missile defense review was that when we look at countries like china, russia, iran and north korea we kind of see three broad trends. one, we see increasing capabilities of existing missile systems, we see them adding new unprecedented types of missile capabilities. they're integrating those existing and new capabilities more thoroughly than ever into coercive threats, military exercises and war planning. so in short, in sum, the missile threat to the united states and our allies is increasing -- growing, both in scope and severity. so while we could talk for hours about the russian and chinese missile threats for today for the purpose of today's event we're going to focus on iran and north korea. some quick comments on that. iran -- the missile defense review said iran is increasing accuracy, range, and
lethality of its missile arsenal korea, mdr said pyongyang neared the time when it could possess the capability to credibly threaten the u.s. homeland with a icbm. it's timely and relevant. a couple quick reasons. one, there was a story in the foreign policy in the last 24 hours talking about the recently -- recent space launches of iran and the implications that have militarily including for the potential development of an iranian icbm. and we also saw this morning a "washington post" story talking about kim jong-un may be making an announcement regarding the possible resumption of ballistic missile tests. and if that's not enough for you to make it relevant and interesting, of course we had the dod budget submission laid out. so with that, i would like to get started. and i'd like to start with rebecca, if i may. for those, rebecca, who have not followed the issues as closely as you have and others have here, if you wouldn't mind could you start by giving us the big take aways from your perspective on the 2019 missile defense review. what does it tell us? what do you think they got right and where did they fall short? rebecca: sure.
thank you. i'm happy to be here this morning. thank you for coming. fdd has done excellent work on the threat from iranian missiles, in particular on missile defense. i was once a fellow here at fdd and i can't say enough positive things about the organization. so it's my pleasure to be here in this forum. so the trump administration's missile defense review. one of the things to notice right off the bat is its missile defense review, not ballistic missile defense review, which is what the obama 2011 bmdr was just looking at the ballistic missile threat. we have opened the scope here. so now we're looking at just the missile threat. that's because our adversaries have really taken big steps technologically on the kinds of threats they have. and now looking at the cruise missile threat as well as some other more complex threats out of russia and china, the hypersonic glide vehicles and some other things.
so that's -- so it's a different -- and it falls in line with the new era of great power competition. the national security strategy, the national defense strategy, the nuclear posture review and then now this, the missile defense review. the way i described them is they all fit together like russian nesting dolls. that's what they are like. the missile defense review kind of follows that trend. that doesn't mean- some people asked does that mean we're not longer worried about the terrorism threat or no longer worried about iran and north korea? of course not, and especially on the missile piece. i'll say why that would be a wrong way to think about it, but it means we are trying to now sort of do a little bit of course correction to make sure we are looking at the high-end sophisticated threats coming out of our peer competitors russia and china, and china in particular, in terms of the
peerness of the two. now what the missile defense review states is, as we have discussed already, the icbm threats coming out of north korea and iran are still concerning. when i say icbm, i'm talking about the missiles that can actually reach the united states homeland. when president trump and kim jong un were going back and forth during fire and fury era is what i call it. everybody knows what i'm talking about when i say that -- that was right after the north koreans had successfully tested a massive icbm, the way song 15. it was bigger than we had discussed in an open setting. some people will say but we don't know if any miniaturized a nuclear war head to put it on the missile. you don't have to. it was so big you could carry a
lot of mass in the nose cone there. so the thing that we haven't seen them do, which is why you if you look carefully at the wording from the missile defense review it says they're nearing a credible threat. what that means is we have not seen them successfully launch the missile and then have it re-enter the atmosphere and successfully obviously put the war head on its intended target with some rely ability. -- reliability. but if you look at even just previous open source, the defense intelligence agency discussed this in an open setting in a congressional hearing several years ago, that -- with everything else we have seen the north koreans test that even if not reliable -- it if they wanted to roll out some of these and launch them all at once and maybe not reliably put the warhead on the intended target, they would get pretty close. and all you really do -- it doesn't matter for the u.s. purposes -- i mean it matters but it doesn't -- it will be a bad day if the war head lands in kansas, versus wherever it's supposed to land.
you know and that would be even further than where they might want to land it on the west coast. so we should not rest soundly knowing that the north koreans haven't proven this through a test. and then we should worry about -- make one more point about president trump often talks about the fact that the north koreans have stopped at the timing. and he talks about that as an achievement of the diplomacy that he is engaging in with kim jong-un. i would say he is partially right. you do need to continue testing to increase the reliability and to get up to the credible threat where you have proven you have the technology to do it. you need testing for that, but you can improve the capability without testing by increasing the quantity of missiles that you have, and there is no sign that the north koreans have stopped producing missiles during this time of detente between the united states and north korea. and so they can improve the
capability and improve their confidence that they would be able to successfully land a missile that could hit u.s. territory, simply by producing more of them. now if kim says we're going to stop talking and we're testing again, i think that would be a very, very serious error on the part of kim, because that is something that president trump really has put a lot of weight on of where he said that he is going to go a different direction. and he has never feared going back to really hard maximum pressure if diplomacy wasn't going to work with kim. now the -- another interesting thing about this missile defense review is it makes a very important point that missile defense is -- we need it because we have entered a new era of -- a new missile era. not only are missiles increasing worldwide, they're increasing in number, increasing in sophistication among our adversaries. and they proliferate. you can proliferate. simply because north korea has a particular missile technology doesn't mean you cannot worry another country has it.
in the past we have seen cooperation between iran and north korea. when they test the space launch vehicles, that technology can be directly used and applied to an icbm. so when secretary pompeo says that the iranians cannot launch a space launch vehicle without the united states understanding that as an icbm threat, that's why -- or an icbm test, that's why is because the technology is directly transferrable to an icbm technology. but the missile defense review makes a really important point. missile defense is -- two things. there's a couple of things. one it's stabilizing. in the past you will hear some people make the argument that if the united states increases its missile defense systems too much that will create a destabilizing situation between the united states and adversaries. the missile defense review makes it clear that no no, no missile defense is stabilizing. to have a robust missile defense system giving the united states
an increased confidence that we might be able to defend that which we value most in an initial strike, that we can protect our ability to respond, that gives the united states some elbow room in terms of knowing if they want to go with full offensive retaliation. you know it gives them decision space. you can see that with the israelis. every time the israelis are using iron dome, i often say, iron dome has saved palestinian lives because it has given the israelis the option to not respond with overwhelming force because it gives them the ability to intercept the missiles that are headed towards more populated areas or areas they want to protect. the same concept can be with the united states. it gives the united states options in how to respond. and it also -- also can -- this is i think one of the most important things that this missile defense review makes the point now -- and then i'll briefly say i don't think the budget matches with the missile defense review says. but it has a deterrent effect.
it should if we are doing it right, because if we can -- we don't have to be able to intercept every missile. that's a strawman when people say rebecca, you want to catch every missile they want to throe -- throw at the united states. that is not what i want to do it sounds like nice it's unrealistic. i'd like it to be so strong and architecture so strong that it creates in the minds of adversaries enough doubt that an initial strike would be worth the cost. we might be able to intercept it and hopefully we are able to. hopefully we are able to intercept more than just one or two strikes, and that might give them enough there by denying them that initial political gain they might think they have more for an initial first strike which could dissuade them from the initial act of aggression in the first place. missile defense if robust enough
and proven through testing we can create a doubt in the minds of adversaries not to launch that attack it stabilizing, creates a deterrent effect and also strengthening diplomacy. because if our missile defense systems are strong enough- we can show the north koreans and the iranians that we have the ability to do this, that perhaps they might want to -- they can come -- we can take that option off theie plate and they might be more interested in having a diplomatic conversation with the united states. now just briefly with the budget -- or do you want to talk about that in the next round.? >> can we hold on that. thank you. that was an excellent overview. thank you. let me go to you. you focused on the iranian missile program as much as anyone. can you provide an update on the iranian missile program perhaps with the regional threat poses and then turn to what rebecca touched on with regard to the homeland? >> sure. thank you guys for turning out today. i can think of no better thing to do on friday morning than
talk about flying tubes. thank you for coming out. every time you hear bad news on one failed interceptor test, and all of a sudden you hear this outpouring of military contractors, arms control experts deriding missile defense. i wish we had the video segment of rebecca saying missile >> because that is the rebuttal to what you are hearing when you hear that, oh some interceptor failed. that exactly that argument rebuts everything that you happen to hear and washington. on the iran front, if i may, think about alliteration when he think about the threat. you need to think about procurement, production, and proliferation. procurement because the missile program was foreign source. iran went to syria and north and thust some stuff
became the basis for the liquid fueled ballistic missile program. also in the 1990's, a rate -- a ryan got this missile, and it is the gift it keeps on giving. it is in some ways there ultimate deterrent. birth asile, which whole series of big -- vehicles, so it was the gift to iran in the 1990's. when you think about the threat from iran, that is the procurement angle. iran has gone abroad, purchasing whole system. we know in 2001 iran got a cruise missile -- missile, from the ukraine. it is a verse by this threat. reversedot systems, it engineered them. procurement, production, for over a decade, the director have
been saying that iran has the largest -- it kept producing what it knew how to reverse engineer again and again. where it lacked a qualitative age, where it lacked coercive capability in the late 1990's and early 2000's, at added redundancy to the quantity, thus making sure it could saturate missile defense. ofs did or any act aggression against the iranian homeland. once you got into systems that nationller, but enter -- pearl inflation -- aboutance that you hear
-- most accurate platform in general. hass the one that iran refined for at least four generation. we know it has birthed a couple different systems with a slightly better range of accuracy for them missile, and theas given weapons to yemen's. when you look at their , --stments in yemen's it is the only instance of fatalist short-range missile to not even a proxy, but simply to a partner. so their willingness to proliferate these muscles that it has procured, produced, reverse engineer, is a sign it knows that missiles change the regional bounds.
this is actually creating -- this is actually eroding the balance of power in the middle east. threat potent military to the u.s. as well as to the allies and interests in the middle east. when you think about the missile threat in the region, you should state -- about procurement, production and proliferation. through the same place they went shopping into thousand one, you run -- ukraine, they know where they like to go shopping for foreign tech as well as where it wants to send missiles that are either procured or produces. homeland,atify to the there is a short historical
memory in this town. there are experts who i love, respect, admire, have read growing up, but i think -- incorrect on this. india is one country you should look at to learn about the iranian move. the reason i say that is while america and the soviet union are the gold standard for how to taking as program, military base and making it civilian and then flight testing that, that is not what most nations have. we have to look at the capabilities you have. is a nice model because india during the cold war, responding to different changes in power, was part of
the world's nonaligned movement and. considerations, it looks to rely on a network of foreign suppliers to move from a space vehicle program. when you about their various space launch vehicles, derived from the north korean gift, as well as aging things that iran has learned to develop potential satellite system that it can put into lower orbit, those are not civilian only. the seymour is best suited at present to enter low earth orbit's because we don't know enough about their technology to say that this can reenter the
atmosphere at this speed and deliver this warhead. they are still experimenting with it. what americans and russians have said about failed tests, that they inform our science, and iranians learn, too. that doesn't mean it provides the regime with useful military information about its program. itsran looks to grow missiles, it will revisit this consideration it has vis-a-vis the europeans right now regarding range. i will stop there. lets transition real quickly, if you don't mind. really hard to follow those presentations. first, let me say one thing. missileorth korea's
threat is part of its capabilities. it is really a core capability that it uses, not only for the military, but for diplomatic purposes. talk about that. in the region, north korea poses , threat to u.s. forces, japan it's scads and the like there. we talk about missile defense in the region. we talk about patriot, fad, and i am sure everybody is the mayor idealhat controversy, the in the region would be to have ,n integrated missile defense u.s., south korea and japan. unlikelyhat is really given the friction between korea and japan. japan has moved out on patriot
koreanshree and the have embarked on a program for the air missile defense, which is really trying to target missiles before launch which i think is difficult for many reasons. we really have -- we don't have an integrated missile defense in the region. that is a shortfall. that is something we should all press south korea and japan to try to press forward on that, but as we know, even with the joint intelligence sharing agreement, that was hard to negotiate, and that has proven the call. isintegrated missile defense probably unlikely, but we should aggressively pursue because it's important for many of the reasons i think a rebeccah has said, for deterrence and to have to raise the doubts in the minds
of kim jong-un. that, thist say missile, obviously it is big and can carry a lot, but obviously that size will, and the size of the warhead, will depend on how far it can fly. it is open to interpretation whether it can reach here, the west coast, or the midwest, one thing i think we should look at, the 14 did test a reentry fickle -- vehicle. the observation was that it burned up in the atmosphere because they observed fire around it. from watching the movies like the right stuff, when anything reenters, there will be a lot of fire. i think, had they developed a reentry capability, i think the jury is still out. the other thing that doesn't get ach coverage, this also is
little bit perhaps out there, electro magnetic pulse. a burst that would really destroy the electronic infrastructure that it can reach. we haven't seen any tests, but they have said they are pursuing it. there are some analysts who really focuses on that, and i think we should consider that, although we have seen no evidence that they are moving towards that. talking about proliferation, but north korea is a proliferator. we need to understand that. it is a moneymaking venture for them. it supports the regime. countries toess not allow proliferation. i would like to see the
proliferation security initiation reinvigorated. lastly, i will talk about, they have used missiles for its blackmail diplomacy. the 1998, there all really to are do either two things, advance their program or they are to send signals. we have to interpret what they mean. it is clear that they use them to get concession or to get a response from south korea, japan, the united states, and so it is an important part of its diplomatic arsenal or what we should call political warfare.
-- tos something that create political effects. lastly, wartime is the most important. these missiles are critical to the war plans, and i would say that if war broke out on the peninsula, you will see immediate targeting with their entire arsenal of missiles at all aerial parts of debarkation in south korea to prevent reinforcement, but also the bases in japan which are critical staging bases to flow forces from the united states and japan to korea and war. koreamissiles for north are asymmetric, they have political component, blackmail diplomacy, and a proliferation moneymaking component and a moneymaking component. it is really one of the
treasured sorts that kim jong-un wields to advance his entrance -- interest. >> can you give us an update on what the report is regarding so hey? >> that is the liquid fuel launch site and they have missile there. and test engines there, they said they were going to take it down. they partially dismantled it last summer, and recent reporting we have seen, that they have rebuilt it. are theyuestion is going to embark on some kind of tests, and there was specialization -- speculation today, one of them of course is that they are sending the signal --us, and the reports from
kim jong-un is considering ending the diplomatic engagement with the u.s. and returning to testing. south korea intelligence reported to their general assembly that they think they are building it up so they can take it down again. interesting --n >> thank you. i want to be able to go to the audience for questions. one of the things of this new center that we have here is based on the understanding of the threat. don't stop there, ask the equally important question, what does the department of defense specifically do about this? becky, in that spirit, i would love to go to you.
a slight reduction from fy 19 requested level, but a significant reduction from fy 19, and that is not getting a lot of reporting. you don't compare requests in my mind. 10.5 billion,ut about a 10% reduction in light of this growing threat, which i think is interesting. i am eager to hear your thoughts. actually it is a complicated answer, but i was disappointed -- i do think it is useful to some degree to know what this president requested
last year versus what he requested this year. that is congress coming in and adding more money, but the administration asked for 9.9 and now they are asking for 9.4, and the missile defense numbers, additional funding -- that comes from outside the agency budget. one of the reasons there is a theis because when president and kim were trading ratchetingd we were at maximum pressure with sanctions, the president increase the diff bit -- defense budget right then. and he increase the number of ground-based interceptors that would be deployed on the homeland. defense, itmissile is actually a system of systems.
them, now the line is sorta being blurred because we are going to be more doing more testing, a missile interceptor that we have been cooperating on with the japanese. some of these -- they have longer legs, and we are going to test them. the homeland defense system, and started deploying that in 2002 -- there wasident increased funding, and that is why you will see a bigger bump last year because of the requirement dollars to get those interceptors in the ground. we bought those. we are talking about dollars.
this budget that we have this year is going to be spending -- studying some things because of this new shift towards the sophisticated threats coming out of china and russia. when you are researching and so that kindings, of explains that. i will say i went to hit them a little bit harder because we should be really looking to boost up missile defense because the north korean threat has not gone down. the reigning in -- the iranian threat does not mean that they are not learning and making improvements. the united states really should be looking at what we can do to increase our programs and test it more, get some more test targets, perhaps increase the number of interceptors that we do have. we are going to shoot more than one at an incoming missile.
we are going to run out of interceptors quickly. how the enemybout tests, the reason that the north koreans have been able to quickly advance their program is because they are not afraid to fail. they learn from failure. the united states is much more failure a verse. we don't test as frequently. we learn from the tests and improve them, but i have recommended that we have got to get to the point where we can go faster than what we are going. you'll often hear that the current system that we have is only about 50% reliable. you will see that in every mainstream article ever printed on this breed that is unfair. we don't look at the other programs and count how many failures they have had and give them a grade. we look at what they have been
able to do, and that is the capability they have. same thing with our defense system. if you look at the interceptors today deployed in the ground, not the ones we first initially, but the ones there now, they are 546, as currently configured with the current upgrades for that is much better -- but we need to continue testing. it is better than what it gets accused of being, but still not where it should be. you mentioned the 44 interceptors, and during the briefing they talked about how they talked about how there would be a delay on the vehicle and how that will impact the additional -- can you quickly provide 30 seconds of thought on that? trying towe are improve the kill vehicle on these interceptors.
these things are hard because you are working with multiple contractors. it is disappointing, and we don't know at this point if that will affect the delay of the interceptors. i have heard that you can still deploy as they currently are and you can retrofit after they are in the ground. i don't know if that is going to delay the deployment of those interceptors. i would just say we got to get to the point where this country is not afraid to fail so that we can fail and fail quickly so we can get back up and get these things improved. the phrase that you will hear the department use a lot is we have to move at this speed of relevance. that couldn't be more true in the case of missile defense when our enemies are moving quickly. >> i hope you are right. i hope there is a work around.
i hope you are right. like you said, if there is a icbm coming, we will fire more than one. the more we have -- rebeccah: there are other ways to get around this. they don't have to be fixed. there are other concepts that -- theile that doesn't department has already looked at the potential sight of where the united states might put other interceptors, somewhere in the midwest. that impact study has already been completed, so the department should be ready to go. can i follow up on that? -- they are less positioned in terms of battle space, so
putting a third ground-based site in ohio, in new york, for example, would give us an open anrce, additional space for icbm that could be coming, and the whole thing we keep saying is that we need to stay ahead of the threat. -- in the budget, we sought nothing on that. rebeccah: it hedge, and this is part of its posture, if we saw the iranian threat mature, that we might revisit the possibility. it is because the system is so expensive that they are putting their money elsewhere. i think it is unwise, especially because you have the impact study already completed, that they did not name the site or the location. i think it is down to three different locations. name the site, pentagon. you know it.
let's name it and do what we can now while we have an opportunity to get prepared so if we need to rollout and populate it with more ground-based interceptors, that we are able to that. homelandhe only defense system we have. it protects the country. it is better than it gets credit for. towards othere technology. we need a space sensor larry -- layer. other missile defense systems we have now, and the reason that is, if you just -- we use sensors to be able to see these and tracked these missiles coming towards the united states. discriminate that countermeasures to kind of trick our warhead. space-basedve a center layer, we have a much
better ability to track these missiles from birth to death so we don't lose them. we can just see what we are trying to kill a lot better. it gives us more space to be able to look at it and hit the interceptor. these centers, they are pricey, but we have got to the point where every single administration says we need to do this, and we don't do it. think that this can has been kicked way down the road to the point we have been long out of road, and we need to get it. go to audience questions. you can raise your hand and identify yourself and your affiliation and that would be great. >> thank you for a wonderful presentation. what is your sense of where we ought to go with boost phase
with either iran or north korea? so much for that question. -- it also intercepts the incoming missile in different stages we do not have a boost phase. we have midcourse defense, terminal defense, but we don't have boost phase defense. having that capability would be the optimal place to intercept, because you intercept it over its own territory. that is one benefit. you will intercept the missile before it has a chance to release its -- right now we talk about the kill vehicle, one of the reasons is because we want to be able to discriminate between the really nasty part that we want to hit and everything else, and then we have the follow-on to the arcade
the. we are doing that so that we have increased reliability to be able to intercept the missile because of all of the stuff they are putting on it. ifis also cheaper because you're using something like lasers to hit the boost phase, you've got an endless magazine of opportunities to shoot at this thing as opposed to the kinetic vehicles we have now. we went to get a boost phase, but it is difficult. you have to be either right on top of the threat or close to it. it is hard to get close enough to it. it's got to be superfast. they are different things we are thinking about. the administration is determined to get to this technology. there is some seed money, and they want to look at the
space-based capability, but they are just studying it. being able to utilize space better to get that mission, especially talking about the boost phase is the way to go. at this point there is no policy or legal restrictions or the united states doing it. there is no treaty prohibiting this. it just has to make the decision to do it and resource it properly. that is all there. it's important that we move in that direction. that will get at all of these threats, especially as the number of muscles -- >> any other questions? ask this in the contest really for any of you, ,ut we will start with rebeccah
a reluctance to spend money when it is perceived to be helping our allies, i note in the budget request, to include some quickly, someone might look at that and say that is japan and israel, we don't care about that. $500 million for israeli for david's sling and arrow. we know the dod deployed the system as part of its -- another example we have in the united warning systemy not only to the u.k. but also to the united states. your thoughts on how that united states currently works with our allies? say there isill something to the public sentiment that the united states continues to pay a lot for ally
cooperation when our allies could pay more. there's something to that. this is not a new phenomenon where donald trump just realize this was happening. doesn't has as much of a soft touch as president obama had, and the reason for that is he is trying to get our allies to contribute more. take our cooperation with japan, for instance. usually beneficial, not just to the japanese but the united states for our presence in the region. if you look at the amount of trade goes through that region. if the united states is going to be able to be able to have a we have to befic, able to get in there, and china is doing everything it can right now, and it has been planning for years, while with a been
asleep at the switch to deny the united states the ability to move in that region. when you think about missiles, a lot of people say, the north koreans would never launch a missile at the united states. that would mean war. why would you think that? first of all, we don't know the , but these missiles have incredible capabilities. they can keep us out of a region because we might not be willing to accept the risk, to be able to move in a region, if they have this capability. the chinese have a massive missile force. i know this is about north korea and iran, but i think it is important to note that. the chinese, or the 90% of their
entire missile force with violate this treaty had it been party to it. massive numbers of ground launch missiles that can hold at risk united states bases in the so anyway,apan and the former president, it is usually important to the united states if we want to continue having trade in these regions that we are able to get in there. missile defense is a major part of it. fair -- paraphrase, missile defense is really about america's place in the world. are we not going to insist on having access to this region? when you look at what is going through there, if we are going to do that, we need to be able to protect our allies and are basing their and our ships and carriers in those regions. in the case of israel, believe the united states security is tied to the security of israel.
israelis have been incredible part needs on the forefront of developing this technology and that we are now able to benefit from as well in the case of -- >> i think that is something that a lot of americans don't really appreciate. the recent deployment, if you are a planner in iran, this creates issues for you. suddenly you have this new capability. how does that change? >> israel is a great example. if you are a gcc country and you want to offset this challenge, you need to look west. look at what israel has done to create a missile defense system.
dorm, david's sling, and now you have sad. these are going to continue testing them. so these are systems that are at the forefront of the nation security. if iran wants to dampen israel plus security, it will have to overcome this. doing in the region by proliferating these systems, s again.out the p >> coming back to the issue of cost sharing, which i thought you phrased in a good way, i know you recently published an op-ed on the cost sharing idea
that we would make our allies pay 150% of these costs. would korea contacts, why that be a problem from your perspective? i was happy to hear the secretary of defense yesterday say that is an error. -- i thinkthat was we have probably already tested it in the korea contacts. i think korea is now paying almost a million dollars for support to u.s. forces there. they did and chris -- increased significantly. we have to remember that we are in korea for our interests. think she laid out from a missile defense point of view, we need basis to support radars, and i think if we ever did boost
phase, i think we would want to have aircraft stationed there to be able to operate. overseas basing is important to us. responsibility to defend south korea. they are charted with that. don't28,000 u.s. forces -- they do deter war, and we know that from interrogating defectors. that deters war, and that is in our interest to do that. cost, the other aspect, if we withdrew our forces, we would absorb a huge bill to our tax powers to station those forces back from the united states. there is a cost-effective aspect of this because we don't have the facilities to base them. if we return the fleet from japan, the air wings, about
70,000 forces from korea and japan, we would be building new bases in the united states at taxpayer expense. we do benefit from having the burden sharing, the host nation support. i think that cost is going to cause some political problems. i wouldn't want to leave the impression from my own statement, iri lies can pay more. we can say we do need it, therefore we got to foot the bill, but our allies have been taking advantage of that for a while. -- many people talk about -- when you talk to forces that are deployed, whenever they , they will all say the same thing, and we know how they
are spending their money in other ways. nations, andlthy they do have more, so these are not just military allies. these are political allies, especially in the case of nato. -- to provide protection against threats from the middle east. from russia as well, too. it is in their interest just --e our interest, so i think this administration has been able to get more money out of our allies because the approach -- i call it tough love. i don't know if our allies consider it that way. will say, too, it depends on who you talk to. some people don't want to give the president credit for anything. i would say it is both. secretary mattis came out of the most recent summit and said it
was the most successful one he ever participated in. why? when the president turns to merkel and gives her a hard time, it makes everybody nervous . it makes our nato allies nervous, too. our president is not only saying it, but he means it. say i sort of predicted that the nato alliance will be in better shape than when the president inherited it. that has actually happened in terms of this posture. you do want to make sure that we are aligning politically and not just militarily. there is something to it. we see what they are doing, and kim jong-unw that has gotten over -- what did i say?
when moon has gotten over his skis. kim is way out. -- whenever you see that kind of thing it causes you to wonder, we are providing security for them and us, and we should have more say about how kind of things are going. some are more problematic than others, that it is important to cordate your action , like the persian gulf, some of these countries have expressed interest in purchasing missile defenses. whether or not that will get held up, is going to be another political football for the administration. it is clear the threat is there. but it is also important for us to have goals.
summer of 2018, there was a report that the u.s. was stripping for patriot batteries out of the persian gulf. they has to be a more cost way to deal with the north korean missile threat. becausevery important iran, and the past year and half, has launched operations using ballistic missiles. the last time was in 2000 against an opposition group in iraq. iran has lost 19 missiles from its territory into the backyard of its neighbors. this means there are no defenses in the region against it. it knows that it can get away with it, and it publicizes it. it does it again and again. to use these systems and not --n have them be intercepted
i mean you're not going to fire it on -- they are not going to tell the government of baghdad, but they will buy your it at iraqi kurdistan. twice they have struck isis positions in eastern syria. -- it is a threat that is growing. if you are a partly -- partner sees the threat the same way you do, that is the predicate for talks. >> a question right here. i would like to dispute two things to the panel. first off, saying that that was summit, successful nato he has only been to two. thatere's not a lot
sometimes comes out of things, but he said it was successful. stain, but i'm just -- i understand, but i'm just saying he only went to two. areas that missiles have been launched into, they are the most effective interception force in the world, arguably with the israelis. it is an important argument. there is also issues of distance. they've got over 100 intercepts to the extent that there have been successful so launches. general there just launched in places that aren't fenced. i think the idea that our partners are ineffective, kuwait
-- >> do you have a question? >> no, i don't. >> it is a welcomed comment. right over here? tremendousperkin, presentations. i would like to congratulate you for a panel on both iran and north korea. at the same time i think it can't be stressed enough how in many ways this is one single threat because -- and reference this, the long history of collaboration between the programs, but now as the countries move forward into , production,ms they can leapfrog each other. support the reference to counter proliferation, because
it is the geography that is the biggest barrier. that obviously doesn't stop knowledge being transferred, but i am just wondering if you could , any of you, talk a little bit about where you see the greatest problems in terms of one of the two being behind in being able to draw upon the expertise, either operational or testing, where they don't have to go through the r&d because the other side has done something already, and vice versa. the iranians have or expensive they can share with north korea. where do we have to look at for that? also, and observation, we tend to focus on this problem strictly as a nuclear but with the issue
precision revolution and also the cost of the interceptor versus the cost of the missile itself, the rocket, but the bad guys are going to figure out at a certain point, if we can just , perhapsnough cheap precise, missiles and rockets, we have a shot of trying to swap any system. that is the case in southern lebanon and the southern part of north korea. i will take the last one first. i would just say that the , the cost of the interceptor versus the cost of the missile, i think it is better to look at the value of
the thing you are protecting versus the cost and what you're willing to do to protect that. every time i hear that, i think ?hy have we gotten this right the enemy doesn't care about the cost, but we are still going to have a value that we attached to what we want to protect. the other thing is we are not going to sit here with a catchers mitt and try to catch the whole rate of missiles that come at us, but we can do some damage limitation. fails,event deterrence -- there is evidence in some regions that we have dissuaded different attacks because of missile-defense. it is a hard thing to prove, because you're trying to prove a negative, but you also want to be able to absorb an initial attack, and that you can respond with offensive
capability. we need to have a better plan, which this review, again to its credit, most of the improvements in the review are in policy and strategy then conceptual then what i would say the budget fully matches. but this mdr came out very last minute. now that we have the house of representatives that switched parties, it will be difficult to implemented.a your point is well taken, but we want to have this mix so that missile-defense is cooperating our offense of strategy in the event that deterrence fails and we end up having to go to war. at to belabor this, there is point that i heard, madison is over his career, he has engaged in many summits, the point he this hasg, it does --
had an effect, the present putting the squeeze on our allies, has resulted in more contributions from our allies paired we might be uncomfortable with it, but it is getting results. >> i think we have a question here. >> i did not mean to give that impression at all. i am fully supportive. i civilly think more is better. -- simply think more is better. better, and i respect that capability. are firing, but i am not saying the deserts need to be protected, but it is an area -- maybe it is a reason to consider a basic they are, especially on this basis. to the point about what iran and north korea could be doing.
an article about what iran might look to purchase, it's been a while since they acquired a whole system. there are two whole systems that they acquired, and one became the basis for the liquid fueled -- whatever you want to call it, which became one that is relatively failing the flight sent -- test. these can carry nuclear warheads. what is the next one? we speculated back in 2017, and i think i still stand by it, that it could be a two-stage solid fuel mrv m. iran has one. i haven't seen it tested sense 2011 or 2013 read i think it was because the tests were not
successful. but it could be something that the iranians to want to purchase. >> i don't have the technical ability to say who is ahead or not, but they do have a relationship, and i think they benefit from that relationship. in terms of proliferation, i think you are right. it is not just nuclear or missile proliferation. i think it needs to be addressed on a global scale. of course we focus on nuclear and missile because those are the biggest threats. rebeccah: the north koreans are weaponsnding chemical technology to syria. this is a nasty proliferator of the whole gamut of dangerous weapons. writtenticle that i had with the current north korea senior fellow.
whole host of things including submarines. it is not just in the missile domain. >> our time is winding down. i want to give each of you 30 seconds on closing thoughts, any important thoughts. >> i think north korea's capabilities are critical to its survival. the missiles are the key tool there across the spectrum, diplomacy, information, influence, and wartime and proliferation to make money. they are really critical. we need to focus more on north korea pot proliferation and shut it down as well as find -- we have got to improve our defenses. , think that is the hardest defending against the threat is the most difficult thing. rebeccah: just to reiterate, defense is stabilizing. we've gotten to a point where we
can no longer only defense threatsthem -- limited the line is being blurred their as technology continues to improve. thee have to finally make shift in terms of putting whereces, putting money our mouth is so that we can really take our soul defense to the next level. you don't hear this very often, but the chinese and russians work on defense themselves. everybody has to act in their own interest. we have got to take missile defense the next level. that you hears the statement from the iranians, from the government, that the west is trying to disarm us unilaterally, that the armistice is all we have. and if you look at it, they are very weak supplied air force,
but we should not let that argument sit at base value. the iranian people did have a defense when the regime shot missiles back at baghdad and iraq. iran, that which makes insecure is its missile force, so that which kept it secure in .he 80's is making it insecure it is driving america -- this is really a source of insecurity for the iranian people. i'm pretty sure that the people are cognizance that is just the missile testing that it is driving everyone to focus on the iran threat. governmentonsible hopefully one day would be cognizant of that development. i would say our partners need to stand with us and stand up on the iranian missile challenge. we need to translate words into
announcer: today joe biden will deliver remarks at a democratic party fundraiser. live coverage of the event begins at 6:15 eastern time with the former vice president scheduled to speak at 7:00 here on c-span. sunday night angela stent examines foreign policy and international goals. , she is interviewed as --a titus who serves on the house foreign affairs committee. more optimistic that if we find common ground that we can be a good partner with russia? putin's popularity has fallen, and public opinion shows the majority of russians now don't want stability. they want change. they want a better economic
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