The purpose of this research is to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for two primary reasons: (1) to document the history and evolution of CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC), and (2) to use the consolidated lessons learned to shape recommendations to improve future contingency contracting operations. In this study, we focused on senior-level leadership within the DoD, both from the acquisition and nonacquisition communities, to capture strategic-level lessons learned. Our research relies on qualitative data received via interviews with senior leaders. The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and reductions has left many capability gaps and has increased the need for contracted support. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan only magnified the DoD's reliance on contracted support, and forced the DoD to focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of contingency contracting activities. The evolution of contingency contracting has not only been in scope, but also in the expectations placed on contingency contracting officers, the use of contingency contracting as a battlefield enabler, and the recognition of the need to manage contractors as part of the total force.