mine alone. it's been prove bid the judge of the fisa court and has been known to member of the committee and the intelligence committee at the time that the section 215 authority was renewed. >> as i understand that. as i understand that. it's been part of the problem we've had is that until recently most people didn't have any idea about those. we have had significant constraints that limited our ability to explain why some of us had concerns with the patriot act. why some of us on both sides of the aisle voted against reauthorizing the patriot act. we were unable to speak about this publicly. we have secret procedures being undertaken pursuant to secret law. it has been a bit of a problem. now what would you say then -- getting to you, mr. cole. to my constituents, as i understand what you're saying, we're collecting it but not looking tat. we're collecting it but not closing our eyes. don't worry about that. what would you say to my constituent's saying it's not government's information. it doesn't make it relevant under the law. it still doesn't meet what many of my constit

. you do not have to get advance notice from the fisa court. i propose before they do any kind of query, any kind of search, they have to go to the fisa court. and at that step in the process,

pages long from the fisa court that ruled, that much of what the nsa is doing which is spying on american citizens is both unconstitutional in violation of the fourth amendment and illegal, a violation of the statute. this opinion remains a complete secret. the fisa court has said they have no objection to having it released, but the obama administration insists it has to be secret. both members of congress and

judiciary committee, is working on legislation to revise the fisa court. what are the main approaches of this massive surveillance operation the u.s. is running. >> i supported al franken and udall on making the rules and orders and opinions on the fisa court which are disclosed. senator franken's effort on the numbers of certain kinds of invasive actions by the government. my focus is equally important on the process. on the fisa court itself, how is it selected? right now it's only by the chief justice of the united states supreme court, john roberts, acting alone without any kind of review. >> just so folks are clear here, the foreign surveillance intelligence act set up this secret court. the court itself is secret, the judges are appointed by john roberts in secret. there is no adversarial process. it's simply a government lawyer coming before this secretly appointed judge with no one on the other side. >> that's right, and that's the second important element of my program, which is that there should be some adversarial process there, should be some kind of special advocate who take

. americans were assured by the president and others that the fisa court had significant oversight, and we've heard from the chief judge of the fisa court who says that's not true.

unique position to talk about this. i actually applied for fisa warrant as a counterterrorism prosecutor, and i think the idea of having a public defender -- you know, really, it is a search warrant to the fisa court, which you wouldn't have in a normal criminal case, would slow down the efficacy and efficiency of our counterterrorism investigation. so i don't think that's the right way to go. i will tell you again, when i was doing this, we would run the numbers through the private phone carriers. we never really imagined that all this data would be

we understand the need for secrecy in ongoing investigations, but we need to know how the fisa court is interpreting the laws that congress has written. we need oversight over that from congress and we need redirected and declassified versions of those fisa court rulings for the public. >> what are your thoughts about russia granting temporary asylum to edward snowden, who really

fisa court, ordered the agency to destroy. the n.s.a. argues that the number of privacy violations is tiny compared to the 20 million data searches done every month in the hunt for terrorists. n.s.a. compliance director john delong told reporters by phone: t mistakes are routinely disclosed to the fisa court, to the justice department and to congress. >> .

searches for names and assign suspicion to people and track them. it has nothing to do with the fisa court. it's necessary when you're targeting a u.s. person. this database concerns loss of u.s. persons but it's done completely independent of the fisa court. >> they have to clear some bar of justification for the foreignness of the person that

. it has nothing to do with the fisa court. it's necessary when you're targeting a u.s. person. this database concerns loss of u.s. persons but it's done completely independent of the fisa court. >> they have to clear some bar of justification for the foreignness of the person that they're clearing for in order for it to be within the four squares of the law as the nsa understands it, is that right?

, you will have zero security. >> fisa -- >> they should have held hearings. it should've have been a more robust oversight board. now they will, that is good. the inspectors general can give more generic reports. congressional oversight committees, intelligence committees can talk about the subjects they are looking at without disclosing sources. john mclaughlin noted we do oversight hearings. even on the fisa court i would disagree with some of the panelists. they can release some things. they can release how many cases they get, how many are denied, how many are sent back for review. you can have periodic review by other bipartisan commissions that have credibility. you can do it incrementally but it is going to be difficult to swim against the general tide distrust of government. i would also be remiss if i didn't say i could not disagree with anthony romero more that snowden did as a service. i think he did this country and incredible disservice. we are now going to have slightly more transparency and better oversight and that is a good thing. i refused to give mr. snowden credit

testimonies that there are checks within the fisa system. do you believe that there are insufficient checks to outweigh the concerns that some have about the appointment of an independent counsel? if you have touched on this in earlier questions, i apologize. you mention this with regard to independent counsel. in the second panel, mr. baker raise concerns with the independent counsel. can you give me your thoughts about whether or not it is needed? >> this is a topic being discussed within the administration and congress as one avenue that might be available. traditionally, when you issue search warrants and wiretaps, you do not have an absurd a process that takes place. -- an adversary process that takes place. there's not someone on the other side. there is a legal tradition that the way we have been doing it is one that we have done in other context. we have a court involved. that is unusual, as it was pointed out. --iculously within a foreign particularly within a foreign intelligence context. to have the courtsthis is something that we are involved at all. open to having discus

foreign intelligence surveillance, or fisa, court has come under increasing scrutiny. we take a closer look now. the story of the court goes back to 1978. the senate's church committee among others had chronicled surveillance abuses by the government brought to light in the watergate scandal. one response: congress created the court to review warrants for national security investigations. proceedings are closed and many years and several amendments later, the snowden disclosures of surveillance by the n.s.a. have raised new questions. on sunday, for example, the senate's democratic majority whip-- dick durbin-- argued the court is hardly impartial. >> and there should be another in this case, it's fixed in a way, it's loaded. there's only one case coming before the fisa, the government's case. let's have an advocate for someone standing up for civil liberties to speak up about the privacy of americans when they make each of these decisions. >> brown: but at today's senate hearing, deputy attorney general james cole said there's no clear precedent for changing the way warrants ar

scrutinize government surveillance programs connected on the foreign intelligence actor for fisa. congress has repeatedly expanded the scope of fisa and has given the power to collect information on the law-abiding americans. we must carefully consider whether they have gone too far. last month, they learned for the first time that one of these authorities, section 215 of the u.s. a patriot act has been secretly interpreted to authorize unprecedented on scale. information was also leaked about the section 702 on fisa which authorizes the nsa to collect the communications of the forerunners -- foreigners overseas. i am concerned about the potential damage capabilities and national security. it's appropriate to hold people accountable for holding such a massive leak to occur. we need to examine how to prevent this kind of breach in the future. in the week the president said this is an opportunity to have an open and a thoughtful debate about these issues and i offer that statement because this is a debate several of us have been trying to have for years. i will get the classified b

intelligence .urveillance act in the years since september 11, congress has expanded fisa, given the government sweeping powers to collect information on law-abiding americans. we must carefully consider whether those laws may have gone too far. last month americans learned for the first time the one of these 215 of the, section u.s. patriot act has for years been secretly interpreted to authorize collection of phone records. information was leaked about section 202. collectrizes the nsa to communications overseas. the way thatone these programs were disclosed. i'm concerned about the to oural damage intelligence capabilities and national security. it is appropriate to hold people accountable for allowing such a massive leak to occur. we need to examine how to prevent this type of reach in the future. , thee wake of the leaks president said this is an opportunity to have an open and thoughtful debate about these issues. i welcome that statement. this is a debate that several of us on the committee have been trying to have for years. some of the others will get the classified briefing

because the fisa court is so secret, people don't know if it's being an effective independent arbiter or not. some say yes, some say no. so a proposal like that of senator merkley which would make the fisa court provisions more public. of course, redacting anything that would affect national security, might make some sense and might let the american people know more what's going on. >> schieffer: you came down pretty hard the other way-- day on edward snowed extent russians when they granted asylum to snowden. he, of course, is the guy who leaked so much of this information. do you think that any of what we're going through right now has anything to do with anything snowden might have leaked that these people have picked up and are now causing them to push forward on this? >> well, it's much too early to tell that. obviously, these plots that al qaeda does take months and months and months to germinate. so, obviously, they started before that. whether it had an effect, no one knows. but i will say that the relationship between the united states and russia, for instance, is more poisonous

any otherthan operation in our country today. it is watch on a regular basis i the fisa court. i do not think we need a fisa court. has thethe president power as commander-in-chief to carry out these operations. that is what president bush claimed in the early to thousands. that is what the court has said. the reality is we will have a fisa court. in any event, it is monitored on a regular basis. 30 day reports. six month reports. if when they are tracking -- last year, only 300 times were they had to drill down a numbers -- if they make a mistake and put the wrong digit , they have to do a full report on that. they have to purge everything they got. they have to file a report with that one explaining human error that was made. that is the type of scrutiny that it is under. my experience on the intelligence committee with the nsa was, what we heard over the last several years before any of this broke, with all of the allegations being made about security over the last 12 years, the nsa hardly ever came up. they were attacking dick cheney, george bush, waterboarding, the fbi and othe

records on an unprecedented scale. information was leaked about section 702 of fisa, which authorizes the collection of to medications of foreigners overseas. i do not condone the way these and other highly classified programs are disclosed. i am concerned about the potential damage of intelligence gathering capabilities and national security. it is appropriate to hold people accountable for allowing such a massively to occur. we need to examine how to print this type of reach in the future. in the wake of these leaks, the president said this is an opportunity to have an open and thoughtful debate about these issues. i will come that statement because this is a debate that several of us on this committee and both parties have been trying to have for years. i will get the classified briefings but you cannot talk about them. a lot of these things that should be and can be discussed. we're going to have the debate that the president called for and the executive branch has been a full partner. we need straightforward answers. i am concerned we are not getting them. just recently the director

,ance, if not the current design of the fisa court stacks the deck against civil liberties. it can be improved and enhanced without sacrificing speed or security. special advocates can be cleared or security purposes.

oversight to ensure all incidents of noncompliance are reported to oversight committees and fisa court and that appropriate steps are taken to ensure violations are not repeated. what should happen here?

involvement of the chief justice. it would change the fisa court of review process. years,found that, in my

that the queries are limited, the access to the data fisa court, and the has repeatedly found these records are relevant. >> is there any precedent that

these were reported to the court. a portion them should have been that have to do with fisa authorities, when you're looking into americans' records and we honestly don't have the rest of the chain ton what was reported. what we coknow is there are thousands of them and the obama administration has assured us and the public before this came out that it happens infrequently, once in a while. >> warner: now, equally

district court judge, reggie walton, said to you about the fisa court's authority when you asked him about this. explain that a little more. >> so he's the chief judge of the secret spy court, the foreign intelligence surveillance court, that is supposed to be the lynchpin for the checks and balances on our government spying programs. it takes it really seriously. it does everything in a classified, secret skiff, but

the fisa court has been doing in terms of declaring some of this illegal, some of it legal. remember, we keep hearing that there's all kinds of robust oversight by congress and we need not worry and yet these members of congress, one who is

fisa court of review or the united states supreme court. question, lead to my join inhat you would this process of trying to improve the current structure

diminished in quality. that is a principal that should be involved in some way in the fisa court. proposingill that i'm is for navigate to be involved .n the proceedings at some point, when there are ,ignificant issues of law

and the fisa court in a timely and comprehensive manner and that appropriate steps are taken to ensure violations are not repeated. the report stems from an nsa audit obtained by the post from leaker edward snowden.

i have no doubts about the fisa judges pushing back and having a commitment to the law. in appearance, the system is failing fast. to maintain the trust and credibility of the american people. they want to be protected from terrorists, at the same time, also protected from the degradation of constitutional rights. andchanging the appointment

simply would have inserted an order into each fisa , a single sentence, that the court issues reminding people that domestic surveillance is unconstitutional without probable cause. -st: a tweet

into the fisa court rulings. we understand the need for

there's serious abuse, in 2011, there was an 86-page ruling from the fisa court saying what the nsa was doing, systematically violated the constitution and the law.

just the nsa doing these thousands of violations for the report. we hoped that the fisa court would be a stopgap. but what the article says is that in another case, the foreign intelligence surveillance court which has authority over some nsa operations did not learn about a new collection med until it was in operation for many months. then the court when they learned about it, they ruled it it unconstitutional. so the gap between what they are doing and when they serve it it up to the court is another egregious violation in thmy min. >> this whole process that this administration has let get to this point really does have to be reviewed. i recognize a need for a lawful and efficient nsa operation. i think it's critical to the national security. but i do understand that there are bounds under which they are required not to cross, limits that they are required not to cross, and they can't cross those under the law and they shouldn't cross them. if the court needs more tools because we're counting on the fisa court to make sure that those bounds are not exceeded f that court needs mor

the idea in a fisa court you need opposing councilility, there needs to be somebody in there other than government lawyers? >> i think this should add fuel that we should be safely assured violations are happening and oversight is robust and full. as for whether a privacy advocate should be added to the court, that's really not my role. that's one of the things that's been mentioned on the hill. there are other people who have raised really good practical questions about how in the dead of night a privacy advocate can be summoned to weigh in on whether or not some collection can take place.

under the fisa court, the analyst sits at his or her desk and search for things when they don't even know the person they're searching for.

data pursuant to fisa's business records provision. the companies that provide information or seeking to be able to speak more publicly about this.

different about it, is that unlike surveillance under the fisa court, the analyst sits at his or her desk and search for things when they don't even know the person they're searching for. they can search just by general key word or they search e-mail

released documents showing a past secret court ruling on n.s.a. surveillance the fisa court chastised the n.s.a. for illegally collecting tens of thousands of e-mails more on the i'm asking unmasking of the fisa court ahead. army was a lower manning was sentenced to thirty five years in prison for leaking documents but the story does not in their full look at the extreme conditions placed on the media as well as we cover the trial. san francisco officials are considering a class action lawsuit against nevada they claim nevada gaya gave hundreds of psychiatric patients a one way ticket to california more on this clash later on today show. it's thursday august twenty second four pm in washington d.c. i'm megan lopez and you are watching r t well the obama administration is trying to beat its critics to the punch in the wake of the n.s.a. surveillance scandal they are coming clean in a way the white house released documents dealing with a foreign intelligence surveillance court ruling from two thousand and eleven after the electronic frontier foundation filed a freedom of information act

thing. but not to worry, all is supervised by fisa. well, not really. we now know tens of thousands of e-mails between americans with no connection to terrorism are being collected. but if there's no connection to terrorism, why isn't the fisa court stopping it? two years ago, mr. president, you said the nsa was working with fisa to enhance protections. really? in no time a fisa court judge write, quote, for the first time the government has now advised the court of the volume and nature of information it's been collecting, which is fundamentally different from what the court had been led to believe. now, when i was a judge, if someone lied to me on something of such a serious nature, their butts would be personally chaperoned to the local lockup courtesy of yours truly. yet two years later the chief judge now says that the fisa court actually lacks the tools to verify when and how often the government surveillance aims to protect rules of the government privacy. i guess the beat goes on. ♪ the beat goes on, the beat goes on ♪ drums keep pounding rhythm to the brain ♪ la-da-da

recommendation of the church commission. it set up a careful system of a fisa court, an intelligence committee on the hill was set up then to monitor these applications. it worked very well, in my view, through 2001. congress after that pulled it back. i believe strongly that may the amount of metadata is excessive. i am sure my buddy thinks this. that ought to be debated. maybe the program should be narrowed. there has been robust oversight over the years. >> i want to be clear on this. who can accesses data and for what purposes? >> i think this was in a letter that went to the hill yesterday. papers were sent to congress in 2009. i cannot speak to any individual member of congress that is currently now with the knowledge of the program. in terms of access, access is strictly controlled. in order to create the data, one has to have reasonable suspicion that there is a tie to a specific terrorist group that is identified in the court order. >> just a terrorist group. if there is a foreign espionage group and i think my target is about to leave united states, i need to check out this

change the underlying patriot act and the fisa amendments of 2008. i voted against the reauthorization of the so-called patriot act because i believed it was too loosely written, there was room for abuse. so i think we need to undertake lots of reforms. the amendment, i don't think, did the trick, frankly. i think there are much more important things we need to be doing. >> so are you comfortable with the fact what we know now, which is that the nsa does take in every phone call number in america on a daily basis, brings it all in, keeps it in case they need to go look at it, they'll need a judge's okay for that and now we're learning that, yeah, they did make mistakes, some of which were in violation of the constitution, a judge later found out. and yet 3,000 instances, 2,000 instances not big, except some of those instances involved 3,000 americans whose e-mails or phone calls were then monitored. >> right. and i think we need to make reforms to prevent that from happening. in fact i'm working on an initiative to do exactly that. so there's a distinction to be made between the collec

communications of a u.s. person under fisa anywhere in the world requires a showing of probable cause to a federal judge. turning to the 215 prpl, we call it the 215 program because it's conducted pursuant to section 215 of the patriot act. that provision allows the director of the fbi to a apply the fisk to obtain business records that may be relevant to an authorized national security investigation. the fbi uses this provision for lots of different things. the only program nsa uses it for in connection with the fbi is the business records metadata program we're discussing today. so what is that program all ant? before i get into the details, i think it would be helpful to understand what is the point of the program and why did it evolve. so in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, one of the major issues that was exposed was a seam between our foreign intelligence collection and our domestic counterterrorism methods. do the u.s. government over the past decade has taken a number of efforts to address this dwield, some of them institutional, some of them utilizing certain programs like the t

any system to get a warrant. remember, the theme of this whole story has been that the fisa court is a rubber stamp. now the story today is, look at how the fisa court slammed the nsa, sort of like we have to pick which boat we want to ride on. the story today, the opinion today goes to underscore what folks like i have been saying all along, that the fisa court is not only looking at warrants, they are looking at the entire process of the system, and what was done in this application to say we want to keep going with the process is the fisa court went into extremely excruciating detail about is the nsa complying with the fourth amendment and the law? they found that, as you go down the system, what they are -- in the vast majority of it, but they have this one element of the program -- >> mean not getting americans' data if they can? >> no, not getting it kept in the system. that's it. >> right. >> and what they want is, no, that's not in compliance. >> okay. >> so the nsa went away and fixed it a month later. that's what we're dealing with, and they reported it to congress a month

notified to the national security court or fisa court. the collection was done under section 702. this is the collection that looks overseas at foreign internet communications, so foreign emails. the nsa did not have a good means technically speaking to separate out from that collection the information that was being put forth on the internet by u.s. persons. so you had what was called bundled communications. so when you open up your computer, and you look at your email, you see 20 emails down the screen. if one had come from a bad actor, the nsa was looking at overseas, they pulled down everything on that screen. what the fisa court said at the time when they were alerted to what was a significant collection problem, the judge said, quote, for the first time, the government has now advised the court the volume and nature of the information, it, the nsa, has been collecting is fundamentally different from what the court had been led to believe. shortly after that, the nsa we were told on background was trying to work with congress to make changes to salvage that information. >> s