tv U.S. Institute of Peace Discussion on North Korea Sanctions CSPAN July 8, 2019 10:57pm-12:49am EDT
z are is and reason t decisions we made. itself.k speaks for the report is my testimony. and. r robert mueller set to appea before two sessions of congress o dive them tem to the house judiciary committee and will ake questions from the house intelligence committee. will be live. >> forrin policy experts look at conditions for removal of northic sanctions against korea. this follows president trump's kim jung un.
d get re going to go an started and thanks for joining us despite the rain. it's difficult for many of you. my name frank, welcome to usip. for those of you not familiar ip they're dedicated preventing mitigating or resolving conflict. global hot spots that has dell you'ded peace for many years at the korean peninsula. president trump and chairman kim north the border between
korea and south korea which rekindled prospects of who incoming progress try to make on peace. sticking point has been north korea asking for sanctions relief in order for the kim regime to survive and thrive it conomy andevelop the e sanctions impeded these goals. ion stated dministrat provide ll not sanctions relief ml north korea akes steps towards denuclearization. how do we offer sanctions relieve to incentivize diplomacy? the same time, not minimize
uickly.erage too q so we've assembled this town of speakers. one is running late so we'll have him join when he arrives ut i've asked them as a group to help explain the scope of the cess ions regime and pro relief, some potential practical elief, r providing r taking into account the pportunities nd o o d that could be applied t north korea case. so, let me introduce the anelists in order they'll be speaking. first, again, dan is not here so peak have him probably s second or third. he's a program manager at national committee on north korea. research and publications and is the lead h searcher and editor for nort korea and the world, an
nteractive website exploring diplomaticonomic and relations. up next is including the north orea sachgss and policy enhancement act. 1, 3, runs a website korea. nd the un panel of experts is established to resolution 1874 esponsible for monitoring and analyzing north korea's global financial activities and recommendations on implementing sanctions and had a ong career as a un official, director of the northeast asia
program and she was a director of the asia pacific program here alum.lcome back to usip rosenberg and she focuses on foreign policy implications of the shifts this the energy market. he was a senior advisor at the treasury department. anded who fiction on burma. i have had each of them to speak for about eight minutes or so, and then, i will ask a couple questions to get the discussion going and we can open up and a.ing time for q i was going to have dan start. so we'll start with josh first.
>> thank you. good morning. my comments don't remember sent of any government or committee of congress. it will be a great honor to the what became noin as hoeshg sanctions ands policy an ideat might five you are of impatience with the way presidents contukted north korean policy. by looked back at cheating the north korean government and learn presidents pursued dip of instant frat fiction.
nonviolent ng away which the only strategy we have left. what we have learned through our 2005 is that ince moeshg is dependent on the financial system. the dollar is the world's reserve currency and most of the sustains the regime has tb cleared and that gives he justice department the jurisdiction to regulate, block, people when are hin those transactions. north korea has no sovereign right to access to our pnl system, and as long as it threatens our security interests, we should tee any it that right. that is is the fill loss by behind sanctions legislation than is nothing more denial of access to financial
ystem and congress's power owe control the rez to lift sanctions is constitutional. article one,wer in section eight which congress has the authority to regulate commerce. but conres suspects from north has to regain our transparency.ting never too t's hefr early to think about lifting of sanctions i suspect we're having this conversation of years too kerly because it's going to ta so much political pressure on north koreanof the that perhaps seeing it
nder lined and we'll have a diplomatic incentive to reach an ets our t that me in this disarment and that helped assad use chemical weapons against innocent civilians in syria. murder king jung un's half roerj with nerve agent. the cyber attacks the united states and threatens bed rock of our political system, treedom of 81 ression, and stole $ million out of the bangladesh hoeshg must make changes
ansparency the tr necessary. and north korea is a regime that nt of cash small amou overhead and small relaxation of it ancial pressure will give option to continue us status quo. ption that will be acceptable to congress. 104a sets out arms trafficking, perpetuation or uman rights of h abuses and then, require mandatory sanctions. section 208 is a pipas around he sanctions for humanitarian of sanctions.00rrier
we saw the brink act, which passed the senate and north korea policy oversight act which co-sponsored by senator elliott inggall and ts by senators marquee.and irms our slation aff goal is is verifiable and nuclearization of north korea. we have always missed, i think, the root of all evil in north korea. might not sanctions be to put temporary pressure on until he comes back
ten? 11. last three are in 2017 and we'll talk about that. and underneath 1718 committee of which i'm a member, there are eight members and they represent five permanent members and representing because e're independent experts but come from five permanent members korea, ave members from singapore and japan. and experts have bring expert ease in different areas. and economicsance customs and export the like.aritime and thethe mandate is assisting
ommittee and to investigate alleged violations of sanctions articulated in the city council. that means both gathering and provided information to us by different sources, er states, or emb experts or organizations, un bodies and other interested parties we make recommendations ons to the 1718 committee and member states in order to implementation and our report, you can find it online. . there are lots and lots of ry ofes and that is a summa s for the investigation period.
ound in it's l p reports that the expansion has hatched and it has matched by the rec quizit international coordination and resource allocation to actually drive plementation. so it's resolution 2397 icbm d in response to very a ntroduced very, nationals that comes into full force, it's a requirement to repatriate s
working in other entities and prohibits or individuals strengthens nd sale regarding ply a and l petroleum products llve been on the transfer of a industrial machinery with exception of spare parts to lian ain commercial civi operations. the panel found that evasion entitiesy north korean have undermined
s well and agents are experienced and they can mobilize money and people and e in salesey can engag and trafficking of arms and related materials and they can conceal nl activity by using nationals and gn other methods or the flow of hat, they, hrough t north korean actors have full tim now global pnl is sfiet efforts put forward to others. and the business conducted by some networks is generating revenue and one of the recent areas of investigation is into actors, north korean actors and activities and cyber space so that includes tacks on financial institutions and crypto currency exchange, laundering of proceeds from attacks through crypto currency and mining of currency
which had been done through taking illegal control of ate money is cre happening. y going in and reaching in and stealing money from a bank asset endered meaningless because debate never has an opportunity to freeze assets because they're being stolen rom under the watch of the bank. o obviously given the wide of ing sanctions on a swath areas and this activity taking larger proportionate
ability of dprk to generate which under resolution is that i virtue, illegal. i'll turn it over. clarify it. the al sanctions cover ty hibitions and that is pret much 95% plus. >> yes. >> then thank you for inviting me to speak today. or coming in ies f late. there are road closures and may have as folks noticed. this is important.
and signalling actions such as the mitchell test will come with a cost and will come s so higher cost constraining meaning sanctions are maebt to impede development of wmd and military capabilities sanctions ea of pressure will of force the abandon president to stiffer rams and in return for ons relieve.ancti o getting course is is bargaining right?
and with maximum economic pressure, that is not going to so slate into subjectives sanctions are hot a strategy to be used in are conjunction with tools enable to effective. ls?what are the goa there is some key differences u.s. n un sanctions and regime.ns panel wrist had a role had drafting. of arrierringfor
and trading relief on thoouk programs i articulate give shouldles about how that go forward. first, any trade of sanctions korean nuclearth concessions should be premised of tee nukemate goal collarization but should make sense on its own terms assuming the process doesn't two any further. second, let's start with sanctions to the north korean hoouk program and can be adjusted for snapped back. i think that should go ahead regardless. think the un sanctions are
candidates for meaningful north steps and i think that sanctions are more easily and then p or down things like investment, north korea which are difficult to turn on or off. third don't ease up on measures currency and we can be reasonably confident it won't be punled hoo producing more nuclear weapons. hat until there is a trees on north korean material production facilities. that is not to say no sanctions the point back until we're in a total freeze in place. and i think you can perhaps start out with adjustment of
on north korean imports and vicks and they do not have a direct military would have benefits. of the day about it avenues to access are blocked it effectively enforced, fuel. matter how much it pushes towards an economy and labor rights and should on north korean workers there receiving their wages hong other things. if a program of relief is to
go forward, the u.s. and countries should continue to implement and force the in place that remain clear and be shouldn't expend the scope while negotiations are under way. so it's hard to say whether they will be willing to get more on the programs than it offered in accept less. there is a reasonable standard i good ef and would ab if talks tactic collapse. north korea is is ready for 's lead to a hat
u.s. le roll back the should be ready as well. >> thank you many i appreciate proposing those give principles. and i hope we can talk about later. liz? >> thank you. after it's great to go you have gone to respond to things you have said. i appreciate how you've laid out the purpose of sanctions had place including the law and the horts that under lie them and the un and in the u.s. system, and some of the modalities they're used and indeed potential ideas or pribs principles for unwinding them make a pint of the politics of this and practicality that states and inteed other international
mind in ust bear in order to proceed or operate this this legal environment with lots of constrictions. i want to st point ake is that what what you may makes about sense for people familiar with the laws and have awareness and strong compliance if place. awareness and programs for all of this, ncluding riskiest of jurisdictions and industry. so over a long period of time
and is available by the un investigative journalists and by advisories from the u.s. japanese from the photos.nt and with here hasn't been enough compliance with the exception of of the biggest center banks. everybody else to carry out sanctions and manage are in tioning with willful or case cases willful blindness so that
thinkingr challenge to of sanctionironment unwind so the d is that want to make it's valuable to think about could look like eysry to layout a few where relief can occur but it's impractical to set xpectations around what would be a incremental version. it would be difficult to execute ll for ng that is sma small or incremental.
h ere are other challenges wit small for small approach. and another point i want to make that it has to be big for big ad of small for shawl is hat point i want to make removed. that can't be would take a lot to remove them. saying you can't told them down just as incentive. and there are many concern hat's under lie north korea
sanctions. proliferation and uclear activities and others, and other events. incentivize that may be a domain for other kinds of ngagement and not sanctions relief. ing. is the confidence build the establishment of communications. and variety h korea of other important players in this. and this kinds of exchanges
would have to be by an amount to presidential veto but there are the bills in congress of members who have staked their claim on issue and are serious about wanting a big exchange. i mean are the of north korean concessions have opinion proved and verified and only thereafter willing to offer major sanctions relief. and for people would be comfortable with it following a progression as the iran sanctions relief did which is to say you're starting with a lot including how rnationals had the inte financial system perfect it's flow for the o moeshgin government and economy. reasons, the only
viable way ahead for the united states hot withstanding what may suggest by low t or related to mrip p massy for his close friend, mr. kim there is only a practical way forward had the united states for major relief after north concessionsverified cvw s nuclear and probably program. as well. >> thank you to panelists providing a soeberring perspective on not only the eague but also political obstacles for league and maybe starting there with that point. you talk about political viability. what is possible from the u.s. perspective and i point out
by step gue that step is the only way viable for them o build trustneed t y can't give us a ven a and we know they prioritize the relief had the area that's affect civilian economy. so maybe we can start with un hat is what cause t north korea asked for in terms of relief. and this is maybe an easy question. nguage is vague on requirements and say the security council will review the north korean actions and they strengthen or to as kneaded. things that north orea these to do that are
sufficient? u read.hat is what yo you need agreement in p 5? that is it. agrees they put to the security council. that discussion. and they call for relief and they're in support of that. .s. and like it's the u hab other like hinded partners right? yeah.l, principle is that you he'd all five on board. not on or 2 that are board could block it. so, yes. yes. >> let's turn to humanitarian side. already humanitarian carvouts as part of the un sanctions. can you talk more about how
those come into play? 17, 18 committee related and there is an important comprehensive humanitarian exemption which is established by 1718 committee and this is to facilitate dprk.itarian assistance to third principal th ensure you're limited wi research impact and sanctions and a focus to prevent harm to the civilian population. of basis for this is para-25
2397.ution authority on a case by case basis and reaffirms are not intend to have consequences or reject activities and cooperation and are not intended to affect the onal and nternati nongovernmental organizations carrying out relief. is tressing primary responsible of the dprk government to meet needs of the people right? exempt des may that is deemed
necessary. and number seven adopted in ust less than a year after paragraph formalized this practice. ant.ians are import they clarify, you know, often difficult things that you can get members to agree on. they're not looking ats what it le in the field. o this notice gives very for there quirements s specific requirements including exempt for exemption members e submitted by themselves or office of the
united nations resident coordinate kwloer. so nongovernmental organizations er state or a memb united nations coordinator's to most hon governmental organizations have to do it in this formal process. to encouraged to do i s and e every six month there is id out so detailed description of quantities, specifications and goods and like. plan states transfer, all parties involved. transactions and then,
annex with planned shipment dates so after the committee has this information then, it decides whether or not to give n approval letter that is published unless the organization has a problem with that. nd then the organization is to undertake. so the panel has no role in that process. it's five permanent member adopt res had to solutions trying to convince dprk to come into conformity. so the panel does not have a
ole this that process all that the panel does is reports this all of its reports to the ended ty council on unint consequences of sanctions for population and in this report a section derived 20m discussion was more than organizations within the dprk with the united nations country team and all other actors that in distributing. if we're unable to investigate we're not going to report on it. to rely s case we had
on those actors and from that, the panel was able to dmreen reas of concern with regard to says that made it relevant i think is because there is ways they can be better implemented such you an create goodwill and assistance to the civilian population and ensuring theirs is not diminished would be one way to do that. the e panel has found very generous lead time. right? take weeks you you have to know exactly you're planning shipments and
financial acts willing to bid or contract. up and to be lined agreed. any changes to planned suppliers routes and specifications invalid.er this these are just practical issues right? nd the nature is on sometimes unpredicted right? marl events so the panel amongst organization it on the delivering and sanctions had inintended coneek kwenss so that of all hibition
industrial industrial machinery. this wide swath is going to affect a number of sensitives items right? udes pumps, filters, and , drilling equipment the equipment system and pair tvrts for vehicles delivering assistance. the is problematic in of al community in terms resistance. o you can just, that is one example of how one sanction measure can affect a wide swath and what you get is you get suppliers in neighboring countries won't
the way but what is working and you have a lot of difficulties due to the fact diplomats are arrying cash in on their bodies. provisions laid out. ss for it. proce delays are not too trengthent or delays are not too excessive. e parts that ensur aren't focused on just nsuring a g but i principle that under lines
sanctions. let's punish people responsible behavior and not have consequences for others that are unrelated is important. >> thank you. >> yes. i want to leave time for audience q and a. and i want to ask questions quickly. and so liz, you mentioned not precedent. set a bad into ant to segue that snap back pro visions. and there is not a long history in terms of sanctions enforcement. do we know how effective they are in the case of jcpoa? did the u.s. withdrawal from that agreement prevent us from testing the effectiveness of back pro like snap
anyone connected to iran's financial system and it's significant trade in pelt troel detective ine prod that suggests to people it's and effective too ask them pack or reimpose them. but this is a really important distinction. is differentconomy to be brief it's size is smaller than north korean economy and the much less connected to broad international financial is.tem than iran's
diversified more internationally. has we've orth korea discussed a very effective evasion of sanctions it leaves it vulnerable to us us estrictions which we know are financial sanctions so moreh korea is likely to be capable of functioning in a scenario d snap back than iran is for various hould not r.ns so we s overlearn the lesson of iran with respect to north korea. ou.thank y and thank you for being very concise. last question is josh before we open up. last question to josh before we open up.
i don't want you to left -- feel left out, dan. not to get too much into the weeds of the north korea sanctions, but josh, you talked about sections 401 and 402 which provide very high bar for providing a temporary suspension or determination of sanctions. it's not only behaviors related to denuclearization, but north korea taking the actions on counterfeiting, on human rights, on transparency, that's the high bar. then you also talked about section 208c, which the president has an ability to waive sanctions under that act if that waiver would be important for national security interests. that's a big term and has a lower bar. why wouldn't the president give sanctions relief to north korea on that basis? the interest of saint diplomatic negotiations are important for national security interest so i will do a waiver on that rather than trying to get north korea to meet all the onerous requirements?
>> because that's not what congress intended. when they enacted section 208 which is the bypass, it specified this was a case-by-case waiver. there was a broader humanitarian waiver of course that everyone thankfully agrees we should not -- should do everything we can to spare people from the effects of sanctions. with regards to donald trump simply invoking the national interest waiver section 208, there are a few reasons why that would be problematic. the clear intent is to say we impose mandatory sanctions for money laundering but by the way it doesn't mean you're required to crash the bank of china. it doesn't mean you're necessarily required to crash
the three chinese banks that are currently subject to a contempt of court order in the district of columbia federal district court. it says in essence that we have other interests in addition to north korea that we don't want to affect. if the president were to exceed that, again i think what you would see is a reaction by congress to legislatively reimpose sanctions. sections 401 and 402 set a higher bar and that was intentional. let me talk about a place called camp 16. it cyclical prison camp that holds -- it is a political
prisoner camp. one survivor said people there were buried up to their necks in -- and the women in the camp were raped and murdered. leave aside the question of whether the american people choose to give the government of north korea, which perpetrates these crimes against humanity access to our financial system and perpetrate that system. i would argue is a child of the 80's, when we all grew up, that it is far less morally defensible to perpetuate a system like this. the complete pragmatic. how many ways or computer numeric controlled ways or how much material can you hide in a camp that size? it's not the only such camp. we have camps 14, 18 and 15
still in operation and any number of other places. what those conditions are designed to do is to extract transparency from north korea. i would like to associate myself with elizabeth's comments on snapping back. with north korea, it is a financial intelligence and enforcement and a diplomacy problem to get countries to enforce the sanctions in the first place. that requires years of diplomacy and law enforcement, you have to put it in the context that until 2016, our north korean sanctions were quantitatively and qualitatively weaker than our sanctions against belarus and zimbabwe. so to say that we can -- that there is a magic lever behind the curtains of the oval office
where we can turn the sanctions off and on again and bypass all the coalition diplomacy, we will need to enforce them, completely regardless of what congress thinks of all this. i think it is out of context and would not work in this one. >> with that i will turn to the audience. we have paul with a microphone. raise your hand if you have a question and when you do, introduce yourself, your name and affiliation. you are so stunned by the riveting remarks. a question right here. >> thank you. it seems that hanoi -- the trump -- in hanoi trump administers and try to get the big deal for big deal and failed. does the panel think now the
administration is going to try a small for small approach? and if so, elizabeth mentioned the roadblocks for that, do you think that will be any more effective than trying to go for a big for big? >> i will direct that to dan first because it gets at the central problem of how do you overcome this fundamental tension about small for small, which is what north korea wants and what he says, going big for big. >> i think i don't know what the administration's internal strategy with negotiations, if you look at the remarks from special representative it week or two ago, he says the u.s. is willing to talk about what was a
phased approach. he reiterated that exchanges might be possible, no sanctions relief at this time. i think if we do get serious working level dialogue, the question of big for bigot hanoi wasn't going to get them anywhere. what might be a more reasonable for reasonable approach. what's enough north korea can do the justifies some suspension of certain sanctions while keeping other elements. i think north korean actions like a shut down of this material production at other known uranium enrichment sites, i think that would have some value and i think closing on a possibility of getting those actions and holding out for the
hope of getting everything all at once would be shortsighted. >> i think the appropriate thing for the united states government to do in the case of that, there was not a smashing success in capitulation based on the first proposal, that is ok. i think that is an impetus to get creative and thoughtful instead of to back down on the u.s. position. by creative and thoughtful i mean thinking about the kind of concession the u.s. can give that are not sanctions but are still meaningful. this has enabled a period of can i say stability? is that too strong? it doesn't have anything to do with sanctions really.
in the areas of diplomatic engagement, perhaps cultural, humanitarian, considering what else occurred around modification of military exercises, if there is any give their. continuing with the summit diplomacy which clearly has social capital and political capital value for the north koreans. what may be available there, another way of saying that is can you think of a sequencing where there are gives on the united states side or international side that are meaningful to north korea but that hold until a later point after which north korea has made verifiable and substantial nuclear commitment that holds until then the relief of
economic sanctions from the united states or the international community and just to say they have to proceed, otherwise they have a truly difficult nonfunctional mass around compliance even worse than we have now, which is bad. >> especially if you take into account what north korea says is them trying to downplay their desperation for sanctions relief. after hanoi you had the foreign minister, the foreign minister say what we actually want is security guarantees. and not sanction relief. on the other hand, if we are going to get creative on sanction relief, maybe north korea might get creative and have some things where they don't provide concessions on the
nuclear program but on other things like say conventional aspects of their military. next question. >> hello. i just came for a few days for meetings about north korea and i saw your event so i thought that's a wonderful occasion to come here. thank you for a really intriguing discussion. thank you to stephanie for mentioning the humanitarian aspect. i had some meetings before coming here and we had some good discussions about the sectoral sanctions and what can be done in that regard. one of the thoughts was actually if you look at the situation from the internal domestic north korean perspective, some of these especially the seafood and textile industry, i could use the word privatized in north korea.
so if we sanction those areas, we are sort of discouraging the internal economic developments which we should probably maybe try to make work which are also undermining from inside. that would be one point and as a european i would also like to ask about the european sanctions which are those that should go farther than the u.n. sanctions and also -- if you think about rolling back sanctions, we could also start to think about the e.u. sanctions and go back in coordination with the united states. i was wondering also what the other partner sanctions, whether
that would be some system how to do it. within iran deal sanctions, europeans are trying to save as much as possible. one of the ways they're doing it is the mechanism which would be providing financing to iran outside of the u.s. financial system. that is something which the u.s. administration likes to see but to some extent it would also tell them how to finance certain issues but at the same time keep the financial sanctions in place. learn the positive lesson rather than the negative lesson. thank you very much. >> any thoughts on the tension between hindering organic growth of the private economy versus
actually hindering the nuclear program and then the thoughts about e.u. sanctions or south korea's sanctions come all the other unilateral sanctions? >> can i talk about the seafood piece of this? i've looked at the seafood question carefully. i am familiar with the research by andre and peter and others that claims the seafood injured -- industry is privatized. i disagree and would challenge the premise of that research and i have had dialogue with peter ward about it. i think it's based off old information. what has happened since the research that is the basis for those conclusions is first the
north korean military took over most of the boats, a lot of the boat ships that first began arriving in 2015 before the sanctions were even strengthened. which is an important point. were army boats. what you begin to see about that time is two things. the fishing industry came under the control of north korean government agencies, including bureau 39, the general bureau. which is the money laundering -- money laundering and intelligence agency. the ministry of state security which is the north korean version of the gestapo and the internal security force the guards political prison camps. they begin to push aside the army, so and then the other development you begin to see is the government was selling lots of fishing rights to chinese so that the waters close to the coast badly overfished and that's why a lot of these boats were going so far out, so the winds blew them out to the open ocean. the sanctions are against the export for seafood. we are talking about a country where the population is badly
protein deficient. the first question is wire the north korean people not eating that seafood, why is it being exported and who do you suppose is really using that money if in fact the industry has come under the control of a few government industries that are the apex predators of the north korean pecking order. the other point i would make is internal reports from north korea tell us at times when the seafood export sanctions are enforced, local market prices inside north korea for fish and seafood go down. consumers, the poor in north korea will say i've never been able to afford fish and seafood in my lunch before.
i think it's the league that first taught the world how to salt and preserve fish, the seafood industry should be salting and drying and preserving fish, trading around the country and providing for the nutritional needs of the population that does not have enough efficiency. i would say that these facts bring us to the exactly opposite conclusion that we should enforce the fish and seafood sanctions and any frankly food export sanctions very strictly because north korea's food production should be feeding a hungry population. >> regarding speaking to desh seeking to differentiate the various sanctions and regimes.
the eu, the u.s., u.n., i admire the creativity and thinking about how to consider different options whether incrementalism is appropriate or not. you've already heard my argument for why i think it's not the strongest put forward on this issue. in general i would say there is not a lot of success to be had by seeking to differentiate the e.u. sanctions significantly from the u.s.. virtually any company, bank, or nonprofit or relief group of sufficient size to handle connectivity, permitted connectivity with north korea, has to -- will find itself in some way object to u.s.
sanctions on north korea and what that means is they cannot choose to abide by a different set of measures, sanctions measures in a different jurisdiction that may be perceived as more permissive and planned to remain a growing concern. which it is it will violate u.s. sanctions potentially and put themselves out of business. so to try and encourage to take your example, a rollback of european sanctions on north korea and encourage the banks with companies. to try and expand economic conductivity would be encouraging them to gauge in a conflict of situate -- and in violations of sanctions which is the fast road to insolvency.
and not carrying out the point of what they were doing which is trying to create economic opportunity for north korea and the people of north korea. it was fragile at best and the u.s. administration given its overwhelming hostile view towards iran will be quick to make insolvent everyone related to it or otherwise subject to major u.s. criminal liability that can be accomplished. as soon as it violates iran sanctions and to court connectivity with north korea. which would accelerate that process as well. i don't expect that is the conduit towards moving money
into north korea. and the kind of leapfrogging through jurisdiction such as germany or russia is problematic is that is been, that kind of modality for achieving humanitarian financial flow into north korea, whether or not that improves on cash couriers is a different connection. >> let's go back to the audience. the first hand i saw. >> i'm with the school of public service over by the national cathedral. with the recent situation with iran or the u.s. is reimposed sanctions despite their seeming compliance and the verified compliance with international community, would north korea see this as an issue as the next ministration can pull the rug out and undo what has been done. other more skeptical the united states his ability to keep a steady heel?
>> yes and so is everyone else the united states will want to work with including our closest security allies. >> i would just add congress passed a law is passed in a bipartisan way to look north korea know the conditions has to meet and that those conditions will go from administration to administration despite the changes are partisan political patrol. >> i'm a research assistant for the national interest. my question is how that we are going to get the working level start -- negotiation started, what do you think officials should talk about, what should the agenda be before the next
summit be including president trump and chairman kim in terms of the definition. >> i think there was a fair bit of progress up to the hanoi summit on some of the secondary issues in the negotiations. there was reportedly progress in talks about the liaison office, about enhancing recovery after getting recovery. a number of other issues. of course what ultimately sunk the summit was a lack of agreement on north korea's nuclear program and what the u.s. would offer with new -- north korean actions towards denuclearization and a roadmap. so for working level talks to make progress, there has to be something really tangible. certainly there are some things we can do in the short term in
confidence building measures but there is another summit that's more than an impromptu nice to meet you kind of thing, i think there would have to be some kind of deliverable on this issue. >> so based on current information, what is the chance the white house will soften the position for political capital in the upcoming election and what is the chance congress would allow such a deal to occur? >> can i stop and check twitter? >> i do think finding resolution or success broadly defined a north korea is a key aspiration
of the trump administration and i think there would be a great effort to come up with conditions for what can be called success ahead of president trump's reelection, the next general election basically -- basically. achieving a trade deal with china is also one of the key foreign policy and economic benchmarks and goals for this administration and it's a pretty tough going there. there are advisors around the president and no deal, no trade deal rather than one that doesn't seem adequate with conditions. i expect there will be a similar kind of reckoning around the enforcing summit or
conversations. the comes of towards the end of this presidential term. i can't see how broad success towards massive denuclearization could possibly occur. though i do think it will be a major effort by the administration to achieve some conditions. as far as congress, i don't think they will budge much at all. success will have to be squishy for the administration in order for congress to let that go by. >> because congress wants to be a part of input on a deal, particular with a peace treaty but it desh do you think that gives the administration more of a reason to not pursue and go with an executive agreement. >> even though they said all along that they will get senate consent on this. >> they said that on nafta too.
>> i think this administration will president trump is in office, the political stars are aligned in a way that there is a reasonably good treaty that goes to congress, i figure road be much easier for the administration to get that through then a democratic administration. i think the trump administration would be able to pull some of its republican allies on board who would be much more skeptical if a democrat was in office. on the other hand, assuming president trump gets reelected, the window will be tight to get enough ground in negotiations to submit a realistic and good treaty to congress in the next
year. >> more questions in the back. >> i'm fay with the saint albans school of public service. i'm wondering what the panels thoughts are on the extent to the -- to which they can -- china and the u.s. can work on the issue in light of the tensions with the countries concerning trade and huawei. thank you. >> china u.s. cooperations. >> the most important north korea story that almost no one is following is happening in the u.s. district court for the district of columbia now where a prosecutor -- where prosecutors are trying to enforce subpoenas against three major chinese banks, the record of the case is sealed and the names of the banks are not unsealed, there
has been some speculation about which of those banks are. two of those subpoenas are issued by grand juries. all are calling for the bank to turn over records about suspected north korean sanctions. the judge has granted the government motion to take production of those records. banks did not comply and they plan to find them in contempt of court. i would in no way say our pressure against north korea has been maximum to this point. donald trump has particular been pulling punches. what the justice department has done with these actions and with the seizure, which is not such a china story, i think if the justice department becoming a
new center of gravity in the sanctions effort and you can look for congress really to empower a justice department doing as much as it can to enforce the law by the treasury department which seems to be doing as little as possible. i think this will give the chinese financial industry a negative incentive against violating north korean sanctions and i would suspect as a matter of chinese government policy. i think things will get worse before they get better. >> the three unnamed banks reported on are presumed to be chinese banks. >> yes.
>> i agree with what you said except i would say it's not just the justice department and law enforcement mechanisms the leading edge to pursuit of -- this is what you do if you can't enforce sanctions, you try and dial up your law enforcement actions. it is also commerce. justice and commerce. you mention huawei. one of the reasons we are talking about it is they are listed on a commerce list and i do think these are going to be two tools the administration will look to use more and more including north korea to advance its policy. a high-level comment on china, the uss to work with china to achieve success, however squishy or broadly defined to make that including more sanctions or in rolling them back. it's not a desh it is a have to have for success. >> it seems like holding -- it seems a have to have for success. >> it doesn't seem holding those banks is the most cooperative way to work. how we run out of cooperative
measures with china and are we left with coercive? >> we haven't run out of them at all. there is ample opportunity for creativity, that is just not the style and mo of the administration. there are ample opportunities to dialogue pressure, but if you are coming at this from an america first, disdain for multilateralism and cooperation, these are the tools you reach for first. commerce listings, criticizing nato, pulling out of the jcpoa and paris accord, you are looking for ways to actually make your allies or some of your counterparts become the pressure valve for your enemies. you are putting your allies and some competitors as the focus of the pressure.
>> president trump -- do you think he talks to desh >> if you read the court's orders ordering the records to be turned over, the basis for the prosecutor's argument in this motion to compel was that we have previously tried to use our mutual legal assistance treaty with china to get them to voluntarily cooperate and turn over records. those banks had agreed with the fdic's to give those -- give access to when they wanted to set up branches in the united states. in 2016 there was another investigation where we tried to invoke to get the chinese banks and the chinese justice ministry to cooperate. they pretty much gave us the middle finger. we got no cooperation on their part, that is the basis for why the justice department is using
more coercive means. i would be very cautious about attributing too much diplomatic or political incentive to what the justice department is doing. the justice department, and i would single out the southern desert of new york, but also the d.c. district, may really value their political --. in the legal profession we refer to the southern district of new york, the sovereign district of new york for the reason they just really push away washington and its political considerations. i strongly believe in that to some extent i know some of the people believe that the justice department is simply proof -- pursuing violations of law. they don't believe the financial system should be open for people who break the law, whether they are north korean, chinese or anything else. we enforce our money laundering and sanctions laws harshly
against european banks, we made them pay $9 billion in fines, penalties and forfeitures, why of the chinese banks been given what to -- what amounts to do fact on immunity until now? i think what we are doing is getting the attention of the chinese banks where we perhaps have enough leverage to come to a future agreement on only allowing through those transactions for the north korean people. >> let's take these last two questions and then i will have one more. >> on ethan with the school of public service. in any deal we make with north korea, there will be some aspect of north korean denuclearization, no matter how large or small. my question is, with what we know of north korea's track record of cheating and not
really denuclearizing, is there anyway the united states or international body can verify north korea actually is following through with their agreement? >> let's take the second question as well. >> i'm a recent graduate of johns hopkins. before that i worked at the ministry of education at south korea. my question goes to -- and i'm impressed by your talking about the politics and practicality. you mentioned to incentivize north korea, to change behavior, the solution should not be sanctions relief, but the people
and other things. we all know -- we also know north korea has shifted its national statistic policy goal, shifting to focus more on economic development. so even if the u.s. does not want to give relief -- sanctions relief, north korea wants the sanctions relief as its number one priority. if that happens, the united states still can say no, than the negotiation might be another breakdown. how can we close the gap? what would be the united states strategy going forward? >> you have very articulately laid out an impasse that the united states and north korea were to come to if north korea insists there must as an initial and confidence building matter
be economic relief or benefit to north korea and the united states as that shall not be the case. so that is right, that is a challenge. just to borrow from the iranian example, what we have seen in their, this may be rather extreme. the different point of the arc of the progression of conflict the united states has made, 12 demands laid out about what it wants from iran and iran has said no and there has been an offer to a discussion to negotiating or speaking together and there has been no willingness on either side to make that happen. we are seeing an escalation of tensions. that is something that could occur if there is an impasse and break down. that's a real scenario. i think it's more real than the
one we have been engaged in one we have been engaged in today which is what should it look like if there is this deal and denuclearization and the removal of sanctions. it is perhaps the case that there can be valuable benefits north korea that may have a kind of economic value to engage in these other forms of -- or to accept these other confidence building measures or confessions from the united states such as humanitarian or educational exchange or diplomatic realm possibly not just with the united states, but with other countries, a discussion of peace or other domains, the political side of the conversation. what we could look at in that domain as well that could, if the two sides are committed to sticking with the process, at
the early stage of discussing everyone must dig in and have strong positions they put out there at the beginning for negotiations. we haven't seen if either side is willing to get creative in this initial stage of confidence building and progression towards working level conversation. >> i would ask what is the source for your claim north korea has abandoned the policy? i haven't seen that. i would not only question that premise, but i would also ask what practical effects have we seen because of it. reports tell us its production of missiles and nuclear weapons is as high as it has ever been. they still have it in their constitution that they are a nuclear state, they are pursuing nuclear weapons. i think as a practical matter, the question congress will ask is what is north korea done to
deserve sanctions relief. i don't know how anyone could answer that. we may be distant relatives, my grandmother is named minkov. i think you just nailed it. this is hard because every member of congress who may know less than those sitting up here and in this room is just going to say they keep lying to us, they cheat every time, why should we go along with this? they have to earn our trust. this agreement and the standard sections are hard to meet because north korea has thrown away our trust. it will have to win it back with transparency. >> i think you are absolutely right. north korean cheating on agreements certainly a concern to be worried about.
but there are a number of north korean nuclear and missile production sites that are well-known there have been plenty of open source researchers who pour over every inch of google earth and satellite imagery finding various sites. there is a lot taking place, the u.s. intelligence community knows a lot more. being able to have a set of steps even if it's not anytime anywhere inspections, that will still lead to a significant reduction in north korea's ability to advance its programs. of course i've been getting to a -- of course getting to a final deal would require more than that. there will be a continuing need for those open source researchers, for the intelligence community to continue to make sure north
korea is living up to whatever initial agreement it signed on to. >> i would add you need inspectors on the ground to verify the facilities. north korea has an extensive network of underground facilities and bunkers and they simply will not provide access the u.s. or others want by the level of verification certainty we need and that is a problem we will have to overcome. one last question because no one else raised it, south korea wants to get back in the game, they always throw out sanctions relief in terms of projects, resuming the industrial complex on the mountain and tourism project. is there a way to find relief whether it's an exemption on u.n. resolution that allows for joint ventures or anything that allows for inter-korean projects to proceed? >> those -- some of those are
before the committee right now. >> from the u.s. perspective i would say technically yes, but i don't think that washes well politically. you can't just make exceptions just because or is a building measure for one country or one set of project. you're setting a precedent you have to live with with all sanctions. the u.n., u.s. or otherwise, that would be a heck of a thing to bank on to throw that all away. >> it would nullify and undermine the pressure necessary to get north korea to make a major strategic choice about its policies, congress hates caisson intensely. i met with 400 members of the
house -- staffers of the house, many in the course of talking about this, i can't tell you how many times people came up to me and said does it close down --. i said no and they said i won't support it unless it closes it down. there is an intense antipathy to it. i've jokingly approached -- proposed if you were to put in a golden corral buffet in there where the workers and families can eat and then go to a clinic and get medical care, we could assure ourselves the wages are going to the people who earned it. other than that, i think congress is going to see this as undermining sanctions. >> i want to thank the panel and
announcer: here's a look at her live coverage tuesday. c-span has the senate judiciary committee hearing on protecting children online, which starts at 10:00 a.m. eastern. at 2:00 p.m., the house returns from his holiday to work on several housing bills. c-span2, the senate continues work on judicial and executive branch nominations. a pair of events on c-span3.
11:00, the american enterprise institute hosts a forum on border security and migration, then later the senate armed services subcommittee on the u.s. southern command, which covers central and south america and the caribbean. announcer: the house returns from his july 4 recess tuesday, and starting wednesday they take up the $730 billion defense programs bill. the senate passed its version of the bill in late june. the senate continues work on confirmation of executive and judicial nomination, including assistant secretaries and the education and labor departments. watch the house live on c-span, the senate on c-span2. announcer: vice president pence addressed the christians united for israel conference. included in his 45 minute speech on u.s. policy toward israel, he responded to a video by representative alexandria as