tv U.S. Institute of Peace Discussion on North Korea Sanctions CSPAN July 8, 2019 10:04am-11:54am EDT
get started. thank you for joining us despite the rain. i know it was difficult for many of you. welcome to u.s. ip -- usip. are not familiar, we are a nonpartisan, independent institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible. we are funded by congress and we are focused on preventing, mitigating and resolving conflict. thatf the global hotspots has eluded peace for many years is the korean peninsula. canident trump and chairman met at the border with south korea, which has weakened the prospect of returning to measure -- returning to negotiations. in the coming weeks, they will try to make progress on denuclearization and peace. one of the sticking points has
been north korea asking for sanctions relief. in order for the kim regime to survive and thrive, it needs to generate hard currency, and develop its economy, and sanctions have impeded these goals. the trump administration has stated consistently that it will not provide sanctions relief until north korea denuclearize denuclearizes or take significant steps toward denuclearization. how do we offer sanctions relief to incentivize diplomacy and denuclearization, but at the same time not minimize our leverage to quickly? quickly? we have assembled this fantastic panel of speakers. one of them is running a few minutes late, so we will have him join when he arrives. i have asked them as a group to help explain the scope of the sanctions regime against north korea, including multilateral and u.s. sanctions, the process
for providing partial and complete sanctions relief, some potential practical paths for providing relief, taking into account the constraints in opportunities, and any lessons from sanctions regimes on other countries that can be applied to the north korean case. let me introduce the panelists in the order they will be speaking. is not here, so we will have him speak second or third. and is the program manager at the national committee on north researchere he manages and publications. he is also the lead researcher and editor for "north korea and websited," interactive which explores north korea's diplomatic relations. to my left, we have josh stanton, a d c lawyer who played a significant role in drafting sanctions laws, including the north korean sanctions and policy enhancement act and the korean interdiction and modernization of sanctions act.
josh also served as a u.s. army judge advocate general in south korea, and runs the website "one free korea. is onnie klein albright the panel of experts established pursuant to you and security -- to a u.n.st security council request. she provides her conditions to the security council on implement a sanctions. she has had a long career as a u.n. official, as a director of the northeast asia program room at the -- program at the crisis group, and was a usip alum. we have liz rosenberg, director of the security program at a center for new american security. she focuses on the national security and foreign policy implications of the use of
sanctions and economic statecraft, as well as shifts in the energy market. previously, she was a senior adviser at the treasury department, overseeing the development and tightening of global sanctions on iran, libya, and syria, as well as the modification of sanctions on verma in the context of diplomatic normalization. i have asked each of them to speak for about eight minutes or so. i will ask a couple of questions to get the discussion going, and then we can open the remaining time for q and a. i was going to have can -- dan start, but josh can also provide a great overview. i am going toents make this morning are my personal views. they don't represent the opinions of any government agency. or a member of congress committee of congress. unlike the other panelists here, my job has nothing to do with north korea. i am here on my own time. was my greatgo, it
honor to be asked to come to the house foreign affairs committee and draft the north korean sanctions policy enhancement act. it passed the vote by 418-3 and the senate by 96 to zero. that may give you a sense of the congress's impatience with the have conducted north korean policy. they looked back on years of bad , and mendacity by the north korean government, and a presidents who pursued the diplomacy of instant gratification, often prematurely throwing away the nonviolent, peaceful leverage of sanctions, which is really the only avenue we have left to disarm north korea without war. what we have learned through our experiences since 2005 is that north korea is surprisingly dependent on access to our financial system. the dollar is the world's
reserve currency, and most of northney that sustains korea runs through banks in new york. that gives the treasury and justice department jurisdiction block, and, prosecute people behind those transactions. north korea has no sovereign right to access to our financial system. as long as it is against our core interests, we should deny that right. legislation is nothing more than restraining access to the financial system they are atime as peace with us. the president's authority to lift sanctions is constitutional. .t is an enumerated power congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. aat congress expects from
north korea that has repeatedly reneged on its agreements had said it must regain our trust by accepting basic and fundamental transparency. so while i believe it is never too early to begin thinking about the conditions for the suspension and lifting of sanctions, i suspect we are having the conversation about two years too early, because it is going to take so much political pressure on the cohesion of the north korean regime that kim jong-un is presented with the choice between disarming or perhaps seeing the cohesion of his regime undermined, at which point he will have a diplomatic incentives to reach an agreement that meets our fundamental security interest, and is irreversible disarmament. why do we insist on this? we are dealing with a government reactor,t a nuclear
that has helped the side use chemical weapons against innocent civilians in syria, that sold portable surface-to-air missiles to terrorists, that has sent assassins to kill dissidents in exile and to murder kim jong-un's half-brother in a crowded airport terminal with a nerve agent. that cyber attacks united states and threatens the bedrock of our political system, our freedom of expression, that stole $81 million and the bangladesh bank. except the transparency necessary to verify its disarmament, or coexistence will not be possible. that korea is a regime lives on a small amount of cash overhead, and even a small relaxation of financial pressure will give it the option to continue its status.
that is not an option that will be acceptable to congress, which has imposed strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions. 104a sets out 15 categories of conduct, including proliferation,g the facilitation of human rights abuses that require mandatory sanctions. section 208 is a bypass around the sanctions for humanitarian assistance, or for those cases where imposing mandatory sanctions would harm our own national security. in other words, we should not require the president to collapse the chinese financial system when there are other enforcement options. and 402 allow the ultimate lifting of sanctions once north korea accepts transparency and allows for us to verify its disarmament. to those who say that north korea cannot possibly accept
nuclear disarmament, i would answer that this argument is a historical. -- ahistorical. north korea can survive without nuclear weapons. the threat is internal. it is the misappropriation of its wealth. it is fundamentally a kleptocracy problem. if donald trump were to attempt to unilaterally lift sanctions now, i suspect the response would be something like it was in 1986, when congress passed the comprehensive anti-apartheid act over president reagan's veto. we already see several bills in congress, including the asia ,eassurance act, the brink act the north korea policy oversight act, cosponsored by senator ,enendez and eliot engel foreign policy heavyweights in the democratic party in congress, and we have the lead act, by senators gartner and
markey. direction in congress is for more strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions, not less, and all this legislation affirms that our goal is complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of north korea. missed, i think, the root of all evil in north korea, which is money. the goal of sanctions must not simply be to put temporary pressure on kim jong-un until he .omes back for another photo op it has to be to disarm the country, but also to force kim jong-un to make better choices for his people. at this time, the only form of sanctions relief that is appropriate is sanctions released in the form of humanitarian aid that is ensurely monitored to that it feeds the hungry, and regardless of what kim jong-un does, whether he behaves well or
badly, because the north korean people are in no way responsible for his decisions. until then, we need an long game for sanctions, and the long game financialition diplomacy, in concert with u.s. wish to ensure that only those financial transactions involving north korea that directly benefit the north korean people can clear the financial system. thank you. frank: thank you. we have dan arriving right now. we will have him settle in. we can go to stephanie. so my comment today does not bind or represent the united nations, united nations security council, the 1718 committee, or the panel of experts. the goal of the sanctions regime, according to the united nations, so we are speaking about u.n. and not any of the
bilateral or national regimes, like that under treasury and other u.s. agencies which might be the subject here today -- the goals are to persuade the dprk to dismantle its nuclear programs and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. the goal is to reach diplomatic solutions for negotiation and dialogue, and that is something that was articulated specifically following resolution 2270, when the sanctions were described as not the final objective. to goal of sanctions is catalyze effective dialogue. initially that was seen as a six party talks process, and now the six party talks are long gone, so we are looking at other forms of dialogue. finally, the goal of the sections regime is to limit the impact of sanctions on the economy and the civilian population of the country. governedions regime is that falls under
the security council. it was established by resolution 1718. that was set up deliberately for the execution of the sanctions regime on north korea. there are over a dozen other sanctions regimes that have their own committees. this committee has the same composition of the security council, so 15 members, of which five are permanent members. the committee is set up to implement the resolutions on the dprk, which is to say since 2006 are over 10 -- 10? 11? can only. -- 10 only. the last three were in 2017, and we will talk about that. underneath the 1718 committee sits the panel of experts, of which i am a member in my capacity. there are eight members and they represent the five permanent members they are not
representing because of independent experts. we come from the five permanent members, and in addition to that, we have members from the republic of korea, singapore, and japan. they bring expertise in different areas. my expertise is in finance and economics, and we also have nonproliferation, customs and export control, maritime, air transport, and the like. the panel is mandated to assist the committee in carrying out its mandated function. the alleged file asian of sanctions as articulated in the resolutions of the security council -- that means gathering, examining, and analyzing byormation provided to us various different sources, whether it is member states, experts, organizations, u.n.
bodies, and other interested parties. we make representations to the council, and to member states, to improve implementation, and then we report. function -- our reports are public. our last report was dated march 6. you can find it online. they are very extensive, with lots of annexes. panel'sa summary of the investigations for the period. we report twice a year, so for the six months prior. we investigate through on-site inspections. we visit member states at their invitation. we interview. we ask questions. we write letters to companies and member states, and we do our own research. 2017, there is the last spate of resolutions, and we will
focus on the last two. what you have seen in the dprk sanctions regime is a move away from a narrow, targeted focus wmd to auclear and broader -- let's say a broader regime encapsulating a huge amount of the former north korean economy, looking at sanctions, a regime that prohibits a whole cloth of activities in the maritime space, vessels and otherwise. it has become a rather comprehensive regime. what the panel has found in its reports is that the expansion of the regime has not been matched by the requisite political will of member states to actually implement the regime. it has not been matched by the requisite international coordination, prioritization, and research allocation to actually drive effective implementation.
the resolutions -- resolution to 375, adopted in response to dprk's largest ever nuclear test in 2017, and the resolution adopted in response to the icbm launch, introduced sweeping sanctions, including a ban on work authorizations. ont comes into full force december 22. all north korean individuals working in other countries can repatriate. you see have brought the regime has become. it happens all joint ventures with dprk individuals, strengthens measures regarding supply and sale of all petroleum product, introduces a crude oil on all dprk exports of textiles, food, and
agricultural products, and a ban on the transfer of all industrial machinery, transport vehicles, iron, steel, and other materials, with the exception of spare parts to maintain commercial civilian operations. the panel has found that not only have member states insufficiently implemented this regime, but that invasion tactics by north korean entities and individuals have effectively undermined implementation as and the networks behind in illicit activity consists of a core of very skilled agents who are highly experienced, and they can cross borders, can mobilize money, can mobilize people and goods, can engage in sales and trafficking of arms-related materials. they can conceal financial activity by using complicit foreign nationals, front companies, and other methods to fuscate thee -- obg
flow of funds. they have full access to the global financial system right now, despite all the efforts put others.by ofac and the business by these networks is generating significant revenue. one of the recent areas of investigation to the panel is into actors, north korean actors, activities in cyberspace. that includes a tax on cryptocurrency exchange, laundering of proceeds from a the-- from attacks through currency exchanges, and even mining of currency, which has been done through taking illegal control of companies to literally create money, is what is happening. the panel has determined that these types of activities are in invasion of financial sanctions, because like going to bangladesh bank and stealing money from a bank -- the asset freeze provision is rendered
meaningless, because the bank never has an opportunity to freeze those assets, because they are being stolen from under the watch of the bank. it is the view of many member states that this kind of activity, given that the pie has sort of -- the way in which north korea is able to gain foreign currency is shrinking, obviously, given the white have been ranging sanctions on a swath of areas of economic importance. and yet this activity in cyberspace is taking on a larger and larger proportionate -- a larger and larger proportion of the ability of dprk to generate revenue, which under the resolutions, that revenue is applied to prohibited programs, and is by virtue illegal. with that, i will turn it over. frank: just to clarify, the sectoral sanctions cover the
prohibition on north korean exports, on coal and textiles that.afood, all of that is pretty much 95% plus of north korea's export economy right now. thanks for inviting me to speak today and my apologies for coming in late. there were a few road closures in heavy rain, as folks might have noticed. bynk asked me to start off giving me the purpose of the sanctions regime. i think this is an important first-order question. i think it is useful to view must sanctions regimes, certainly the north korean regime, as having implicitly a threefold purpose -- signaling, constraining, and forcing. signaling in the north korean context is that action such as nuclear tests will come at the cost, and future provocations will come with even higher costs.
constraining means the sanctions are meant to impede north korea's development of wmd and military capabilities. , the mostoercing important part of the sanctions regime -- the idea that sanctions pressure will force to north korean governments make concessions, to abandon its nuclear program, in return for the promise of sanctions relief. the coercive part is difficult, getting coercive bargaining rights. it is difficult to translate economic pressure into political concessions, and even with maximum economic pressure, that is not necessarily going to translate into achieving maximalist objectives. broader to be part of a policy. sanctions are not a strategy in , with diplomacy and
foreign policy, in order to be most effective. what are the explicit goals of the sanctions regime? there are key differences between the human sanctions and the u.s. sanctions regime. the one security council resolutions are premised on north korea's abandonment of its nuclear ballistic missile and .ther wmd programs the u.s. asians specifically through the north korean sanctions and policy enhancement act of 2016 -- my co-, mr. stinson, had a significant role in drafting. only northt of not korea's wmd activities, but it's human rights abuses, currency counterfeiting, cyber attacks, etc. for the u.n. sanctions to be lifted, according to the various resolutions, the security council is prepared to strengthen, modify, extend or lift the measures as needed, in light of dprk compliance.
that is to say that the security council, if there is political consensus for doing so -- and that is a big if -- can adjust the sanctions regime in accordance with north korean behavior. for u.s. sanctions to be modified, the executive branch has some leeway in how it administers sanctions, waving waivings on a -- sanctions on a case-by-case basis. for sections to be blocked, the white house has to certify to congress not only that north korea has begun the process of leftlearization, and has the process undefined on issues including human rights, illicit activities, etc. for sanctions under the u.s. law to be lifted, north korea must reach an even higher standard. in theory, there could be a class between the u.n. and u.s. sanction regimes. if north korea is to totally
abandon its nuclear program, but not change on human rights or other matters, you could have a situation where according to the text of the u.n. security council resolutions, u.n. sanctions should be lifted, but u.s. sanctions would remain in place, with secondary sanctions on foreign trade partners. i think that possibility is pretty remote, and not necessarily something to worry about. i think we used to be skeptical that north korea will ever denuclearize, but i think if it does that decision would almost certainly come with a broader context of a strategic shift in north korea's foreign relations and domestic political economy -- not necessarily a whole scale reform and opening, but it would involve the north korean government going on a very different trajectory than the one we have been on. nonetheless, i do think there is that wouldking steps reduce the immediate threat of north korea's nuclear program that would lead to a reduction
or end of its production of fissile material and other material for nuclear weapons, that would stop its development of more advanced ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, and i think that a program of base sanctions relief, in return for meaningful north korean concessions on its nuclear program, could be in the u.s. interest, and the interest of u.s. allies, and could perhaps push north korea in the direction of going on that different trajectory down the road. negotiations, training sanctions relief for north korean concessions on its nuclear program, i would articulate five principles about how that should go forward. first, any trade of sanctions relief for north korean nuclear concessions should be premised on the ultimate goal of denuclearization, but it should also make sense on its own terms, assuming the process does not go any.
second, i would start with sanctions that have the least direct connection to the north korean nuclear program, and that could be most easily adjusted or snapped back. i think sanctions have to facilitate things like cultural exchanges as a first step. certainly sanctions relief to facilitate greater humanitarian access are important. i don't think that should be tied to north korean action on its nuclear program. that should go ahead regardless. theophilus is a first steps, i think the u.n. central sanctions are a prime candidate for the first major sanctions relief, in return for meaningful north korean steps toward denuclearization. trade is morecial easily adjusted up and down or more easily snapped back with mechanisms in place then sanctions on things like north korean access to the financial
system, things like investment in north korea, which are really difficult to turn on and off. the third principle -- do not ease up on measures intended to deny hard currency to pyongyang until we can be reasonably confident that hard currency won't be funneled directly into producing more nuclear weapons there iss to say until a freeze on north korean fissile material production, and ideally at key facilities for icbm production as well. that is not to say that no sectoral sanctions should be walked back until the point where a total freeze is in place. i think you could perhaps start out with an adjustment of some of the sanctions on north korea commercial imports, on things that do notetals have a direct military purpose -- relief of those sanctions would have benefit to pyongyang, but at the end of the day in north korea, if all of its attitudes to access -- avenues to access for currency are
blocked, and sections are it isively enforced -- hard to import fuel if you do not have money to pay for it. sections really should be structured in a way that pushes north korea toward opening its economy and showing a minimal respect for labor rights -- for example, at the industrial complex, it should be premised on the north korean workers receiving their wages directly, among other things, rather than payments going to the north north government, with korean workers essentially being paid in rations. finally, if a program of sections relief is to go forward, the u.s. and like-minded countries should be able to implement the sanctions in place, and they should be on sanctions enforcement, and should not expand the scope of the sanctions regime while meaningful negotiations are underway.
working level negotiations are resume after president trump's impromptu visit. it is hard to say whether pyongyang will be willing to give more on its nuclear program than it offered in hanoi, and to accept less is [indiscernible] high but reasonable standard for sections relief would be a good diplomatic tactic. pyongyang will plan -- will pin if talks on washington collapse. if pyongyang is ready for negotiations that lead to a tangible rollback, i think the u.s. should be ready as well. thank you. i appreciate you proposing fervently those five principles. i hope we can talk about that a little bit later. liz? thank you,-- liz: and thank you for having research participate in this important conversation. to go after you all
have gone, so i can respond to some of the things you have already said. i have appreciated how you all have laid out some of the purpose of sanctions as they are in place, including the authorities that underlie them at the u.n. and in the u.s. system, and some of the modalities of their use, and indeed potential ideas or principles for unwinding them through their modalities. but i want to make a point about that the united states and other international players must bear in mind in order to proceed and operate in this heavily legal environment, .ith lots of constrictions the first point i want to make on practicality here is that what you say, for example, makes good sense for people who are
familiar with the laws, and have a lot of awareness and strong compliance programs in place. world where a lack of awareness in adequate, if , compliance programs, including the riskiest of jurisdictions and industries -- for example, the shipping industry is just beginning to wake up to the challenge that has been outlined explicitly over a long period of time in publicly-available information , by investigative journalists, by advisories from the u.s. government, from the japanese government, with photos. is a good amount of information out there if you are able to look, but there has not and enough awareness compliance protocols in industry internationally, with the
exception of the biggest banks tobally, who are pretty hip the situation. but everybody else, all other industries that have a requirement, and other national governments that are bound as member states to carry out the sanctions, and manage their enforcement, are functioning --h willful or in some cases or willful blindness and political attention to dealing with these laws, and enforcing them. that is a major challenge to asnking about an environment sanctions unwind. there is tremendous lack of formalge and lack of coordinating mechanisms to manage and unwind scenario. the point and want to make is it is valuable to think about what an unwinding of sanctions could
look like. in fact, it is necessary as a out aatic measure to lay future where relief from the sanctions could occur in exchange for north korean denuclearization. but it is impractical to set around a small, incremental future of removing the sanctions, for a variety of reasons, the first of which is that lack of knowledge and compliance basis, which means it would be very difficult to execute something that is small or incremental. there are other challenges with a slowly-phased incremental approach to sanctions. one other point i want to make before explaining why i think it has to be big for big instead of -- that is the practical framework that should underlie any thinking about removal of sanctions. the point i want to make is coming back to the premise,
which is sections relief to incentivize denuclearization, and not minimize leverage. ,o sanctions cannot be removed just as a matter -- rather, they should not be removed, and it would take a lot of lawyering to remove them for an arbitrary whim, which is to say you cannot pull them down just as an incentive. rather, you have to see behavior change, because they are put in place based on a specific concern, and there are many concerns that underlie north korean sanctions. of course, proliferation and nuclear activities and a whole is inf others at the u.n. the united states and the other jurisdictions as well had to do with other destabilizing activities, human rights abuses. incentivize -- incentivize
behavior change and denuclearization on the part of north korea -- that may be the domain for other types of engagement and not sanctions relief. this is the confidence building, the establishment of communications between north korea and a variety of other important players in this, in this diplomacy, the establishment of multilateral forums for effective communication, and those kinds of engagements can certainly include, as have been mentioned already, the diplomacy, particular kinds of exchanges, cultural or educational, diplomatic as well -- particular --port for humanitarian particular humanitarian support, none of which require sanctions relief. exceptions tove sanctions authorities in place.
but that confidence building on a road to denuclearization is not the domain of sanctions relief. we are keen to think of that because of historical precedent, not least because of the iran example, but there are two. ofre was not a removal sanctions as an incentive for behavior change. in fact, it it is dangerous to think about that as such, and to set a new precedent for the north korean program to offer relief, to cancel sanctions, in hopes for a policy or behavioral change on the part of north korea will have ramifications across all other use of sanctions by the united states and by the u.n. for any other kind of security threat to the global community or the united states. it is not as dire as the potential threat of north korean
destabilization and nuclear, chemical, biological weapon use. i will say just one or two other why not to sue for small and incremental, and why it has to be big for big. i look forward to engaging with you all in a conversation. small andall for incremental? this is a methodological approach some people have favored. we heard a lot about it. we have run up to the iran nuclear deal. chick-fil-ad of the -- of the jpoa, the predecessor to the jpoa< what we know as the the nuclear deal -- difficulty in coordinating an international community around small for small, in an
environment of lack of awareness and knowledge and compliance programs, there are other problems that are familiar to any north korea watcher over the years, which is that there is an excellent track record of north korean cheating on sanctions. skilled, is the famous saying. anyone who has dug into this issue would agree. to pursue a path that favors incremental,ll and and might just be a facade to allow north korea to do whatever it wants, not just in cheating that morel sanctions, insidious and threatening proliferation activity, which is the original basis for these sanctions and the international community's concern about north dozen circa the last years, this sanctions regime in particular. another issue that i want to this small forat
small, small, incremental touch aons will dangerous nerve in the u.s. political system that may undermine and unravel any progress, constructive progress toward denuclearization. that is that in washington we important power centers to attend to when it comes to foreign policy and sanctions. we are talking about the white house and the administration and congress, as you well know. right around the time when togress took its opportunity offer its approval or not on the iran nuclear deal, it created for itself -- it created a in thent for itself living memories and the boating records of most members of congress today, where it would decide after a removal of
sanctions in iran, whether it was good with congress or not. congress improved upon that authority, and enshrined in law a couple of years ago, with respect to the potential for removal of russia sanctions. we have now is a congress that is highly attuned to the idea that they should have the final say about whether any sanctions can be removed. if there is to be removal of sanctions, in this case on north korea, it must be to the congress's satisfaction. it would be by a super majority of congress. it would have to be by an amount to override a presidential veto. bills ine are congress. there are a number of members who have staked their claim on this issue, and who are very serious about wanting a big for big exchange. what i mean is a lot of north korean concessions that have and proved and verified,
-- i suspect most people would be comfortable following a progression, as the iran sanctions relief did, which is to say starting with a lot of transparency, including on how money flows and how it is understood in the international system, the financial system, before there is true freedom for it to flow for the north korean government and economy. so for those reasons i think the way politically viable ahead for the united states, notwithstanding what president trump basis -- may suggest by tweet or related in summit diplomacy for his close friend mr. kim, there is only a politically practical way forward in the united states for major sanctions relief after north korea makes major and
verified concessions on its bw -- cbwnd probably d missile program as well. frank: thank you, liz, and thank you for providing a sobering perspective on not only the legal but the political obstacles for providing sanctions relief. maybe we can start with that point. we talked about political viability and what is possible from the u.s. perspective, but i would also point out the north korean perspective, what is politically viable for them. i would argue that step by step only way that is viable for them, because they need to build trust, and they cannot give up even a significant portion of the programs without gaining certain concessions. as we know from hanoi, they prioritized sanctions relief in the sectoral areas that affect the economy.
i want to start with the u.n. sanctions. koreas what north specifically asked for in terms of relief at hanoi. this may be an easy question, but the u.n. security council resolution language was a bit vague on the requirements for lifting sanctions. basically say the security council continuously will review the north korean actions, and they can take steps to strengthen, modify, or suspend measures as needed. is this just a political -- fortion, or are there the things north korea needs to do, that are sufficient to merit sanctions exemptions or lifting? stephanie: that is what you read is simply the need for agreement, and that is it. p5 agrees, they put through the security council. within the discussion, yes. frank: and because china and
russia have already called for sanctions relief, and their already in support of that, it really looks like it is the u.s. other like minded partners that really have a safe, right? stephanie: well, yes. i think the important principle is that since you need all five on board that one or two that are not on board could block it. let's turn to the humanitarian side. there are humanitarian carveouts as part of the u.n. sanctions. can you talk little more about how this come into play? more 1718 this is committee related, but there is an important -- what they call a comprehensive humanitarian exemption mechanism, which is established by the 1718 committee. this was deliberately done to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
this is under the third principle that i told you that sanctions operate, under which sanctions operate, which is to ensure you are limiting the negative impact on the civilian population of a given country. that is the result of decades of research about impact of sanctions on civilian populations across the board, and sort of a focus in recent years on targeting sanctions regimes to the extent possible to prevent harm to the civilian population. so the basis for this exemption mechanism is paragraph 25 of resolution 2397, the one i spoke of, the last resolution from 2017. it gives the committee broad authority to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis in order to facilitate this humanitarian assistance. it reaffirms that sanctions measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population, or in any way to restrict legitimate activities,
including food aid, humanitarian assistance, and other economic activities in cooperation. the sections are also not intended to negatively affect the work of international and nongovernmental organizations carrying out humanitarian assistance and relief. the same time at stresses the primary responsibility of the dprk government to meet the livelihood needs of its people, right? the resolution that decides the committee may on a case-by-case basis exempt any activities from the measures imposed by the resolutions, if the committee deems that is necessary. implementation adopted in august 2018, just a year after the paragraph which thealize this practice -- a.n.'s clarify at
resolutions. compromise language is often difficult to decipher. it is things that you could get security council members to agree on, but they were not necessarily looking at what it meant to people in the field. the implementation assistance notice gets very specific for member states, international organizations, and ngos to carry out how they submit requests for exemption. there are very specific requirements, including that all need to for exemption be submitted either by member the officeselves or of the united nations resident coordinator. nongovernmental organizations ore to get a member state the united nations resident coordinator's office to submit the exemption, which is sort of a step before the exemption even gets to the committee. exception are united nations
agencies, the red cross, and others. most nongovernmental organizations have to do it to this very formal process. they are encouraged to do it every six months. the requirements are all very , soific and laid out obviously an explanation of who are the recipients, the criteria that was used to select these recipients, detailed description of quantities, specifications of the goods, the planned date of transfer, routes and methods, all parties involved, financial transactions, and a list of all planned transfers and services with the qualities and shipment dates. after the committee has this information, it then decides whether or not to give an approval letter. the approval letter is usually published on the 1718 committee website, unless the organization has a problem with that.
and then the organization that submitted the exception request is required to undertake whatever was agreed in the approval letter. so the panel of experts has no role in that process. it is entirely a committee process. it is determined by the member states that are sitting on the security council, the same member states, the five permanent members plus the nonpermanent members that decided to essentially adopt resolutions that are trying to convince the dprk to come into conformity with international law and principles. so the panel does not have a role in that process. all the panel does is it reports. all of its reports to the security council on unintended consequences of sanctions for the civilian population. unintended consequences on -- humanitarian operations. in the panel's last report,
there was a substantial section included which was derived from discussions with more than 20 nongovernmental organizations that are administering assistance directly to the dprk civilian population within the dprk, with united nations and with all other actors involved in disturbing the assistance, because as i said before, the panel's mandate is to undertake investigations. if we are unable to investigate a manner, generally we are not going to report on it. we had to rely on those actors that are themselves subject to the process. from that, the panel was able to , withsix areas of concern regard to this exemption process , that have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to continue to be delivered to, again, the civilian population. i think this is all relevant to this discussion because there are ways in which existing
sanctions can be better implemented, such that you can create good well, and certainly providing assistance to the civilian population, or ensuring assistance is not diminished, would be one of the ways to do that. the panel had found that the a very generals time. the nongovernmental organization has to see the member state or the coordinator. a can take a week to get member state, the ministry of oreign affairs, etc. you are locating suppliers, financial agents willing to bid on contracts. all of that has to be lined up many months in advance and agreed. to shipping routes, item specifications, or quantities can render the exemption completely invalid. these are practical issues, right? also makeead time can
it difficult for humanitarian agents to respond to what our humanitarian crises. the whole nature of humanitarian crises -- sometimes they are unpredicted. there are natural events, acts of god, that precipitate this. was articulating a thatamong organizations are delivering aid on the ground that in particular the sectoral sanctions imposed pursuant to have unintended consequences on humanitarian delivery. and that is a prohibition for transfer to the dprk of all industrial machinery, transport vehicles, iron, steel, and other metals. obviously, this type of a wide swath is going to affect a number of humanitarian sensitive items. that includes food processing, filters, pipes, drilling equipment, providing clean water , and the entire distribution equipment system.
even spare parts for vehicles that were delivering tb assistance. dprk is problematic in the global community in terms of tb i think the only have the ability to diagnose 14% of cases due to a lack of equipment. for practical example is how one sanctions measure can affect a wide small -- wide swath of mandatory and assistance. after articulating how badly sanctions are implemented, you get suppliers in neighboring countries that won't touch anything north korea related. or there are male sniffers going in to -- nail clippers are going in two packages. this type of thing, so it is very easy to see that along with banks.ing in where if a bank sees anything
related to pyongyang, dprk or north korea, it decides not to help it. that is related to a humanitarian banking channel which was established to get money to united states -- united nations agencies. veryare having, they had a hard time. the money went from the headquarters to a german bank, transfer to europe to a russian bank transfer to rubles and the russian bank was responsible was providing -- responsible for providing cash. that was working until it broke down and right now you have a lot of difficulties due to the fact diplomats are carrying cash , these are ways there are provisions laid out, this is something articulated clearly in the resolution the there is a and so having
faithful implementation and toouring the delays are not stringent or the delays are not too excessive and that means the delay between member states and receiving member states, receiving deliberations, those to ensure the parts of the resolutions that aren't necessarily focused on just sanctioning but are focused on ensuring a principal that underlines sanctions which punish the people responsible for the negative behavior and not have consequences for other civilians unrelated, it's important principal. >> i want to leave enough time for audience q&a, i have these pressing questions want to ask, i will ask them quickly and hopefully i can get a quick
answer and these are directed to liz and josh. you mentioned not want to set a bad precedent in terms of sanctions relief in a small or step-by-step fashion. intot to segue that snapback provisions. it seems like there isn't a long history on using snapback revisions at least in terms of sanctions enforcement, do we know how effective they were in the case of jcpoa or did u.s. withdrawal prevent us from testing the effectiveness of something like that? >> yes. to be brief. example of the trump administration re-imposing or snapping back sanctions that had been relieved, sanctions on iran , u.s. sanctions that had been imposed on iran but removed
, that's to the jcpoa the most recent example we can look at, there are other examples for reversals that are smaller scale. this is not a bad parallel to look to. had wasct that that much stronger than many people anticipated which is to say it was much more effective for the sanctions. the community of financial institutions and significantly commodity traders and insurers and port authorities and anyone connected to iran's financial and significant trade in petroleum products. they got the message from the united states and significantly complied with 3m position or snapback of sanctions. people itsts too many
-- it's possible and effective to snap them back or reimposing the great effect. this is a really important distinction, the iranian economy is very different than the north korean economy in many respects. much lessf connected to the broad international financial system than iran's is. most of those financial through china.ws it has been much more diversified internationally. has -- asorth korea we have discussed, a very effective history of evasion of sanctions, which may -- which makes it less susceptible or vulnerable to the youth -- use of u.s. correspondent banking
restrictions, which are what we know is financial sanctions on iran. north korea is likely to be more apable of functioning in removal and snapback scenario than iran is for various reasons. we should not over learn the lesson of iran. with respect to north korea. >> thank you for being concise. last question to josh before we open up. i don't want you to left -- feel left out, dan. not to get too much into the weeds of the north korea sanctions, but josh, you talked about sections 401 and 402 which provide very high bar for providing a temporary suspension or determination of sanctions. it's not only behaviors related to denuclearization, but north korea taking the actions on
counterfeiting, on human rights, on transparency, that's the high bar. then you also talked about section 208c, which the president has an ability to waive sanctions under that act if that waiver would be important for national security interests. that's a big term and has a lower bar. giveouldn't the president sanctions relief to north korea on that basis? the interest of saint diplomatic negotiations are important for national security interest so i will do a waiver on that rather than trying to get north korea to meet all the onerous requirements? >> because that's not what congress intended. when they enacted section 208 which is the bypass, it specified this was a case-by-case waiver. there was a broader humanitarian waiver of course that everyone
thankfully agrees we should not -- should do everything we can to spare people from the effects of sanctions. with regards to donald trump simply invoking the national interest waiver section 208, there are a few reasons why that would be problematic. say wear intent is to impose mandatory sanctions for money laundering but by the way it doesn't mean you're required to crash the bank of china. it doesn't mean you're necessarily required to crash the three chinese banks that are currently subject to a contempt of court order in the district of columbia federal district court. that we havesence other interests in addition to north korea that we don't want
to affect. if the president were to exceed that, again i think what you would see is a reaction by congress to legislatively reimpose sanctions. and 402 set a higher bar and that was intentional. calledtalk about a place camp 16. it cyclical prison camp that holds -- it is a political prisoner camp. one survivor said people there were buried up to their necks in -- and the women in the camp were raped and murdered. leave aside the question of whether the american people choose to give the government of north korea, which perpetrates
these crimes against humanity access to our financial system and perpetrate that system. i would argue is a child of the 80's, when we all grew up, that it is far less morally defensible to perpetuate a system like this. the complete pragmatic. ways or computer numeric controlled ways or how much material can you hide in a camp that size? it's not the only such camp. we have camps 14, 18 and 15 still in operation and any number of other places. what those conditions are designed to do is to extract transparency from north korea. i would like to associate myself with elizabeth's comments on snapping back. with north korea, it is a
financial intelligence and enforcement and a diplomacy problem to get countries to enforce the sanctions in the first place. diplomacyres years of and law enforcement, you have to put it in the context that until 2016, our north korean sanctions were quantitatively and qualitatively weaker than our sanctions against belarus and zimbabwe. can -- thatat we there is a magic lever behind the curtains of the oval office where we can turn the sanctions off and on again and bypass all the coalition diplomacy, we will need to enforce them, completely regardless of what congress thinks of all this. andink it is out of context would not work in this one. >> with that i will turn to the
audience. we have paul with a microphone. raise your hand if you have a question and when you do, introduce yourself, your name and affiliation. you are so stunned by the riveting remarks. a question right here. thank you. hanoi -- the trump -- in hanoi trump administers and try to get the big deal for big deal and failed. now the panel think administration is going to try a small for small approach? and if so, elizabeth mentioned the roadblocks for that, do you think that will be any more effective than trying to go for a big for big? >> i will direct that to dan
first because it gets at the central problem of how do you overcome this fundamental tension about small for small, which is what north korea wants and what he says, going big for big. i don't know what the administration's internal strategy with negotiations, if you look at the remarks from special representative it week the u.s. ishe says willing to talk about what was a phased approach. he reiterated that exchanges might be possible, no sanctions relief at this time. seriousif we do get , theng level dialogue
question of big for bigot hanoi wasn't going to get them anywhere. reasonablebe a more for reasonable approach. what's enough north korea can do the justifies some suspension of certain sanctions while keeping other elements. i think north korean actions like a shut down of this material production at other known uranium enrichment sites, i think that would have some closing on ahink possibility of getting those actions and holding out for the hope of getting everything all at once would be shortsighted. think the appropriate thing for the united states government to do in the case of that, there was not a smashing success in
capitulation based on the first proposal, that is ok. is an impetus to get creative and thoughtful instead of to back down on the u.s. position. by creative and thoughtful i mean thinking about the kind of concession the u.s. can give that are not sanctions but are still meaningful. period of caned a i say stability? is that too strong? it doesn't have anything to do with sanctions really. in the areas of diplomatic engagement, perhaps cultural, humanitarian, considering what else occurred around modification of military exercises, if there is any give their.
continuing with the summit diplomacy which clearly has social capital and political capital value for the north koreans. what may be available there, another way of saying that is can you think of a sequencing where there are gives on the united states side or international side that are meaningful to north korea but that hold until a later point after which north korea has made verifiable and substantial nuclear commitment that holds until then the relief of economic sanctions from the united states or the international community and just ,o say they have to proceed otherwise they have a truly difficult nonfunctional mass around compliance even worse than we have now, which is bad. >> especially if you take into account what north korea says is them trying to downplay their
desperation for sanctions relief. after hanoi you had the foreign minister, the foreign minister say what we actually want is security guarantees. and not sanction relief. hand, if we are going to get creative on sanction relief, maybe north korea might get creative and have some things where they don't provide concessions on the nuclear program but on other things like say conventional aspects of their military. next question. hello. i just came for a few days for meetings about north korea and i saw your event so i thought that's a wonderful occasion to come here. thank you for a really intriguing discussion.
to stephanie for mentioning the humanitarian aspect. meetings before coming here and we had some good discussions about the sectoral sanctions and what can be done in that regard. one of the thoughts was actually if you look at the situation from the internal domestic north korean perspective, some of these especially the seafood and , i could usetry the word privatized in north korea. so if we sanction those areas, we are sort of discouraging the internal economic developments which we should probably maybe try to make work which are also undermining from inside.
point and as ane european i would also like to ask about the european sanctions gohich are those that should farther than the u.n. sanctions and also -- if you think about rolling back sanctions, we could also start to think about the e.u. sanctions and go back in coordination with the united states. i was wondering also what the other partner sanctions, whether system how tosome do it. within iran deal sanctions, europeans are trying to save as much as possible.
one of the ways they're doing it is the mechanism which would be providing financing to iran outside of the u.s. financial system. that is something which the u.s. administration likes to see but to some extent it would also tell them how to finance certain time keep at the same the financial sanctions in place. lesson rathertive than the negative lesson. thank you very much. >> any thoughts on the tension between hindering organic growth of the private economy versus actually hindering the nuclear program and then the thoughts about e.u. sanctions or south korea's sanctions come all the other unilateral sanctions? >> can i talk about the seafood piece of this? i've looked at the seafood question carefully.
researchliar with the by andre and peter and others that claims the seafood injured -- industry is privatized. i disagree and would challenge the premise of that research and i have had dialogue with peter ward about it. i think it's based off old information. what has happened since the research that is the basis for first thelusions is north korean military took over most of the boats, a lot of the boat ships that first began arriving in 2015 before the sanctions were even strengthened. which is an important point. were army boats. what you begin to see about that time is two things. the fishing industry came under the control of north korean government agencies, including bureau 39, the general bureau.
which is the money laundering -- money laundering and intelligence agency. the ministry of state security which is the north korean version of the gestapo and the internal security force the guards political prison camps. they begin to push aside the army, so and then the other development you begin to see is the government was selling lots of fishing rights to chinese so that the waters close to the coast badly overfished and that's why a lot of these boats , so theng so far out winds blew them out to the open ocean. the sanctions are against the export for seafood. we are talking about a country where the population is badly protein deficient. the first question is wire the north korean people not eating that seafood, why is it being suppose and who do you
is really using that money if in fact the industry has come under the control of a few government industries that are the apex predators of the north korean pecking order. the other point i would make is internal reports from north korea tell us at times when the seafood export sanctions are enforced, local market prices inside north korea for fish and seafood go down. consumers, the poor in north korea will say i've never been able to afford fish and seafood in my lunch before. think it's the league that first taught the world how to salt and preserve fish, the seafood industry should be salting and drying and preserving fish, trading around the country and providing for
the nutritional needs of the population that does not have enough efficiency. these factsthat bring us to the exactly opposite conclusion that we should enforce the fish and seafood sanctions and any frankly food export sanctions very strictly because north korea's food production should be feeding a hungry population. regarding speaking to desh seeking to differentiate the various sanctions and regimes. u.n., i admire., the creativity and thinking about how to consider different options whether incrementalism
is appropriate or not. you've already heard my argument for why i think it's not the strongest put forward on this issue. in general i would say there is not a lot of success to be had by seeking to differentiate the e.u. sanctions significantly from the u.s.. , bank, orany company ofprofit or relief group sufficient size to handle connectivity, permitted connectivity with north korea, has to -- will find itself in some way object to u.s. sanctions on north korea and what that means is they cannot choose to abide by a different set of measures, sanctions measures in a different jurisdiction that may be perceived as more permissive and planned to remain a growing concern.
violate u.s.t will sanctions potentially and put themselves out of business. to takey and encourage your example, a rollback of european sanctions on north the banksencourage with companies. to try and expand economic conductivity would be encouraging them to gauge in a conflict of situate -- and in violations of sanctions which is the fast road to insolvency. out the pointng of what they were doing which is trying to create economic opportunity for north korea and the people of north korea. it was fragile at best and the u.s. administration given its
overwhelming hostile view toards iran will be quick make insolvent everyone related to it or otherwise subject to major u.s. criminal liability that can be accomplished. as soon as it violates iran sanctions and to court connectivity with north korea. which would accelerate that process as well. i don't expect that is the conduit towards moving money into north korea. leapfroggingof through jurisdiction such as germany or russia is problematic , that kind ofn modality for achieving humanitarian financial flow into north korea, whether or not that improves on cash couriers is a different connection. >> let's go back to the audience.
the first hand i saw. i'm with the school of public service over by the national cathedral. with the recent situation with iran or the u.s. is reimposed sanctions despite their seeming compliance and the verified compliance with international community, would north korea see the nextn issue as ministration can pull the rug out and undo what has been done. other more skeptical the united states his ability to keep a steady heel? elses and so is everyone the united states will want to work with including our closest security allies. >> i would just add congress passed a law is passed in a bipartisan way to look north korea know the conditions has to
meet and that those conditions will go from administration to administration despite the changes are partisan political patrol. >> i'm a research assistant for the national interest. my question is how that we are going to get the working level start -- negotiation started, what do you think officials should talk about, what should the agenda be before the next be including president trump and chairman kim in terms of the definition. bit think there was a fair of progress up to the hanoi summit on some of the secondary
issues in the negotiations. inre was reportedly progress talks about the liaison office, about enhancing recovery after getting recovery. a number of other issues. of course what ultimately sunk the summit was a lack of agreement on north korea's nuclear program and what the new --uld offer with north korean actions towards denuclearization and a roadmap. so for working level talks to make progress, there has to be something really tangible. certainly there are some things we can do in the short term in confidence building measures but that'ss another summit more than an impromptu nice to meet you kind of thing, i think
there would have to be some kind of deliverable on this issue. >> so based on current information, what is the chance the white house will soften the position for political capital in the upcoming election and what is the chance congress would allow such a deal to occur? can i stop and check twitter? think finding resolution or success broadly defined a north korea is a key aspiration of the trump administration and i think there would be a great effort to come up with conditions for what can be called success ahead of president trump's reelection,
the next general election basically -- basically. achieving a trade deal with china is also one of the key foreign policy and economic benchmarks and goals for this administration and it's a pretty tough going there. there are advisors around the deal, no tradeo one thater than doesn't seem adequate with conditions. i expect there will be a similar kind of reckoning around the enforcing summit or conversations. the comes of towards the end of this presidential term. successsee how broad towards massive denuclearization could possibly occur.
though i do think it will be a major effort by the administration to achieve some conditions. as far as congress, i don't think they will budge much at all. success will have to be squishy for the administration in order for congress to let that go by. bebecause congress wants to deal, of input on a particular with a peace treaty but it desh do you think that gives the administration more of goeason to not pursue and with an executive agreement. >> even though they said all along that they will get senate consent on this. too.ey said that on nafta >> i think this administration will president trump is in
office, the political stars are aligned in a way that there is a reasonably good treaty that goes to congress, i figure road be much easier for the administration to get that through then a democratic administration. i think the trump administration would be able to pull some of its republican allies on board who would be much more skeptical if a democrat was in office. on the other hand, assuming president trump gets reelected, the window will be tight to get enough ground in negotiations to submit a realistic and good treaty to congress in the next year. >> more questions in the back. the saint albans school of public service.
i'm wondering what the panels thoughts are on the extent to they can --ich china and the u.s. can work on the issue in light of the tensions with the countries concerning trade and huawei. thank you. >> china u.s. cooperations. >> the most important north korea story that almost no one is following is happening in the u.s. district court for the district of columbia now where a prosecutor -- where prosecutors are trying to enforce subpoenas against three major chinese banks, the record of the case is sealed and the names of the , therere not unsealed has been some speculation about which of those banks are. two of those subpoenas are issued by grand juries. all are calling for the bank to turn over records about
suspected north korean sanctions. the judge has granted the takenment motion to production of those records. they did not comply and plan to find them in contempt of court. say ourin no way pressure against north korea has been maximum to this point. donald trump has particular been pulling punches. what the justice department has done with these actions and with the seizure, which is not such a think if thei justice department becoming a new center of gravity in the sanctions effort and you can look for congress really to empower a justice department doing as much as it can to
enforce the law by the treasury department which seems to be doing as little as possible. i think this will give the chinese financial industry a negative incentive against violating north korean sanctions and i would suspect as a matter of chinese government policy. i think things will get worse before they get better. the three unnamed banks reported on are presumed to be chinese banks. >> yes. >> i agree with what you said except i would say it's not just the justice department and law enforcement mechanisms the leading edge to pursuit of -- this is what you do if you can't enforce sanctions, you try and dial up your law enforcement actions. it is also commerce. justice and commerce. you mention huawei. one of the reasons we are
talking about it is they are listed on a commerce list and i do think these are going to be two tools the administration will look to use more and more including north korea to advance its policy. a high-level comment on china, the uss to work with china to achieve success, however squishy thatoadly defined to make including more sanctions or in rolling them back. it's not a desh it is a have to have for success. -- itseems like holding seems a have to have for success. >> it doesn't seem holding those banks is the most cooperative way to work. how we run out of cooperative measures with china and are we left with coercive? >> we haven't run out of them at all. there is ample opportunity for creativity, that is just not the style and mo of the administration.
there are ample opportunities to dialogue pressure, but if you are coming at this from an america first, disdain for multilateralism and cooperation, these are the tools you reach for first. commerce listings, criticizing nato, pulling out of the jcpoa and paris accord, you are looking for ways to actually or some of your counterparts become the pressure valve for your enemies. you are putting your allies and some competitors as the focus of the pressure. >> president trump -- do you think he talks to desh >> -- >> if you read the court's orders ordering the records to be turned over, the basis for the prosecutor's argument in
this motion to compel was that we have previously tried to use our mutual legal assistance treaty with china to get them to voluntarily cooperate and turn over records. those banks had agreed with the fdic's to give those -- give toess to when they wanted set up branches in the united states. in 2016 there was another investigation where we tried to invoke to get the chinese banks and the chinese justice ministry to cooperate. they pretty much gave us the middle finger. we got no cooperation on their part, that is the basis for why the justice department is using more coercive means. i would be very cautious about diplomatic too much or political incentive to what the justice department is doing. the justice department, and i would single out the southern
desert of new york, but also the d.c. district, may really value their political --. in the legal profession we refer to the southern district of new york, the sovereign district of new york for the reason they just really push away washington and its political considerations. i strongly believe in that to some extent i know some of the people believe that the justice department is simply proof -- pursuing violations of law. they don't believe the financial system should be open for people who break the law, whether they are north korean, chinese or anything else. we enforce our money laundering and sanctions laws harshly against european banks, we made fines,y $9 billion in penalties and forfeitures, why of the chinese banks been given what to -- what amounts to do fact on immunity until now? ishink what we are doing
getting the attention of the chinese banks where we perhaps have enough leverage to come to a future agreement on only allowing through those transactions for the north korean people. >> let's take these last two questions and then i will have one more. >> on ethan with the school of public service. with north we make korea, there will be some aspect of north korean denuclearization, no matter how large or small. my question is, with what we know of north korea's track record of cheating and not really denuclearizing, is there anyway the united states or international body can verify north korea actually is following through with their agreement? >> let's take the second question as well. i'm a recent graduate of
johns hopkins. before that i worked at the ministry of education at south korea. to -- and i'mes impressed by your talking about the politics and practicality. you mentioned to incentivize north korea, to change behavior, the solution should not be sanctions relief, but the people and other things. we all know -- we also know north korea has shifted its ,ational statistic policy goal shifting to focus more on economic development. so even if the u.s. does not -- sanctionsrelief relief, north korea wants the sanctions relief as its number
one priority. if that happens, the united no, thanill can say the negotiation might be another breakdown. how can we close the gap? what would be the united states strategy going forward? you have very articulately laid out an impasse that the united states and north korea were to come to if north korea insists there must as an initial and confidence building matter benefit to relief or north korea and the united states as that shall not be the case. so that is right, that is a challenge. just to borrow from the iranian
example, what we have seen in their, this may be rather extreme. the different point of the arc of the progression of conflict the united states has made, 12 demands laid out about what it wants from iran and iran has said no and there has been an toer to a discussion negotiating or speaking together and there has been no willingness on either side to make that happen. we are seeing an escalation of tensions. that is something that could occur if there is an impasse and break down. that's a real scenario. i think it's more real than the one we have been engaged in today which is what should it look like if there is this deal and denuclearization and the removal of sanctions. is perhaps the case that there can be valuable benefits
north korea that may have a kind of economic value to engage in these other forms of -- or to accept these other confidence building measures or confessions such as united states humanitarian or educational exchange or diplomatic realm possibly not just with the united states, but with other countries, a discussion of peace or other domains, the political side of the conversation. what we could look at in that domain as well that could, if the two sides are committed to sticking with the process, at the early stage of discussing everyone must dig in and have strong positions they put out there at the beginning for negotiations. we haven't seen if either side is willing to get creative in
this initial stage of confidence building and progression towards working level conversation. >> i would ask what is the source for your claim north korea has abandoned the policy? i haven't seen that. i would not only question that premise, but i would also ask what practical effects have we seen because of it. its production of missiles and nuclear weapons is as high as it has ever been. they still have it in their constitution that they are a nuclear state, they are pursuing nuclear weapons. , think as a practical matter the question congress will ask is what is north korea done to deserve sanctions relief. i don't know how anyone could answer that. we may be distant relatives, my grandmother is named minkov. i think you just nailed it. this is hard because every
member of congress who may know less than those sitting up here and in this room is just going to say they keep lying to us, they cheat every time, why should we go along with this? they have to earn our trust. this agreement and the standard sections are hard to meet because north korea has thrown away our trust. it will have to win it back with transparency. >> i think you are absolutely right. north korean cheating on agreements certainly a concern to be worried about. there are a number of north korean nuclear and missile production sites that are well-known there have been plenty of open source researchers who pour over every inch of google earth and satellite imagery finding various sites.
, the is a lot taking place u.s. intelligence community knows a lot more. a set ofe to have it's not anytime anywhere inspections, that will a significant reduction in north korea's ability to advance its programs. of course i've been getting to a -- of course getting to a final deal would require more than that. there will be a continuing need for those open source researchers, for the intelligence community to continue to make sure north korea is living up to whatever initial agreement it signed on to. >> i would add you need inspectors on the ground to verify the facilities. extensivea has an network of underground
facilities and bunkers and they simply will not provide access the u.s. or others want by the level of verification certainty we need and that is a problem we will have to overcome. one last question because no one else raised it, south korea wants to get back in the game, they always throw out sanctions projects,terms of resuming the industrial complex on the mountain and tourism project. to find relief whether it's an exemption on u.n. resolution that allows for joint ventures or anything that allows for inter-korean projects to proceed? >> those -- some of those are before the committee right now. >> from the u.s. perspective i would say technically yes, but i don't think that washes well politically. you can't just make exceptions
or is a building measure for one country or one set of project. you're setting a precedent you have to live with with all sanctions. the u.n., u.s. or otherwise, that would be a heck of a thing to bank on to throw that all away. >> it would nullify and undermine the pressure necessary to get north korea to make a major strategic choice about its caisson, congress hates intensely. i met with 400 members of the house,- staffers of the many in the course of talking about this, i can't tell you how many times people came up to me and said does it close down --.
i said no and they said i won't support it unless it closes it down. there is an intense antipathy to it. i've jokingly approached -- aoposed if you were to put in golden corral buffet in there where the workers and families can eat and then go to a clinic and get medical care, we could assure ourselves the wages are going to the people who earned it. other than that, i think congress is going to see this as undermining sanctions. >> i want to thank the panel and our colleagues rachel and paul who put this together. please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy.
visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> later today on c-span, secretary of state mike pompeo and national security advisor john bolton will speak at the christians united for israel summit in washington. israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu will address the data ring via videoconference. atch live on c-span, online c-span.org or listen with the c-span radio app. discussions been about an appearance before
congress, any testimony from this office would not go beyond our report. it contains our findings and analysis and the reason for the decisions we made. carefullyhose words and the work speaks for itself. the report is my testimony. i would not provide information beyond that which is already public in any appearance before congress. >> former special counsel robert mueller is said to appear before two committees of congress on wednesday, july 17. at 9:00 a.m. eastern he gives testimony to the house judiciary committee and later he will take questions from the house intelligence committee. his report into russian interference in the 2016 election will air live on c-span3 come online at c-span.org or listen with the free c-span radio app. ♪