tv CSIS Panel Discusses Russian Perspective of U.S.- North Korea Relations CSPAN April 19, 2019 10:00am-11:17am EDT
can. host: ok. that is charlene. that is the end of our program. we thank you for participating. right now, we take it to the organization known as csis, an event taking a look at the united states and north korean relations as well. that event already starting. we will take it to you in process. >> in a while. role, anastasia is a research fellow at the maritime state university in blood of our stock in russia, an expert on north korea, north korean security policy. she will be talking to us about u.s. dprk normalization and the role of surrounding powers including russia, giving her perspective and the view from russia about what this relationship looks like and what
the potential for normalization is. our discussion today, sharon squassoni, who many of you know, a research professor at the elliott school of international affairs and gw. a well-known expert in washington on nuclear energy, arms control, disarmament. senior long history of positions on this role, spend a lot of time here at css as well. , on thea's presentation screen, will be about 30 minutes, then sharon will provide a little bit of discussion and context, and then we will open it up to all of you. we are being recorded, this will be available on the eurasia program website tomorrow. it also means that we are on the record. please silence your phones and other noisemaking devices. if there are no objections, let's go to anastasia.
anastasia: good morning, everybody, for this event. the issue between the united states and north korea has been topical for years. last year, a real chance to move forward, but even the second summit with donald trump and kim jong-un finished without any significant results. there is still no progress an ongoing dialogue. nevertheless, the dialogue should be continued. otherwise, the tensions can be renewed and caused threats to regional security. on the first one it is clear, north korea has nuclear missile
technology, experience with weapons sales, and has gray and black channels which are being things to bey for directed toward proliferation. north korea can be pushed to proliferation by internal and external factors. renewed factors include threat by the united states or pressure by china. factors include economic development which require huge resources. north korea does not have many. the second threat is possible degradation of united states rok alliance. one of the biggest concerns was normalization between the countries would inevitably lead to u.s. troops from south korea and ultimately the degradation of the alliance.
it is a lack of progress in negotiations that can lead to this collapse. in ability achieve progress in negotiation with north korea is more likely the cause. in the position of north korea, it is not an interest in hostile relations with north korea. the image of the superpower can be tarnished if it is unable to come to an agreement. it can potentially push its asian allies to seek their own stance. excuse me. remembered that and japan conducted their nuclear programs in the past and have all of the necessary economic, scientific capabilities to create nuclear weapons in the short term. they just need political will to transfer their nuclear programs
to military. the next threat is further threatening of china's monopoly. china has almost restored its influence on north korea [indiscernible] after the adoption of united resolution 2375, china almost monopolized trade ties. korea for a long timen 2375 exs raised concerns that china could ultimately make north korea its province, dealing with relations between china and political
protectorate, or even annex. politicalmptions protectorate, or even annex. these assumptions are controversial. unit when china's economic influence grows, records suggest north political protectorate, or even annex. these assumptions are controversial. unit when china's economic influence grows, records suggest north korea maintains an independent foreign policy. china could impact the foreign policy of north used as a tool f foreign policy. sanctions imposed on the latest resolution to 375 have certainly affected the welfare of ordinary people in north korea and activities. impactctions produced no things they were targeting. north korea experienced and unchanged position, could become another encouraging model for other countries which are under u.n. or u.s. sanctions. certainly decreases the efficiency or perception of
efficiency as sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. at the same time, it brings some results and a number of prospects. first, both south korea and japan consider the removal of so-called north korean threat by peaceful means the most optimal path. it is not surprising considering the country's proximity to north thea and the presence of united states on their territories. this could become a target for north korean missiles. if the united states could establish peace on the peninsula by establishing normal relations, it would help. the alliance between the united states and rok has been a successful one because it never remains static. in response to the changing security environment, changes are made to military exercises and number of troops. this did not lead to the collapse of the alliance. the same would not hold true for
u.s.-dprk normalization. any future government in full regard with a policy ideology would be interested in an alliance with the united states in some form as a source to hedge against an and china. -- japan and china. the bilateral alliance is in need of update for its structure to meet the new geopolitical environment, otherwise, it risks destabilizing the peninsula. modernization would maintain its relevant value and would be appreciated, and would help to strengthen its position in the region. today, the main purpose of an alliance is deterrence of china, so it doesn't make sense to put this alliance at risk. as for united states troops in
the south, north korea made it clear in the past, it is ready to accept their long-term presence. the position of north korea will hardly change as they also consider the united states presence as a geopolitical hedge against chinese and russian influence. modernization of the alliance would lay the groundwork for new security mechanisms in northeast asia. it is not about the special advisor to south korean president, told during the last meeting that north korea can ultimately become a military ally of the u.s. north korea made it clear there are no enemies. the idea of the level of cooperation may seem fantastical but it is not new and has already attracted the attention of experts, particularly one who served on the korean peninsula energy organization. this idea of building united
-dprk relationship. they also recommend the united states shipped from the current lines. rather, united states should be friends and working to empower both north and south korea to battle against china. coulds way, united states more positively shape the future of northeast asian regions. to make it possible, the united states should not just make peace with north korea, but also build a constructive relationship with pyongyang. the refusal of united states normalized relations with dprk could lay the groundwork for the china-dprk-rok triangle. prospect is participation of the united states in economic projects on the korean peninsula.
it is no secret there are businessmen in the united states, rok, european countries are waiting for sanctions relief to start business in north korea. now it has been transformed. of the normalization united states and north korea would make it possible for american businessmen to work there constantly, and would allow the united states to spread soft power and serve as a security guarantee for north korea. indeed, the united states will not attack north koreans if there are americans in the territory. another option is participation of united states in so-called korean projects of korean economic cooperation. not only has economic importance but also can promote inter-korean
rapprochement and have peacekeeping potential. participation of united states in this project was not only helped both states of the korean peninsula but also would become one of the few influences along with russia. now let's look at normalization. first of all, the different positions of the main participants. the position of north korea can be centered as proactive. north korea feels an urgency for change, or storing its diplomatic and foreign relations. the results to date are impressive, including numerous summits. has skillfully played the opposition of interest between the u.s. and china. north korea sought rapprochement with china as leverage to bring truck to the leveraging -- negotiating table. in the same way, north korea uses the dialogue to put pressure on china. along with dialogue with the
u.s., north korea is also developing inter-korean relations a red this forced china to intensify its diplomacy. north korea has reminded china of its energy. china seem to take a reactive position. north korea is of particular interest to china as a territory and cheap negotiations with the united states. faced with an american president, we need to talk with the north korean leader, china felt its need to restore its influence over north korea. at the same time, while china considers the peninsula's influence, it is not interested in any significant changes. it benefits from maintaining the status quo. for this reason, china would not favor north korea establishing closer ties with the united or rok.
it would seek to control or interfere in the current process. experts say even during the first summit of trump and kim, the third virtual participant in the negotiations. agreement reached in singapore was fully init would seek to cor interfere in the current process. experts china's interest. the same could be said about the second summit which finished with no result but the door open for dialogue. as for united states, their position also seems reactive. current dialogue with north korea appears to be a reprise of the past, when inter-korean rapprochement and change in the region resulted in the u.s. opening a dialogue with north korea. north koreans always responded to these signals but these efforts. with a trump presidency there is the possibility of changes. trumppossible that donald has his own vision of development of relations with dprk but it should be remembered he does not -- he may not have
the same power in the united states as kim jong-un in dprk. another obstacle to achieving agreement between the u.s. and the divergence between the official and real goals in dialogue. official, clear goals are well known. inis denuclearization exchange for security guarantees for dprk. these are well known. united states insists on its models. north korea insists on their own, providing for the korean peninsula. managing deterrence, this approach is not aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons in north korea, but different
limitation. the roadmap offers not denuclearization, but demilitarization of the north korean nuclear program. the model proposed by chinese scholars, which provides leading north korea with a small amount of nuclear weapons, considers an approach, some weaknesses and strengths, but they have a common drawback. it should be noted that none of these approaches takes into account the motivational factors for north korea to possess nuclear weapons. and it's strategic goals. there are different approaches to motivation behind the north korean nuclear program. an isolated state, revisionist
state. korea, ifion, north we compare statements of its leadership, official statement in state media with the main basics of approach to foreign political values, we see there is much in common. , motivations to possess nuclear weapons, researchers dealing with this issue single out the following factors motivating all countries to develop nuclear weapons. security considerations, prestige, technical progress. korea, the full set of motivating factors would look like this. we see the more flexible approach of denuclearization
does not consider this factor. they provide compensation for north korea nuclear weapons as a means of security only, but what about other functions of this weapon, what about prestige, to counter ality potential enemy? how can that be compensated, will it be compensated? since nuclear deterrence has been created to achieve certain geopolitical goals, it is logical north korea can only do this after achieving goals. what are these goals? let's try to understand it. reunification, absorption by another is impossible and technically unfeasible. this is well understood in south and north korea. north korea has its own idea of reunification.
it sees coexistence of two independent countries rather than reunification. however, there can be integrated processes, establishing one political system on the peninsula. the important moment, the careening insula should be neutral in its foreign policy. kim jong-un, while studying in switzerland, got interested in historical experiences of this country as a neutral state. the status of neutral state in the past century. the korean war and the division of the korean peninsula could be avoided even though both states are actively involved in geopolitical gains of big powers , and korea has been a strategic pond in confrontation of powers. thanks to nuclear weapons, north
korea got the opportunity to become a strategic rogue. those who play chess know that a rooook is considered one of the stronger pieces. of course, north korean chances have increased but in order to achieve strategic goals, it needs nuclear potential, which has showed. what are the real interests of these powers? countries --hows refusal of north korea to make unilateral concessions without -- reliable guarantees also was acceptable. these approaches could be
justified in the beginning of 2000 when north korea didn't have nuclear weapons but serious problems in economics and could make some concessions. now using old approaches, looks strange. there are two possible explanations. first, big powers ignore the shift, ignoring unipolar, bipolar. important point, north korean regime and its de facto nuclear status is a part of the status quote. that is why denuclearization cannot be the goal. consequences would be more serious than those of nuclear states. another problem is the dialogue format. seems thedialogue most efficient for normalization or bilateral relations but its implementation is difficult due
to interest of the third parties. dialogue between the united states and north korea has brought no results. one of the reasons is active interference of internal and external forces. in the u.s., hardliners of trump may not let him make concessions to kim and make him make decisions in the last moment. as for north korea, it is more complex. is no domestic political struggle for the moment, just external factors influencing their position on negotiations. there is one country which could do it, china. interference was difficult to prove. it certainly took place. in this case, bilateral talks are not bilateral. in order to achieve progress of one at least interference factor
is needed. negotiations with a mediator could be another option. if the north korean government has already played a role in improved as a mediator, which we saw in the winter political games. importantly, the south korean government is interested in normalization of united states and north korea. no country in the region is really interested in normalization except neutral countries like mongolia and russia. mongolia has much in common with north korea from the point of geopolitical position, maintaining good positions. the mongolia position itself as a neutral from different international negotiations.
hand,,russia, on the one russia seems to take a passive hand. dprk, other hand, with taking an aggressive hand. there may be certain advantages. russia does not have much leverage on north korea. pyongyang does not consider russia as an external threat. from this point, russia seems an attractive mediator with north korea. at the current stage, this role is hampered by the tension between the u.s. and russia. the stronger of it support of china on the korean peninsula. for more active involvement of russia facilitating the dialogue
mosten the u.s. and dprk, relations with washington is needed. normalization between united states and dprk is not only possible but also meets the interest of both countries. it would require revision of the current agenda and strategy of the united dates. -- states. these changes are good but not limited to. you can see them on the slide. the first one is it is necessary to revise the strategy errors -- strategies. north korea cannot only play the role of a buffer but can also act in the interest of the u.s., if the latter would take into account its interests. the second one means, different approaches should be applied to the citizens of north korea. peacefults right to
programs not only violates international laws but does not build trust between countries. normalization before denuclearization. denuclearization of north korea is possible only as a result of inter-korean negotiations and security with the u.s. in order to achieve or at least to start achieving this goal, motivations should go first to bilateral negotiations. engagement instead of pressure. it is clear, understanding and trust is a natural result. in order to start normalization, development of human cooperation is needed. concessions, that word is negatively pursued by countries. adjustments seem more harmless and allow countries to adjust their strategic goals.
for example, freezing united concessions is an option. bilateral reason instead of multilateral reason. it is clear. at least neutral mediators. finally, managing risk instead of avoiding risk. experts point to united states reactive, calling it avoiding risk. it is true for united states north korean policy. refuses to be proactive and change strategy on the dprk.
thank you for your attention. [applause] thank you, anastasia. let me pass it over to sharon. [inaudible] i don't have any prepared remarks, but i do have tons of questions, because your presentation -- so interesting and provides such a different perspective than we often get here in washington. first, full disclosure, i do believe the mongolians are a good mediator, because mongolians actually introduced anastasia and me a couple years ago. thus started some of this collaboration. i have, instead of repair comments, some big questions.
i hope maybe i can ask them of you, we can have a little bit of a dialogue, and then open the questions,l of your because this looks like a pretty expert audience to me. so i have a few big questions. is denuclearization really possible? you seemed to suggest that the chinese do not believe -- at least the chinese scholars think that we maybe you will too reduce risk from north korea's nuclear weapons. in your big points, one of them was normalize, not denuclearize. frame, --rough a u.s.
another full disclosure, i'm a nonproliferation person. i view these issues in a particular way. i think the trump administration has been fairly clear that denuclearization has to happen, if not yesterday, then next week. most of us understand that is unrealistic. but somewhere there is a range. do you think denuclearization is really possible, if north korea has, as you say, has a lot of motivating factors, have put nuclear weapons in their doctrine, they see nuclear weapons as pretty much changing the northeast security environment? could you elaborate on that? of course i think it's possible, but maybe not in our life. it will require the inter-korean reintegration, which will be
prevented actively by different countries in the region. cooperation and security with the united states is very difficult. it will take a lot of time because two countries which opposed each other will have to find ways to cooperate in such sensitive spheres as security. working with both korean states is needed in this case. chinese, they do not believe in denuclearization, maybe because they do not believe in reunification. scholarson of chinese is that a stable north korea is more preferable to a denuclearize north korea. if it needs nuclear weapons to guarantee stability, china can get used to it.
so, one of the challenges in my long career of nonproliferation, is convincing other countries, you don't need nuclear weapons for security. certainly, some of your comments about further proliferation, the -- more isouth korea the case for japan -- has a latent nuclear weapons capability. uranium enrichment, processing. not a huge jump for them in terms of technical capabilities. politically, it would be a huge jump. maybe the u.s. is not doing such a great job -- but japan and south korea are examples of countries that have strong alliances with the u.s., no nuclear weapons.
it seems hard for me to understand that north korea would want to live in a northeast asia where south korea and north korea -- sorry, south korea and japan suddenly develop nuclear weapons. the other point is, here are two to view a countries that are economically successful more or less, strong alliances with the u.s. good examples of countries without nuclear weapons that have done well. so how would the u.s. get at this point about prestige, nuclear weapons, the fact that this is not really going to help north korea? i'm a parade -- a nuclear weapon will stop being a symbol of prestige when all countries have it. i hope that does not occur. south korea, there was
interest in statements by north our nucleart weapons will be for all koreans. some south korean experts say even a north korean weapon would be common for the korean nation. that would create a huge problem for the nonproliferation treaty. anastasia: again, it is possible after reunification of any form. reunification is a distant prospect. i had a very narrow question. you quoted kim jong-il about the aboutce -- from 2000 -- the potential presence of u.s. troops after reunification. that was pre-nuclear weapons --
their first test was 2006? do you think kim jong-un has a different view, perhaps? i don't feel any reason for him to require the removal of united states troops. just require the removal of nukes. north koreans still do not believe that united states would withdraw all tactical weapons from the south. preventd a guarantee to . for united states troops, they consider it as a geopolitical hedge against the influence of big neighbors. united states troops can deter the influence of china and possibly russia. sharon: do i have the liberty to ask a few more questions?
some of these are disparate. i have a whole page here. you mentioned chinese interference in the summit process. can you talk more about that, what china might have done, what motivated china in that regard? as i already told, china is interested in the status quo, which means no improvements in the relation between north korea and the united dates. china has different leverage, economic leverage over north korea. i have very big doubts about the north korean envoy to negotiations. what if he was an agent of influence for china? any evidencee have or indication that he is?
anastasia: unfortunately, no, just my own opinion. nobody would confirm the information. maybe later if it becomes history. but there is no political struggle currently in north korea. that proved by the fact the leader can leave the country for several days for a foreign trip. the regime is stable, no conflicting factions in the country. couldt external factors influence the position of north korea. if you would indulge me, i have two more questions, not about your presentation, but more coming from vladivostok. you have a particular perspective, you are much closer to the region. -- and of your comments about sanctions let me to raise this question.
the u.s. perception is that north korea is extremely isolated, but coming from the region, i have the hunch that you don't see them as isolated as we do. is that the case? you talked about sanctions affected trade, relations, the exertion of soft power on north korea. could you talk a little bit how your view from your geopolitical perch might differ? view, is north korea not as isolated as we think they are? anastasia: i think the influence of sanctions is noticeable. we have almost lost this. workers engaged in the construction sector, north
korean restaurants closed. but the situation is not the same in china. there are some reports that china continues their cooperation. for north korea itself, visitors to this country notice that sanctions did not influence its economy. it affects some groups of people, maybe welfare, prices of some goods, but these goods are still supplied. it is difficult to track those channels. russia is the one that suffered from the sanctions. share of trade with north korea was very small even before
sanctions. one last question, since you've been in washington for a few months. what did you think was odd or perceptionst u.s. of north korea, the situation there? anastasia: [laughter] concerningpression the north korea, united states very isolated internationally. approach is the same of a cold war approach. i don't understand why it has not developed.
say the u.s.en you is isolated in information, you mean that we are not getting a lot of information about north korea? anastasia: a vacuum with north korea. maybe some people don't even know where north korea is located on the map. some people don't know where mexico is. anastasia: at the same time, experts are very flexible. the most interesting ideas that i have found here while reading articles from experts. unfortunately, experts are not governments,y everywhere, not just here. jeffrey: thank you both. i think we have opened up a lot of avenues for discussion. i know there's a lot of expertise in the room, so i want to take advantage of it.
at this point, opening up to questions. wait to be recognized, you will get a microphone. speak into the microphone, the brief, and please ask a question, rather than making a long statement. richard. >> hudson institute. sharon, when you have the chart about south korean and japanese capabilities. they are much further behind in some respects because that was just to build a weapon. they have not been able to practice concepts. more importantly, they don't have the incentive. the u.s. has been good about giving them other means to ensure their security. that was my comment. my question for you is, russia and china have been promoting this three-step peace plan. first, you have a cessation of north korea nuclear missile
tests, cessation of large u.s. exercises. the next phase is the series of , particularlyings between the head of the united states and north korea, and also between north korea and russia, and so on. we have gone through those. we will now need to go through the third phase, according to this model of rebuilding this multilateral structure, to embed some of these processes. i was curious how you would assess the implementation, that peace plan, do you think this is what we are following? and what do they make him further? may comehim further -- further? thank you. anastasia: you asked about multilateralism? multilateralism may be
i see in some cases, but a negative example, six-party talks. country, when there are more than three countries, they see their own interest and ultimately negotiations turn into a platform for putting claims in different questions. theteral relations between united states and north korea should be improved bilaterally, at least neutral mediator, but not in the same format as the six-party talks. , [indiscernible] it is a russian table. -- fable. there are different levels.
it would require participation of all countries. concluding a peace treaty. china also took part in the korean war. russia unofficially. all of these countries unofficially but they took art. so they should take part in the final draft. as for normalization, your question about -- i will make it clear later. normalization between the u.s. and dprk for bilateral reasons, in my opinion. >> global peace foundation. two questions. one about korea, one about mongolia. you mentioned differentiation rather than reunification of
korea. also talking about a distant thing rather than immediate possibility. talked tokim jong-un regional party leaders, military reunificationaid has to happen by 2020, the matter what. also, the south korean government asked scholars to study about confederation ideas, like the european union, that kind of way of scenario reunification. what if both sides want to go .hat way how serious are they, what would be russia's position on this? neutral platform for people to
convene. mongolia wants to do that. however, the former president went to north korea, tried to promote democracy there. he wanted to see mongolia as an example for north korea and transition to democracy without nuclear weapons and promote the whole regional region. how do you see that kind of transition into a nuclear-free democracy, that kind of possibility, and under what conditions can that happen? anastasia: i almost forgot the first question. 2020.: reunification by the end of the world
by this year. it is very difficult to predict. oftake this basic concept reunification -- not reunification but cooperation, it's already been implemented now. the next question is who will replace moon jae-in. if a new president comes to south korea, foreign policy turns very sharply, including north korean policy. not so many countries interested in the inter-korean rapprochement. i don't use the word reunification. as for mongolia, it's very interesting. as you know, mongolia has their own concept. north korea could borrow this concept.
arabia. i'm not an expert, just a journalist. toanted to ask with regard -- in america, we see things differently perhaps from people like you or people closer to north korea. the perception here is that the north korean leader is completely off-the-wall, megalomaniac, no one controls him. mind, -- and some people may argue in america we have a similar situation. but in america, there are people around the president that do have influence, whereas in north korea, the perception from here is it is one man rules all. believe oneis it to can negotiate with the leader of north korea, that he will follow through on promises?
are there people that he is accountable to? in this case, negotiations would be affected if just two leaders negotiate leader to leader. that is why north koreans take seriously just trump, not his advisers. other persons can be replaced. they are not something constant. if it is kim jong-un who negotiates, he should negotiate with trump only. understand the reality is different in the u.s., trump is not the only person that makes decisions. but they still want to talk with trump only. jeffrey: i think the question was, if the u.s. does negotiate can kim, how much constants
reliable than the american president. i think they have much in common. , all agreements could be implemented, if the position is not influenced by other forces. sorry, my english is not so good. maybe i did not understand. the other thing. hastimes north korea purported to make promises, which it never made. for example, when north korea was talking about denuclearization of the korean peninsula, the media wrote about the denuclearization of north korea. it is not good because it
creates false expectations. when these expectations are not met, it creates tensions in relations. sharon: so the question of whether leaders will follow agreements is a good one. that is why some people think we should have treaties. even then, some countries do not always adhere to treaties. that is why we have this rule of law. it is a funny situation where you have a leader who we believe , kim jong-un, is very much in control of his country, can make decisions, but in the past, that reneged and violated agreements. we can argue whether there were misunderstandings over those things. i used to never issued for the u.s. government.
that is why you have negotiate histories. obviously, some things can fall through the cracks. on the other hand, we have a u.s. president who has other constraints on him, but is capable of turning on a dime and decide to do good things are bad things on any given day. dialogue, i believe, is really critical as we go forward, but not enough. it is not enough for north korea to take certain transparency and confidence building steps, for example, shutting down its nuclear test site. that is very nice but that does not guarantee that it will never test nuclear weapons again. right? so both sides need to see it in their interest to adhere to, or write agreements, have some sort of verification, monitoring.
is useful,ilateral as we have seen with iran nuclear deal. even though the u.s. has decided for whatever reason to get out of it, the other parties see a need to stay in the agreement. where we get there with north korea, that is a good question. but that rule of law is critical, in my view. just to make a comment on the previous question, this issue of confederation. however unification, whatever , -- the it happens swiss republic is a confederation. confederation, you have a lot of agreement on how things happen. at this point, i just cannot see south korea, which has quite a vibrant democracy, and north korea, -- and i take your point,
democracies are -- there are no perfect democracies. but north korea is just so far away from that. i don't know if i could trust kim jong-un's points about unification. i think he would have a heart attack when he saw exactly what accountability means. i hope he gets there. but we are not anywhere close. sorry for going off. jeffrey: we have to think about historical examples of confederation's with countries with such radical he different political systems. over here. >> i have a reporter from eurasia. i have a question about the kim jong-un visit to russia maybe next week. can you tell me what is the main purpose of russia and north
korea having a summit at this moment, when negotiations with the united states and north korea have been deadlocked? what do you think about that? anastasia: thank you. this issue is very interesting. we traditionally have good relations with north korea, so i wonder why the visit is so late after so many summits with other leaders. i would not expect practical results from this summit. , as i alreadyegy told, is not so active. north korea currently needs to balance china. the only country that can do it is the united states, not russia. some observers point to north the summit with no
results, look to russia. -- i don't think what can be discussed is a possible mediator roles in russia in the current dialogue between united states and north korea. i don't think there will be practical results. it will be discussed for the future because now we can do nothing in this sanctions condition. >> thank you.
i am a scholar from korea. i have two questions. you mentioned a new kind of regional security system. trilateral relationship. also, china trilateral relationship. in my view, at least for northeast asia, to think about any kind of multilateral security mechanism, at least both the u.s. and china should agree. in that context, do you think china and russia has some intention to work with the u.s. to create such a mechanism? you mentioned nuclear weapons. weapons for both north and south korea. even some south korean people have argued that.
do you think that you can be endorsed by others like u.s., china, russia? i don't believe it's possible. too many contradictions and relations. because too many considerations and a rivalry between the u.s. and china, between the u.s. and russia, no points of contact. not six participants could create security mechanisms and i do not think these three countries who are in a rivalry can create something like this, they have different interests. as for nuclear weapons, for koreans -- it is not my opinion, it is the opinion of south korean experts. and it is considered radical.
[indiscernible] thees, but we do not know strategies of the government for the future. koreans, this is a nation with 5000 years history. maybe they have strategies for hundreds of years. we cannot know it. if the model i described -- or the perfect model, with participation between the united states and the two korean states, they will is -- any nukes, but it difficult to implement and maybe koreans will decide to go another path. >> can i just go on the record thinking that is a terrible idea. [laughter] for north korea's nuclear -- alls to be taken up korean nuclear weapons -- i
would really be surprised if other countries in the region could, could agree to that. we want fewer nuclear weapons, not more. >> the ones he recommended before would have something to say about that. >> something actually like that could spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which has kept the number of nuclear weapons states very low. we can talk all week long about, um, about problems with that treaty and implementation, but on the whole has been very successful in keeping nuclear risks lower. it is going to celebrate its 50th anniversary next year. i'm sure that these issues, you know, north korea continuing nuclear weapons will be
raised. this is not the only country that joined the treaty as a nonnuclear weapon states and left and developed nuclear weapons. iran is not in that category. but israel, india, they never enjoyed the treaty, so north korea from a nonproliferation perspective presents very strong challenges to, you know, what are we doing, why are we doing this. we need to solve this issue. >> mina ms. -- my name is sylvia. first question is for sharon. where do you situate the recent tactical guided weapons tests from north korea in their strategy and thinking? where do you think we will go ahead from here, because it is
clearly an indication of the north korea's regime's frustration with washington dc's inflexibility in negotiations. my second question is for anastasia. you mentioned that russia is viewed as a trash and cash as a trusted -- as a trusted partner. do you think they would try to influence dpr to sign and ratify the cbdb, it seems one of the lowest hanging actors pro nonproliferation that they can undertake. thank you. sharon: i think you intimated in your question, north korea trying to get or poke the united states. it was not a nuclear weapons test or a long-range missile test, there are other things it could have done.
but it is a reminder to the u.s. , hello, you need to deal with us. and we are serious about this. the u.s.ot be happy walked away from the last summit. i think it is a tactical signal, a tactical test. think russia and north korea are rather friends, their partners. their relations are specific. russia never presses on north korea, that is why they have good relations. of course, russia can persuade, but they are friends, so they do not force them to do something. it is not russian. maybe china will act more effectively. >> what are the sources -- sorry, what are the sources of leverage russia would have over north korea?
[speaking russian] anastasia: russia never interfered in the policy of north korea. so leverage, it is good leverage. in the russia and north korea relations. sharon: on the point about the treaty, russia signed the treaty, right? signed and ratified. the u.s. and china have not. it seems to me it is a russia's interest, very strong interest, to get this treaty -- you know, into force. and to do that you need to north korea, you need the u.s., you need china. if i was the russians, i would be on a full-court press to make this happen. think northm, i
korea can do just after improvement of relations with the united states. they do not need tests for technical reasons. they already made all technical tests. they can make some critical tests, but the protest is demonstration. if north korea is not satisfied with the process, it can demonstrate or test something. i do not think they could persuade them to sign this treaty. i do not think there is no improvement in relations with the united states. have any other questions? hi, my name is jack. i live in the information vacuum. so question about north korea. well, i almost forgot it.
back to unification, do we have any sense of how they in north korea view what are the characteristics unification will bring about, what expectations they have that in 2020, is that the end all, sign a treaty or begin the process? when did they expect something to be different? anastasia: i do not believe it will happen so fast, but maybe in 2020 some more improvement in the relations will occur because some type of cooperation will be restoring some border or trading, some border zones. impossible even with reunification by this concept, one nation and to political
systems, it will take decades. we will not see it. that is why some experts consider it will never occur, it will occur not in their lives. >> any concluding thoughts? sharon: i don't. na for cominghank a to see us. for providing a really interesting perspective on these issues. i feel like in washington we listen to each other say the same things and if you are a north korea expert, you know the charge by heart. and so it is, i am not sure i would call it an information vacuum, but certainly we tend to follow very conventional routes for information, so i want to thank you for opening up the spectrum for us.
anastasia: thanks for having me. >> of course. to you.a: thank you has made the approach. it was a very efficient platform. >> maybe that will be the topic of our next meeting. thank you all for coming. give a hand to our panel. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]
>> i think it is important on this day that we continue to offer the people of colorado, the people of littleton, the families involved, the knowledge that all of america cares for them and is praying for them. ago, the: 20 years columbine high school shooting was one of the deadliest high school shootings in american history. tonight at 8:00 p.m., we look back on the shooting and provide reflection on the tragedy. >> at that time, columbine had never happened. neither the parents or the school counselor looked at the issue of a violent paper as something that was indicative of the possibility of some real deterioration and thinking. announcer: watch our special on the columbine high school shooting tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. [bell rings]
>> i think the legacy of rochester is really ongoing. the more rochester embraces its role as a city of compassion, wellness, hospitality, i think our mission is to make people feel welcome that this is a home away from home. announcer: the cities tour is exploring the american story. this weekend, we take you to rochester, minnesota, with the help of our spectrum cable partners. south of0 minutes minneapolis, rochester has been the home of the mayo clinic since its founding in 1864. >> it is a good neighbor in rochester. the mayo clinic helps rochester achieve international recognition. in many respects, it when i have happened except for the city of rochester. it was a small town, the intimate nature of rochester that allowed this incubator to expand that became a world presence in medicine. announcer: we will speak with local authors in this city of
115,000. ♪ >> ♪ come gather around people wherever you roam ♪ >> plus people think bob dylan is a leftist or somehow associated with the hippie movement of the 1960's, the voice of a generation in the 1960's, a label he detested. i would say you cannot really say he is exactly left or right. so i think most people have a misconception about what bob dylan is. announcer: watch c-span's cities tour of rochester this saturday at noon on c-span 2. and on sunday at 2:00 p.m. i on american history tv on c-span 3. working with cable affiliates as we explore the american story. announcer: coming up in 45 minutes, a discussion on israeli domestic and foreign politics of
following the recent elections. the middle east institute is the host of the conversation. live coverage begins at noon eastern here on c-span, online, and on the free radio app. host: during the morning we will be joined by several legislators to get their view of the report. jamie raskin, democrat of maryland, he serves the eighth district and a member of the judicial committee. good morning. guest: good morning. host: what happens now with your committee on the release of this report? guest: well, we are going to hear from several people. we will hear from attorney general barr, from special counsel robert mueller. we will be able to get our remaining questions answered about the writing of the report, the staged choreographed release of information. as well as the report over the last several weeks. we have tough questions to