The ethical lapses exemplified by Abu Ghraib, Mahmudiyah (Blackhearts), and Maywand (5/2 Stryker) are distressing symptoms of an even bigger, and potentially devastating, cultural shortcoming. The U.S. Army profession lacks an institutional ethical framework and a means of peer-to-peer self-governance. The frameworks the Army has may imply, but they do not explicitly dictate, an Army ethic. Other English-speaking nations' ethical constructs can inform the development of an Army Ethic that serves to protect our organizational and individual honor from moral and ethical lapses that do great harm to the institution, undermine the American public trust, and hinder mission accomplishment. This paper describes the problem, provides a review of the literature, including current Army artifacts, reviews partner nation military ethics, and sketches the necessary philosophical underpinnings. The paper also addresses the importance of promulgation, nontoleration, and the necessity for the Army to act as a learning organization. Finally, the paper supplies and justifies a proposed institutional and individual Army Ethic and means of promulgation, ethical decision-making, and governance. The proposed Ethic would replace and integrates a number of disjointed and disconnected Army ethical prescriptions.