tv European Union Trade Director on U.S.-EU Trade CSPAN July 31, 2019 11:44pm-1:04am EDT
the free c-span radio app. "washington journal" line every day with news and policy issues that impact you. coming up thursday morning, your reaction of the second night of the democratic presidential debates. join the conversation all mornings with your phone calls, facebook and tweets. 7:00 eastern thursday morning. join the discussion. >> a look of global trade policy. we'll hear from the director of general trade and the focused on the data industrial tariffs and the world trade organization. this runs an hour and 15 minutes. william: welcome, everyone. i am glad you are here. it is a great honor for me to
introduce sabine weyand, who is the new director general for trade in the e.u. -- in that you commission. she took over the position a month ago and this is her first visit in washington. csis is happy to have her here to make some open remarks, then she and i will have a conversation that will touch on a number of issues. then we will open it up for your questions. dr. weyand for trade. prior for this, she was the deputy chief resident negotiator for two and a half years, which had to the one of the difficult jobs in the e.u.
i told her that if we invite her back a year from now, we will ask her who was harder to negotiate with, the british or the americans. i am sure we would get a polite answer, but, she has a history in a number of positions of significance inside the european commission. as i said earlier, one of my personal favorites is before she was a brexit deputy, she was deputy director general of trade. those of you who are european know exactly what that means and how important it is. i have no clue, but it certainly sounds impressive. she has numerous positions going back more than 20 years with the commission. she has a doctorate in political science, her phd thesis was on the, transport policy, a study in e.u. policymaking, and she also
studied political science, economics, literature and linguistics at freiburg university in germany, and at cambridge. so it is a distinguished resume and distinguished background. with that, i am pleased to invite her to make some remarks. dr. weyand: good morning, ladies and gentlemen. thank you very much for the friend introduction. this is indeed my first trip to washington in menu capacity as director for trade at the european commission. the purpose of this visit is to listen and learn, so it is an irony that i start off by giving a speech, but that is where we are, and i hope to be able to set out some expectations and to enter into a discussion with you about the overall orientation of where we
are in trade policy and also in e.u. and u.s. relations. allow me to start not with trade, but with history, because if we don't learn from history, we are doomed to repeat it. in the words of an american economist and social theorist, thomas sowell, one of the most important reasons for studying istory is that virtually every stupid idea invoked today has been tried before and proved disastrous before, time and again. so today i would like to share with you a few stories from history, which i think are particularly relevant to our discussion today. there are three historical events i would like to mention and are they are linked by a common theme. they are the murder of an italian envoy in london in 979, a letter written by
george washington in 1379, and an unscripted scene in the 1986 movie "ferris bueller's day off." let's start with the murder of a trade negotiator in 1379. my colleagues who are with me today like myself are very happy that that seems to have gone out of fashion. he was sitting in the streets, mining his own business. >> a man walk us through times intentionally stepping on him. an argument broke out, swords were drawn and he was killed. why? because he was an envoy of the italian government. a trade negotiator sent to access the ports of london. narrow interests did not want this. a group of wealthy londoner middlemen who got rich from the duties of imports and exports. his story was part of a larger story of international trade, the monopoly held over the ports by these middlemen made
sure that trade was focused on 1-1 relationship with other ports, limiting imports, driving up prices and making the majority suffer. but eventually, barriers were lifted and other ports would open. his murder could not hold back wider prosperity forever. george washington's letter in 1976 was to the american people, his farewell address. after 20 years of public service, he stepped down, but he wanted to speak to the people, addressing them as friends and fellow citizens. he reflected on the challenges america was to face and offered advice. the credo of his foreign policy section is a strong endorsement of free trade. that trade links should be established naturally, that there should be minimal
interference from government, that common rules international trade should be established. it is interesting, that this was not in line for the policy of his presidency. he saw the policy of protectionism at the end, or perhaps it had something to do with other influences. the letter was published three years after adam smith's "wealth of nations." finally, "ferris bueller's day off." the actor, ben stein, was too good at his job. he could not finish the scene without the class laughing. hey told him to talk about the most boring thing he could think of to calm him down. he happened to be a real economist, so he delivered a monologue on the tariff act of 1930, and that did the trick, the students stopped laughing. today, it is well-known that this sank the u.s. deeper into recession and that indeed, it was not a good idea to go down that road. so these seemingly unrelated events are bound together by ne common theme.
that is the winter of protectionism. today we would do well to remember these lessons, not used because of the decisions e make now will affect the global landscape for years to come. so what is the view from the e.u.? it is not about trade disrupted, it is the entire global order that is in flux. geopolitics, security and technology are at the core of this change, and trade and economics have been dragged into this reality. they have lost the independence they share before. central to this transformation is a rivalry between the u.s. and china on a geostrategic level, and the competition for technological leadership. trade is but the means that this competition is carried out. what does that mean for the e.u.?
we are caught between china's economic model with all the trade, distortions and brings, market distortions that it creates in our home markets and also in third markets and also in the chinese markets. on the other hand, we have the u.s. increasingly taking unilateral measures, against this backdrop, the e.u. wants to hold its own. we are determined to promote a rules-based international order with updated rules for the 21st century. because the alternative is a road where might is right. deal economics is a particular challenge for the e.u. because the e.u. was built on the separation between trade and economics on one side and politics and security on the other. today, we realize that we have to up our game if we want to be lawmakers and not rolled takers -- rule makers in the world of
oday and tomorrow. there is no room to be shy. especially now, we choose the type of world we want to be in. making decisions that will affect generations to come. the e.u. has chosen its path. we are protecting our market from unfair, deceptive and illegal practices. we have stepped up our ability to use trade defense measures. we have set up a screening that looks at foreign investment in the e.u. to make sure these investments do not raise security or public order issues. we are promoting tools such as the international procurement estimate that gives us leverage to open up the country markets, etc.
we are also bringing together our policies and making the best use of them -- competition, industry, trade. abroad, we are doing so too, standing up for multilateralism, and forcing the rules, ensuring a level playing field. in this context, obviously, china springs to mind. the e.u. is not against the emergence of china, but we have a problem with the lack of convergence of china with the rest of global order. in this respect, we share the u.s.'s concerns about distortions from nonmarket policies and practices, and that is behind our commitment, our engagement together with the u.s. and japan and the so-called trilateral process to try to develop rules to address this behavior. we are also using our economic weight to make our voice heard. the e.u. stands for a market of 500 million people and we want
to leverage its size and importance in order to shape he global environment in a way that is conducive to fair trading practices and sustainable development. we want to shape a world through connections and standard-setting. we want to remain outward looking and engaged. as you know, we have had the most active trade negotiating agendas in the world. in the last five years, we have completed negotiations with japan, canada, singapore, south korea, vietnam, and last month, we concluded negotiations after 0 years with this country. so what does this mean for e.u.-u.s. relations? the relationship is a central artery of the global economy and the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. it has the potential to be an
incredible tool for everage. we are already using it as such indeed, it has been central to our response to the unfair trading practices of china. the trilateral work in this context is extremely important, as i said, between the u.s.-the e.u. in japan to develop rules on issues such as industrial subsidies, state owned enterprises, ip theft, or forced technology transfer. but we want to anchor these rules in a multilateral environment in a reformed w.t.o., because in our view, it is the only way to have a lasting discipline that can be forced in a sustainable manner over the duration, independent of individual people in office. hat is what we are trying to achieve. we need to work with the u.s. as a partner in this
endeavor. but recently, our relationship has come under strain. tariffs on steel and aluminum, long-running disputes over aircraft subsidies. it is natural that friends sometimes disagree with each other, but this is something else. there are real threats elsewhere, i have referred to some of them, yet we find ourselves in growth slowing series of skirmishes. e have to overcome this. there is political rule to fix these issues, to choose cooperation over conflict. we can see that since the meeting between president juncker and trump. they laid out a positive agenda for the e.u. and the u.s.. a certain anniversary is coming up later this week, and on that occasion, that e.u. will be publishing a progress report on the last year and how we see the way forward. let me pick up a few themes from this cooperation. the very important one is
global partnership on standards. the strategic case for the a you and the u.s. for setting joint standards in areas that are not regulated but where regulatory efforts are underway is overwhelming. it is today that we will set it is today that we will set the standard for robotics or 3-d printing, for connected cars, and we want to do so jointly in order to shape the global order in these issues in line with our principles and ideas. there is also a strong business case for doing this. it is not extremely sexy, i recognize that, but reaching an agreement on conformity assessment and on standards reduces the cost of trade, of doing business, and of complying with each other's workers, and applied to a $1 trillion bilateral relationship, these
things make a real difference for business. we have also proposed to work together on industrial tariffs to eliminate them. that, again, would not only bring benefits for business, and they are far from being negligible, on both sides, we are looking at additional exports by 2033 in the order of $26 billion. but, this would also build trust. and so, finding settlement for the long-standing, ever flowing dispute. the more we can do away with our bilateral trade irritants, strengthen our bilateral cooperation, the more political energy and capital we can spend on dealing with the real challenges, and that is how can we shape the global trading order in line with our values and principles?
here, perhaps lies the difference between the e.u. and the u.s. the e.u. and its member states have learned the hard way that no single country in today's world is able to enforce or shape the world around it on its own. it needs cooperation. we argue that this applies even to the biggest countries. so, we need to work together on these issues, that is our number one priority. we are committed to modernizing the w.t.o., and actually going for a branch reform, where this is necessary. why are we so attached to the w.t.o.? it is the only framework we have to achieve this. it is not perfect, it is in need of reform, but what is the alternative? tearing it up and starting afresh?
do we have the luxury of time to build something totally new? i don't think so. we think we need to maintain the functioning of the w.t.o. we need to review all its functions, from the negotiating function, to the monetary function, to dispute settlement. we need to develop the rules to make it work for the 21st century. we have already proposed a route to reform, and we would want to engage seriously with the u.s. on this. we want to update the rule book, to deal with issues and reinvigorate the negotiating function from fisheries, to e-commerce, services, and investment facilitation. we want to ensure proper functioning of this settlement -- dispute settlement, because what is the value of rules without the means to enforce them? that is why we want to unblock the appointments of the appellate body by addressing the concerns raised by the u.s. as
regards to the fashioning of the -- the functioning of the appellate body. and we want to overall improve the working methods of the organization. but, we are not alone in this either. japan is engaged with us in this process, and so are other countries. we have been making proposals reaching out to a large number of other w.t.o. members. we are convinced that the best way to secure the benefits of global trade and the best way to rein in china in a fair and lasting manner is through a better w.t.o., one fit for the 21st century. so, let me come back to where i started, history. what can we learn from history? i think we can learn that narrow interests gain from managed trade, while the majority lose out. but there is no protection in protectionism. that trade is about more than money, it is about influence and alliances, about politics and power, but it is better to
reform than to relapse and that in the long run, though the pendulum has swung back and forth and undergone disruption, the amount of progress is in the direction of global debate. that is why the e.u.-u.s. alliance is important. -- is so important. an alliance where we address our concerns through the rules of -- the rule of law, where we work together to set global rules for the w.t.o. an alliance where we curtail unfair practices from china and others. and where we secure the benefits of open global trade for another generation. thank you very much, and i look forward to the discussion. [applause]
william: thank you for that. i wanted to get a copy of that later if i can. as some of you know, i write a column about the trade negotiating. i got chills. [laughter] i think i can use that in the future. dr. weyand: don't give ideas to everyone. [laughter] william: we don't want to encourage that kind of behavior, but i certainly understand it, i understand the circumstances. what we would like to do now is drill down on some of the issues that were just mentioned and others that we know are going on out there. some of them between the u.s. and the e.u., and others that are more broad-based than that. the two of us will have a conversation for a little while,
then we will turn our attention to all of you. we have plenty of time for questions for you. let's begin with the obvious, the u.s.-e.u. relationship. you are here among other things to discuss the anniversary of the juncker and trump agreement coming up in a few days. characterize for us where you see the negotiation right now and particularly, are we in agreement on scope, are we still arguing on scope, is their -- there progress on the question of other culture? is that the only issue that divides us as far as scope is concerned, or are there others? dr. weyand: so, often in life, there are different things. one is the public debate, where the issue of scope is not settled, you referred to agriculture.
then, there is the actual work in the executive working group which was set up, and which obviously sticks to the mandate set by the two presidents. here, the picture is a mixed one. i think we have actually made some decent progress on the issue of regulatory cooperation, which as i said, has huge potential. there is a joint e.u. and u.s. interest to set a global standard. i think here, we are moving forward, hopefully, but that is one of the things i will have to test when i meet my interlocutors this afternoon. but here, we have made progress on pharmaceuticals, cooperating on medical devices, but there are a lot of other issues out there we could make progress. we have also -- we are also working well together on energy issues, lng, which is a success story. i think it is in the interests
of both sides. where we are stuck is on industrial tariffs. we have a mandate to negotiate the elimination of industrial tariffs, but there has not been much of a take-up so far on the u.s. side. so, i am interested to explore why that is the case and what can be done to unblock it. then, there is another strand of this work which is extremely important, and where i think we need to move up a gear. we have been working at the technical level, but it needs to go to the political level, and that is on the issue of working together, including japan, but working together to rein in china and develop a system in which china can function without disrupting markets around the world. it is a very mixed picture. some progress, some areas of promise. but we need to step up.
industrial tariffs, so far, not much. william: what has been the u.s.'s argument on industrial tariffs? are we just not interested in that? dr. weyand: i'm trying to find out. i have the impression that there are people in the u.s. administration who are more interested in raising tariffs them lowering them. william: we will get to that. dr. weyand: and there are others who indeed say, i don't want to cut industrial tariffs without discussing agriculture. william: the european response to that has been what? dr. weyand: the european response to that is, we have a mandate fixed by the two presidents. let's work on that mandate. the reason why agriculture is absent from the mandate was an issue of discussion that
president juncker explained why the e.u. was not able to do much in this respect. we also have to be very clear that there are limits to what we can do in terms of overarching agreements between the e.u. and the u.s. at the moment. you are familiar with the discussions in europe about sta's being premised with respect to the climate agreement. -- paris climate agreement. that is an issue we need to keep in mind. and, we have to be clear. we have an authorizing environment composed of 28 member states and the european parliament, and we don't have a mandate from our member states to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. in addition to agriculture, we would also deal with favorites like public procurement, maritime services, etc.
one last remark, i think rather than being hung up about questions of philosophy almost, i think we need, in the current circumstance, to make progress on concrete issues. -- to build trust by making progress on concrete issues. we have the substance to do that. then, i think we can see where this process takes us over time. but i don't think we have -- the fact that we have different concepts of what ideal mandateave been in the should prevent us from moving forward on the areas we agreed to cooperate. william: two questions about that. if the united states were to agree to put all those things like public procurement and things that we don't want to talk about if we were to put them on the table, would you put those things on the table, like agriculture? dr. weyand: if we are in the business of discussing hypotheticals, does it mean the u.s. administration would rediscover its full commitment to the paris agreement and be willing to bind to that? [laughter] william: one can always hope. [laughter]
william: it raises a timing issue that maybe we can explore. there is a new european parliament earlier this month. there will be a new e.u. commission that is now taking formation. is anything going to change? do you have to get a new mandate? could you get a new mandate with the commission? dr. weyand: that you is built on -- the e.u. is built on the principle of institutional continuity. so, the mandate that we have remains valid, and that is the mandate we received from the member states. so, there is no need to change that at this stage. what is interesting -- we are at the process of preparing the arrival of the new team including the new trade commissioner, etc. i cannot prejudge the decisions they will take. but you can see the theme over the last couple of years, which is reinforcing the political guidelines of the
president-elect, mrs. ursula von der leyen. i see two things, one is the determination to leverage all policy instruments, including foreign policy instruments at the global level. and as i said, the strength of the internal market. i think her background in international affairs and security matters is helpful. i would expect the commission to see that it will be stronger. the second is the strong focus on equipping the e.u. with a domestic instrument necessary to protect its own market and also to defend its interests -- including in situations where others have recourse to unilateral measures, or where they deny us the possibility to have access to multilateral dispute settlement. so, a stronger focus, more robust enforcement and defending the e.u. interests in a world where the rules-based system was under threat.
william: any inside information you want to share with us on who will be the next trade commissioner? dr. weyand: this would be purely speculative. host: go ahead. -- william: go ahead. dr. weyand: i think traditionally, the trade portfolio has been one which has been very much. -- very much coveted. the president always has a choice on possible candidates. i'm sure we will end up with a strong trade commissioner. that is all i want to say. i know a few candidates but not all of them. william: we will be watching with great interest. i think we know some of them, too. dr. weyand: you may have seen some of them in washington. [laughter] william: from time to time, yes. i don't think anybody would be unwelcome. we are just looking forward to the change. it will be interesting. -- interesting to see. it is a government of continuity, but these are also governments of individuals.
we believe in continuity, too, but you can see, we have undergone remarkable changes lately. going back a step, i think we all welcome the conformity assessment progress that you mentioned, and i certainly agree. i have written about how important that is in terms of cost savings, not necessarily in terms of altering the trade balance. but, the reality is, at the same time, that europe and the united states have been arguing about regulatory details for 40 years on many issues without much success. do you see any significant change there? we are sort of nibbling around the edges. are we ever going to get beyond -- it seems to be our objectives are the same. we both want safeguards, clean -- safe cars, clean air, we don't want toxic to chemicals polluting the environment, yet we take significantly different regulatory approaches to achieving that objective.
-- achieving the same objectives. why can't we get closer together on these fronts? dr. weyand: i think we have to unpack that a little bit. there are lots of issues in what you said. one is indeed on an agreement on conformity assessment, that makes it easier for people to certify that they meet the other party's standards without having to undergo additional testing or certification. that has had an enormous impact. here, we have the ingredients, i need to check that with my interlocutor. we think we have the agreements to make an agreement that would apply across all sectors and would reduce compliance costs considerably. i think that would be a very good results. -- result. from our point of view, that should be doable. but, of course, in terms of
saying that we all have the same policy objectives, why can't we just agree on, you know, accepting what each side is doing as good enough? we do have totally different set-ups on both sides of the atlantic in terms of liability and responsibility. mixing these systems is not easy. we have different institutional set-ups which reflect societal preferences that are different. the thing to work with us is really to work with us on the standards and regulations themselves, to start working together early. that is most promising in areas where these standards are not yet set. it is much more difficult to try and undo what has been done and build something new, where both sides have been regulating for 30 years. that is why i think the focus on two things is helpful -- the conformity assessment.
it reduces compliance cost, but it does not touch the respective standards as such. and then, work together on the development of these standards. the point is, we don't have much time for that. because of the standards on robotics, 3-d printing, they are being set now. cash on connected cars, they are being -- cars, they are being set now. there are different international organizations that work on these standards. we have a burden to work together on this with the u.s. william: so this tells me, no progress on chickens, one of my favorite subjects. but i certainly agree, it is much easier to address regulatory differences in areas where there are not built in institutional interests in maintaining the status quo. i think it has not gone unnoticed here in the u.s. that a number of those areas -- gdpr
being one, where europe has not exactly moved multilaterally, but basically has been the first mover, in a review, at the expense of the united states. why should we have confidence in a multilateral approach when there is a growing number of these new areas where you have acted on your own? dr. weyand: again, i think we have to unpack this a little bit. i would not put taxation issues or gdpr in the same box as tests for cars. it is not the same nature. but to come back to your point, what do we do in areas where standards are set in both sides have are debated differently? i think we need to have much more of a permanent dialogue between the regulators on both sides, bilateral cooperation, in order to make it easier to fulfill each other's requirements. that is a possibility often in areas where we are not coming
from virgin ground in terms of regulation. on the issue of gdpr, i think here, we have to recognize that societal preferences on both sides of the atlantic are not exactly the same. i think in the e.u., we have much more of a public concern about privacy. there have been prominent cases in the european court of justice for that. we have had a long experience of trial and error in getting to public regulation that meets our core principles, and we have to recognize that europeans are very attached to the idea that the individual owns his or her data. and that is what is reflected in the gdpr. yes, it is a first-mover advantage we have there. i recognize that.
no we can also see there is splendid isolation. we see that california is following in the same direction. we also see that japan is considering legislation in that direction. if i look at the global level, we have had a discussion about data, free flow, with trump, i think that is something we can work with. that is something we now need to pick up in the trade negotiations and e-commerce negotiations in geneva. on the tax, i would disagree with you that we have gone alone on this. actually, this is exactly what people want us to do vis-a-vis china, i.e., we are aiming for international war. that is what the o.e.c.d. is working on. but, we also see that process is slower than we like it, so we are creating interim measures
that show our determination to go for fair taxation. whether we are talking brick or digital transactions. these measures are there as long as there is no international agreement on how to tax these in the future. now, of course, these measures have to stand up to scrutiny in the w.t.o. the u.s. has expressed doubts about whether the french law in particular is nondiscriminatory. i think the place to address these concerns is the w.t.o. so, i think we are ready to discuss these issues. we are obviously convinced that the measures are not discriminatory, but we are ready to discuss. william: i think that answers my next question, which was, it will come to the w.t.o., unless the o.e.c.d. gets busy and preempts the discussion with a joint proposal that everyone can subscribe to, which would make this particular question moot.
we will see. the w.t.o. tests, as we learned, in the past cases, some of which the u.s. lost, is not the intent, but the effect. and i think that is the case, where the u.s. can demonstrate the effect will be overwhelmingly on american companies. but, there is only one way to see that, to figure that out, and that is to go through the process. we will get to the process in a minute. going back to the gdpr, you mentioned the japanese, you mentioned us, you did not mention the chinese, who have taken a different view on privacy. they seem to not believe in it, at least as far as government access to data is concerned. are you worried that we are moving in the direction of essentially a fragmentation of the internet, where europe is operating according to one set of principles.
china, a very large market is operating according to a different set of principles. the u.s. may offer it on a third operate on a third set of principles. and we may be competing to bring other countries to our orbit, but that is not exactly a way to maximize at least the commercial aspects of digital trade. dr. weyand: i think there will be a competition for regulation in this area. and i would not exclude that there may be a certain fragmentation of the internet in this respect. the question is, how can we manage that if it comes to that? i think we need to look at something like the digital trade negotiations in the w.t.o. as an area to try and see whether we can establish at least some certain principles that everyone can sign up to. then, we have to see how to organize exchanges between those who are willing to go further and where we can exactly do the trade-off between what are the
reassurances we need in terms of building trust, which allows the free flow of data. so that basically, if you on the -- only exchange data freely between countries that have signed up to certain principles of protection of privacy and data. i think that will be the challenge. i think there is a difference between a certain fragmentation of the internet, which you see already today, but it has not stopped the internet from functioning. you already see that today. when other europeans access an american website, you have certain warnings on gdpr, or certain websites look different in europe than they do in the u.s. that has not paralyzed the system. we need to avoid a situation where basically, you have the total separation. something like the chinese war on the internet, think that
-- i think that would be problematic. william: china is not the only country that either has imposed or is contemplating much more serious restrictions on cross-border transmission of data and the requirements of data localization. let me go back to the more mundane for the moment. we have spent a lot of time here in the united states focusing on the industries of the future but of the past. are you optimistic about we are going to not get into an automobile tariff war with the e.u.? the trade commissioner, as i recall, has said different things about that at different times. what is your current feeling about what trump is going to do? dr. weyand: i would not pretend to be able to anticipate that.
william: neither would we. dr. weyand: i don't know whether i would have a better understanding of that after my trip and my meeting today and tomorrow. i think that the fact that there are different expectations, and that expectations change with time, there are people looking at this from different angles. i personally think that getting into this spiral of measures and countermeasures is indeed not a good way to go about international trade, and it only creates losers on all sides. we see that with steel and aluminum tariffs, we went forth and took rebalancing measures. should the u.s. go down the road on imposing tariffs on european auto exports to the u.s., we would be forced to do the same and also take rebalancing measures. so, it is a lose-lose scenario.
i think the object of the e.u. is try to prevent that and get to a situation where we develop the positive aspect of our the bilateral relationship, but where first and foremost, we can focus our energies on addressing the real issues we face on the global stage. william: another looming issue that may be bigger in dollar terms is the boeing-airbus dispute. where we both lost the w.t.o. my view is, you lost bigger than we lost, certainly in dollar terms. both sides have potential retaliation lists. i think you have done that. we are in the process of doing one which will be near 25 billion. a heavy list.
what do you see the outcome there? the arbitrator in the u.s. case i think will shortly produce in number, my guess is not now but in september, i am hearing. it probably will be a number different than what either side has asserted, it usually is, but then i think that is the endgame. the retaliation will probably go into effect. what happens then? we wait to see the results of your case and what that number is? dr. weyand: i have to start off by disagreeing with you. [laughter] i mean, our assessment is not that these are two cases of different magnitude. actually, our assessment is that they are more or less in the same ballpark. if you look at the issue of adverse effects, which is what will determine the size of the award. so, we have two parallel cases. we have both lost, as you said.
we have both sides, and enriched law practices. so, i think it is time to put this to bed also, because we are no longer in a world in which we were 15 years ago, where this was all about competition between airbus and boeing. we have other people in other countries getting onto the market with deeper pockets, and different ways of subsidizing. i think from our point of view, the ideal outcome would be to use the next weeks and months to get to an agreement which sets out discipline for the future and which results the issue that way. olves the issue
that way. -- resolves the issue that way. that we do so in a way which makes the imposition or suspension of concession superfluous. we recognize that once the award is out, of course, the u.s. is entitled under the w.t.o. to suspend concessions. so this is quite different from steel and aluminum tariffs or what they are doing with china. we recognize that. host: yes, we did it the right way, for once. dr. weyand: you said that, i didn't. [laughter] we are hampered by the fact that our case will take longer. but in our assessment, they are comparable. rather than going down this road of taking measures on both sides, we would like a resolution to the issue and then and make the imposition of sanctions superfluous. of course, i recognize that there have been voices in the u.s., the moment we have the right to impose sanctions, we
will do so -- that is something we will have to discuss because i don't think it is in the u.s. interest to impose these sanctions because it would oblige the e.u. to do the same a few months later, and that is not conducive to a good outcome. it will not help business on both sides of the atlantic. william: i assume that is an issue you will bring up today when you meet with your counterparts. you mentioned there are other countries out there. one down the road, not immediate, is china. china has a history of massive subsidies to promote industrial objectives of its own, and this is probably a good example of that. one of the things that the e.u. has been involved in is that trilateral process with japan and the united states.
to develop an approach for addressing the state owned enterprises and nonmarket subsidies. bring us up to date if you can on where that exercise sans. -- stands. pull the result become public at this point? and once you have an agreement, how do you move on? ms. weyland: i think we have been working constructively at a technical level, but we have not been good at making the jump from technical to political level, and that is something we need to look at, because these issues are right for technical proposals. the technical groundwork has been done, but the discussion to see what exactly are we trying -- to be had is to see what exactly are we trying to achieve, we need to have rules that are negotiable. if you put the ambition to far
out there, no one will follow you. you can kill proposals that are -- a process by being overly ambitious and not negotiable. so we need to fine-tune a level of ambition to be negotiable, something that is a political assessment that has to be done at the political level and we hope as of september we can have the political discussion and then bring this forward, bring it to the wto and also pull together the forces of the u.s., eu, and japan for leverage and -- to leverage markets in order to persuade others to come to the agreement. william: is the discussion entirely among the three countries? ms. weyland: the chinese are
perfectly aware of the process taking place. mr. reinsch: because we are telling them, or because they are listening in? ms. weyland: we have the tariffs with them going on so it is not a surprise. i think for the moment, they do not have to position themselves because it is not yet out there. that is why it is so important that we really produce results of this work, that this gets endorsed at the political level and that then this is something that will oblige china to position himself. -- itself. because at the moment, they have not had to do so. they are in a comfortable position. mr. reinsch: that brings us to the wto, which i know is an issue of great importance to the commission, and also here. let me start with specific questions, and we will work our way up to the bigger picture.
you commented earlier about the e-commerce negotiations. can you say a word about fisheries and how optimistic you are about getting that done in time for 11 months from now, the main goal? ms. weyland: i think it is the only multilateral negotiation. e-commerce does not involve the whole membership. they are plurilateral. i think it is really important that we get to a result here. what we see is that the degree of preparedness from the whole scope of the negotiation is not the same, and actually, we have a more challenging deadline because of negotiations are supposed to be finished by the end of the year. when i look at the papers that are the basis for further negotiations last week, you can see on issues like the illegal
unreported undeclared fishing, we are more advanced than on the issue of subsidies contribute into overcapacity and overfishing. so, we will have to consolidate what we have in these areas while moving forward on areas that lagged behind, and by the end of the year, we can say, on overfished stocks, we are basically there. but some will disagree. and then, move forward on the rest. i think in the autumn, we will have a clear picture on if we can go there. the u.s. is very much engaged in these negotiations and have -- has very much pushed for that, which is good, but i think this will require more on the
u.s. side, on our side, a lot of heavy lifting to get this into a space where we can find an agreement. mr. reinsch: there are two of -- to other disputes i want to ask you about ongoing. one has faded a bit. maybe you can make -- the market economy between the eu and china. rumors are that you won and china lost, and the case mysteriously disappeared and may never appear in public. is that true, the outcome? ms. weyland: i am looking at my lawyers, but i think i am not supposed to comment in public on the case that was put to rest in the wto.
in the meantime, we are confident that our renewed methodology works. we have been applying it for a while, and we will continue to apply it. this is an area where we have had constructive cooperation and exchanges with the u.s. mr. reinsch: because we are next. [laughter] if you lost, we would have been next. there is also, of course, a different one, which is more complicated, and we are not on the same page. that's the 232, the steel and aluminum tariff dispute. many countries have brought complaints against the united states. there was an adjudication on the issue between russia and ukraine, which i'm sure you know, where russia won.
what is the timeline that you see for the american cases, and what do you think the outcome will be? ms. weyland: i do not have a crystal ball. i think this is one of the cases where we have come to a truce because there are american measures and counterbalancing measures and the state continues, which is not a satisfactory state. -- the litigation continues, which is not a satisfactory state. this is the negativity we would like to avoid repeating, but i cannot tell you, i do not have insight into the timeline of these cases. mr. reinsch: i think an assessment has been similar to the boeing airbus case. i think we will probably both lose. there is parallel litigation. that brings us to the issue of the appellate body. this is a case where if we lose, either side loses, the temptation will be to appeal,
which if nothing else will drag things on for another year or so. yet, we may face a situation relevantly soon where that is not really an option because the appellate body will go away. the eu seems to be busy creating alternatives to the appellate body using article 25. can you say a few words about that and how it is going? do you have any traction or not? ms. weyland: i am making a habit of this. i will start by disagreeing with you again. [laughter] we are seriously worried about the dispute settlements. -- settlement system. mr. reinsch: as are we. maybe not our government, but -- ms. weyland: obviously, the bodypearance of the applet has wider repercussions, because
after december 11, when there is only one appellate body left, -- member left, people can appeal into the void. it paralyzes the whole dispute settlement system. in that situation, the first stage of the system is unlikely to survive for a long time, which will lead to results. so, we are seriously engaged with the walker process, which is an attempt, more than an attempt, it is a process that addresses the concerns raised by the u.s., concerns which we may not necessarily agree with, but that does not matter, we can still clarify a certain number of rules to make sure the system functions in the way it was intended to function when it was set up. the u.s. argues to say the system has strayed from that he
-- and it needs to be brought back to that. if that is the objective, what we are seeing from the walker process settlement body is an honest attempt, a serious attempt, to deal with these issues. and that is the plan, to unlock the appointments in the appellate body. obviously, given that we are a few months ahead of the possible demise of the system, we cannot sit idly by and see if it works or not. therefore, there is an alternative to the system. our objective, there is only one plan, and the plan is to get the system back up and running again. but, we are looking to say, if after december you cannot hear new cases because there is no appellate body, we need a system
cap step solution to mirror that body functioning. but we go about that in a more structured manner, so you have two wto members who say, there is a concrete dispute or a pipeline of current and future disputes, we come to the situation where we have to bring recourse to the appellate body. we replace staff. drawnbitrators would be from previous members of the applet body. they would be serviced in the same way and would be able to stop the gap until the appellate body is up and running again. this is something, we are
actually in the process of finalizing such a bilateral agreement with canada. we are in contact with other countries, but there are not other alternatives to the body as a stopgap solution. which would disappear the moment the body is up and running again. where moving along way to address the u.s. concern. although, i still have to see whether responding to these concerns is indeed what the u.s. wants and would be needed to unlock the appointment of the applet body, or whether the objective is really rather between the applet body system disappearing and returning to 1994's government. i'm not entirely clear. in any case, we have the solutions of-- the the walker report on the table.
william: it is time to turn to the audience. what for the microphone, identify yourself. -- weight for the microphone -- wait for the microphone, identify yourself. >> you talked a lot about linkages, assertiveness, and instruments. i wanted to ask two questions related to that. the first is, enlisting some new instruments the eu has, you mentioned the screening mechanism, which is a transparency mechanism that does not have any teeth in it at the eu level. taking that as an example, are there new instruments you believe the eu needs in order to better protect its instruments, and would those be achievable before november 1, when a new commission takes office?
the second question is, you talked about automobile tariffs. does the u.s. face a decision, either we impose automobile tariffs, or work with the eu to deal with china and wto reform issues? is this anrds, either/or choice from the eu point of view? do tariffs threaten the eu cooperation with the u.s. on other reform issues? ms. weyland: on the first issue, the fbi's screening is basically built on the instruments that exist already and on that basis, -- already in member states, and on that basis, it will develop the rules we need in order to deal with consequence. so you have to look at this as, one instrument will have to be
be backedill have to up by complete measures. and then have a look at the china communication, where there are a number of initiatives announced that would strengthen our domestic toolset. this is something we are working on as civil servants, which will be ready for when the new team takes over so they can make political decisions over what exactly they want, the initiatives, what they prioritize, and what they want to take forward. i will not announce now all of the things we are working on, because it is not my place, but if you look at the political guidelines of the president-elect, you can see references to the situations where we would have to be able to use functions in case we are denied recourse in the new settlement system. so that gives you a sense of
direction of what we need to do and that we need to have tools. the whole enforcement theme is very strong. we are working on a menu of options from which the political level can choose. on the auto issue, we are not in the business of, we have a cooperation agenda which was y ided by president --president junger, and that agenda includes a commitment not to introduce trade restrictive measures as long as the process is ongoing. our intention is to stick to that. i do the u.s. the courtesy to assume that they do that, as well. but, it is also clear it is complicated to measure in -- to manage in parallel a
positive agenda of constructive engagement, bilaterally or multilaterally, and at the same time, pile up irritants in the bilateral trade arrangement. it has an impact on the overall atmosphere and capacity to deliver on the positive track. we are not in the business of saying, if you do this, we do that. our objective is to avoid a tit-for-tat approach. >> distilled spirits council. thank you for joining us this morning and for your comments about the negative impact tit-for-tat countermeasures can have on the u.s. and eu. we, the distilled spirits council and our counterparts in europe are jointly in strong opposition to tariffs on the spirit sector and have been
working hard since last year when additional tariff countermeasures were applied to american whiskey. we have seen a 19% decrease in export since then. we are very concerned about the escalation in the boeing airbus dispute. could you share insight into the eu strategy to de-escalate the trade dispute in regards to the distilled spirits sector? thank you. ms. weyland: as i said, one of the objectives of my visit here in washington is to see whether we have the ingredients of the deal that will put the boeing airbus dispute to bed, and then that would make the suspension of concessions on both sides superfluous, but we are not in
the business of discussing functions lists with each other and we are not going to do a specific intervention in favor of one sector or the other. we are trying to get to a situation where neither side would have to suspend concessions. because let's keep in mind, the objective of suspending concessions in this situation is to reduce the other party. -- induce the other party to comply with the ruling. it is our intention to comply with the wto ruling, and if we -- and to do more than that. and if we do that, hopefully the case of suspension of concessions will go away. that is the way we approach it. i will have to see what the u.s. does. -- with the u.s. position is on this. the u.s. position is on this. >> on the autos report, the eu
--tion on the legitimacy's of autos and auto parts imports has been clearly stated but if this administration is treating the audit report -- i have heard a rumor the pay it forward is dealing with agriculture and bilateral trade talks, whether that is a clearly spoken intent is up for question. is it your understanding that there is a pay for two to avoid auto tariffs where there has to be some concession on the european side? a voluntary restriction of certain european auto exports,
or if it could be something like agriculture, if there is any type of concession that is seen as required from the eu side? ms. weyland: i think the eu position has been expressed many times by the trade commissioner and commission president that we will not negotiate under the threat of wto legal action, nor will we go down the road of managed trade. that is what i can say in answer to your question. otherwise, we have a positive cooperation agenda where we are moving forward, a little too we canfor my taste, do more there. but we are not going to negotiate under threat of legal sanctions, which is the difference between possible
automobile action and airbus boeing. -- and the airbus boeing case. mr. reinsch: we have time for one more. there it is. >> i am with the american chemistry council. thank you for your remarks. i appreciate the focus on avoiding tit-for-tat tariffs. that has been a major focus of the chemical industry in the u.s., where we are being hit on all sides by u.s. tariffs, retaliation by the eu, retaliation with china, et cetera. i am curious as to whether you think it is possible to avoid more tariffs in the u.s. eu -- u.s.-eu discussion, with respect to boeing airbus where chemicals are a prominent feature on the eu and u.s. list. thank you. ms. weyland: i can only talk about what our intention is. i cannot anticipate the results.
this is something we will have to see over the next days and weeks, but we think we are ready to enter into negotiations of a settlement that would make the imposition of sanctions superfluous. that is all i can say. i do not control the u.s. action in this respect. i can only discuss. mr. reinsch: on that note, thank you very much. please thank her for her graciousness. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]
sieve interview with donald trump as he reflects on his first 2.5 years in office. >> you look at the european union, china, doing poorly. we are the hottest country in the world. we have a strong military. stronger after this last budget. i will be able to cut back. we had to rebuild our military. we did not have a choice. ask an interview saturday at 10:00 a.m. eastern. listen wherever you are.
this weekend, in american history tv, saturday at 8:00 p.m., comparisons between abraham lincoln and andrew johnson. >> you look at the whole cartoon. --is a different impress and impression. not that he was a defender, but that he did not understand the constitution. his ability. he was acting in unconstitutional ways. >> a preview of the 19th amendment exhibit. >> women in new jersey who were the first voters, beginning in 1776, when new jersey became a state, the state constitution sex whenention of discussing voting qualifications. it only had a property requirement. women who owned enough property,
primarily widows and single women, not all women, could and did vote in elections at the local, state, and national level. >> at 8:00, john farrell talks early life and career. >> he campaigned for the marshall plan. every crowd that would take them. he owed them his best judgment, not his obedience and he convinced them. richard nixon did not just win the republican nomination, he won the democratic nomination. past inre the nations's american history tv every weekend.
>> federal reserve chairman powell announced a interest rate cut for the first time since 2008. 2008. he answered several questions including whether he caved to political pressure from the president. >> good afternoon and welcome. we decided today to lower the target for the federal funds rate to a range of 2%-two .5%. -- 2.25%. the outlook for the u.s. economy remains terrible, and this action is designed to support the outlook. it is intended to ensure against downside risks. offset is factors.