c. >> to the south the german attack had split the 28th division, cut off the 112th infantry. >> that afternoon i received orders from division which was then at bastion to fall back and fight stiff delaying action direction bastion. i know that this was impossible. >> the german attack in this sector was made by troops of the 5th panzer army. the capture with the roads and rail ways was vital to the advance. they had been expected to take st. vith with little resistance. on the 18th their commander came up himself to see what was delaying the advance. >> translator: i suspected the presence of scattered though very courageous forces which had come here to assist the fighting troops. i was under the impression that up to the 17th and 18th the small, scattered battle troops were not under centralized command. however, on the eve of the 18th before night fall it became obvious that new enemy forces were approaching. >> the general's surmise was correct. but american intelligence of the siz

c. and fanatics are known for their disability to keep a cool head. this is an absolute necessity for the strategist. at the sat time, hitler was not inclined to consider the enemy capable of fast action. he was and remained a military dilly tant. >> the cost to germany would be staggering. more than a quarter of a million men dead, wounded or captured. slowly and painfully, the remnants retreated behind their shattered western defenses. it was the beginning of the end. by the 3rd of february, the 84th division had moved back to their positions on the siegfried line. their objective lay before them. the rhine and the elk. >> i'm lewis w. truman. during world war ii, i was a colonel, chief of staff of the 84th infantry division and chief of staff for alexander r. bowling who was the commanding general of the 84th infantry division. >> the river crossing was one of the most thoroughly rehearsed crossings of any unit in the european theater. the original crossing date was to be 10 february.