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The former year's truce ended, Cleon warreth on the Chalcidic 
cities, and recovereth Torone. Phrcax is sent by the Athen- 
ians to move a war amongst the Sicilians. Cleon and Brasi- 
<las, who were on both sides the principal rnaintaincrs of the 
war, are both slain at Amphipolis. Presently after their death 
a peace is concluded : and after that again, a league between 
the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. Divers of the Lacedae- 
monian confederates hereat discontented, seek the confederacy 
*of the Argives. These make league, first with the Corinth- 
ians, Eleians, and Mantineans : then with the Lacedaemonians : 
and then again, by the artifice of Alcibiades, with the Athen- 
ians. After this the Argives make war upon the Epidaurians: 
and the Lacedemonians upon the Argives. The Athenian 
captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue touching 
the yielding of Melos : which the Athenians afterwards be- 
siege and win. These are the acts of almost six years more 
of the same war. 

1. THE summer following, the truce for a year* U 0f HJ) r 

' \ The tnioofor a 

which was to last till the Pythian holidays 1 , expired, year 

* Exercises dedicated to Apollo, Corsini, Boeckh, Mueller, Goeller, 
and celebrated at Delphi about the and others : \v!io take the meaning- 
twelfth of the month ElapheboHum, of this passage to be, that "the 
as ..may be gathered by the l)gin- truce was dissolved, and war again 
ni#g.othe truce on that day/ [In renewed up to the time of the 
thifc month Elaphebolion of the third Pythian games", at which time fol- 
year of the Olympiad, according to lowed the peace; see ch. 19. In 




A. C 422. 

OL 80. 2. 3. 
The Delians 
removed out of 
Delos upon 

The Drlians seat 
themselves in 

Cleon goeth out 
with an army 
into the part> 
upon Tlnucr: 

he ftssaultetli 

During this truce, the Athenians removed the 
Delians out of Delos, because [though they were 
consecrated, yet] for a certain crime committed of 
old they esteemed them polluted persons 1 : because 
also they thought there wanted this part to make 
perfect the purgation of the island ; in the purging 
whereof, as I declared before 2 , they thought they 
did well to take up the sepulchres of the de^d. 
These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every 
one as he came, in Adramyttium in Asia, a town 
given unto them by Pharnaces. 

2. After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed 
with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet 
against the cities lying upon Thrace. He had with 
him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms and 
three hundred horsemen ; of confederates more ; 
and thirty galleys. And first arriving at Scione, 
which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men 
uf arms of those that kept the siege ; and sailed 
i Tthe haven of the Colophonians, not far distant 
from the city of Torone. And there having heard 
by fugitives that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor 
those within sufficient to give him battle, he 
marched with his army to the city, and sent ten of 
his galleys about into the haven. And first he 

the month Hecatomba?on of the 
same year, according to Arnold, who 
follows Haack and others in ren- 
dering the passage : " the truce 
having lasted till the celehration of 
the Pythian games, then ended". 
The passage has given rise to much 
controversy, which concerns the date 
of the Pythian games rather than 
any fact in this history.] 

1 [" Not pure to perform the 

functions of priest". They are said 
hy Diodorus to have incurred the 
displeasure of Athens hy their at- 
tachment to Sparta. The com- 
mand of the Delphic oracle for their 
restoration (see ch. 32.) seems to 
show a connexion between them and 
that oracle, which may have afforded 
them the opportunity of injuring 
Athens. Thirlwall.] 
2 [See iii. 104.] 


came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised 
about the city to take in the suburbs : making a 
breach in the old wall, that the whole might be 
one city. 3. And Pasitelidas, a 1 Lacedaemonian, 
captain of the town, with the garrison there pre- t^S 
sent came to the defence, and fought with the Y mrct , h to 

7 f delend it. 

Athenians that assaulted it. But being oppressed, 
and the galleys which were before sent about being 
by this time come into the haven, Pasitelidas was 
afraid lest those galleys should take the town, 
unfurnished of defendants, before he could get 
back, and that the Athenians on the other side 
should win the wall 2 , and he be intercepted 
between them both : and thereupon abandoned 
the wall, and ran back into the city. But the ci.u taketh 
Athenians that were in the galleys having taken r roile ' 
the town before he came, and the land-army fol- 
lowing in after him without resistance and entering 
the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some 
of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the pi' ., 
and some others, amongst whom was the captain rasUeiidas, a 
Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now c^'in^ 11 
coming with aid towards Torone : but advertised alive * 
by the way that it was already lost, went back 
again ; being about forty furlongs short of prevent- 
ing it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two 
trophies, one at the haven, another at the wall. 
The women and children of the Toronseans, they 
made slaves ; but the men of Torone and the Pelo- 
ponnesians, and such Chalcideans as were amongst 
them, in all about seven hundred, they sent away seven hundred 

. -i m, -r i men sent pri- 

prisoners to Athens. The Peloponnesians were 80ne r S to Athens. 

[The Lacedaemonian, iv. 132 ] a [That is, the new wall.] 

B 2 


v. afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed ; 
'"T^P the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians, by ex- 
A. c. 422. change of man for man. 

OL 89 23 

taken About the same time the Boeotians took Panac- 


the S)'rat 

The Leontine 

The Leontines 

^ ft fort of the Athenians standing in their con- 
fines, by treason. 

Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in 
Torone, went thence by sea about the mountain 
Athos [to make war] against Amphipolis. 

4. About the same time Phaeax the son of Erasis- 
tratus, who with two others was sent ambassador 
into Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with 
two galleys. For the Leontines, after the Athenians 
upon the making of the peace were gone out <rf 
Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom 
of their city : and the commons had a purpose also 
to have made division of the land 1 . But the great 
men perceiving it, called in the Syracusians, and 
d rav e the commons out : and they w r andered up 
and down, every one as he chanced ; and the great 
meri 5 upon conditions agreed on with the Syracus- 
ians, abandoning and deserting 2 that city, went to 
dwell with the privilege of free citizens in Syra- 
cuse. After this again, some of them upon dislike 
relinquished Syracuse, and seized on Phocese, a 
certain place part of the city of the Leontines, and 
upon Bricinnise, a castle in the Leontine territory. 
Thither also came unto them most of the commons 
that had before been driven out : and settling them- 
selves, made war from those places of strength. 
Upon intelligence hereof the Athenians sent Phseax 

1 [That is, the land of the state: 
not the private property of indivi- 
duals. As at Rome, the agrarian 

laws concerned only the public 
lands. See Arnold's note.] 
2 [" Making desert".] 


thither, to persuade their confederates there, and, 
if they could, all the Sicilians jointly, to make war 
upon the Syracusians, that were now beginning to A c 442 - 

^ J . , , , , OL.R0.2.S 

grow great ; to try if they might thereby preserve Pha-ax moveth 
the common people of the Leontines. Phseax arriv- "* 

acusians - 

ing, prevailed with the Camarinseans and Agrigen- s y ra 
tines: but the business finding a stop at Gela, he The Geians stop 

A , t i i i A \ the motion made 

went unto no more, as conceiving he should not be by Phtcax . 
able to persuade them. So he returned through 
the cities of the Siculi unto Catana, having been at 
Bricinnise by the way and there encouraged them 
to hold out : and from Catana he set sail and 
departed. 5. In his voyage to Sicily, both going 
and corning, he dealt as he went by with sundry 
cities also of Italy, to enter into friendship with the 
Athenians. He also lighted on those Locrians, 
which 1 having dwelt once in Messana, were after- 
wards driven out again ; being the same men, which 
after the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Mes- 
sana, wherein one of the factions called in the 
Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit there, [and 
now were sent away again] : for the Locrians held 
Messana for a while. Phseax therefore chancing to piucax mnketu 
meet with these as they were going to their own J 
city, did them no hurt : because the Locrians had 
been in speech with him about an agreement with 
the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a 
general peace, these only of all the confederates 
refused to make any peace at all with the Athen- 
ians. Nor indeed would they have done it now, 
but that they were constrained thereunto by the 

1 [" Those Locrians, that had thereupon held Messana for a 
settled and been again driven from while." These were the Locrians 
Messana" : " and the Locrians called Epizcphyrii.] 


war they had with the Itoneans and Melseans, their 
own colonies and borderers. And Phaeax after this 
returned to Athens. 

6. Cleon, who 1 was now gone from Torone and 
come about to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat 
of the war, assaulted the city of Stageirus, a colony 
of the Andrians ; but could not take it : but Galep- 
cieon. gug ^ & co } on y o f the Thasians, he took by assault. 
And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, to will 
him to come to him with his forces according to 
the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace 
unto Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up 
as many mercenary Thracians as he could ; he lay 
st ^^ * n Eion to expect their coming. Brasidas upon 
notice hereof, sat down over against him at Cer- 
dylium. This is a place belonging to the Argilians, 
standing high and beyond the river, not far from 
Amphipolis ; and from whence he might discern all 
that was about him. So that Cleon could not but 
be seen, if he should rise with his army to go 
against Amphipolis ; which he expected he would 
do, and that in contempt of his small number he 
would go up with the forces he had then present. 
The force. of Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred 
Brasuks. mercenary Thracians, and took unto him all his 
Edonians, both horsemen and targe tiers. He had 
also of Myrcinians and Chalcideans a thousand 
targetiers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for 
men of arms, his whole number was at the most 2 
two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hun- 
dred. With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas 

1 [" Cleon, when as before men- &c, we*, vulgo <OQ. The voy&ge has 
tioned he sailed from Torone for been already mentioned, ch. 3.] 
Amphipolis, making" &c. Befcker 2 [fidXterra : '* about".] 


and sat down at Cerdylium : the rest stood ready v . 
ordered with Clearidas their captain, within ' ' * 

r * YEAR X. 

Amphipolis. A.C m. 

Of 80 3 

7. Cleon for a while 1 lay still; but was after- cieon goeth'u 

wards forced to do as was expected by Brasidas. 
For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, miml 
and recounting with themselves what a command 
his would be, and with what ignorance and cow- 
ardice against what skill and boldness of the other, 
and how they came forth with him against their 
w r ills : he perceived their muttering, and being 
unwilling to offend them wdth so long a stay in 
one place, dislodged and led them forward. Arid 
he took the same course there, which having suc- 
ceeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to 
think himself to have some judgment. For he cieoii.uot ex- 
thought not that any body would come forth to ^^"uitt^Mtli. 
give him battle, and gave out he went up prhici- atiouolUlclmui - 
pally to see the place : and stayed for greater 
forces, not to secure him in case he should be com- 
pelled to fight, but that he might therewith environ 
the city on all sides at once, and in that manner 
take it by force. So he went up and set his army 
down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, standing 
himself to view the fens of the river Strymon and 
the situation of the city towards Thrace : and 
thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, 
without battle. For neither did any man appear 
upon the walls, nor come out of the gates : which 
were all fast shut. Insomuch as he thought he 
had committed an error in coming 2 without engines: 

1 [" During this while".] the top, hut on the slope of the hill : 

2 [Amphipolis is supposed to have and this is the " strong hill "whereon 
been situated, like Syracuse, not on Cleon halted, and whence he could 


v. because he thought he might by such means have 
* YEA* x~" won ^ e c *ty as ^ e ^ l} S without defendants. 8. Bra- 
A.c.422. sidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians remove, 

Or 89 8 

came down also from Cerdylium and put himself 
into Amphipolis. He would not suffer them to 

A stratagem of make any sally, nor to face the Athenians in order 
Q ^ a fj.j e ^ mistrusting -his own forces, which he 
thought inferior, not in number (for they were in 
a manner equal) but in worth: (for such Athenians 
as were there were pure 1 , and the Lemnians and 
Imbrians which were amongst them were of the 
very ablest) : but prepared to set upon them by a 
wile. For if he should have showed to the enemy 
both his number and their armour, such as for tli 
present they were forced to use, he thought that 
thereby he should not so soon get the victory, as 
by keeping them out of sight and out of their con- 
tempt till the very point 2 . Wherefore choosing to 
himself a hundred and fifty men of arms, and com- 
mitting the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he 
resolved to set suddenly upon them before they 
should retire : as not expecting to take them so 
alone another time, if their succours chanced to 
arrive. And when he had called his soldiers to- 
gether to encourage them and to make known unto 
them his design, he said as followeth : 

THE ORATION OF Q, " Men of Peloponnesus, as for your country, 

I O HIS -,1,1 A i i LI 

how by valour it hath ever retained her liberty, 
and that being Dorians you are now to fight against 
lonians, of whom you were ever wont to get the 

look down into every part of the 1 [That is, citizens only.] 

city. This explains the term icarijX- 2 [Contempt, &TTO rov <Woc, 

0v, " in not coming down with " from seeing the real state* of the 

engines'*." It was thought" &c.] case".] 



victory, let it suffice that I have touched it thus 
briefly. But in what manner I intend to charge 1 , 
that I am now to inform you of: lest the venturing 
by few at once, and not altogether, should seem to 
proceed from weakness, arid so dishearten you. I 
do conjecture that it was in contempt of us, and 
as not expecting to be fought withal, that the 
enemy both came up to this place, and that they 
have now betaken themselves carelessly arid out of 
order to view the country. But he that best 
observing such errors in his enemies, shall also to 
his strength give the onset, not always openly and 
in ranged battle, but as is best for his present 
advantage, shall for the most part attain his pur- 
pose. And these wiles carry with them the greatest 
glory of all, by which, deceiving most the enemy, 
a man doth most benefit his friends. Therefore 
whilst they are secure without preparation, and 
intend, for aught I see, to steal away rather than 
to stay : I say, in this their looseness of resolution, 
and before they put their minds in order, I for my 
part with those I have chosen will, if I can, before 
they get away fall in upon the midst of their army 
running. And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon 
as you shall see me to have charged and, as it is 
probable, to have put them into affright, take those 
that are with you, both Amphipolitans and all the 
rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates 
run out upon them, and with all possible speed 
come up to stroke of hand. For there is great 
hope this way to terrify them ; seeing they which 
cpme after, are ever of more terror to the enemy 

1 ["To attack".] 




f , 



Oration of 



than those that are already present and in fight. 
And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a 
Spartan : and you, confederates, follow manfully, 
and believe that the parts of a good soldier are 
willingness, sense of shame, and obedience to his 
leaders; and that this day you shall either gain 
yourselves liberty by your valour, and to be called 
confederates of the Lacedaemonians, or else not 
only to serve the Athenians yourselves, and at 'the 
best, if you be not led captives, nor put to death, 
to be in greater servitude than before 1 , but also to 
be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the 
Grecians. But be not you cowards, seeing how 
great a matter is at stake : and I, for my part, wUl 
make it appear that I am not more ready to per- 
suade another, than to put myself into action." 

10. When Brasidas had thus said, he both pre- 
pared to go out himself, and also placed the rest 
that were with Clearidas before the gates called the 
Thracian gates, to issue forth afterwards as was 
appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight 
when he came down from Cerdylium, and 2 again 
when he sacrificed in the city, by the temple of 
Pallas, which place might be seen from without ; it 
was told Cleon [whilst Brasidas was ordering of his 
men] (for he was at this time gone off a little to 

1 [" Or else to be the subjects of 
the Athenians, (if at the best you 
escape without slavery or death), 
and that subjection more irksome 
than before : and to be besides the 
hinderers" &c. The distinction is 
made between oXoc, the general 
term, signifying both political and 
dometic slavery: and 

signifying the latter only. Arnold.] 
2 [" And in the city (the interior 
of which was exposed to rievv from 
without) as he was sacrificing at 
the temple of Pallas and about the 
matters before related, it was told 
Cleon (for &c.)." The act of sacri- 
ficing indicated the intention of 
Brasidas to fight: see vi. 69, note.] 


look about him), that the whole army of the ene- 
mies was plainly to be discerned within the town, 
and that the feet of many men and horses, ready 
to come forth, might be discerned from under the 
gate. Hearing this, he came to the place: and 
when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight 
until his aids arrived, and yet making no other 
account but that his retreat would be discovered 1 , 
he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat, and lendetu i 
and 2 that as they went the left wing should march army hack ' 
foremost, which was the only means they had to 
withdraw towards Eion. But when he thought 
they were long about it, causing the right wing to 
wheel about and lay open their disarmed parts to 
the enemy, he led away the army himself. Brasi- Bra<< ja a 
das at the same time, having spied his opportunity ^\7 s ) 
and that the army of the Athenians removed, said 
to those about him and the rest : " these men stay 
not for us ; it is apparent by the wagging of their 
spears and of their heads : for where such motion 
is, they use not to stay for the charge of the enemy : 
therefore open me some body the gates appointed, 
and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon 
them". Then he went out himself at the gate to- 
wards the trench 3 , and which was the first gate of 
the long wall, which then was standing ; and at 
high speed took the straight way, in which, as one 
passeth by the strongest part of the town 4 , there 

1 ["And thinking to be before- Brasidas upon this seeing his oppor- 

hand in the retreat". Bekker &c. tunity, and that &c.] 

fOfaiffOai : vulgo, t><pQij(ji<jQai.~\ 3 [" The palisade".] 

* [" And in their march to begin 4 [" The steepest part of the 

the mowment with the left wing in hill": where Cleon halted to view 

the direction of Eion, as the only the city. Arn. Goell. The "long 

practicable plan". Gol.Arn. "And wall" was to the south of the city.] 


Brosidas is 
wounded and 

standeth now a trophy: and charging upon the 
midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified 
both with their own disarray and the valour of the 
man, forced them to fly. And Clearidas, as was 
appointed, having issued out by the Thracian gates, 
was withal coming upon them. And it fell out that 
the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden 
attempt, were on both sides in confusion : and the 
left wing which was next to Eion, and which indeed 
was marching aw r ay before, was immediately broken 
off from the rest of the army and fled. When that 
was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, 
was there wounded 1 . The Athenians saw not when 
he fell: and they that were near took him up ad 
carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it : 
cieonflieth,and and though Cleoii himself presently fled, (as at first 
he intended not to stay), and was intercepted by a 
Myrcinian targetier and slain 2 , yet his men of arms 
casting themselves into a circle on the [top of a little] 
hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas : 
and shrunk not at all, till begirt with the Myrcin- 
ian and Chalcidean horse and with the targetiers, 
they were put to flight by their darts. Thus the 
whole army of the Athenians, getting away with 
much ado over the hills and by several ways, all 
that were not slain upon the place or by the Chal- 
cidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion. The 

is slain. 

Brasidas Ins 

1 [" And Brasidas, upon their re- 
treat advancing upon the right 
wing, is wounded".] 

2 [Cleon was a tanner by trade: 
a man of slender abilities, and pos- 
sessed of no knowledge, political or 
military. His eloquence was im- 
petuous and coarse, set off with a 

loud voice. He was the first that 
ventured to abandon the grave 
manner and decent gesture pre- 
scribed by usage to the Athenian 
orator : and adopted the style, as it 
is described by Cicero, o( the Ro- 
man orator ; the femur percussum, 
pedis supplosio, &c.] 


other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and 1 
having so long kept him alive, brought him yet 
breathing into the city : arid he knew that his side 
had gotten the victory, but expired shortly after. 
When Clearidas with the rest of the army were 
returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled th 
those that were slain, and erected a trophy. 

11. After this the confederates, following the The honour done 
corpse of Brasidas all of them in their arms, buried * 

him in the city 2 at the public charge; in the 
entrance of that which is now the market-place. 
And the Amphipolitans afterwards, having taken in 
his monument with a wall, killed 3 unto him as to a 
lifiro, honoured him with games and anniversary 
sacrifice, and attributed their colony unto him as 
to the founder ; pulling down the edifices of Agnon, 
and defacing whatsoever monument might maintain 
the memory of his foundation. This they did both 
for that they esteemed Brasidas for their preserver; 
and also because at this time, through fear of the 

1 [" And preserving him (from the hero". evrfyvttv, to sacrifice to the 
enemy), brought him" &c.] dead, by cutting of! the head from 

2 A distinguished honour: the the hack of the neck, whereby it 
ordinary burial-place being always fell to the ground : and so opposed 
outside the walls. The Athenians to ff^agtiy, to sacrifice to the gods 
at the height of the Roman power above, by holding back the head so 
refused this honour to M. Marcel- as to look upwards, and cutting 
his : *' quod rcligione se hnpediri the throat. Arnold. Nevertheless, 
dicerent, neque tainen id anteacui- <70aai is the term used by Ulysses 
quam concesserant". Cicero, epis. in Hecuba, Eurip. 221, for thesa- 
ad divers, iv. 12. At Rome to crifice of Polyxene to Achilles, and 
bury within the walls was forbidden such the manner of the sacrifice. 
by the Twelve Tables : though Ci- The worship of their founder was a 
cero mentions some few exceptions, duty of the colonists amongst the 
" ut C. Fabricius, virtutis causa". Greeks. Thus the Chersoiiesitans 
De legibus, ii. 23. Arnold.] to Miltiades, re\vrtj<raj>ri vovcn, 

3 [" Sacrificed to him as to a wg vo^oc oVcwrry (Herod, vi. 38.).3 


Athenians, they courted the Lacedaemonians for a 
league. As for Agnon, because of their hostility 
with the Athenians, they thought it neither expe- 
dient for them to give him honours, nor that they 
would be acceptable unto him if they did. The 
dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians : of 
whom there were slain about six hundred, and but 
seven of the other side, by reason that it was. no 
set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and 
precedent affright. After the dead were taken up, 
the Athenians went home by sea ; and Clearidas 
and those with him stayed to settle the estate of 

supplies goingto 12. About the same time of the summer now 
en ding, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, 
Lacedaemonians, were leading a supply towards the 
parts upon Thrace of nine hundred men of arms : 
and when they were come to Heracieia in Trachinia, 
they stayed there to amend such things as they 
thought amiss. Whilst they stayed, this battle was 

The end of the *> . -i , , T T " 

tenth summer. lought i and the summer ended. 

13. The next winter, they that were with Rarn- 
phias went presently forward, as far as [the hill] 
The supplies go- Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians for- 
' bidding them to go on, and Brasidas, to whom they 
o to were carrying this army, being dead, they returned 
homewards : conceiving that the opportunity now 
served not, both because the Athenians were upon 
this overthrow gone away, and for that they them- 
selves were unable to perform any of those designs 
which the other had intended. But the principal 
cause of their return was this : that they knew* at 
their coming forth, that the Lacedaemonians had 
their minds more set upon a peace than war. 


14. Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and y. 
return of Rhamphias out of Thessaly, it fell out that "^ * 
neither side did any act of war, but were inclined A.v.m. 
rather to a peace : the Athenians for the blow they xh 

had received at Delium, and this other a little after 

at Amphipolis ; and because they had no longer that !J? h a c ^ nse8 wh 

confident hope in their strength, on which they the Athe nans 

relied when formerly they refused the peace, as e&ire peace * 

having conceived upon their present success that 

they should have had the upper hand ; also they 

stood in fear of their own confederates, lest em- 

boldened by these losses of theirs they should more 

and more revolt ; and repented that they made riot 

the peace after their happy success at Pylus, when 

occasion was offered to have done it honourably : 

and the Lacedaemonians on the other side did desire The causes why 

peace, because the war had not proceeded as they l^ s T a^rlT n 

expected ; for they had thought they should in a r eaco - 

few years have warred down the power of Athens, 

by wasting their territory ; and because they were 

fallen into that calamity in the island, the like 

whereof had never happened unto Sparta before 1 ; 

because also their country was continually ravaged 

by those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helotes 

continually fled to the enemy ; and because they 

feared lest those which remained, trusting in them 

that were run away, should in this estate of theirs 

raise some innovation, as at other times before they 

had done. Withal it happened, that the thirty 

1 [That is, Spartans had never Thermopylae, and at Thyrea (Herod. 

before been known to surrender i. 82.). Of the 420 men of arms 

Witt arms in their hands : for they sent over into Sphacteria, not half 

had before lost more men, as at were Spartans (see iv. 38.)] 


years' peace 1 with the Argives was now upon the 
point of expiring ; and the Argives would not renew 
it without restitution made them of Cynuria : so 
that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, 
both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected 
also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would 
revolt to the Argives : as indeed it came afterwards 
to pass. 

15. These things considered, it was by both parts 
thought good to conclude a peace ; but especially 
by the Lacedaemonians, for the desire they had to 
recover their men taken in the island. For the 
Spartans that were amongst them, were both of the 
prime men 2 of the city, and their kinsmen. Ajajd 
therefore they began to treat presently after they 
were taken : but the Athenians, by reason of their 
prosperity, would not lay down the war at that 
time on equal terms. But after their defeat at 
Delium, the Lacedaemonians, knowing they would 
be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a 
year, during which they were to meet and consult 
about a longer time. 

1 [This is the treaty referred to nation : and connected with this, 
in ii. 9 : no more particular ac- a certain pre-eminence of the Hyl- 
count is given of it. For Cynuria, lean trihe. Then again in the times 
see ch. 41.] of the Peloponnesian war " men of 

2 [pi ^irapTiarai Trpwrot. In a the first rank", oi Trpuiroi avdptg, are 
certain sense all Dorians were equal often mentioned in Sparta, who, 
in rights and dignity : but there without being magistrates, had a 
were yet manifold gradations, which considerable influence on the go- 
when once formed, were retained vernment. The KaXoi (e'ayafloi were 
by the aristocratic feelings of the also, in general, persons of distinc- 
people. In the first place, there tion. Muell. iii. 5. Ofthefollow- 
was the dignity of the Heracleid ing words " and all equally their 
families, which without possessing kinsmen" no satisfactory ^explana- 
any essential privilege in Sparta had tion is given. Goeller renders them : 
a precedence throughout the whole " et pariter sibi cognati".] 


16. But when also this other overthrow happened 
to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon 

* r 7 

and Brasidas were slain : the which on either side 

were most opposite to the peace ; the one, for that 

he had good success and honour in the war; the t t e % 

other, because in quiet times his evil actions would several ends - 

more appear and his calumniations be the less 

believed 1 : those two that in the two states aspired 

most to be chief, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, *^ F ^ 

and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military 

charges had been the most fortunate of his time, 

did most of all other desire to have the peace go 

forward. Nicias, because he was desirous, having 2 Nicias hunu 

h^erto never been overthrown, to carry his g O od inseekingpeace 

fortune through, and to give both himself and the 

city rest from their troubles for the present ; and 

for the future to leave a name, that in all his time 

he had never made the commonwealth miscarry ; 

which he thought might be done by standing out of 

danger, and by putting himself as little as he might 

into the hands of fortune ; and to stand out of 

danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had The reason why 

the same desire, because of the imputation laid ^in 

upon him about his return from exile by his 

enemies, that suggested unto the Lacedaemonians 

upon every loss they received, that the same befel 

them for having, contrary to the law, repealed his 

1 [Cleon is accused of being; the tiiat this latter charge is without 

author, not only of the fine imposed foundation : if for no other reason, 

on Pericles in the second year of that our estimation of his charac- 

the war, (an act for which, as aimed tor, drawn by the hand of the exile, 

at a party man, there may be some may not be affected.] 

allowance), but of another act of a 8 [" Whilst he had never &c. 

different character, the banishment and was still in repute, to carry 

of Thucydides. It is to be hoped his good fortune" &c.] 




banishment. For they charged him further, that 
he and his brother Aristocles had suborned the 
prophetess of Delphi, to answer the deputies 1 of 
the Lacedaemonians, when they came thither, most 
commonly with this : " that they should bring back 
the seed of the semigod, the son of Jupiter, out of 

1 [The Theori, messengers to the 
oracle, were at Sparta called after 
their god, Pythii : of whom each 
of the two kings, in their character 
of high priest, nominated two. The 
office was one of great dignity: they 
were entrusted to deliver the oracle 
truly and honestly to the kings ; 
and were the assessors of the kings 
and gerusia, and the messmates of 
the former both at home and in the 
field. It is probable that the three 
Pythian interpreters at Athens, who 
were however specially chosen for 
each theoria, once possessed equal 
dignity : but their powers, naturally 
incompatible with a democracy, 
were lost at a very early period : see 
Muell. iiL 1. The semigod is Her- 
cules: the Spartans, the conquerors 
and lords of the Achseans, submit- 
ting to be governed themselves by 
kings, as it is said, the descend- 
ants of Hercules, and therefore of 
Achaean blood. That the Dorians 
were led to the conquest of Pelo- 
ponnesus by Achaean chiefs, was a 
tradition current, not only amongst 
the Dorians themsel ves, but amongst 
other nations also : and the victory 
of Echemus, the king of Tegea, 
over Hyllus, the son of Hercules, 
in the first Dorian invasion, is 
pleaded by the Tegeatans as their 
title to the post of honour at the 
battle of Plataea (Herod, ix.26). 
Thucydides here attributes the 

founding of Lacedftmon to Eurys- 
thenes and Procles, (the sons of. 
Aristodcmus, one of the three sons 
of Aristomachus), the first two kings 
of Sparta : whereas Herodotus, in 
relating the origin of the two kings 
(vi. 52), says that Aristodemus, and 
not his sons, was the founder. In 
either case, Sparta must have been 
a place of very slight importfKTce 
before the Dorian invasion : which 
alone made it the ruler of the sur- 
rounding states. It was built dif- 
ferently from Mycena), Tiryns, and 
other Achaean cities of the Cyclo- 
pean, or Pelasgian, architecture: 
the Acropolis is on a hill of inconsi- 
derable height, of easy ascent, and 
without trace of ancient fortification 
or walls : it has no monuments of 
the times of the fabulous princes, 
the Pelopida? &c., whilst Amyel, 
amongst many others, possessed the 
tombs of Cassandra, Agamemnon, 
and Clytemnestra : Muell. i. 5. 
The " ploughing with a silver share", 
betokened a famine, and the conse- 
quent dearness of the fruits of the 
earth. Schol. Pleistoanax, con- 
demned for bribery (see vi. 104, n.) 
to pay a fine beyond his means,lived 
in banishment in a house partly in, 
and partly out of the temple, that 
he might enjoy security ajad at 
the same time avoid profaning the 
temple : which could not be done, 
were the whole house in it.J 


a strange country into his own : and that if they 
did not, they should plough their land with a silver 
plough": and so at length to have made the Lace- 
daemonians nineteen years after, with such dances 
and sacrifices as they who were the first founders 
of Lacedaemon had ordained to be used at the en- 
throning of their kings, to fetch him home again ; 
who. lived in the meantime in exile in the moun- 
tain Lycaeum, in a house whereof the one half was wwldrating his 
part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lace- 
daemonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe 
to withdraw his army out of Attica. 17- Being 
troubled with these imputations, and considering 
wrfeh himself, there being no occasion of calamity 
in time of peace, and the Lacedaemonians thereby 
recovering their men, that he also should cease to 
be obnoxious to the calumniations of his enemies ; 
whereas in war, such as had charge could not but 
be quarrelled upon their losses : he was therefore 
forward to have the peace concluded. 

And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal 
the Lacedaemonians braved them with a prepara- p^T 
tion already making against the spring, 1 sending showofwar * 
to the cities about for that purpose, as if they 
meant to fortify in Attica: to the end that the 
Athenians might give them the better ear. When Peace concluded 
after many meetings and many demands on either 
side, it was at last agreed that peace should be 
concluded, each part rendering what they had 
taken in the war, save that the Athenians should 
hold Nisaea : (for when they [likewise] demanded 

Platsea, and the Thebans answered that it was 

1 [" About the spring &c. already braved them beforehand with 9 * &c.] 

C 2 


v. neither taken by force nor by treason, but ren- 
dered voluntarily, the Athenians said that they also 

A.c.421. had Nisaea in the same manner) : the Lacedse- 
The Boeotians, monians calling together their confederates ; and 


the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and 
(for these disliked it), giving their 
iendeZ votes for the ending of the war ; they concluded 
the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians .with, 
sacrifice, and swore it, and the Athenians again 
unto them, upon these articles : 

THE ARTICLES 18. " The Athenians, and Lacedaemonians, and 
their confederates, have made peace, and sworn it 
city by city, as followeth : 

" Touching the public temples, it shall be lawfel 
to whomsoever will, to sacrifice in them, and to 
have access unto them, and to ask counsel of the 
oracles in the same, and to send their deputies 
unto them, according to the custom of his country, 
securely both by sea and land. 

" The whole place consecrate and temple of Apollo 
in Delphi, and Delphi itself, shall be governed by 
their own law, taxed by their own state, and judged 
by their own judges, both city and territory, accord- 
ing to the institution of the place 1 . 

" The peace shall endure between the Athenians 

1 [The Delphian nobility were Muell. ii. 1. As the temple there- 
of Doric origin : and so great was fore of the Doric god : at whose 
their influence over the temple, that bidding the Spartans entered on 
they may be considered as the actual many hazardous enterprizes, de^ 
managers of it. They formed a throned the tyrants throughout 
criminal court, and sentenced all Greece, &c.: and without whose 
offenders against the temple, by the sanction they never undertook any 
Pythian decision, to be hurled from important action (as this history 
a precipice : and whether any mur- shews by many examples) : its in- 
der was expiable or not, was a dependence was of the last import- 
question within their jurisdiction, ance to Sparta.] 


with their confederates, and the Lacedaemonians 
with their confederates, for fifty years, both by 
sea and land, without fraud and without harm- 

r, OL.89.3. 

UOing. Articles of the 

" It shall riot be lawful to bear arms with inten- P eacetetween 

the Athenians 

tion of hurt, neither for the Lacedaemonians and aud the Laced - 

. i * i P monians. 

their confederates against the Athenians, nor for 
the Athenians and their confederates against the 
Lacedaemonians, by any art or machination what- 
soever : if any controversy shall arise between 
them, the same shall be decided by law and by 
oath, in such manner as they shall agree on. 

" The Lacedaemonians and their confederates 
siiflll render Amphipolis to the Athenians : the 
inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedaemon- 
ians shall render unto the Athenians, shall be at 
liberty to go forth whither they will with bag and 

" Those cities which paid the tribute taxed in 
the time of Aristides, 1 continuing to pay it, shall be 

1 [The tribute taxed in the time worthy of attention. It was the 
of Aristides, was four hundred and practice of Cimon and the aristo- 
sixty talents. In his lifetime, whe- cratical party to ingratiate them- 
therwith his assent or not is dis- selves with the people, by distribut- 
puted, the treasury, on the nomi- ing their vast wealth in so called 
nal proposal of the Samians, was liberality amongst the lower class of 
removed from Delos(i. 90) to Athens, citizens. Great as was the mischief 
The tribute, as may be supposed, of this practice, it was thrown into 
suffered no reduction by the change, the shade by the invention of Pe- 
Cimon having first of all stripped ricles. Unable to contend with the 
the weaker states in succession of private wealth of his antagonists, 
their means of defence (i. 99), the he resorted to a similar application 
tribute was ere long raised by of the public money : and his en- 
Pericles to six hundred, and in trance into the public assembly was 
course of jtime by Alcibiades and marked by a series of measures, all 
others to thirteen hundred talents, tending to enable the poorer citizens 
The cause of this increase is well to live upon the public treasury. 


v. governed by their own laws. And now that the 
P eace * s concluded, it shall be unlawful for the 

A.c.421. Athenians or their confederates to bear arms against 
Article's of the them, or to do them any hurt, as long as they shall 

P a Y the said tribute : the cities are these : Argilus, 
Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus ; 
and they shall be confederates of neither side, 
neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athe- 
nians; but if the Athenians can persuade these' 
cities unto it, then it shall be lawful for the Athe- 
nians to have them for confederates, having gotten 
their consent. 

"The Mecybernaeans, Sanseans, and Singaeans, 
shall inhabit their own cities on the same conjjj,- 
tions with the Olynthians and Acanthians. 

" The Lacedaemonians and their confederates 
shall render Panactum unto the Athenians. 

Besides the vast public worts, expenditure : and the military chest 

good in themselves, but undertaken was left to depend on extraordinary 

mainly with the view of giving contributions. His other measure 

bread to a great number of work- was still more mischievous : the 

men, he was the author of two payment of an obole to the juror 

remarkable laws. In former times, for his attendance at the courts of 

it had been found necessary for the justice. The pay was just high 

public tranquillity, that the admis- enough to ensure the attendance 

sion to the theatre, originally gra- of the most objectionable class of 

tuitous, should be subjected to the jurors to sit in judgment on the life 

charge of a small sum of money, and fortune of their fellow-citizens. 

Pericles passed a law entitling every Corruption was probably a vice in- 

citizen to this money out of the herent in the tribunals as organized 

treasury. Had the design been by Solon : the 6000 sworn citizens, 

simply to place the amusement of or jurors, called the rj\iaia. But 

the theatre within reach of the poor that the bribing of them was, a few 

citizens, the obvious plan was to years later than the present time, 

revive the free admission. In course reduced to a regular system ; and 

of time, the theoricon absorbed the that condemnations of obnoxious 

entire surplus funds of the treasury, individuals were extorted*by threats 
after defraying the ordinary civil *of withholding prosecutions, and 


" And the Athenians shall render to the Lace- y. 
dsemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pte- ""\ * ~ s 
leum, and Atalante : they shall likewise deliver A.CUSI'. 
whatsoever Lacedsemonians are in the prison of Article's oniu 

Athens, or in any prison of what place soever in l 

the Athenian dominion : and dismiss all the Pelo- andtheLaceda3 - 


ponnesians besieged in Scione, and all 1 that Bra- 
sidas did there put in, and whatsoever confederates 
of the Lacedaemonians are in prison, either at 
Athens or in the Athenian state. 

" And the Lacedaemonians and their confede- 
rates shall deliver whomsoever they have in their 
hands of the Athenians or their confederates, in 
same manner. 

thereby cutting short the juror's 
pay : this Pericles alone is answer- 
able for. As to the allies, the 
amount of direct taxes wrung from 
them, was the least of their griev- 
ances. A far sorer burthen was the 
transfer of all criminal causes, and 
all suits involving property above 
a certain low amount, from their 
own tribunals to those of Athens. 
She derived therefrom the profits, 
comparatively trifling, arising from 
fees of justice and the influx of 
strangers into the city, at the ex- 
pense of suffering to the allies 
difficult to be conceived. This is 
what the Athenian orator (i. 77) 
wishes to represent as a commcr- 
cium juris pmbendi et repetendi. 
At the time of Pericles' accession 
to power, the Athenians, amongst 
whom democracy had already made 
rapid strides, had still left one 
security fpr an impartial trial in 
criminal cases. This security stood 
in his way: and he did not hesitate, 

by the overthrow of the Areopagus, 
to place the life and fortune of 
every citizen at the mercy of a vote 
of an assembly of 6000 citizens. 
Of the justice dealt out by a popular 
assembly, an example is seen in the 
affair of the Hermes-busts (vi. 44, 
note) : another in the fate of the ten 
generals after the battle of Argi- 
nusa). The working of the Helioea 
shewed itself in the occasional direct 
division of the rich man's property 
amongst the citizens at large (Herm. 
103, n. 7): and in the common 
practice of confiscating the property 
of the rich to supply the wants of 
the treasury, whence the jurors 
derived their salary (Arist. v. 5, vi. 
2, 5.). It may perhaps be a ques- 
tion, whether if victory in this war 
had sided with Athens, she could 
long have survived this state of 
things : and whether Pericles had 
any faith in her so doing.] 

1 [" And all others, allies of the 
Spartans, in Scione, and all" &c.] 




Or. 89. 3. 

Articles of the 

" Touching the Scionaeans, Toronaeans, and Ser- 
mylians, and whatsoever other city belonging to 
^ e Athenians, the Athenians shall do with them 
what they think fit. 

" The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lace- 
daemonians and their confederates, city by city ; 
and that oath shall be the greatest 1 that in each 
city is in use. The thing that they shall swear 
shall be this : / stand to these articles and to this 
peace, truly and sincerely. And the Lacedaemo- 
nians and their confederates shall take the same 
oath to the Athenians. This oath they shall on 
both sides every year renew, and shall erect pillars 
[inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia 2 , aM 
in the Isthmus ; at Athens, within the citadel ; and 
at Lacedaemon, in the Amyclaeum. 

" And if anything be on either side forgotten, 
or shall be thought fit upon good deliberation to 
be changed ; it shall be lawful for them to do it, 
in such manner as the Lacedaemonians and Athe- 
nians shall think fit, jointly. 

19. " This peace shall take beginning from the 
24th of the month Artemisium, Pleistolas being 

1 [In formulisjurisjurandi, varii 
et confirmandi et fidem dandi gra- 
duserant. Prater usi tat urn testium 
jusjurandum aliud erat sauctius, 
quod magis quam alia fidem ob- 
stringere videbatur: quale prasUi- 
bant Areopagitae, dum se et omnem 
progeniem diris devovent, quodque 
ut praecipua gravitate et vi praedi- 
tum memoratur. Imprimis illam 
formulamobligareputaverunt, qua 
per liberos jurabant. Goeller. 
He observes also, that the Athen- 
iaus swore on behalf of themselves 

and their allies (bee eh. 47): here 
therefore they swear both to the 
Lacedaemonians and to their allies, 
whilst the latter swear to the Athen- 
ians only. The Amyc/ccum was a 
templeof Apollo at Amyc((c, and not 
actually a part of Sparta so called, 
as supposed by some : but from its 
nearness, Amyclre itself was consi- 
dered as part of Sparta, as the Pei- 
roeus of Athens and the Herpjum 
ofArgos. Haaek. Popp.J 

3 By Delphi, where the Pythian 
games were kept. 


ephore at Sparta, and the 15th of Elaphebolium, 
after the account of Athens, Alcaeus being archon. 1 

" They that took the oath and sacrificed, were 
these. Of the Lacedaemonians : Pleistolas, Dama- 
getus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, 
Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, 
Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of 
the.Athenians these: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, 
Laches, Euthydemus, Prodes, Pythodorus, Hagnon, 
Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lol- 
cius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.'* 

20. This peace was made in the very end of 
winter, and the spring then beginning, presently 
-f^ter the City Bacchanals, and [full] ten years and 
some few days over 2 , after the first invasion of 
Attica and the beginning of this war. But now 
for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the 
times themselves : and not trust to the account of 
the names of such as in the several places bare chief 
offices, or for some honour to themselves had their 
names ascribed for marks to the actions foregoing. 
For it is not exactly known who was in the begin- 
ning of his office, or who in the midst, or how he 
was, when anything fell out. But if one reckon the The true way of 
same by summers and winters, according as they [ 
are written 3 , he shall find by the two half years 
which make the whole, that this first war was of 
ten summers and as many winters continuance. 

1 [" This treaty begins from the 2 [" A few days let*" Goeller, 

ephoralty of Pleistolas, the fourth Arnold. Of the next sentence the 

day before the end (i. e. the 26th) sense may be correctly given : but 

of the month Artemisium; and from the text, as it stands, is admitted 

the archoyship of Alcaeus at Athens, to be untranslatable.] 

the sixth day before the end (the 3 [That is, u as they are here 

24th) of the mouth Elaphebolion".] written".] 


21. The Lacedaemonians (for it fell unto them by 
lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed pre- 
A.c.431. sently those prisoners they had then in their hands, 
TheLacedmoD- and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and 

Philocharidas, into the parts upon Thrace, with 
Imfl^deKw" comman d to Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to 
their prisoners, the Athenians, and requiring the rest of their 

confederates there to accept of the peace in such 

manner as was for every of them accorded. But 
The Amphipoii- they would not do it, because they thought it was 

not f r their advantage: and Clearidas also, to 

* & rat tfy the Chalcideans, surrendered not the city, 
alleging that he could not do it whether they 
would or not. And coming away soon after witb 
those ambassadors to Lacedsemon, both to purge 
himself, if he should be accused by those with 
Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, 

- and also to try if the peace might by any means 
be shaken 1 : when he found it firm, he himself 
being sent back by the Lacedaemonians with com- 
mand principally to surrender the place, arid if he 
could not do that, then ,to draw thence all the Pe- 
loponnesians that were in it, immediately took his 
journey. 22, But the confederates chanced to be 
present themselves in Lacedaemon: and the Lacedae- 
monians required such of them as formerly refused, 
that they would accept the peace. But they, upon 
the same pretence on which they had rejected it 
before, said, that unless it were more reasonable 
they would not accept it. And the Lacedaemonians, 
seeing they refused, dismissed them, and by them- 

1 [ <4 Might be altered : and finding it already ratified" &c. 


selves entered with the Athenians into a league 1 : v. 
because they imagined that the Argives would not 
renew their peace, (because they had refused it A - 
before when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos, 
and held them for no dangerous enemies without 
the Athenians) : and also conceived, that by this ialls - 
means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir ; for 
if they could, they would turn to the Athenians. 
Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then 
present, and conference had, they agreed ; and the 
oath and league was concluded on in the terms 
following : 

23. " The Lacedaemonians shall be confederates THE ARTICLES 
jyith the Athenians for fifty years. 

" If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedae- 
monians and do the Lacedaemonians any harm, the ATHENIANS 
Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians against them 
in the strongest manner they can possibly : but if 
the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall 
be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy 
both to the Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians, 
and shall be warred upon by them both ; and both 
cities shall again lay down the war jointly : and 
this is to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. 

" And if any enemy shall invade the territories of 
the Athenians, and do the Athenians any harm, then 
the Lacedaemonians shall aid the Athenians against 
them in the strongest manner they can possibly: but 
if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall 
be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy 
both to the Lacedaemonians and to the Athenians, 


v'. in its strict sense, (see i. 44) ; here, an alliance defen- 
an alliance offensive and defensive sive only.] 


v. and shall be warred upon by both ; and both the 
*TBA*X/ cities shall again lay down the war together : and 
A.c.421. this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. 
Articles of the "If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall 
.assist the Lacedaemonians with all their strength 

" These things shall be sworn unto by the same 
men on either side that swore the peace, and shall 
be every year renewed by the Lacedaemonians [at 
their] coming to the Bacchanals at Athens; and by 
the Athenians [at their] going to the Hyacinthian 
feast at Lacedaemon ; and either side shall erect a 
pillar, [inscribed with this league], one at Lacedae- 
mon, near unto Apollo in the Amyclseum, another 
at Athens, near Minerva in the citadel. 

" If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians to add or take away any thing touching the 
league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly.'* 

" 24. Of the Lacedaemonians took the oath, these: 
Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, 
Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philo- 
charidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, 
Empedias, Menas, Laphiius. Of the Athenians : 
Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthyde- 
mus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thra- 
sycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timocrates, 
Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes." 

This league was made not long after the peace : 
The Athenians and the Athenians delivered to the Lacedaemonians 
t&en at ^ e men *^cy had taken in the island ; and by this 
time began the summer of the eleventh year. And 1 


[" And hitherto hath been writ- these ten years was without inter- 
ten this first war, which during mission." Goeller.] 


hitherto hath been written these ten years, which 
this first war continued without intermission. 

25. After the peace and league made between 
the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, after the ten 
years' war, Pleistolas being ephore at Lacedaemon 
and Alcaeus archon of Athens ; though there were 
peace to those that had accepted it ; yet the Co- 
rinthians and some cities of Peloponnesus endea- 
voured to overthrow what was done, and presently 
arose another stir by the confederates against La- 
cedaemon. And the Lacedaemonians also after a TheLaced* ra on- 
while became suspect unto the Athenians, for n 
performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. 
And for six years and ten months 1 they abstained 
from entering into each other's territories with 
their arms : but the peace being weak, they did 
each other abroad what harm they could ; and in 
the end were forced to dissolve the peace made 
after those ten years, and fell again into open war. 

26. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens 
written from point to point, by summers and win- 
ters, as everything came to pass, until such time 
as the Lacedaemonians and their confederates had 
made an end of the Athenian dominion, and had 
taken their long walls and Pieraeus. To which From the begin. 
time from the beginning of the war, it is in h!Twa* end 
all twenty-seven years. As for the composition ** ' seven 
between, if any man shall think it not to be 
accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. 
For let him look into the actions that passed as 

1 [Auctoris coinputatio annorum lati, rursus ad bellum aperte cum 

progreditur usque ad annum 01. 91. Atbeniensibus gerendum se accinx- 

2. A.C. 414 : quo tempore Lace- erunt: vide vi. 93. Exeunt ipsi sex 

dffimonii, ab Alcibiade exstimu- anni et menses decem. Goeller.] 


v. they are distinctly set down 1 ; and he shall find 
that that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in 
A.c.431. which they neither rendered all, nor accepted all, 
The time of this according to the articles. Besides, in the Man- 

and Epidaurian wars, and in other actions, 
it was on both sides infringed : moreover, the con- 
federates on the borders of Thrace continued in 
hostility as before : and the Boeotians had but a 
truce from one ten days to another. So that with 
the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful 
cessation, and the war that followed after it, a man 
The number of shall find, counting by the times, that it came to 
! J ust so man y years and some few clays : and that 
those who built upon the prediction of the oracles^ 
have 2 this number only to agree. And I remember 
yet, that from the very beginning of this war and so 
on till the end, it was uttered by many that it should 
be of thrice nine years' continuance. And 3 for the 
time thereof I lived in my strength, and applied 
my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the 

s, for same. It happened also that I was banished my 

his ill success at A * r Y 

* country for twenty years, after my charge at 
Amphipoiis : whereby being present at 4 the affairs 
of both, and especially of the Lacedaemonians by 
reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better 
learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrels 
therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after 
those ten years, and that which followed, according 

1 ["For let him consider how it with the prediction". Arn. " For 

(the composition) is characterized I myself remember yet" &c.] 

by the facts of tie case". Arnold, a [" And I lived to the end qf it, 

Goeller.] being of an age to judge pf events 

3 [" Found in this solitary in- and also applying" &c.] 

stance the event exactly agreeing 4 [ u Conversant with." Arnold.] 


as from time to time the war was carried, I will v. 
now pursue. 1 ^^ 

27. After the concluding of the fifty years' peace A.cuai. 
and the league which followed, and when those The Corinthians 
ambassadors which were sent for out of the rest 
of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were 
departed from Lacedsemon, the Corinthians (the out . the 

11 < m 

rest going all to their own cities) turning first to 
Argos 2 , entered into treaty with some of the Argive 
magistrates to this purpose : that the Lacedae- 
monians having made a peace and league with the 
Athenians, their hither to mortal enemies, tending not 
to the benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, 
it behoved them 3 to consider of a course for the 
safety of the same : and to make a decree, that any 
city of the Grecians that would, and were a free city, 
and admitted the like and equal trials of judgment 
with theirs, might make a league with the Argives 
for the one mutually to aid the other: and to 
assign them a few men with absolute authority 
from the state, to treat with : and that it should 
not be motioned to the people, to the end, that if 
the multitude would not agree to it, it might be 
unknown that ever they had made such a motion : 
affirming, that many would come into this confe- 
deracy upon hatred to the Lacedaemonians. And 

1 [" The controversy therefore but they turning" c. Bekk. &c.] 
after these ten years, and the fol- 8 [" The Argives" The limiting 
lowing rupture of the treaty, and the alliance to such states as treated 
the war thereupon how it was" &c.] others upon a footing of equality in 

2 ["After concluding &c., the the distribution of justice, operated 
embassies from Peloponnesus,which as an exclusion from it of all states 
were sent /or to assist at them, re- not independent on the one hand, 
tired from Lacedoeraon. And ail and of Athens and Spaita on the 
but the Corinthians went home: other. Goeller.] 




' ** 

Twelve men 


the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, 
went home. 

^' These men of Argos having heard them, and 
reported their proposition both to the magistrates 
an d to the people, the Argives ordered the same 
accordingly : and elected twelve men, with whom it 
should be lawful for any Grecian to make the 
league that would, except the Lacedaemonians and 
Athenians, with neither of which they were to 
enter into any league without the consent of the 
Argive people. And this the Argives did the more 
willingly admit, as well for that they saw the 
Lacedaemonians w r ould make war upon them ; (for 
the truce between them was now upon expiring)^ 
as also because they hoped to have the principality 1 
of Peloponnesus. For about this time Lacedaemon 
had but a bad report, and was in contempt for the 
losses it had received. And the Argives in all 
points w r ere in good estate, as not having concurred 
in the Attic war, but rather been at peace with 
both, and thereby gotten in their revenue 2 . Thus 

made attempts, with little success, 
upon Argos : but when the final 
conquest of Cynuria (seech. 41, n.) 
had given her the key of Argolis, 
Cleomenes in a decisive victory, 
some time between 624 and the 
Persian war (see Muell. iii. 4 ), slew 
six thousand of her Dorian citizens. 
After this disaster, and till the next 
generation arrived at manhood and 
expelled them, the government fell 
into the hands of the slaves (grr/m- 
nesii) : and to replenish her free 
population, she was obliged to col- 
lect and admit to the rights of citi- 
zenship the subject periaci of the 
surrounding cities. She was too 

i : to obtain the /ye- 
ot, or to be the leading power.] 
2 ["But rather made their ac- 
count by being at peace with both", 
Arnold, Goeller. The Dorians that 
subdued Argos, did not, like the 
Spartans, congregate themselves in 
the capital, but dispersed them- 
selves in several of the ancient and 
considerable cities: whereby the 
influence of Argos in Argolis was 
almost annihilated, and she was 
reduced to being the head of a 
league for common defence and 
regulation of the common interests, 
Within a century after the Dorian 
invasion, Spartan ambition bad 



the Argives received into league all such Grecians 
as came unto them. 

29. First of all therefore, came in the Mantineans 
and their confederates: which they did for fear of The 
the Lacedaemonians. For a part of Arcadia, during S^ 
the war of Athens, was come under the obedience league 
of the Mantineans ; over which they thought the 
Lacedaemonians, now they were at rest, would 
not permit them any longer to command : and 
therefore they willingly joined with the Argives, 
as being, they thought, a great city, ever enemy 
to the Lacedaemonians, and governed as their own 
by democracy 1 . When the Mantineans had revolted, 

v . 

ater r 

crippled to take any part in the 
Persian war, and followed the coun- 
sel of the oracle: "hostile to her 
neighbours, but the friend of the 
gods, to draw in her spear and sit 
watchfully guarding her head : and 
the head will take care of the 
body": Herod, vii. 148. Hatred 
of Spartan supremacy had no small 
influence on her policy : she pre- 
ferred exclusion from the common 
affairs of Peloponnesus, and even 
submitting to the yoke of the bar- 
barian, rather than acknowledge 
the /y/novta of Sparta : Herod, ibid . 
Her new population was indus- 
trious, and multiplied apace ; and 
prosperity and wealth returned to 
Argos: but her constitution thereby 
received a democratic tendency in- 
consistent with the Doric character, 
the peculiar features of which gra- 
dually disappeared.] 

1 [Except the possession of Mes- 
senia, nothing was so vitally im- 
portant to Sparta as her influence 
over the towns of Arcadia : as their 


hostility would exclude her from 
all intercourse with the rest of 
Greece. Very little is known of 
the manner in which she gained a 
footing in those towns. The in- 
vading Dorians effected no settle- 
ment in their inarch through Arca- 
dia in their route to Sparta: though 
no opposition is heard of by any 
state except Tegea. Still in the 
two first Messenian wars the Arca- 
dians appear as the allies of the 
Messenians. In later times their 
territory, the most extensive in Pe- 
loponnesus, served only as a tho- 
roughfare for hostile armies : the 
people, the native Pelasgians, who 
had immemorial possession of the 
land (Herod, i. 140, viii. 73), had 
no weight in the affairs of Pelo- 
ponnesus, and shed their blood for 
hire in quarrels with which they 
had no concern. The Mantineans 
however, though they now followed 
the policy of Argos, had long been 
attached to the Peloponnesian 
league, and the faithful ally of 



the rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter 
amongst themselves, that it was fit for them to do 
the like : conceiving that there was somewhat in 
it more than they knew, that made the Mantineans 
to turn ; and were also angry with the Lacedae- 
monians, amongst many other causes, for that it 
was written in the articles of the Attic peace, 
The article of that it should be lawful to add unto or take .away 

adding and alter- - , , ^ * * , -,, 

ing milked. from the same, whatsoever should seem good to the 
two cities of the Lacedemonians and the Athen- 
ians. For this was the article that the most 
troubled the Peloponnesians, and put them into a 
jealousy that the Lacedaemonians might have a 
purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring theer** 
into subjection : for in justice, the power of changing 
the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the 
confederates in general. Whereupon, many fear- 
ing such an intention, applied themselves to the 
Argives, every one severally striving to come into 
their league. 

30. The Lacedaemonians perceiving this stir to 
begin in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians 

ian* about this were ^Q^ ^e contrivers of it, and entered them- 

leaguewith ,-,.., i * i 

selves also into the league with Argos, sent ambas- 
sadors unto Corinth, with intention to prevent the 
sequel of it : and accused them, both for the whole 
design, and for their own revolt in particular, 
which they intended to make from them to the 
league of the Argives ; saying that they should 

Sparta : and their present defection staunch ally of Sparta), and partly 

may be attributed partly to their to the establishment of a democratic 

desire to retain possession of Par- government under the* influence of 

rhasia and to their hostility to Argos. This defection is not for- 

Tegea, (ever since its reduction the gotten in after times,: see ch. 50, n.] 


therein infringe their oath, and that they had already 
done unjustly, to refuse the peace made with the 
Athenians ; forasmuch as it is an article of their 
league 1 , that what the major part of the confede- 
rates should conclude, unless it were hindered by 
some god or hero, the same was to stand good. 
But the Corinthians, those confederates which The apology of 
had refused the peace as well as they being now ^ 
at Corinth, (for they had sent for them before), i 
their answer to the Lacedaemonians did not openly 
allege the wrongs they had received ; as that the 
Athenians had not restored Solium nor Anacto- 
rium 2 , nor anything else they had in this war lost : 
4^dt pretended not to betray those of Thrace 3 ; for 
that they had in particular taken an oath to them, 
both when together with Potidsea they first re- 
volted, and also another afterwards. And there- 
fore, they said, they did not break the oath of their 
league by rejecting the peace with Athens. For 
having sworn unto them by the gods, they should 
in betraying them offend the gods. And whereas 
it is said, unless some god or hero hinder it, this Their amwer 
appeareth to be a divine hindrance. Thus they touching their 
answered for their old oath. Then, for their league 
with the Argives, they gave this answer : that 
when they had advised with their friends, they 
would do afterwards what should be just. And 
so the ambassadors of Lacedsemon went home. At 
the same time were present also in Corinth the 
ambassadors of Argos, to invite the Corinthians 
to their league, and that without delay. But the 
Corinthians appointed them to come again at their 

1 The Peloponnesian. 2 [See ii. 30, iv. 49.] 3 [rove iiri 

D 2 


next sitting. 31. Presently after this came unto 
them an ambassage also from the Eleians : and first 
they made a league with the Corinthians; and going 
thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, 
according to the declaration before mentioned l . 
The Eleians had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians 
concerning Lepreum. For the Lepreates having 
. heretofore warred on certain of the Arcadians, 
and for their aid called the Eleians into their con- 
federacy with condition to give the moiety of the 
land 2 [to be won from them], when the war was 
ended, the Eleians gave unto the Lepreates the 
whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an 
imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to JupitEi 
Olympian: which they continued to pay till the 
beginning of the Athenian war. But afterwards 
upon pretence of that war giving over the pay- 
ment, the Eleians would have forced them to it 
again. The Lepreates for help having recourse to 
the Lacedaemonians : and the cause being referred 
to their decision, the Eleians afterwards, upon sus- 
picion that the Lacedaemonians would not do them 
right, renounced the reference, and wasted the 
territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedaemonians 
nevertheless gave sentence, that the Lepreates 
should be at liberty to pay it or not 3 , and that the 
Eleians did the injury : and because the Eleians had 
not stood to the reference, the Lacedaemonians put 
into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. The Eleians 

1 [In ch. 28. " The reason of Lepreatans in possession of their 
this was, that the Eleians had a lands, with the imposition -thereon 
quarrel" &c.] of a talent" &c.] 

2 [That is, of the Lepreatans' 3 [" Were independent 1 ' : that is, 
territory.- "The Eleians left the of the Eleians.] v 


taking this as if the Lacedaemonians had received 

their revolted city, and producing the article of 

their league, " that what every one possessed when 

they entered into the Attic war, the same they 

should possess when they gave it over" 1 ; revolted 

to the Argives as wronged, and entered league 

with them as is before related. After these came The Corinthian* 

presently into the Argive league the Corinthians, 1^? 

and the Chalcideans upon Thrace. The Boeotians terinto n IIlB 

*- league with 

also and Megareans threatened as much 2 : but Ar 8 os - 
because they thought the Argive democracy would 
not be so commodious for them, who were governed 
according to the government of the Lacedaemonians, 
by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it. 

32. About the same time of this summer the Tho Athenians 
Athenians expugned Scione, slew all that were r < coverS "<> ne 
within it at man's estate 3 , made slaves of the women 
and children, and gave their territory to the Pla- 
tseans. They also replanted the Delians in Delos, The Dciiana re - 
both in consideration of the defeats they had re .P lantedinDelos - 
ceived after their expulsion, and also because the 
oracle at Delphi had commanded it. The Phoceans 
and Locrians also began a war at that time against 
each other. 

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now The Corinthians 
leagued, went to Tegea to cause it to revolt from 

1 [This seems to refer to the fun- guarantee to this effect before the 

damental preliminary agreement, war. Thirlwall.] 

described inch. 17 in very different 2 [" Thought themselves also 

terms : " that peace should be con- wronged : but being watched and 

eluded on the terms of each party courted by the Lacedaemonians, 

rendering what they had taken in and thinking the Argive democracy 

the war" : otherwise we must sup- would not be so commodious for 

pose that the Peloponnesian confe- them &c., they stirred &c." Goell.] 

derates had given each other a 3 [See C Icon's decree, iv. 122.] 


the Lacedaemonians, conceiving it to be an import- 
ant piece 1 [of Peloponnesus], arid making account, 
if they gained it to their side, they should easily 
obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused 
. to become enemies to the Lacedaemonians, the 
Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, 
grew less violent : and were afraid that no more 
of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they 
went to the Boeotians, and solicited them to enter 
into league with them and the Argives, and to do 
The Corinthians as they did. And the Corinthians further desired 
fru!^?h ndays the Boeotians to go along with them to Athens, and 
Athens, as the t o procure for them the like ten days' truce, to 

Boeotians had it. * . 

that which was made between the Athenians afld 

Boeotians presently after the making of the fifty 

years' peace, on the same terms as the Boeotians 

had it : and if the Athenians refused, then to 

renounce theirs, and make no more truces here- 

The Boeotians after without the Corinthians. The Corinthians 

^erc^te^ng having made this request, the Boeotians willed 

aieaguewith them, touching the league with the Argives, to 

stay a while longer, and went with them to Athens, 

but obtained not the ten days' truce : the Athen- 

1 [** Part (of their plan)". " the tation of an ambiguous oracle, the 
whole of Peloponnesus". Tegea Spartans (854, A.C.) invaded the 
since its reduction by Sparta, had territory of Tegea, carrying with 
ever been supported by her, in them the fetters which they expected 
accordance with her policy of pre- to lay upon the Tegeatans : but 
venting the growth of any consider- being overthrown, submitted to 
able state, against the pretensions have them imposed on themselves, 
of Mantineia : and to the fidelity of Herodotus (i. 67.) saw the same 
Tegea she was perhaps indebted for fetters suspended in the temple of 
her safety at this perilous moment. Minerva at Tegea. The import- 
All her recollections connected with ance of Tegea to Sparta in a mill. 
Tegea were not of a pleasant tary point of view has already been 
nature. Led by their misinterpr*- noticed : iii. 8, note.] 


ians answering, that if the Corinthians were confe- v. 
derates with the Lacedaemonians, they had a peace '^ AR xi - 
already. Nevertheless the Boeotians would not A c ' f. 
relinquish their ten days' truce, though the Co- The Athenmns 

rinthians both required the same, and affirmed that 
it was so before agreed on. Yet the Athenians Coriuthiam ' 
granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but 
without solemn ratification 1 . 

* 331 The same summer the Lacedaemonians with TheLacedH? 
their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax { 
the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, 
made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects 
of the Mantineans ; partly as called in by occasion 
of sedition, and partly because they intended, if 
they could, to demolish a fortification which the 
Mantineans had built and kept with a garrison in 
Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians towards 2 
Sciritis of Laconia. The Lacedaemonians therefore 
wasted the territory of the Parrhasians. And the 
Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody 
of the Argives, came forth to aid a the Parrhasians 
their confederates: but being unable to defend 
both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the 
Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the 
Lacedaemonians, when they had set the Parrhasians 
at liberty, and demolished the fortification, went 
home likewise. 

34. The same summer, when those soldiers which 
went out with Brasidas, and of which Clearidas 
after the making of the peace had the charge, were 
returned from the parts upon Thrace : the Lace- 

1 [" But no treaty".] 3 [" Themselves guarded the tcr- 

* [" As a check upon Sciritis". ritory of their confederates the Par- 
See v. 51. Arn.] rhasians". Arnold.] 





A. C. 421. 

v. dsemonians made a decree, that those Helotes 
which had fought under Brasidas should receive 
their liberty, and inhabit where they thought good *. 
But not long after they placed them, together with 
such others as had been newly enfranchised 2 , in 
Lepreum ; a city standing in the confines between 
Laconia and the Eleians, with whom they were now 
. at variance. Fearing also lest those citizens of 
that were ulkeiT their own, which had been taken in the island and 
Kfficotr t had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should 
inake bargain, upcm apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, 
if they remained capable of honours, make some 
innovation in the state, they disabled them* [though] 

1 [An essential condition of their 
freedom : being bound to the soil, 
and incapable of removal from it, 
or of receiving their freedom but at 
the will of the state.] 

2 [vtoSap&Sw : " recently ascrib- 
ed to the tifinog" i. e. new Spartans : 
a name acquired by the enfranch- 
ised helot after having been some 
time in possession of his liberty. 
Their number soon nearly equalled 
that of the citizens. There were 
also Mothones or Mothaccs (from 
/i60wv, verna) : helots, that having 
been brought up with young Spar- 
tans (like Eumscus in the house of 
Ulysses) obtained their freedom 
without the rights of citizenship. 
Their descendants however must 
sometimes have obtained those 
rights : since Callicratides, Lysan- 
der, and Gylippus were of Mothonic 
origin. Mueller, iii. 3.] 

3 [" They disgraced them/' Of 
arista there were, both at Sparta 
and Athens, various degrees. The 

highest degree at Sparta was a kind 
of excommunication, reserved for 
for him that disgraced himself in 
the field, or returned, as Aristo- 
demus at Thermopylae, without his 
companions. The culprit could fill 
no public office : had the lowest 
place in the chorus : in the game of 
ball, neither party would have him 
on their aide : he could find no com- 
petitor in the gymnasium, no com- 
panion of his tent in the field : none 
would give him fire: his degra- 
dation was made visible to the 
world by his ragged cloak and half- 
shaved beard. Muell. iii. 10. The 
same degree of infamy at Athens 
amounted to actual outlawry, the 
an/ioc fairly losing all protection 
of the law, both public and private: 
whilst the minor degree deprived 
him of some specified rights only ; 
as the right of speaking and voting 
in the public assembly, of entering 
the agora, of sailing to the Helles- 
pont or to Ionia, &c, Hcrui. 124.] 


some of them were 1 in office already. And their 
disablement was this : " that they should neither 
bear office, nor be capable to buy and sell". Yet 
in time they were again restored to their former 

35. The same summer also the Dictideans 2 took The 
Thyssus, a town in Mount Athos, and confederate fromTh/ 881 
of the Athenians. This whole summer there was Athenians - 
'continual commerce between the Athenians and 
the Peloponnesians : nevertheless they began, both jealousy 
the Athenians arid the Lacedaemonians, to have l 
each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, 
in respect of the places not yet mutually surren- 
dered. For the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it 
fell to make restitution first, had not rendered 
Amphipolis and the other cities, nor had caused J in the parts 

* * ' about Thrace, 

the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon nor by the BOJO- 
Thrace, nor by the Boeotians nor Corinthians : 
though they had ever professed, that in case they 
refused they would join with the Athenians to 
bring them to it by force ; and had prefixed a time, 
(though not by writing), within the which such as 
entered not into this peace were to be held as 
enemies unto both. The Athenians therefore, when 
they saw none of this really performed, suspected 
that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon 
refused to render Pylus when they required it : 
nay, they repented that they had delivered up the 
prisoners they took in the island ; and detained 
the rest of the towns 3 they then held, till the La- 

1 [" Being in office". The object habitants of Dium in the peninsula 
of disgracing, was to render them of Athos. The Dictideans are un- 
incapable,of abusing their office to known. Popp. Goell. Arn.] 

the detriment of the state.] 3 [" Places". Methone, Pteleum, 

2 ["The Dians": that is, the in- Atalantis, Cythera &c. Goell.] 


cedsemonians should have performed the conditions 
9 n th 6 * 1 * P art also. The Lacedaemonians to this 
alle S ed > " that the y had done w ^at they were able 
The apology of to do ; for they had delivered the Athenian pri- 
soners that were in their hands, and had withdrawn 
their soldiers from the parts upon Thrace, and 
whatsoever else w r as in their own power to perform: 
but Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power 
to surrender : that they would endeavour to bring' 
the Boeotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, 
and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian 
prisoners in Bceotia to be sent home : and there- 
fore desired them to make restitution of Pylus, or, 
if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians^ 
and Helotes, as they for their part had drawn their 
garrisons out of the towns upon Thrace ; and if 
they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of 
The Athenians Athenians". After divers and long conferences had 
mtelan^He. this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athen- 

senians and Helotes, and all other Laconian fugitives: 

and placed them in Cranii, a city of Cephallenia. 

The end of the So for this summer there was peace, and free 

eleventhsuramer passage from one to another. 

TheLacedffimon- 36. In the beginning of winter, (for now there 

TdeTvoTto dis. were other ephores in office ; not those in whose time 

*>ive the peace, the peace was made, but some of them that opposed 

it), ambassadors being come from the confederates, 

and the Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian ambas- 

sadors being [already] there, and having had much 

conference together but concluded nothing, Cleo- 

bulus and Xenares, ephores that most desired the 

dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the am- 

bassadors were gone home, entered into private 


conference with the Boeotians and Corinthians, v. 
exhorting them to run both the same course : and \ EAB ~/ 
advised the Boeotians to endeavour first to make a A.CUSI. 
league themselves with the Argives, and then to A proposition of 
get the Argives together with themselves into a ol 
league with the Lacedaemonians: for that the 
might by this means avoid the necessity of accept- Corinthians. 
ing the peace with Athens: for the Lacedaemonians 
would more regard the friendship and league of 
the Argives, than 1 the enmity and dissolution of 
the peace with the Athenians : for they knew the 
Lacedaemonians had ever desired to have Argos 
their friend upon any reasonable conditions ; be- 
cause they knew that their war without Pelopon- 
nesus would thereby be a great deal the easier. 
Wherefore they entreated the Boeotians to put 
Panactum into the hands of the Lacedaemonians : 
to the end, that if they could get Pylus for it in ex- 
change, they might make war against the Athenians 
the more commodiously. 

37. The Boeotians and Corinthians being dis- 
missed 2 by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other 
Lacedaemonians of that faction, with these points 
to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to 
their several cities. And two men of Argos, of The Argm>s pro- 
principal authority in that city, having waited for 
and met with them by the way, entered into a 
treaty with them about a league between the 
Argives and the Boeotians, as there was between 
them and the Corinthians and the Eleians and 
Mantineans already : " for they thought, if it suc- 

1 [" Would choose the friendship ing friends &c. before coming to a 
of&c., at the risk of the enmity" rupture" &c.: Goell.] 
&c. : Arn. " Would prefer mak- * [ u Commissioned to deliver'*.] 


ceeded, they might [the more] easily have either 
war or peace, (forasmuch as the cause would now be 
common), either with the Lacedaemonians or whom- 
soever else it should be needful". When the 
Boeotian ambassadors heard this, they were well 
pleased. For as it chanced, the Argives requested 
the same things of them, that they by their friends 
in Lacedsemon had been sent to procure of the 
and promise to Argives. These men therefore of Argos, when they 
itorein?oBTotiaSaw that the Boeotians accepted of the motion, 
to that purpose. p rom i se( j ^ o senc j ambassadors to the Boeotians 

about it ; and so departed. When the Boeotians 
were come home, they related there 1 what they 
had heard both at Lacedsemon and by the way 
from the Argives. The governors of Boeotia were 
glad thereof; and much more forward in it now 
than formerly they had been ; seeing that not only 
their friends in Lacedsemon desired, but the Argives 
themselves hastened to have done the self-same 
thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came 
to them from Argos, to solicit the dispatch of the 
business before propounded : but the governors of 
Bceotia commended [only] the proposition, and 
dismissed them with promise to send ambassadors 
about the league to Argos. 38. In the meantime 
the governors of Boeotia thought fit, that an oath 

selves, the Co. should first be taken by themselves, and by the 

rinthians, Chal- , _ _ ^ , *, i, 

- ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the con- 
. federates upon Thrace 2 , to give mutual assistance 
upon any occasion to them that should require it, 
and neither to make war nor peace without the 

1 [" To the Bceotarchs".] Megareans, and the ambassadors 

2 [" Meanwhile it was thought from Chaleidice, to take an oath to 
fit by the Boeotarchs, Corinthiaus, each other to give" &c,] 



common consent : and next that the Boeotians and 
Megareans (for these two ran the same course) 
should make a league with the Argives. But 
before this oath was [to be] taken, the governors 
of Boeotia communicated the business to the four 
Boeotian councils, in the which the whole authority 
of the state consisteth 1 : and withal presented their 
advice, that any city that would, might join with 
them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But The 
they that were of these councils approved not the l 
proposition ; because they feared to offend the falleth off - 
Lacedaemonians, in being sworn to the Corinthians 
that had revolted from their confederacy. For the 
governors of Boeotia had not reported unto them 
what had passed at Lacedsemon, how Cleobulus 
and Xenares, the ephores, and their friends there, 

1 [The Boeotian states were 
united in a confederacy represented 
by a congress of deputies, who inet 
at the festival of Pambccotia, in the 
temple of the Itonian Athene near 
Coroneia,more perhaps for religious 
than political purposes. There 
were also other national councils 
which deliberated on peace and 
war, of perhaps nearly equal anti- 
quity : though first mentioned at a 
later period when there were four 
of them. It does not appear how 
they were constituted, or whether 
with reference to as many territorial 
divisions, of which we have no other 
trace. The chief magistrates of the 
league, called Bceotarchs, presided 
in those councils and commanded 
the national forces. The fourteen 
wooden images carried to the top 
of Cithseron (iv. 99, note) seem to 
point to that as the original num- 

ber of the confederate states : and 
that of the Bojotarchs was perhaps 
once the same, though afterwards 
reduced and undergoing many 
changes. Thebes had early the 
privilege of appointing two : one of 
whom was superior in authority 
over all the rest, and was president 
of the board. Thirl. It is probably 
this Bceotarch of Thebes, that in 
federal decrees is called ap^on/ iv 
Koivif /3ot(orwv, sometimes simply 
apxwv. To exercise the office, 
which was annual, beyond the legi- 
timate time, was a capital offence : 
and Epaminondas and Pelopidas, 
even after the battle of Lcuctra, 
were brought to trial for violating 
this law. But the Boeotarch was re- 
eligible: and Pelopidas accordingly 
was chosen Bceotarch eleven years 
consecutively. Mueller, Hermann, 


had advised them to enter first into league with 
the Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards 
to make the same league with the Lacedaemonians : 
for they thought that the councils, though this had 
never been told them, would have decreed it no 
otherwise than they upon premeditation should 
advise. So the business was checked : and the 
ambassadors from Corinth and from the cities upon 
Thrace departed without effect. And the gover- 
nors of Bceotia, that were before minded, if they 
had gotten this done, to have leagued 1 themselves 
also with the Argives, made no mention of the 
Argives in the councils at all, nor sent the ambas- 
sadors to Argos, as they had before promised : but 
a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the 
whole business. 
A.c.421.0. 39. The same winter the Olynthians took Me- 

Or 8B d. 

Mecyberne taken cyberne 2 , held with a garrison of the Athenians, by 

from the Athen- ncanil l4. 
ians by assault. aSSaUll. 

1 [" To have tried to league".] infantry, a far greater number of 

2 [The acquisition of Mecyberna targetiers, and nearly 1,000 horse, 
(a port-town about two miles from Thebes and Athens did not disdain 
Olynthus) was the commencement to send ambassadors to her, to treat 
of a series of conquests, which led of an alliance. Sparta became 
Olynthus to aspire to the rank of an alarmed, and sent an army of not 
imperial state. Not long after the less than 10,000 to crush the danger 
end of this war, she succeeded in in its infancy. This, not without 
forming and placing herself at the receiving some checks, she succeed- 
head of a confederacy of the Chal- ed in doing : and little foreseeing 
cidean states, embracing not fewer the remote consequences, conceived 
than 32 towns ; some, as Potidsea, she had achieved a great triumph, 
of considerable note. Her power But the power of Olynthus, now 
was further augmented in a very im- broken, was unequal afterwards 
portant degree by the cession to her to withstand the attacks of Philip : 
from Amyntas of a considerable who subdued and razed her to the 
part of the kingdom of Macedonia, ground. And the Chalcjdean pen- 
She became of ability to bring into insula, which had hitherto sepa- 
the field as many as 8,000 heavy rated Macedonia from the sea, at 


After this the Lacedaemonians, (for the confer- 
ences between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians 
about restitution reciprocal continued still), hoping 
that if the Athenians should obtain from the Boeo- 
tians Panactum, that then they also should recover 
Pylus, sent ambassadors to the Boeotians, with 
request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners 
plight be put into the hands of the Lacedaemonians, 
that they might get Pylus restored in exchange. 
But the Boeotians answered, that unless the Lace- 
daemonians would make a particular league with 
them as they had done with the Athenians, they 
would not do it. The Lacedaemonians, though 
they knew they should therein wrong the Athen- 
ians ; for that it was said in the articles, that neither 
party should make either league or war without 
the other's consent ; yet such was their desire to 
get Panactum to exchange it for Pylus, and withal 
they that longed to break the peace with Athens 
were so eager in it 1 , that at last they concluded a 
league with the Boeotians, winter then ending and 
the spring approaching : and Panactum was pre- 
sently pulled down to the ground 2 . So ended the 
eleventh year of this w r ar. 

40. In the spring following, the Argives, when 
they saw that the ambassadors which the Boeotians 
promised to send unto them came not, and that 
Panactum was razed, and that also there was a 


YEAtt XI. 


OL. 89.4. 
ians enter into a 
league with the 
Boeotians, know, 
ing it to be 
against justice. 



The Argives 

the Lacedcetnon 

the same time that it became the 
fairest part of his dominions, vir- 
tually made him master of the whole 
of Greece. See Thirl, ch. 37, 43.] 

1 [" Were so desirous of the 
Boeotian connexion, that" &c. The 

effect of making this separate treaty, 
was to raise Boeotia from a depend- 
ent member of the confederacy to 
the rank of an independent ally. 
Herm. 38.] 
2 [By the Boeotians : see ch. 42,] 


private league made between the Boeotians and 
the Lacedaemonians, were afraid lest they should 
on all hands be abandoned, and that the confede- 
rates would all go to the Lacedaemonians. For 
they apprehended that the Boeotians had been 
induced both to raze Panaetum, and also to enter 
into the Athenian peace, by the Lacedaemonians ; 
and that the Athenians were privy to the same : so 
that now they had no means to make league with 
the Athenians neither ; whereas before they made 
account, that if their truce with the Lacedaemonians 
continued not, they might upon these differences 
have joined themselves to the Athenians. The 
Argives being therefore at a stand, and fearing to 
have war all at once with the Lacedaemonians, 
Tegeats, Boeotians, and Athenians, [as] having for- 
merly refused the truce with the Lacedaemonians, 
and imagined to themselves the principality of all 
Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much 
speed as might be, Eustrophus and ^Eson, persons 
as they thought most acceptable unto them, with 
this cogitation, that by compounding with the La- 
cedaemonians as well as for their present estate 
they might, howsoever the world went 1 , they should 
at least live at quiet. 4 1 . When these ambassadors 
were there, they fell to treat of the articles upon 
which the agreement should be made. And at 
The territory of ** rst ^ Argives desired to have the matter referred, 
und either to some private man or to some city, con- 
cerning the territory of Cynuria 2 : about which 

1 [" Intending to compound &c., seven races described by Herodotus 

and then, so far as circumstances (viii. 73.) as inhabiting Peloponne- 

permitted, to keep quiet". Goeller.] sus : of which, he says, four, the 

*- [The Cynurii are one of the Dorians, ./Etolians, Dryopes, and 

mon and Greece. 



they have always differed, as lying on the borders 
of them both ; (it contairieth the cities of Thyrea 
and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedaemon- 
ians). But afterwards, the Lacedaemonians not 
suffering mention to be made of that, but that if 
they would have the truce go on as it did before, 
they might, the Argive ambassadors got them to 
yield to this: "that for the present an accord An odd condiu 
should be made for fifty years ; but withal, that it ofatruce 
should be lawful nevertheless, if one challenged 
the other thereunto, both for Lacedaemon and 
Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, 
so that there were in neither city a plague nor a 

Lemnians, wore foreign races ; one, 
the Achaeans, had never quitted 
Peloponnesus, but dwelt, not in 
their original seats, but in those of 
the lonians ; and two, the Arcad- 
ians and Cynurians, were aboriginal 
(that is, Pelasgians), and dwelt in 
their original seats : but of all these, 
the Cynurians were the only lon- 
ians, though the Argive government 
had (loricised them. Cynuria, a 
valley between Laeonia and Argolis, 
is said to have been subdued by 
Sparta as early as 1000 : but in 720 
the war about it was renewed, and 
the Argives got and kept possession 
of it and of the whole eoast as far 
as Malea, including the island of 
Cythera, till about 518 (the time at 
which Sparta reduced Tegea), when 
they finally lost it by the famous 
battle of Thyrea, alluded to by 
Thucydides. The two armies being 
about to join battle, it was agreed 
to decide the dispute for Cynuria 
by a contest between 300 chosen 
men on each side. The armies 


withdrew to avoid the temptation 
to violate the agreement : and the 
(>00 fought till there were left only 
two Argives, and one Spartan, 
Othryades, who were parted by 
night. The Argives ran home to 
report their victory : whereupon 
Othryades spoiled the dead, erected 
a trophy, and slew himself to avoid 
the disgrace of surviving his com- 
panions. The next day the victory 
was claimed by the Argives, as 
having the greater number of sui- 
vivors ; by the Spartans, as having 
erected a trophy. The dispute was 
settled by a battle, in which Sparta 
was victorious : and the Argives 
shaved their heads, and vowed their 
hair should never grow till they 
recovered Cynuria. (Uerod. i. 82). 
Much blood was shed for this 
inconsiderable territoiy : which 
decided which was to be the lead- 
ing power in Peloponnesus. It was 
not till Sparta was master of it, that 
she was able to attack Argos with 
success : sec eh. 28, note.] 





.. * 



exchange for 


war to excuse them" : as once before they had 
done, when, as both sides thought, they had the 
victory : " and that it should not be lawful for one 
part to follow the chace of the other, further than 
to the bounds either of Lacedsemon or Argos." 
And though this seemed to the Lacedaemonians at 
first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards, 
because they desired by all means to have friend- 
ship with the Argives, they agreed unto it, and 
put into writing what they required. Howsoever, 
before the Lacedaemonians w r ould make any full 
conclusion of the same, they willed them to return 
first to Argos, and to make the people acquainted 
with it ; and then, if it were accepted, to return 
at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these 

L. 42. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, 
the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Andromedes and 
Phsedimus and Antimenidas, commissioners for 
receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the 
Boeotians to render them to the Athenians, found 
that Panactum was demolished 1 , and that their 
pretext was this : that there had been anciently 
an oath, by occasion of difference between the 
Athenians and them, that neither part should 
inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. But for 
the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Boeotians 
had, they that were w r ith Andromedes received, 
convoyed, and delivered them unto the Athenians : 
and withal told them of the razing of Panactum, 
alleging it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens 
should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was 

[" By the Bojotiaiis".] 


told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter : y. 
for that they conceived that the Lacedaemonians ' 


had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panac- A.C.ISO. 
turn, which was pulled down and should have been The Athenians 

rendered standing; and because also they 

heard of the private league made with the Boeotians. of 1>anactum > 

10 y and the league 

whereas they had promised to join with the Athen- made with tho 

,,. , , Boeotians. 

ifins m compelling such to accept of the peace as 
had refused it. Withal they weighed whatsoever 
other points the Lacedaemonians had been short 
in, touching the performance of the articles ; and 
thought themselves abused : so that they answered 
the Lacedaemonian ambassadors roughly, and dis- 
missed them. 

43. This difference arising between the Lacedse- The Argues 

T.I * ,1 , At make league with 

monians and the Athenians, it was presently Athens b y means 

wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired ofAlcibittdes - 

to have the peace dissolved. Amongst the rest 

was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, though 

young in years, yet in the dignity of his ances- 

tors honoured as much as any man of what city 

soever 1 . Who was of opinion, that it was better to 

join with the Argives; not only for the matter The cause why 

itself, but also out of stomach labouring to cross ^hio 

the Lacedaemonians : because they had made the ? ie L 

J uinss. 

peace by the means of Nicias and Laches, without 

1 [" A man though yet young (as to the Alcimuonides, and thus Clcis- 

he would be considered in any other theiies, the friend of the democracy, 

city), yet for the dignity of his was among his ancestors. His 

ancestors of great consideration", father Clinias had equipped and 

Both by his father's and mother's manned a galley with 200 men in 

side, he was connected with the the Persian war : he fell at the 

noblest of the Eupatrids. He traced battle of Coroneia (447), leaving 

his paternal Ihie through Eurysaces, Alcibiades, perhaps, seven or eight 

son of Ajax, to ^acus : his mother, years old. and the heir lo one of the 

the daughter of Megaclcs, belonged largest fortunes in Athens. Thirl] 

E 2 


v. him ; whom for his youth they had neglected, and 
* ' % not honoured as for the ancient hospitality between 

YKAR XII. ^ r J ^ 

A.c.420. his house and them had been requisite : which his 
father 1 had indeed renounced, but he himself, by 
good offices done to those prisoners which were 
brought from the island, had a purpose to have 
renewed. But supposing himself on all hands 
disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first ; 
alleging that the Lacedemonians would not be 
constant, and that they had made the peace only 
to get the Argives by that means away from them, 
and afterwards to invade the Athenians again when 
Aieibiades send- they should be destitute of their friends 2 : and also 
^JTtoAtto[ as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent 
to make a league. p regent iy to Argos of himself, willing them with 
all speed to come to Athens, as being thereunto 
invited, and to bring with them the Eleians and 
Mantinearis to enter with the Athenians into a 
league, the opportunity now serving 3 , and promis- 
ing that he would help them all he could. 

44. The Argives having heard the message, and 
knowing 4 that the Athenians had made no league 
with the Boeotians, and that they were at great 
quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, neglected the 
ambassadors they had then in Lacedaemon, whom 
they had sent about the truce, and applied them- 
selves to the Athenians, with this thought : that if 
they should have war, they should by this means 
be backed with a city that had been their ancient 

1 [" His grandfather".] peace". Duker.] 

2 " And that having made peace 3 [" To come with the Mantine- 
with themselves, first to subdue the ans and Eleians and invite the 
Argives and then turn upon the Athenians to an alliance, the oppor- 
Athenians "destitute of help, that tunity" &c.] 

this was their ohject in making 4 [" When they knew".] 


friend, governed like their own by democracy, and v. 
of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they pre- 7 EAR ' x ~ 
sently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a league : A.CUSO. 

Or 89 4 

and together with theirs went also the ambassadors 

of the Eleians and Mantineans. Thither also with 
all speed came the Lacedaemonian ambassadors 
Philocharidas, Leon, and Enclius, persons accounted Atlicns ' to P re - 

J ' * * vent their league 

most gracious with the Athenians ; for fear, lest with the Argives. 
hi their passion they should make a league with 
the Argives, and withal to require the restitution 
of Pylus for Panactum ; and to excuse themselves 
concerning their league with the Boeotians, as not 
made for any harm intended to the Athenians. 

45. Now speaking of these things before the 
council, and how that they were come thither with 
full power to make agreement concerning all con- 
troversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into 
fear : lest, if they should say the same before the 
people, the multitude would be drawn unto their 
side, and so the Argive league fall off. But Al- 
cibiades deviseth against them this plot. He 
persuaded the Lacedaemonians not to confess their 

plenary power before the people : and giveth them 

T^ i iiii i i//* (len y bci ' ore the 

his faith, that then Pylus should be rendered, (for poopietiwt the 

he said he would persuade the Athenians to it as 
much as he now opposed it), and that the rest of 
their differences should be compounded. This he 
did to alienate them from Nicias: and that by 
accusing them before the people as men that had 
no true meaning nor ever spake one and the same 
thing, he might bring on the league with the 
Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans. And it came 
to pass accordingly. For when they came before 
the people, and to the question, whether they had 


full power of concluding, had, contrary to what 
YEAR xn had said in council, answered No, the Athen- 
A.c.420. ians would no longer endure them ; but gave ear 
in- to Alcibiadcs, that exclaimed against the Lacedse- 
moniaris far more now than ever : and were ready 
then presently to have the Argives and those others 
with them brought in, and to make the league : 
but an earthquake happening before anything was 
concluded, the assembly was adjourned. 

46. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though 
the Lacedaemonians had been abused, and he him- 
self also deceived, touching their coming with full 
power to conclude ; yet he persisted to affirm, 
that it was their best course to be friends with the 
Lacedaemonians, and to defer the Argives' business 
till they had sent to the Lacedaemonians again to 
be assured of their intention : saying, that it was 
honour unto themselves, and dishonour to the 
Lacedaemonians to have the war put off. For, for 
themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was 
best to preserve their good fortune as long as they 
might : whereas to the other side, who were in 
evil estate, it should be in place of gain to put 
things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he 

ambassador to j j i 

to persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof him- 

about perfom- self was one : to require the Lacedaemonians, if they 
a"ticiel the meant sincerely, to render Pariactum standing, 
and also Amphipolis ; and if the Boeotians would 
not accept of the peace, then to undo their league 
with them ; according to the article, that the one 
should not make league with any without the con- 
sent of the other. They willed him to say further; 
"that they themselves also, if they had .had the 
will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with 


the Argives, who were present then at Athens for 
the same purpose." And whatsoever they had to 
accuse the Lacedaemonians of besides, they in- 
structed Nicias in it : and sent him and the other 
his fellow-ambassadors away. When they were 
arrived, and had delivered what they had in charge, 
and this last of all ; " that the Athenians would 
make league with the Argives, unless the Lace- 
daemonians would renounce their league with the 
Boeotians, if the Boeotians accepted not the peace" : 
the Lacedaemonians denied to renounce their league 
with the Boeotians ; for Xenares the ephore, and 
the rest of that faction, carried it : but at the 
request of Nicias they renewed their former oath 1 . 
For Nicias was afraid he should return with nothing 
done, and be carped at (as after also it fell out) as 
author of the Lacedaemonian peace. 

At his return, when the Athenians understood 
that nothing was effected at Lacedaemon, they 
grew presently into choler : and apprehending 
injury, (the Argives and their confederates being 
there present, brought in by Alcibiades), they made 
a peace arid a league with them in these words : 

47. " The Athenians and Argives and Manti- T n K ARTICLES 
neans and Eleians, for themselves and for t he FTIIF IRAGUE 
confederates commanded by every of them, have 
made an accord 2 for one hundred years, without 
fraud or damage, both by sea and land. It shall 
not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleians nor Man- 
tineans, nor their confederates, to bear arms against 


1 [That is, they ratified afresh lution of that with the Athenians.] 
the existing treaty : thereby inti- 2 [" A peace". This relates only 

mating that the Boeotian alliance to forbearing to attack each other : 

was not to be considered as a clisso- the alliance follows below.] 


v. the Athenians, or the confederates under the com- 
mand of the Athenians, or 1 their confederates, by 


A.c.420. any fraud or machination whatsoever. 

" And the Athenians, Argives, and 2 Mantineans, 
have ma de league with each other for one hundred 
Athenians and years on these terms : 

the Argives. J 

" If any enemy shall invade the territory of the 
Athenians, then the Argives, Eleians, and Manti- 
neans shall go unto Athens to assist them, accord- 
ing as the Athenians shall send them word to do, 
in the best manner they possibly can. But if the 
enemy after he have spoiled the territory, shall be 
gone bacjc, then their city shall be held as an 
enemy to the Argives, Elcians, Mantineaiis, and 
Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all 
those cities : and it shall not be lawful for any of 
those cities to give over the war, without the con- 
sent of all the rest. 

" And if an enemy shall invade the territory, 
either of the Argives, or of the Eleians, or of the 
Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come unto 
Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, to assist them, in such 
sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in 
the best manner they possibly can. But if the 
enemy after he hath wasted their territory, shall 
be gone back ; then their city shall be held as an 
enemy both to the Athenians, and also to the 
Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and war shall 
be made against it by all those cities ; and it shall 
not be lawful for any of them to give over the war 

1 [" Nor for the Athenians or machination whatsoever".] 

their confederates against the Ar- 2 [" Eleians and Mantineans 

gives or Eleians or Mantineans, or have made a defensive alliance with 

their confederates, bv any fraud or each other" &c.l 


against that city, without the consent of all the v . 

" There shall no armed men be suffered to pass A.c 
through the dominions either of themselves, or of T he a 

any the confederates under their several commands, 

to 1 make war in any place whatsoever, unless by Athenians and 

J J the Argives. 

the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, 
and Mantineia, their passage be allowed. 

" To such as come to assist any of the other 
cities, that city which sendeth them, shall give 
maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive 
in the city that sent for them ; and the like at their 
going away : but if they w ill use the arrny for a 
longer time, then the city that sent for them shall 
find them maintenance, at the rate of three oboles 
of yEgina a day for a man of arms 2 , and of a 
drachma of /Egina for a horseman. 

" The city which sendeth for the aids, shall 
have the leading and command of them, whilst the 
war is in their own territory : but if it shall seem 
good unto these cities to make a war in common, 
then all the cities shall equally participate of the 

" The Athenians shall swear unto the articles, 
both for themselves and for their confederates : 
and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the 
confederates of these, shall every one swear unto 
them city by city. And their oath shall be the 

1 ["Nor by sea, to make war"&e.] were equal to five Athenian oboli ; 

2 [" For a man of arms, a light- that is, to not quite sevenpence 
armed soldier, and an archer ; and English (see i. 96). The Athenian 
of a draehme of JBgina" c. The standard supplanted the ^Eginetan 
JEginetan draehme was equal to from the time of the founding of 
ten Athenian oboli: three ^Eginetan Messene and Megalopolis. See 
oboli, therefore, or half-drachme, Muell. iii. 10.] 




Athenians and 

the Argives. 

greatest that by custom of the several cities is 
KAE xn used, and with most perfect hosts 1 , and in these 
A.c.420. words: I will stand to this league according to 
The articles of the articles thereof 9 justly, innocently, and sin- 
cerely, and not transgress the same by any art or 
ma cJimation whatsoever. 

" This oath shall be taken at Athens by the 
senate and the officers of the commons 2 ; and admi- 
nistered by the Prytanes. At Argos it shall be 
taken by the senate and the council of eighty, and 
by the Artynae ; and administered by the council 
of eighty. At Mantineia it shall be taken by the 
procurators of the people 3 , and by the senate, and 
by the rest of the magistrates ; and administered by 
the theori and by the tribunes of the soldiers. At 
Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the 
people, and by the officers of the treasury 4 , and 
by the council of six hundred ; and administered 

1 ["With victims full-grown": 
not the young of their several kinds : 
hostia majores, and not hostile lac- 
tantes. Am.] 

2 [" The home magistrates" : that 
is, the pry times, archons, secretaries, 
and other high officers, as opposed 
to the strategi. Goell. Of the 
" council", and of " the eighty" of 
Argos we are entirely ignorant. 
The Artynce must be an ancient 
office, and older at least than the 
abolition of the monarchy, that is, 
than the Persian war : for the same 
office existed in their ancient co- 
lony, Epidaurus, whose constitu- 
tion resembled that of Argos only 
in the more ancient period. Its 
origin may have been a division of 

the regal authority into civil and 
military functions. Muell. iii. 8.] 

3 [ot firimovpyoi : magistrates 
not uncommon in Peloponnesus. 
Amongst the Achacans at least, 
their chief duty was to transact 
business with the people : which 
makes it possible that at Argos they 
were identical with the leaders of 
the people. Muell. iii.8.- Thef/ieon 
were a sacred college whose func- 
tions were perpetual, like the col- 
lege of pontifices and augurs at 
Rome. Arn.] 

4 [ol TU rt Xiy t%ovT( c : not simply 
magistrates, but some particular 
body of men exercising sovereign 
authority. Goell. A body like the 
original senate at Ronle. Arn.] 


by the procurators of the people, and by the keepers v. 
of the law. 

" This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians. A.c.42o. 

J . OL.89.4. 

who shall go to Mis, arid to Mantmeia, and to The articles of 

Argos, thirty days before the Olympian games ; 
and by the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, who 
shall come to Athens, ten days before the Panathe- 
nsean holy days 1 . 

" The articles of this league and peace and the 
oath shall be inscribed in a pillar of stone by the 
Athenians in the citadel : by the Argives in their 
market-place within the precincts of the temple of 
Apollo : and by the Mantineans in their market- 
place within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. 
And at the Olympian games now at hand, there 
shall be jointly erected by them all, a brazen pillar 
in Olympia [with the same inscription] . 

" If it shall seem good to any of these cities to 
add anything to these articles ; whatsoever shall 
be determined by them all in common council, the 
same shall stand good." 

48. Thus was the league and the peace con- 
cluded : and that which was made before between 
the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, was not- 
withstanding by neither side renounced. But the The Corinthian* 
Corinthians, although they were the confederates 
of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this 
league : nay, though there were made a league 
before this between [them and] the Argives, 
Eleians, and Mantineans, that where one, there all, 
should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear 

1 [The great Panathenaean holi- piadum, hide ab Hecatombaeonis 
days. " Panbtheiuea Magna quarto die vicessimo octavo celeb rabautur". 
quoque anno, ct tertio quovis Olyin- Goeller.] 



The Olympian 


ians forbidden 
the exercises ; 
and why. 

to it; but said that their league defensive was 
enough, whereby they were bound to defend each 
other, but not to take part one with another in 
invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their 
confederates, and inclined again to the Lacedae- 

49. This summer were celebrated the Olympian 
games ; in which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, was 
the first victor in the exercise called Pancratium' 1 . 
- And the Lacedaemonians were by the Eleians pro- 
hibited the temple there ; so as they might neither 
sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes amongst the 
rest : for that they had not paid the fine set upon 
them, according to an Olympic law, by the Eleians; 
that laid to their charge, that they had put soldiers 
into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum, in the 
time of the Olympic truce 2 . The fine amounted unto 

1 Pancrathim consisted of wrest- 
ling and fighting with fists. 

2 [" According to the Olympic 
law": " That they had home arms 
against the fort of Phyrcon, and put 
their soldiers into Lepreum in the 
time of the Olympic truce". Sparta 
in conjunction with the Eleians and 
^Etolians were the authors of the 
icX a P ttt or Peloponnesian armis- 
tice. The same 6\vp,7naKal (nrovcai 
put a stop to warfare for a sufficient 
period, to enable the spectators to 
go and return from the festival in 
safety : and during this period the 
territory of El is was of course re- 
garded as inviolable, and no armed 
force could traverse it without in- 
curring the penalties of sacrilege. 
The Eleians sent round to the dif- 
ferent states the 0irovdo(l>6poi t truce- 
bearers, of Jupiter : who proclaimed 

the armistice, first to their own 
countrymen, and then to the other 
Peloponnesian states : after which 
no army could invade another's ter- 
ritory. The fine here imposed is the 
same as that required at this time 
for the ransom of prisoners of war : 
whence it is evident that the trans- 
gressors of the truce were consi- 
dered as becoming slaves of the 
god, and required to he ransomed 
fiom him. The fine was divided 
between the Eleians and the temple 
of Olympia. By these and similar 
laws was the armistice protected, 
which was intended not merely to 
secure the celebration of the games 
from disturbance, but to effect a 
peaceable meeting of the Pelopon- 
nesians, and give occasion to the 
settling of disputes ancf conclusion 
of alliances. Apollo, the Doric god, 


two thousand minse, which was two minse for every v. 
man of arms, according to the law. But the Lace- ' YEAR XI 7 

daemonians, by their ambassadors which they sent A.c.t2o. 

i . i i t i i i i .1 Oi - 90 - L 

thither, made answ r er, that they had been unjustly contention b 

condemned ; alleging that the truce was not pub- 

lished in Lacedaemon when their soldiers were * :lei * m belore , 

the Grecians at 

sent out. To this the Eleians said again, that the oiympia, about 

a mulct set IIJMMI 

truce was already begun amongst themselves ; who the Lacodajmon. 
used to publish it first in their own dominion : and ^*^ breaking 
thereupon, whilst they lay still and expected no {^ c " lyinpic 
such matter, as in time of truce, the Lacedaemon- 
ians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedae- 
monians hereunto replied, that it was not necessary 
to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lace- 
daemon at all, if they thought themselves wronged 
already : but rather, if they thought themselves 
not wronged yet, then to do it by way of preven- 
tion, that they should not arm against them after- 
wards 1 . The Eleians stood stiffly in their first 
argument, that they would never be persuaded but 
injury had been done them : but were nevertheless 
contented, if they would render Lepreum, both to 
remit their own part of the money, and also to pay 
that part for them which was due unto the god. 

50. When this would not be agreed unto, they 
then required this : not that they should render 

was at this time regarded as the time of their celebration to be regu- 

proteetor of the sacred armistice, lated by the Pythian cycle of eight 

Thirl, ch. x : Muell. i. 7. It does years.] 

not however appear, that the non- ! [" But considering at the time 

payment of the fine moved either that they (the Lacedamioniuns) had 

the Eleians or the Delphians to done them no wrong, they (the Elei- 

claim the Lacedaemonians as slaves ans) afterwards announced to them 

of the god.. The important influ- the truce : and after that, they (the 

ence of the Delphic oracle on these Lacedaemonians) nowhere boreanns 

games is said to have occasioned the against them". Goell.] 




Lepreum, unless they would ; but that then they 
should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, 
seeing they desired to have free use of the temple, 
and there before the Grecians to take an oath to 
pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the 
Lacedaemonians refused that also, they were ex- 
cluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games ; 
and sacrificed at home : but the rest of the Grecians, 
except the Lepreates, were all admitted to be spec- 
tators. Nevertheless, the Eleians fearing lest they 
would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a 
guard there of their youngest men in arms : to 
whom were added Argives and Mantineans,, of 
either city one thousand, and certain Athenian 
horsemen, who were then at Argos waiting the 
celebration of the feast. For a great fear pos- 
sessed all the assembly, lest the Lacedaemonians 
Lace- should come upon them with an army : and the 
rather, because Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a 
Olympic race. Lacedsemoiiiari, had been whipped by the Serjeants 
upon the race : for that when his chariot had 
gotten the prize, after proclamation made that the 
chariot of the Boeotian state had won it, (because 
he himself was not admitted to run 1 ), he came 

1 [The Lacedemonians being 
excluded from the games, Lichas 
had entered his chariot in the name 
of the Boeotian people instead of 
his own. Reappears again here- 
after in viii. 43, 84. From the fre- 
quency with which he introduces 
the subject, Thucydides seems to 
have duly appreciated, what he did 
not live to know by experience, the 
value of the Spartan professions of 
" making a war for the liberty of 

Greece". Nothing- was so much 
coveted hy the Spartans as an ex- 
cuse for giving effect to their lead- 
ing maxim of dividing, in order to 
render powerless, the Pcloponnesian 
states : and this unwise provocation 
was not forgotten when the Spartans 
found their hands free from the 
occupation of this war. Tiiree years 
had not elapsed from that time, 
when Elis was required by the 
" deliverers of Greece" to acknow- 



forth into the race and crowned his charioteer, to 
make it known that the chariot was his own. This 
added much unto their fear, and they verily ex- 
pected some accident to follow. Nevertheless the 
Lacedaemonians stirred not : and the feast passed 

After the Olympian games, the Argives and their 
confederates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians 
into their league. And the Lacedaemonian am- 
bassadors chanced to be there also : and after much 
conference, and nothing concluded, upon occasion 
of an earthquake they brake off the confer enee, and 

ledge the independence of her sub- 
ject towns : and on her refusal, the 
allies of Sparta were summoned to 
invade and lavagc her territory. 
The Arcadians and Achaians in 
particular were attracted by the 
scent of the rich booty : and the 
campaign is said to have spread 
abundance over the rest of Pelo- 
ponnesus. In the end her walls 
were demolished, her subject towns 
made independent, and she herself 
reduced to the state of a dependent 
ally of Sparta. The next was a 
more decided step. The peace of 
Antalcidas, the main feature in 
which was the guarantee of the in- 
dependence of all the Greek states, 
had received the assent of Sparta in 
the expectation that the oligarchy 
would be found powerful enough to 
get the upper hand in all the Pelo- 
ponnesian states. But finding that 
she had miscalculated, in direct 
violation of that treaty she called on 
Manteneia (385) to throw down her 
walls: in otter words, to place 
herself at the mercy of Sparta. The 

refusal to obey was followed by the 
demolition of the city, and the dis- 
tribution of the inhabitants amongst 
the five hamlets out of which it was 
originally formed. Phlius, by a 
timely compliance, saved herself 
from a similar fate. After these 
acts, which were discountenanced 
by both her allies, Coiinth and 
Thebes, it will excite no surprise to 
see Sparta seize and occupy, in 
time of peace, the Cadmeia of 
Thebes. All this, however, might 
have been pardonable, and as the 
first necessary step towards the 
establishment of a government of 
Peloponnesus, even justifiable, had 
the Spartans at the same time 
shown any signs of a capacity for 
effecting that object. But the ex- 
ample of Heracleia (see ch. 52, and 
iii. 93) and the countenance given 
by her to all the worst acts of the 
30 tyrants in Athens, aie amongst 
the manifold proofs that the govern- 
ment of others was a business with 
which the Spartans had very little 







The twelfth 




returned every one to his own city. And so this 
summer ended. 

51. The next winter, the men of Heracleia in 
Trachinia fought a battle against the jEnianians, 
Dolopians, Melians, and certain Thessalians. For 
the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as 
built to the prejudice only of them ; and both 
opposed the same from the time it was first founded, 
annoying it what they could ; and also in this 
battle overcame them, and slew Xenares a Lace- 
daemonian, their commander, with some others, 
Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the 
twelfth year of this war. 

52. In the very beginning of the next summer, 
the Boeotians took Heracleia, miserably afflicted 1 , 
into their own hands, and put Hegesippidas, a 
Lacedaemonian, out of it for his evil government. 
They took it, because they feared, lest whilst the 
Lacedaemonians were troubled about Peloponnesus, 
it should have been taken in by the Athenians. 
Nevertheless the Lacedeemonians were offended 
with them for doing it. The same summer Alei- 
biades the son of Clinias, being general of the 
Athenians, by the practice 2 of the Argives and 
their confederates, went into Peloponnesus, and 
having with him a few men at arms and archers of 
Athens, and some of the confederates which he 
took up there, as he passed through the country 
with his army, both ordered such affairs by the 
way concerning the league as was fit ; and coming 
to the Patreans, persuaded them to bnild their 

1 [" Grievously infested after the Lacedemonian".] 
late battle"." Hegesippidas t}w 3 [" With the co-operation".] 


walls down to the sea-side, and purposed to raise 
another wall himself towards Rhium in Achaia, 
But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others 
as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and 
hindered him. 

53. The same summer fell out a war between 
the Epidaurians and the Argives ; the pretext 
thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the 
Epidaurians ought to have sent in consideration of 
their pastures to Apollo Pythius, and had not done 
it : the Argives being the principal owners of the 
temple 1 . But Alcibiades aad the Argives had 
indeed determined to take in the city, though 
without pretence at all ; both that the Corinthians 
might not stir, and also that they might bring the 
Athenian succours from ^Egina into those parts, a 
nearer way than by compassing the promontory of 
Scyllseum. And therefore the Argives prepared, 
as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by invasion. 

54. About the same time also the Lacedaemon- 
ians, with their whole forces, came forth as far as 

1 [Epidaurus, Troczen, ^Eginu, common to all the surrounding 

and other towns, received their district, though belonging more 

share of Doric inhabitants either particularly to the Argives. The 

mediately or immediately from Ar- Dryopians, in their character of 

gos : hut she having lost her power Craugallida? (see iv. 54, note) had 

over the towns of Argolis, certain erected temples to the same god at 

obligations on the part of those Asine in acknowledgment of a 

cities towards Argos belonging to similar dependence : of which one 

early times, became at a later pe- only was spared by the Argives, 

riod mere forms. Such was the when they destroyed that town, 

obligation of the Epidaurians to Mucll. i. 5. Which of the above 

send sacrifices to the temple of two temples is meant by Thucy- 

Apollo Pytha^us : a temple erected dides, is disputed : Arnold under- 

on the ascent to the Larissa of Ar- stands that at Argos, Valcknaer and 

gos, probably goon after the Dorian others that at Asine. Of the word 

invasion, to the national deity who /3ora/itW, " in consideration of their 

had led them into the country, and pastures", no explanation is gi\ en.] 




Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory to- 
wards Lycseum, under the conduct of Agis, the son 
of Archidamus, their king. No man knew against 
what place they intended the war; no not the 
cities themselves, out of which they were levied 1 . 
But when in the sacrifices which they made for 
their passage the tokens observed w r ere unlucky, 
they went home again ; and sent word about to 
their confederates, (being now the month Car- 
neius), to prepare themselves after the next feast of 
the new moon, (kept by the Dorians), to be again 
upon their march. The Argives, who set forth the 
twenty-sixth day of the month before Carneius, 
though they celebrated the same day, yet all the 
time they continued invading and wasting Epi- 
dauria 2 . And the Epidaurians called in their con- 

1 [This is an exception to the ge- 
neral ruleof the Peloponnesian con- 
federacy, that the object for which 
the allies were summoned, should 
he publicly declared: a rule of 
some moment for the independence 
of the less important members. 
Another example of the same ex- 
ception is seen in the invasion of 
Attica by Cleomenes : Herod. v,74.] 

2 [" And sent word about to their 
allies, to be prepared to inarch after 
the next month, which was the 
month Carneius and a festival with 
the Dorians. Upon their retreat, 
the Argives setting out on the 
fourth day before the end of the 
month next to the month Carneius, 
and marching the whole of that day, 
crossed the frontiers of the Epidau- 
rians and began wasting their ter- 
ritory". Bekk. Arn. " And march- 
ing that day, invaded the Epidau- 

rian territory and wasted it the 
whole time (till the Carneian holi- 
days)". Goell. The Hyacinthia 
and Carneia were festivals in con- 
secutive months in honour of Apollo 
of Amycla) : the latter a warlike 
festival, lasting nine days, during 
which nine tents were pitched near 
the city, in each of which lived nine 
men in the manner of a military 
camp. Muell. ii. 8. It was unlaw- 
ful for the Dorians to bear arms 
during this festival : and the Spar- 
tans made it their excuse for leav- 
ing the Athenians, when they 
applied to them for aid, to fight the 
battle of Marathon single-handed: 
see Herod, vi. 106, 120. Arnold 
supports his reading, by supposing 
that the cia/forfjpta, the passage of 
the frontiers, was the only object of 
the Argives : that, thaC effected, they 
might ravage the territory unmo- 


federates to help them : whereof some excused 
themselves upon the quality of the month ; and 
others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and 
there stayed. 

55. Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the AC no. 
ambassadors of divers cities, solicited by the Arnt ( ^; s ^ 
Athenians, met together at Mantineia, where in a mt about peace, 

,,..,,, but cannot agree. 

conference amongst them Euphamidas of Corinth 
said : " that their actions agreed not with their 
words ; forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there 
to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians with their 
confederates and the Argives stood armed, in the 
meantime, against each other in order of battle : 
that it was therefore fit, that somebody should go 
first unto the armies from either side ! , and dissolve 
them ; and then come again and dispute of peace". 
This advice being approved, they departed, and 
withdrew the Argives from Epidauria. And meet- 
ing afterwards again in the same place, they could 
not for all that agree : and the Argives again 
invaded and wasted Epidauria. 

The Lacedaemonians also drew forth their army 
against Caryse : but then again their sacrifice for 
passage being not to their mind, they returned. 
And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the 
third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They 
had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of 
Athens, and Alcibiades their commander : but 
these hearing that the Lacedaemonians were in the 
field 2 , and seeing now there was no longer need of The end or the 
them, departed. And so ended this summer. 


tested, whilst the allies of the Epi- l [" That some one from either 
daurians were prevented by the side should go" Sec.] 
festival from crossing the frontiers 2 [Uw/oriJ<r0ai:" had ended their 
to help them.] expedition" : Haack. Popp. Bred. 

F 2 




56. The next winter the Lacedaemonians, un- 
known to the Athenians, put three hundred garrison 
A.c.419.8. soldiers under the command of Agesippidas into 
The Argives ac- Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives 


came an( * expostulated with the Athenians, that 
coast to be of the w hereas it was written in the articles of the league, 

dominion of ^ 7 

that no enemy should be suffered to pass through 
either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the 
Lacedaemonians to pass by sea : and said they had 
wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the 
Messenians and Helotes into Pylus against the 
Lacedaemonians. Hereupon the Athenians, at the 
persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote upon the Laconian 
pillar 1 , [under the inscription of the peace], that 
the Lacedaemonians had violated their oath : and 
they drew the Helotes out of Cranii, and put them 
again into Pylus, to infest the territory with driving 
off booties ; but did no more. 

All this winter, though there was war between 
the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set 
battle : but only ambushes and skirmishes, wherein 
were slain on both sides such as it chanced. But 
in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, 
the Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as 
destitute of men by reason of the war 2 , thinking to 


Am. : the same word being used in 
the first part of the sentence in the 
sense of " drew forth their army". 
Goeller, by an alteration of the text 
and punctuation, makes the sense 
as follows: "The Athenians &c., 
hearing that the Lacedaemonians 
were in the field, came to help with 
a thousand men &c. : and when 
they were no longer wanted, went 
1 Which was erected for the 

articles of the peace to be written 
in. [The writing upon this pillar 
that the Lacedaemonians had vio- 
lated their oaths, was a step short 
of declaring the treaty to be at an 
end : which would have been done 
by destroying the pillar. Arn.] 

2 [That is, expecting that the 
Epidaurians would \>e abroad, de- 
fending their territory against the 
plundering warfare of the Argives. 


have won it by assault : but returned again with 
their labour lost. And so ended this winter ; and 
the thirteenth year of this war. 

57. In the middle of the next summer, the La- YEAB 
cedaemonians seeing that the Epidaurians their A - c - 418 
confederates were tired, arid that of the rest of the Preparation of 
cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted, ^ 

and others were but in evil terms ; and apprehend- Argos 
ing that if they 1 prevented it not, the mischief 
would spread still further : put themselves into the 
field with all their own forces, both of themselves 
and their Helotes, to make war against Argos, 
under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, 
their king. The Tegeats went also with them, and 
of the rest of Arcadia all that were in the Lace- 
daemonian league. But the rest of their confede- 
rates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were 
to meet 2 together at Phlius : that is to say, of the 
Boeotians five thousand men of arms and as many 
light-armed, five hundred horse, and to every 
horseman another man on foot 3 , [which holding 
the horse's mane ran by with equal speed] : of 
Corinthians two thousand men of arms, and of 
the rest more or less as they were : but the Phlia- 
sians, because the army was assembled in their 
own territory, put forth their whole power. 

58. The Argives, having had notice both for- 
merly 4 of the preparation of the Lacedaemonians, 
and afterward of their marching on to join with 

1 [" If they quickly" c.] armed men,who sometimes mounted 

2 [" Were met together".] behind, sometimes vaulted off ra- 

3 [** Five hundred horsemen, and pidly, and were thus doubly for- 
as many hamippi". The Boeotian midable. Muell. iii. 12.] 
cavalry were accompanied by light- 4 [" Both at first".] 


A. c. 418. 


v. the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise 
into the field. They had with them the aids of the 

. J 

A. c. 418. Mantineans and their confederates, and three 
thousand men of arms of the Eleians : and marching 
forward, met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium, 
a town of Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. 
And the Argives prepared to give battle to the 
Lacedaemonians, whilst they were single. But 
Agis, dislodging his army by night, marched on 
tQ p hlius tQ the Ye ^ of the con f e d e rates, unseen. 

go Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the 
morning retired first to Argos, and afterwards to 
t h e forest of Ncmea 1 9 by which they thought the 
Lacedaemonians and their confederates would fall in. 
- But Agis came not the way which they expected : 
Store but with the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epi- 
Argos * daurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, 

took another more difficult way to pass, and came 
down into the Argive plains. The Corinthians 
also, and Pellenians and Phliasians, marched an- 
other troublesome way 2 . [Only] the Boeotians, 
Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to 
come down by the w ay of the forest of Nemea 3 , in 
which the Argives were encamped ; to the end 
that if the Argives should turn head against the 
Lacedaemonians, these might set upon them at the 
back with their horse. Thus ordered, Agis entered 
into the plains, and spoiled Saminthus and some 
other towns thereabouts. 59. Which when the 
Argives understood, they came out of the forest 4 

1 [" To the road through Nemea: * [" By another by-road over the 

by which they thought the Laceda> mountains". MuelL] 

monians &c. would full in (to the 3 [" By the road Co Nemea".] 

plain of Argos)",] 4 [" Out of NeuW.J 


somewhat after break of day to oppose them ; and 
lighting among the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew 
some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of 
their own by the Corinthians, though not many. 
The Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, marched 
forward 1 towards Nemea, and found that the Argives 
were departed : for when they came down and saw 
their country wasted, they put themselves into 
order of battle. And the Lacedaemonians on the The Argm* 
other side did the same ; and the Argives stood ^1^ 
intercepted in the middest of their enemies. For I? 08 a . nd the 

* Boeotians: 

in the plain between them and the city, stood the and t 
Lacedaemonians and those with them; above them, 
were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians ; 
and towards Nemea, were the Boeotians, Sicyon- cit r- 
ians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had 
none : for the Athenians alone of all their confe- 
derates were not yet come. 

Now the generality of the army of the Argives 
and their confederates did not think the danger 
present so great as indeed it was ; but rather that 
the advantage in the battle would be their own : 
and that the Lacedaemonians were intercepted, not 
only in the Argives' territory, but also hard by the 
city. But two men of Argos, Thrasyllus, one of Propositions or 
the five commanders of the army, and Alciphron, l^riJitolLi 
entertainer 2 of the Lacedaemonians, when the ofArgos: 
armies were even ready to join, went unto Agis, 
and dealt with him to have the battle put off: 
forasmuch as the Argives were content and ready 
both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators, 
in whatsoever the Lacedaemonians should charge 

1 [" As they had been ordered".] 3 [*p<5l- tvoc : see iii. 70, note.] 


them withal ; and in the meantime to have peace 
solemnly confirmed. 

oi. ob?? 60 ' ^is t ^ iese ^ r * ves sa *d of themselves, with- 
accepted bv out the command of the generality. And Agis, of 
himself likewise, accepting their proposition with- 
out deliberation Jiad with the major part, and 
having communicated it only to some one or more 
of those that had charge in the army 1 , made truce 
with them for four months ; in which space they 
were to perform the things agreed upon betwixt 
withdraw- them: and then presently he withdrew his army 
without giving account to any of the rest of the 
league why he did so. The Lacedaemonians and 
the confederates followed Agis, according to the 
law 2 , as being their general ; but among them- 
selves taxed him exceedingly : for that having a 
very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being 
inclosed on all sides both by their horse and foot, 
he yet went his way doing nothing worthy the 
great preparation they had made. For this was, 
in very truth, the fairest army that ever the Gre- 
cians had in the field unto this day. But it was 
most to be seen, when they were all together in the 
forest of Nemea 3 : where the Lacedaemonians were 

1 [The escort of the king was authority to dispatch and assemble 

called by the name of damosia, and armies, and to lead and encamp the 

consisted of his tent-comrades : to army according to his own judg- 

which belonged the Polemarchs, the ment. Any person who dared to 

Pythians, the three 'opotoi and the resist him, was outlawed : and he 

two ephors who attended the king had power of life and death, and 

on all expeditions. Muell. iii. 12.] could execute without trial. Muell. 

3 [As soon as the king had as- iii. 6.] 

sumed the command of the army, 3 [And it was best seen whilst it 

and had crossed the boundaries, he was yet all together in Nemea". It 

became, by ancient custom, general is probable that the Lacedaemonians 

with unlimited command. He had and their allies on their return took 


with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, 
Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, 
Phliasians, arid Megareans ; and these all chosen 
men of their several cities, and such as were 
thought a match, not only for the league of the 
Argives, but for such another added to it. The 
army thus 1 offended with Agis, departed; and were 
dissolved every man to his home. 
* The Argives were much more offended with 
those of their city, which without the consent of the 
multitude had made the truce: they also supposing, 
that the Lacedaemonians had escaped their hands 
in such an advantage as they never had the like 
before ; in that the battle was to have been fought 
under the city walls, and with the assistance of 
many and good confederates. And in their return 
they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum ; 
the place where the soldiers, before they enter into 
the city from warfare, use to have their military 
causes heard 2 . But he flying to the altar saved him- 
self : nevertheless they confiscated his goods. 

61. After this, the Athenians coming in with the The Athenians 
aid of one thousand men of arms and three hun- A 
dred horse under the conduct of Laches andNicos- Oietruce - 
tratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this 
to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians) willed 
them to be gone again : and when they desired to 

the road through Nemea to Phlius, entering the city, to have their 

being the easiest route : they could causes (avb orpart/ae) that have 

not otherwise have been all together arisen out of the campaign heard", 

at Nemea. Schol.] Goeli. The military courts were 

1 [" Thus the army, offended held without the city : because 
with Agis, retreated" &c. Bekker.] within the walls, the ordinary law 

2 ["In the bed of theCharadrus: would have resumed its authority 
the place the soldiers use, before and its usual forms, Am.] 



The Argives 
break the truce, 
and besiege 


The Argires go 
next against 

treat, would not present them to the people till 
such time as the Mantineaiis and Eleians, who were 
not yet gone, forced them unto it by their impor- 
tunity. Then the Athenians, in the presence of 
Alcibiades that was ambassador there, spake unto 
the Argives and their confederates ; saying te that 
the truce was unduly made without the assent of 
the rest of their confederates, and that now (for 
they were come time enough) they ought to fall 
again to the war" : and did by their words so pre- 
1 vail with the confederates, that they all, save the 
Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus of 
Arcadia. And these, though satisfied, stayed be- 
hind at first 1 , but afterwards they also went; and 
sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly 2 besieged 
and assaulted the same ; desiring to take it in as 
well for other causes, as chiefly for that the hostages 
which the Arcadians had given to the Lacedae- 
monians were there in custody. The Orchomenians, 
fearing the weakness of their walls, and the great- 
ness of the army, and lest they should perish before 
any relief could arrive, yielded up the town on 
conditions : " to be received into the league, give 
hostages for themselves, and to surrender the 
hostages held there by the Lacedaemonians into the 
hands of the Mantineans". 62. The confederates 
after this, having gotten Orchomenus, sat in council 
about what town they should proceed against next. 
The Eleians gave advice to go against Lepreum : 
but the Mantineans against Tegea 3 . And the 

1 ["And these prevailed with principal towns of Arcadia, were 
also, yet staid" &c. Goell.] connected by their position, the 

2 [" They alt" : all the allies.] former with Sparta, the latter with 

3 [Tegea and Mantineia, the two Argos, which supplied occasion for 


Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with 
the Mantineans. But the Eleians, taking it in evil 
part that they did not decree to go against Lepreum, 
went home. But the rest prepared themselves at 
Mantineia to go against Tegea, which also some E^ 
within had a purpose to put into their hands. they go home. 

63. The Lacedaemonians, after their return from TheLaced*. 
Argos W 7 ith their four months' truce, severely ques- ^efr^n^r 
tioned Agis, for that upon so fair an opportunity as ffing the 
they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the unibughten. 
state: for so many and so good confederates AA T ould 
hardly be gotten together again at one time. But 
when also the news came of the taking of Orcho- 
menus, then was their indignation much greater : 
and they presently resolved, contrary to their own 
custom, in their passion, to raze his house, and fine 
him in the sum of ten thousand drachrnes ] . But he 
besought them that they would do neither of these 
things yet : and promised that, leading out the 
army again, he would by some valiant action cancel 
those accusations ; or, if riot, they might proceed 
afterwards to do with him whatsoever they thought 
good. So they forbore both the fine and the razing 
of his house : but made a decree for that present, 
such as had never been before : that ten Spartans 
should be elected and joined with him as coun- 
cillors, without whom it should not be lawful for 
him to lead the army into the field 2 . 

interminable feuds between them: * [flo /Ltvpiacrt : a hundred thou- 

arul these feuds were heightened by sand drachma;: that is, if these were, 

the circumstance that the contigu- as supposed by Mueller, ^Eginetan 

ous plains, which formed the main drachmae, about 5,729/. 3s. 4dL: the 

part of their territories, were liable to ^Eginetan drachme being about 

be much damaged by the waters from thirteen -pence three-farthings. See 

their mountains, which might easily ch. 47 and i. 96, note.] 

be turned toward either side. Thirl.] 2 [" They made a deeiee at that 



field to rescue 


64. In the meantime came news from their side 
inTegea; that, unless they came presently with aid, 
the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and their 

- confederates ; and that they wanted little of being 
re volted already. Upon this, the Lacedaemonians 
w ith speed levied all their forces, both of them- 


selves and their Helotes, in such number as they 
had never done before, and marched unto Ores- 
teium in Msenalia : and appointed the Arcadians, 
such as were of their league, to assemble and follow 
them at the heels to Tegea. The Lacedaemonians 
being come entire to Oresteium, from thence sent 
back the sixth part of their army, in which they 
put both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the 
custody of the city ; and with the rest marched on to 
Tegea : and not long after arrived also their confe- 
derates of Arcadia. They also sent to Corinth, and 
to the Boeotians, Phoceans, and Locrians, to come 
with their aids with all speed to Mantineia. But 
these had too short a warning ; nor was it easy for 
them, unless they came all together and stayed for 
one another, to come through the enemy's country, 
which lay between and barred them of passage. 
Nevertheless, they made what haste they could. 
And the Lacedaemonians, taking with them their 
Arcadian confederates present, entered into the 
territory of Mantineia ; and pitching their camp by 
the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about. 

65. The Argives and their confederates, as soon 
as they came in sight, seized on a certain place 

present, such &c. ; for they elected 
ten Spartans to be of his council, 
without whose" &c. Mueller (iii. 
6) considers the law not to have 
been passed for that campaign only, 
We have already seen instances in 

which the Spartan general has been 
put under the restraint of a council: 
as the case of Alcidas, iii. 69, 76, 
79. But in those cases the council 
had not an equal voice with the 


fortified by nature and of hard access, and put 
themselves into battle array. And the Lacedae- 
monians marched presently towards them ; and 
came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then 
one of the ancient men of the army cried out unto 
Agis, (seeing him to go on 1 against a place of that 
strength), that he went about to amend one fault 
with another : signifying, that he intended to make 
amends for his former retreat from Argos, which 
he was questioned for, with his now unseasonable 
forwardness. But he, whether it w r ere upon that 
increpation, or some other sudden apprehension 
of his own 2 , presently withdrew his army before 
the fight began ; and marching unto the territory 
of Tegea, turned the course of the water into the 
territory of Mantineia 3 : touching which water, 
because into what part soever it had his course it 

1 [*' Seeing that they were march- almost all the streams being 1 , at 
ing against" &c.] some part of their course, swallowed 

2 [Some apprehension of his own up, and reappearing at a greater 
"different from his original plan".] or less interval. This plain is so 

3 [The plain of Mantineia is a complete a level, that in some parts 
high table-land, considerably above there is not slope enough to carry 
the level of the valleys on the coast off the mountain torrents: and it 
of Peloponnesus, although sur- would be flooded, but for trenches 
rounded by high mountains with made to carry the waters towards 
respect to which it is itself a low one or other of the katavothra pro- 
plain. It is so complete a basin, vided by nature for their discharge, 
that the streams which flow into it Thus the waters about Mantineia 
from the mountains have no outlet were, anciently, carried oft* by the 
but through the mountains them- katavothra at the southern extre- 
selves : the limestone of the country mity of the plain, in the territory of 
abounds in caverns, and the streams, Tegea. But Agis, here, turns them 
sinking into these, appear again at in the opposite direction, towards 
a considerable distance in the val- Mantineia : where the katavothra 
leys at a lower level near the coast, were smaller, and the drainage 
These swallows, katavothra, are ex- consequently would be less easily 
ceedingly numerous in Arcadia: effected. Arnold.] 


did much harm to the country, the Mantineans 
and Tegeans were at wars. Now his drift was, by 
the turning of that water to provoke those Argives 
and their confederates which kept the hill, when 
they should hear of it, to come down and oppose 
them ; that so they might fight with them in the 
plain. And by that time he had stayed about the 
water a day, he had diverted the stream. The 
Argives and their confederates were at first amazed 
at this their sudden retreat from so near them : 
and knew not what to make of it. But when 
after the retreat they returned no more in sight, 
and that they themselves, lying still on the place, 
did not pursue them : then began they anew to 
accuse their commanders, both for suffering the 
Lacedaemonians to depart formerly, when they had 
them inclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos ; 
and now again, for not pursuing them when they 
ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, 
The Argives and betraying the army. The commanders for the 
come down from gent were much troubled hereat : but after- 

their advantage * 

to seek the wards they drew down the army from the hill, and 

enemy. . . 

coming forth into the plain, encamped as to go 
against the enemy. 66. The next day, the Argives 
and their confederates put themselves into such 
order as, if occasion served 1 , they meant to fight 
in : and the Lacedaemonians returning from the 
water to the temple of Hercules, the same place 
where they had formerly encamped, perceived the 
enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard 
by them, come down already from the hill. Cer- 
tainly the Lacedaemonians were more affrighted 

1 [" If they should light upon him".] 


at this time, than ever they had been to their 
remembrance before. For the time they had to 


prepare themselves, was exceedingly short : and 
such was their diligence that every man fell imme- 
diately into his own rank 1 , Agis the king command- 
ing all according to the law. For whilst the king 
hath the army in the field, all things are com- 
manded by him : and he signifieth what is to be 
done to the polemarchi, they to the lochagi, these 
to the pentecontateres, and these again to the 
enomotarchi ; who lastly make it known, every 
one to his own enomotia. In this manner, when 
they would have anything to be done, their com- 
mands pass through the army, and are quickly 
executed. For almost all the Lacedaemonian army, 
save a very few, are captains of captains 2 : and the 
care of what is to be put in execution lieth upon 

67- Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritee 3 , 
which amongst the Lacedaemonians have ever alone 
that place. Next to these were placed the Bra- 
sideian soldiers lately come out of Thrace, and 
with them those that had been newly made free 4 . 

1 [" And straightway they fell of also perhaps Arcadian. In marches 

themselves rapidly into their ranks''.] they formed the advanced guard: 

* [" Are commanders of com- in camp they occupied the extreme 

manders". An allusion to the end- place, and in battle the left wing, 

less gradations of rank in the Lace- Al though we have no express state- 

daemonian army : whereby almost ment of their mode of arming, they 

every Spartan was in some respect can hardly have been heavy-armed 

a commander.] troops : since they were particularly 

8 [Originally the Sciritse were no employed when a rapid change of 

doubt, as they were called, inhabit- position, or a vigorous attack, such 

ants of the district Sciritis, on the as storming heights, was required, 

confines of ]yaconia, towards Par- They were often at the post of 

rhasia ; their rights and duties ap- greatest danger. They were GOO 

pear to have been defined by agree- in this war. Muell. iii. 12.] 
ment; their mode of fighting was 4 [Veo&z/iu&ig : seech. 34, note.] 


v. After them in order the rest of the Lacedsemon- 
YBAB xiv" * ans > b an d after band; and by them Arcadians, 
A.c.418. first the Heraeans, after these the Maenalians. In 

OL 90 8 

the right wing were the Tegeats, and a few Lace- 
daemonians in the point of the same wing. And 
upon the outside of either wing, the horsemen. So 
The order of ihe stood the Lacedaemonians. Opposite to them, in 
tke right wing stood the Mantineans ; because it 
was upon their own territory ; and with them such 
Arcadians as were of their league. Then the 
thousand chosen Argives 1 , which the city had for 
a long time caused to be trained for the wars at 
the public charge : and next to them the rest of the 
Argives. After these, the Cleonaeans and Orneates, 
their confederates. And lastly, the Athenians, 
with the horsemen (which were also theirs) had the 
left wing. 68. This was the order and preparation 
of both the armies. The army of the Lacedaemon- 
ians appeared to be the greater. But what the 
number was, either of the particulars of either side 
or in general, I could not exactly write. For the 
number of the Lacedaemonians, agreeable to the 
secrecy of that state, was unknown ; and of the 

1 [From the time that the Dorian after the upper hand in Argos, 

Argives took in and made citizens which could not he without the dis- 

of the perioDci of the surrounding appearance of the Dorian character: 

towns, for replenishing their own as was seen in the diminution of 

numbers (see ch. 28, note), com- their military skill. For this reason 

mences an entirely^-new era in the the Argives were reduced to form a 

constitution of Argos. The newly- standing army of a thousand citi- 

adopted citizens appear to have zens of noble extraction, under the 

obtained the full rights of the old : command of generals possessing 

and the change in her constitution great civil power. This body soon 

was no less, than if the whole body endeavoured to set up an oligarchy: 

of the Achaean periceci in Laconia but the democracy proved to be the 

had declared themselves the sove- preponderating power. Mueller, 

reign power. Democracy had ever iii. 4. See Hermann, 33, 38.] 



other side, for the ostentation usual with all men 
touching the number of themselves, was unbelieved. 
Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedaemonians 
may be attained by computing thus. Besides the 
Sciritae, which were six hundred, there fought in 
all seven regiments, in every regiment were four 
companies, in each company were four enomotiae 1 , 
and of every enomotia there stood in front four : 
but they were not ranged all alike in file, but 
as the captains of bands thought it necessary ; 
but the army in general was so ordered, as to be 
eight men in depth. And the first rank of the 
whole, besides the Sciritay, consisted of four hun- 
dred and forty-eight soldiers. 

1 [" In all seven loehi; in each 
lochos four pentecostyes ; in each 
penteeostys four enomotia; 1 '. The 
ivwpoTta \\as, as the word shows, a 
number of men bound by a com- 
mon oath : they stood in the deep 
phalanx one behind the other, the 
euomotarch at the head of the whole 
file. But here the enomotia ap- 
pears to have had four files of eight 
men each : that is, 32 men in all. 
The seven loehi therefore contained 
358 1 hoplites. To these adding the 
300 picked men about the king, the 
400 cavalry, and the old men in 
reserve by the baggage, perhaps 
500, the whole amount would be 
4784. A sixth part of the army 
having been sent back (eh. 04), the 
entire army must have been 5740 
men: representing the number of 
hoplites, which after all her losses 
in the field Spaita herself could at 
this time furnish. Fifty years later, 
at the battle o*f Leuetra, 700 Spar- 
tans were all she could bring into 


the field (see iv. 126, note). It was 
to her hoplites, armed \\ith long 
spear, short s\\ord, and a huge 
shield hanging from the neck by a 
thong and reaching down to the 
knee, that her attention was almost 
exclusively de\oted. It was this 
manner of arming that the Aeha?ans 
found themselves unable to cope 
with, when the Dorians invaded 
Peloponnesus : and to this the Spar- 
tans owed their victory over the 
naked Persians at Plataea, who, as 
Herodotus says (ix. (>2), were not 
behind the Spartans in either cour- 
age or strength, but without armour 
or military skill could make no im- 
pression on the Spartan phalanx. 
But Iphicrates, the Athenian, dis- 
covered the \\ay, by doubling the 
length of the spear and sword, and 
greatly diminishing the size of the 
shield, of rendering the pfltasta 
(tavgetiers) formidable even to the 
Spartan hoplites : as they found out 
at the battle of Leuctra/J 



v. 69. Now when they were ready to join, the 

YEA* XIT commanders made their hortatives, every one to 

A.c.418. those that were under his own command. To 

The hortative to the Man tineans it was said, "that they were to 

% ht for their territory, and concerning their 
rates. liberty and servitude ; that the former l might not 

be taken from them, and that they might not 
again taste of the latter." The Argives were admo- 
nished, " that whereas anciently they had the lead- 
ing of Peloponnesus -, and in it an equal share, they 
should not now suffer themselves to be deprived 
of it for ever ; and that withal, they should now 
revenge the many injuries of a city, their neigh- 
bour and enemy." To the Athenians, it was 
remembered, " how honourable a thing it would 
be for them, in company of so many and good 
confederates, to be inferior to none of them ; and 
that if they had once vanquished the Lacedaemon- 
ians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would 
become both the more assured, and the larger by 
it ; and that no other would invade their territory 
hereafter." Thus much was said to the Argives 
and their confederates. But the Lacedaemonians 
encouraged one another, both of themselves, and 
also by the manner of their discipline in the wars 3 ; 

1 [" And for their dominion or leading (fiyfpovia). Goellcr.] 

servitude: that the one, after tasting s \jiird r&v iro\ip.iicuv vopuv'. 

of it, might not he taken" &c. See " with war-songs". The /wan took 

ch. 28.] its name from that of Apollo : he 

3 [The r,ytpovia refers to the was first called Tratqwv (healer), then 

time of the Pelopidae : and the Do- the hymn, and lastly the singers. 

rians here appropriate to themselves It was originally a song sung after 

the greatness of the Achaians of any deliverance : as after a plague, 

Mycenae. Arn. " And at one time or victory. And txfyioc was the 

an equal share of it" : that is, an strain or musical part of the song. 

equal share with the Spartans of the Muell. ii. 6, 6.] 


taking encouragement, being valiant men, by the 
commemoration of what they already knew ; as 
being well acquainted, that a long actual experi- 
ence conferred more to their safety than any short 
verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered. 
70. After this followed the battle. The Argives The %ht. 
and their confederates marched to the charge with 
great violence and fury. But the Lacedaemonians 
slowly and with many flutes, according to their 
military discipline ; not as a point of religion, but 
that, marching evenly and by measure, their ranks 
might not be distracted ; as the greatest 1 armies, 
when they march in the face of the enemy, use 
to be. 

71. Whilst they w r ere yet inarching up, Agis the 
king thought of this course. All armies do thus. 
In the conflict they extend their right wing, so as 
it conieth in upon the flank of the left wing of the 
enemy : and this happeneth, for that every one, 
through fear, seeketh all he can to cover his un- 
armed side with the shield of him that standeth 
next to him on his right hand ; conceiving, that to 
be so locked together is their best defence. The 
beginning hereof, is in the leader of the first file 
on the right hand : who ever striving to shift his 
unarmed side from the enemy, the rest upon like 
fear follow after. And at this time, the Mantineans 
in the right wing had far encompassed the SciriUe: 
and the Lacedaemonians on the other side, and the 
Tegeats, were come in yet further upon the flank 
of the Athenians, by as much as they had the 
greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his 

1 [As " large" armies &c.] 

G 2 


left wing should be encompassed, and supposing 
the Mantineans to be come in far, signified unto 
the Sciritae and Brasideians to draw out part of 
their bands, and therewith to equalise their left 
wing to the right wing of the Mantineans ! ; and 
into the void space, he commanded to come up 
Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two colonels 2 , with 
their bands out of the right wing, and to fall in 
there and make up the breach : conceiving that 
more than enough would still be remaining in 
their right wing, and that the left wing opposed 
to the Mantineans would be the stronger. 72. But 
it happened, (for he commanded it in the very 
onset and on the sudden), both that Aristocles and 
Hipponoidas refused to go to the place com- 
manded ; (for which they were afterwards banished 
Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cow- 
ardice) ; and that the enemy had iu the meantime 
also charged : and when those which he com- 
manded to go to the place of the Sciritae went not, 
they could no more reunite themselves nor close 
again the empty space 3 . But the Lacedaemonians, 

ians have the di- . * 1^.1 11^1 + * *t * 

or though they had the worst at this time in every 

P oiut for ^ill, Y ct iu valour they manifestly showed 
themselves superior. For after the fight was once 
begun, notwithstanding that the right wing of the 
Mantineans did put to flight the Sciritae arid Brasi- 
deians, and that the Mantineans together with 

1 [" To make a flank movement 2 [" Two poleinarcha, with their 

from themselves" (the Laceda>mon- lochi out of &c.] 

ians, the centre of the army) " until 3 [" And when upon the lochi 

they extended as far as the Man- not moving forward, he ordered the 

tineans". The Scirite and Man- Sciritaj to join them (the Lacedco- 

tineans were the left and right wing monians), they too were no longer 

of each army.] able to effect the junction*'.] 


their confederates and those thousand chosen men 
of Argos, falling upon them in flank by the breach 
not yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedaemon- 
ians, and put to flight and chased them to their 
carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left 
there for a guard ; so as in this part the Lacedae- 
monians were overcome : yet with the rest of the 
army, and especially the middle battle where Agis 
was himself, and those which are called the three 
hundred horsemen^ about him, they charged upon 
the eldest of the Argives, and upon those which 
are named the Jive cohorts 2 , and upon the Cleon- 
seans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged 
amongst them ; and put them all to flight : in such T 
sort as many of them never struck stroke, but as " 
soon as the Lacedaemonians charged gave ground 
presently ; and some for fear to be overtaken 3 were 
trodden under foot. 

73. As soon as the army of the Argives and their 
confederates had in this part given ground, they 
began also to break on either side. The right 
wing of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeats had now 
with their surplusage of number hemmed the 
Athenians in, so as they had the danger on all 
hands ; being within the circle, pent up, and with- 
out it, already vanquished 4 . And they had been 

1 [In reality, hoplites: scciv.38,n.] now broken off on both sides; and 

* [tt may be supposed that, like at the same time the right wing of 

Sparta, Argos contained five quar- the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates 

ters, each of which had its own with their superior numbers sur- 

lochos: but no information about rounded the Athenians; and danger 

these fi?e lochi is attainable. Arn.] beset them on both sides, in the one 

8 [" And some, not quick enough part being surrounded, and in the 

to escape being overtaken".] other already beaten". Compare 

4 " As soon as Ace. they were the battle in iv. 96. Goell.] 


the most distressed part of all the army, had not 
their horsemen come in to help them. Withal it 
fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing 
of his ow r n army to labour, namely, that which 
was opposed to the Mantirieans and to those thou- 
sand Argives, commanded the whole army to go 
and relieve the part overcome. By which means 
the Athenians and such of the Argives as, together 
with them, were overlaid, whilst the army passed 
by and declined them, saved themselves at leisure. 
And the Mantineans with their confederates, and 
those chosen Argives, had no more mind now of 
pressing upon their enemies : but seeing their side 
was overcome and the Lacedaemonians approaching 
them, presently turned their backs. Of the Man- 
tineans the greatest part 1 were slain ; but of those 
chosen Argives, the most were saved ; by reason 
the flight and going off was neither hasty nor long. 
For the Lacedaemonians fight long and constantly, 
till they have made the enemy to turn his back : 
but that done, they follow him not far. 

74. Thus, or near thus, went the battle ; the 
greatest that had been of a long time between 
Grecians and Grecians ; and of two the most 
famous cities. The Lacedaemonians laying toge- 
ther the arms of their slain enemies, presently 
erected a trophy, and rifled their dead bodies 2 . 
Their own dead they took up, and carried them 

1 [" Many were slain" " The during the battle, was forbidden to 
flight however and going off" &c. the Spartans: and the consecration 
Besides not making long pursuits, to the gods of the spoils of the slain 
the Lacedaemonians were also for- enemies, as well as all rejoicings for 
bidden to spoil the slain during the victory, were considered as ill- 
battle ; for a very obvious reason.] omened. With the retreat ceased 

2 [The spoiling of arms, at least all hostilities. Muell. iii. 1 2.] 



to Tegea, where they were also buried : and deli- 
vered to the enemy theirs under truce. Of the 

J m . 

Arrives, and Orneates, and Cleonseans were slain A.c.4is. 

Oi 90 3 

seven hundred : of the Mantineaus, two hundred : Number of the 
and of the Athenians with the ^Eginetse, likewise dead ' 
two hundred, arid both the captains. The confe- 
derates of the Lacedaemonians were never pressed, 
and therefore their loss was not worth mentioning: 
arid of the Lacedaemonians themselves, it is hard 
to know the certainty ; but it is said, there were 
slain three hundred. 

75. When it was certain they would fight 1 , Pleis- 
toanax the other king of the Lacedsemonians, and 
with him both old and young, came out of the city 
to have aided the army : and came forth as far as 
Tegea, but being advertised of the victory they 
returned. And the Lacedaemonians sent out to 
turn back also those confederates of theirs, which 
were coming to them from Corinth and from with- 
out the isthmus. And then they also went home 
themselves ; and having dismissed their confede- 
rates, (for now were the Carneian holidays), cele- 
brated that feast. Thus in this one battle they Thci.accd.Tn 

iaus recover th<-ir 

wiped oif their disgrace witli the Grecians : for ian '"*.' vel 

* O reputation. 

they had been taxed both with cowardice for the 
blow they received in the island, and with impru- 
dence and slackness on other occasions. But after 
this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, 
and for their minds they were esteemed to have 
been 2 ever the same they had been. 

1 [" When the battle was about occasioned by the dissension be- 
taking place". It was against the tween Deuiaretus and Cleomenes. 
law thatbothldngs should be with Herod, v. 75.] 
the army at the same time : a law 2 [" To be still the same".] 


The day before this battle it chanced also that 
the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded 

* * 

the territory of Argos, as being emptied much 
of men : and whilst the Argives were abroad, 
S?of Argot" killed many of those that were left behind to 
The Athenians defend it 1 . Also three thousand men of Elis and 
a thousand Athenians, besides those which had 
been sent before, being come after the battle to 
aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epi- 
daurus ; and lay before it all the while the Lace- 
daemonians were celebrating the Carneian holidays : 
and assigning to every one his part, began to take 
in the city with a wall. But the rest gave over : 
only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification, 
(which was their task), wherein stood the temple 
of Juno 2 . In it amongst them all they left a gar- 
rison ; and went home every one to his own city. 
And so this summer ended. 
Peace concluded 76. In the beginning of the winter following, 
the Lacedsemonians, presently after the end of the 
Carneian holidays, drew out their army into the 
field : and being come to Tegea, sent certain pro- 
positions of agreement before to Argos. There 

1 [ 4t And of the Argives left lie- worship of the Samian Juno, as well 
hind to defend it and that came as that at Sparta, Epidaurus, and 
out to meet them, slew many".] JEgina, being supposed, from the 

2 [Neither Jupiter nor Juno were resemblance of the ceremonies, to he 
genuine Dorian gods, but were derived from Argos. The native tra- 
amongst those borrowed by them ditions concerning lo are only fabu- 
froin other nations. The whole of lous expressions for the ideas and 
Argolis and Corinth were from early feelings excited by this religion: 
times under the protection of Juno, and the Corinthian fables of Medea, 
originally a Pelasgian goddess : and whose worship with that of Juno the 
Argos was the original seat of her Corinthians introduced at Corcyra, 
worship, which thence received its refer to the indigenous worship of 
peculiar form and character; the Juno Acrsea. Mueller, iv, 10.} 


were, before this time, many citizens in Argos well 
affected to the Lacedaemonians, and that desired 
the deposing of the Argive people : and now after 
the battle they were better able by much to per- 
suade the people to composition than they formerly 
were. And their design was, first, to get a peace 
made with the Lacedaemonians, and after that a 
league ; and then at last to set upon the commons. 
'There went thither Lichas the son of Archesilaus, 
entertainer 1 of the Argives in Lacedaemon, and 
brought to Argos two propositions : one of war, if 
the war were to proceed ; another of peace, if they 
were to have peace 2 . And after much contradic- 
tion, (for Alcibiades was also there), the Lacedae- 
monian faction, that boldly now discovered them- 
selves, prevailed with the Argives to accept the 
proposition of peace ; which was this. 

77- " It seemeth good to the council 3 of the TE ARTICLES. 
Lacedaemonians to accord with the Argives on these 
articles : 

" The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchome- 
nians their children, and unto the Maenalians their 
men, and unto the Lacedaemonians those men that 
are at Mantineia 4 : they shall withdraw their sol- 
diers 5 from Epidaurus, and raze the fortification 

" And if the Athenians depart not from Epi- 
daurus [likewise], they shall be held as enemies 

see iii. 70, note.] peace, if they would have peace". 

2 ["And brought two proposi- Goeller.] 

lions: one, of the terms on which 3 ["Totheassembly":seei.87,n.] 
the war should proceed, if they 4 [See ch. 61.] 
would have 'war: another of the 5 [That is, the Athenians and 

terms on which there should be the allies : see ch. 75. Goeller.] 




.. ..,, 




The Articles. 

both to the Argives and to the Lacedaemonians, and 
also to the confederates of them both. 

" If the Lacedaemonians have any men 1 of theirs 
in custody, they shall deliver them every one to 
his own city. 

" And for so much as concerneth the god, the 
Argives shall accept composition with the Epi- 
daurians, upon an oath which they shall swear, 
touching that controversy ; and the Argives shall 
give the form of that oath 2 . 

" All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and 
great, shall be free according to their patrial laws. 

" If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into 
it to do it harm, the Argives shall come forth to 
defend the same, in such sort as in a common 
council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought 
reasonable 3 . 

" The confederates of the Lacedaemonians with- 
out Peloponnesus, shall have the same conditions 
which the confederates of the Argives and of the 
Lacedaemonians have ; every one holding his own. 

" This composition is to hold from the time, that 
they shall both parts have showed the same to 
their confederates, and obtained their consent 4 . 

1 [Traida : any child.'] 

2 [" And for so much as con- 
cerneth the offering to the god &c. 
the Spartans to require an oath of 
the Epidaurians, and to administer 
it to them accordingly". This is 
Goeller's suggestion. Arnold con- 
siders the passage as corrupt: hut 
that the general sense of it is, that 
the matter of the heast for sacrifice 
alleged by the Argives to he due to 
the temple of Apollo Pythreus from 
the Epidaurians (seech. 53), should 

l>e decided hy the oath of the Epi- 
daurians, whether they believed it 
to be due or not. As to the custom 
amongst the ancients of purging 
themselves by their oath, besides the 
examples cited by Arnold there is 
one in Homer, Iliad ty. 580.] 

3 [This clause is aimed at the 
Athenians, as the preceding one at 
the Mantineans and Eleians.] 

4 [" And having shown these to 
their confederates, let them make 
composition if they will". Goeller.] 



" And if it shall seem good to either part to add 
or alter anything, their confederates shall be sent 
unto, and made acquainted there with 1 ." 

78. These propositions the Argives accepted at 
first ; and the army of the Lacedsemonians returned 
from Tegea to their own city. But shortly after, 
when they had commerce together, the same men 
went further ; and so wrought, that the Argives 
renouncing their league with the Mantineans, 
Eleians, and Athenians, made league and alliance 
with the Lacedaemonians in this form. 

79. " It seemeth good to the Lacedaemonians THE LEAGUE 
and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty 

years on these articles : 

" That either side shall allow unto the other 
equal and like trials of judgment, after the form 
used in their cities. 

" That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus 
(this league and alliance comprehending also them) 
shall be free both from the laws and payments of 
any other city than their own ; holding what they 
have, and affording equal and like trials of judg- 
ment according to the form used in their several 
cities 2 . 

" That every of the cities confederate with the 
Lacedaemonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in 

1 [" And if any thing else shall 2 [" Let the other cities in Pelo- 

seem good to the allies, let them ponnesus be partakers of the treaty 

send it home (to the Spartans and and alliance, retaining their own 

Argives)". Goell. See the same laws and institutions and their own 

precaution, eh. 41. The purport of territory, giving equal and like 

this ohscure passage seems to he, trials of judgments (fcarrri Trarpia) 

that the treaty was to be communi- according to the customs of their 

cated to the allies of each, but not ancestors". Bekker&c.: Koivavtov- 

to depend on their sanction. Thirl.] TMV. Vulgo, xotvav 


the same condition with the Lacedaemonians : and 
confederates of the Argives, in the same with 
ever y one holding his own. 

The league " That if at any time there shall need an expe- 

Argives and dition to be taken in common, the Lacedsemonians 

Lacedemonian ail( j the Argives shall consult thereof, and decree 

as shall stand most with equity towards the confe- 

derates. And that if any controversy arise between 

any of the cities, either within or without Pelo- 

ponnesus, about limits or other matter, they also 

shall decide it. 

" That if any confederate city be at contention 
with another, it shall have recourse to that city 
which they both shall think most indifferent : but 
the particular men of any one city shall be judged 
according to the law of the same." 

80. Thus was the peace and league concluded : 

and whatsover one had taken from the other in 

the war, or whatsoever one had against another 

The Argives and otherwise, was all acquitted. Now 1 ; when they 

mate^onier 8 were together settling their business, they ordered 

Ltshaifqur that the Ar g iv es should neither admit herald nor 

the fort. ambassage from the Athenians till they were gone 

out of Peloponnesus, and had quit the fortifica- 

tion : nor should make peace or war with any 

They solicit the without consent of the rest. And amongst other 

towns upon . . 1-1 i T -i i -i ? 

Thrace to revolt things which they did in this heat, they sent 

from the Athen- am b a ssadors from both their cities to the towns 

lying upon Thrace and unto Perdiccas : whom they 

also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. 

Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, 

1 [" And now managing their receive no herald or embassy from 
affairs in common, they voted to the Athenians, till" &c.] 


but intended it : because he saw the Argives had 

done so ; and was himself also anciently descended 

out of Argos 1 . They likewise renewed their old oath A c 4ia 

with the Chalcidearis ; and took another besides it. 

The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, Demosthenes 

requiring them to abandon the fortification 2 they ^dftto^ 

had made against Epidaurus. And the Athenians ^ from the 

r fort, dehvereth. 

considering that the soldiers they had in it were the same by a 
fefw in respect to the many others that were with EpWaunans. 
them in the same, sent Demosthenes to fetch them 
away. He, when he was come, and had exhibited 
for a pretence a certain exercise of naked men 
without the fort, when the rest of the garrison 
were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates : and 
afterwards having renewed the league with the 
Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the 
fort into their hands. 

81. After the revolt of the Argives from the A cun. 

Of 90 3 

league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood The Man 
it at first, yet being too weak without the Argives, [e 
made their peace with the Lacedaemonians; and 
laid down their command over the other cities 3 . 

1 [He was eighth in descent from aristocratical party would thereby 
Temenus of Argos, the founder of become predominant in Pelopon- 
the family of the Temenidse, the nesus, was her object in the peace 
kings of Macedonia.] of Antalcidas (387). As to Arcadia 

2 [See ch. 75.] in particular, nothing was so much 

3 Which they had the leading of to be dreaded by her as its becom- 
in Arcadia. [That is, over the Par- ing united, and thereby independent 
ihasians and others: see ch. 33, 67. and powerful : as it would thereby 
A leading maxim of Spartan policy, lie in its power at any time to cut 
not less perseveringly followed up her off from all intercourse with the 
than the subversion of the tyrants, north of Greece. This it was that 
was to keep Peloponnesus divided suggested to the Thebans the found- 
amongst the greatest possible num- ing of Megalopolis : a plan exe- 
ber of independent states : this, in cuted by Epaminondas after the 
the mistaken expectation that the battle of Leuctra, and followed a 







Sicyon and 
Argos reduced 
to oligarchies. 


The Dictideans 
revolt from 
Athens: Achaia 
oligarchizod : 
Argos relapseth 
into a democracy 

And the Lacedaemonians and Argives with a thou- 
sand men of either city having joined their arms, 
the Lacedaemonians first, with their single power, 
reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller 
number; and then they both together dissolved 
the democracy at Argos. And the oligarchy was 
established conformable to the state of Lacedsemon. 

These things passed in the end of winter, and 
near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth 
year of this war. 

82. The next summer the Dictideans 1 seated in 
Mount Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the 

And the Lacedaemonians ordered the state of 
Achaia after their own form, which before was 
otherwise. But the Argives, after they had by 
little and little assembled themselves and recovered 
heart, taking the time when the Lacedaemonians 
were celebrating their exercises of the naked yout/i\ 
assaulted the few ; and in a battle fought within 
the city, the commons had the victory ; and some 
they slew, others they drave into exile. The Lace- 
daemonians, though those of their faction in Argos 
sent for them, went not a long time after : yet at 
last they adjourned the exercises, and came forth 
with intention of giving them aid. But hearing by 
the way at Tegea, that the few were overcome, 
they could not be entreated by such as had escaped 

year or two later by the still more 
deadly blow to Sparta, the founding 
of Messene.] 

1 [TheDians. Seech. 35,] 
3 [The Gymnopaedia, a festival in 
which large choruses of naked men 
and boys appeared, said to owe its 

institution to the famous battle of 
the 300 (see ch. 41, note): of which 
Mueller observes (i. 7. 16.), that the 
story is the more fabulous, for being 
celebrated in sacred songs at the 
Gymnopaedia. The story was not 
yet a century and a half old.] 


thence, to go on : but returning, went on with the 

celebration of their exercises. But afterwards, 

when there came ambassadors unto them, both 

from the Argives 1 in the city, and from them that 

were driven out, there being present also their 

confederates, and much alleged on either side : 

they concluded at last, that those in the city had 

done the wrong, and decreed to go against Argos 

with their army ; but many delays passed, arid 

much time was spent between. In the meantime The Argives 

the common people of Argos, fearing the Lacedae- tiTi^iTof 

monians, and regaining the league with Athens, as Athens ami with 

' ~ o o y long \\allstukem 

conceiving the same would turn to their very great ;y from th^r 

advantage, raise long walls from their city down 

to the sea-shore : to the end, that if they were shut 

up by land, they might yet with the help of the 

Athenians bring things necessary into the city by 

sea. And with this their building, some other cities 

of Peloponnesus were also acquainted 2 . And the 

Argives universally, themselves and wives and 

servants, wrought at the wall : and had workmen 

and hewers of stone from Athens 8 . So this sum- The end of the 

fifteenth summer 

mer ended. 

83. The next winter the Lacedaemonians, under- Th 

-i . i // A i an arm y come 

standing that they were fortifying, came to Argos to Argos, ana 
with their army, they and their confederates allS^ 
but the Corinthians : and some practice they had buildin s- 
beside within the city itself of Argos. The army 

1 [" Both from those of the La- 3 [" Were privy to this their 

cedaBrnonian faction in the city, and building".] 

from the Argives who had been 3 [The Peloponnesian population 

driven out". Goell. Hobbes has being agricultural, and knowing 

followed Portus in turning tJyylXon/ little of these handicrafts, were less 

into 'Apyf MUJ/, and leaving out the skilful than the Athenian workmen, 

latter word after ical r&v $%w.] Arnold.] 


was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, 
king of the Lacedaemonians. But those things 
which were practising in Argos and supposed to 
have been already mature, did not then succeed. 
Nevertheless they took the walls that were then 
in building, and razed them to the ground : and 
They take Hy. then, after they had taken Hysiae, a town in the 
Argela toWD m Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, 
they went home, and were dissolved every one "to 
The Argives his own city. After this, the Argives went with 
an army into Phliasia: which when they had 
wasted, they went back. They did it, because the 
men of Phlius had received their outlaws : for there 
the greatest part of them dwelt. 

The Athenians The same winter the Athenians shut up Per- 
^ mdbwhtoi diccas in Macedonia [from the use of the sea] ': ob- 
the use of the j ec ti n g ? th a t h e had sworn the league of the Argives 
and Lacedaemonians ; and that when they had pre- 
pared an army, under the command of Nicias the 
son of Niceratus, to go against theChalcideans upon 
Thrace and against Amphipolis, he had broken the 
league made betwixt them and him, and by his 
departure 2 was the principal cause of the dissolu- 
tion of that army ; and was therefore an enemy. 
And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year 
of this war. 

YEAR xvi. 84, The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos 
with twenty galleys ; and took thence the suspected 
Argives, and such as seemed to savour of the Lace- 
daemonian faction, to the number of three hundred ; 

1 [This is according to the trans- which is corrupt. Haack also p re- 
lation of Portus : considered by poses to read kv p.aKtdovig,,'} 
Goeller to be correct as to the sense, 2 [That is, from his undertaking : 
though departing from the text, " by his tergiversation". Goll.] 


A.C 410.' 


and put them into the nearest of the islands subject v . 
to the Athenian state. 

The Athenians made war also against the isle of A.C 410.' 
Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, 
and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own, 
twelve hundredmen of arms, three hundred archers, 
and twenty archers on horseback : and of their 
confederates and islanders, about fifteen hundred 
men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the 
Lacedaemonians 1 , and therefore refused to be 
subject, as the rest of the islands were, unto the 
Athenians ; but rested at the first neutral ; and 
afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it by 
wasting of their land, they entered into open war. 

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes the 
son of Lycomedes, andTisias the son of Tisimachus, 
being encamped upon their land with these forces, 
before they would hurt the same sent ambassadors 
to deal with them first by way of conference. 
These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring 
before the multitude ; but commanded them to 
deliver their message before the magistrates and 
the few : and they accordingly said as followeth : 

85. Athenians. " Since we may not speak to the 
multitude, for fear lest when they hear our persua- 
sive and unanswerable arguments all at once in a 


1 [Herod, viii. 48. The Minyans, the third generation revolted against 

the posterity of the Argonauts set- the Dorians, migrated in coiise- 

tled at Lemnos, were driven thence quence from Laconia to Crete, ac- 

by the Pelasgians, whom the Boeo- companied hy some Spartans. In 

tians had forced to take shelter in their passage they left a portion of 

Attica, whence they were for some their body in Melos ; which dated 

cause again compelled to seek a its unfortunate connexion with 

fresh home. Jhese Minyans, ac- Sparta from this epoch. Thirl, ch. 7. 

cording to Herodotus (iv. 148), took For the date of its foundation, see 

refuge in Laconia : and having in chap. 112.] 


YEAR xv 


v. continued oration, they should chance to be 
seduced ; (for we know that this is the scope of your 
Bringing us to audience before the few) ; make 
Dialogue be* surer yet that point, you that sit here: answer 1 

tween the Athen- i . .. i . . . i 

. yu a * s o to every particular, not in a set speech, 
but presently interrupting us, whensoever anything 
shall be said by us which shall seem unto you to be 
otherwise. And first answer us, whether you like 
this motion or not ?" 

86. Whereunto the council of the Melians an- 
swered : " The equity of a leisurely debate is riot to 
be found fault withal ; but this preparation of war, 
not future but already here present, seemeth not 
to agree with the same. For we see that you are 
come to be judges of the conference : and that the 
issue of it, if we be superior in argument 2 and there- 
fore yield not, is likely to bring us war ; and if we 
yield, servitude." 

87. Ath. "Nay, if you be come together to reckon 
up suspicions of what may be, or to any other pur- 
pose than to take advice upon what is present and 
before your eyes, how to save your city from de- 
struction, let us give over. But if this be the point, 
let us speak to it." 

88. Mel. " It is reason, and pardonable for men 
in our cases, to turn both their words and thoughts 
upon divers things. Howsoever, this consultation 
being held only upon the point of our safety, we 
are content, if you think good, to go on with the 
course you have propounded." 

89. Ath. " As we therefore will not, for our 

f. : " decide", or, " form superior in the argument in point 
yonr opinion upon every &c".] of right and justice, and therefore 
2 [" If, as is likely, we shall he yield nat, will bring" &c.l 


parts, with fair pretences ; as, that having defeated v. 
the Medes, our reign is therefore lawful, or, that ' YEAB xvi ^ 
we come against you for injury done ; make a long - c ^J 1 J- 
discourse without being believed: so would we Dialogue be.' 

i i , , , *i i tween the <Ulien- 

have you also not expect to prevail by saying, ia 
either that you therefore took not our parts because 
you were a colony of the Lacedaemonians, or that 
you have done us no injury. But out of those 
things which we both of us do really think, let us 
go through with that which is feasible ; both you 
and we knowing, that inhuman disputation justice 
is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal l ; 
whereas they that have odds of power exact as 
much as they can, and the weak yield to such 
conditions as they can get." 

90. Mel. " Well then, (seeing you put the point 
of profit in the place of justice), we hold it profit- 
able for ourselves, not to overthrow a general 
profit to all men, which is this : that men in danger, 
if they plead reason and equity, nay, though some- 
what without the strict compass of justice, yet it 
ought ever to do them good 2 . And the same most 
of all concern eth you : forasmuch as you shall else 

1 [" But agreeably to what we ourselves), not to trample on that 
both of us really think, (to the real which is for the good of all men, 
sentiments of both), we would have but as mortals, ever in danger of 
you think of getting what you can, stumbling, to place justice in mo- 
(not what you may have a right to): deration, which has before now con- 
both of us knowing, that in human vinced many a one, that he has been 
disputation justice is then only a gainer by remaining somewhat 
considered, when strength is equal ; within his strict right". G61. u To 
whereas" fcc. Arn. Goell.] place justice in moderation, and to 

2 [" We then consider it at any any one that can satisfy his hearers 
rate profitable to you, (for to that, with somewhat within the limits of 
you having tfcus placed for discus- strict justice, to let him have the 
sion the point of profit in the place benefit of it". Arn. Bekker &c., 
of that of justice, must we address Ivr^g: vulgo, /crog.] 

H 2 


give an example unto others of the greatest revenge 
can be taken, if you chance to miscarry." 

9l * ^^' " ^ s ^ or us > though our dominion 
Dialogue be. should cease, yet we fear not the sequel. For not 
they that command, as do the Lacedaemonians, are 
cruel to those that are vanquished by them ; (yet 
we have nothing to do now with the Lacedaemon- 
ians) ; but such as having been in subjection, have 
assaulted those that commanded them and gotten 
the victory 1 . But let the danger of that be to our- 
selves. In the meantime we tell you this : that we 
are here now both to enlarge 2 our own dominion, 
and also to confer about the saving of your city. 
For we would have dominion over you without 
oppressing you, and preserve you to the profit of 
us both/' 

92. Mel. " But how can it be profitable for us 
to serve ; though it be so for you to command ?" 

93. Ath. " Because you by obeying, shall save 
yourselves from extremity ; and we not destroying 
you, shall reap profit by you." 

94. Mel. " But will you not accept, that we 
remain quiet and be your friends, (whereas before 
we were your enemies), and take part with 
neither ?" 

95. Ath. "No. For your enmity doth not so 
much hurt us, as your friendship will be an argu- 

1 [" But we have not now to do bably was a witness of the politic 
with the Lacedaemonians, but to see moderation of the Lacedaemonians, 
whether the subject is to set upon which at the end of the war saved 
and get the better of those that once Athens from the doom awarded to 
commanded him". Bekker, &c. her by Corinth and Thebes: see 
Goeller agrees with Hobbes. With ch. 50, note, and iii. 68, note.] 
respect to the sentiment " we fear 2 [" To advantage our own do- 
not the sequel" ; Thucydides pro- minion".] 


ment of our weakness, and your hatred of our v. 
power, amongst those we have rule over." - ' * 


96. Mel. "Why? Do your subjects measure A.c.4ie. 
equity so, as to put those that never had to do Dialogue {' 
with you, and themselves, who for the most part j* 
have been your own colonies, and some of them 
after revolt conquered, into one and the same 
consideration ?" 

97- Ath. "Why not? For they think they 
have reason on their side, both the one sort and 
the other ; and that such as are subdued, are sub- 
dued by force, arid such as are forborne, are so 
through our fear l . So that by subduing you, be- 
sides the extending of our dominion over so many 
more subjects, we shall assure it the more over 
those we had before ; especially being masters of 
the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you 
can get the victory) than others whom we have 
subdued already 2 ." 

98. Mel. " Do you think then, that there is no 
assurance in that which we propounded 3 ? For 
here again, (since driving us from the plea of equity 
you persuade us to submit to your profit), when 
we have shewed you what is good for us, we must 
endeavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it 
shall be good for you also. As many therefore as 
now are neutral, what do you but make them your 

1 [" And that they remain free grammatical construction of the 
by their own strength, and that we words is by Arnold pronounced to 
through fear do not meddle with be desperate.] 

them."] 3 [ u But do you not think there 

2 [" Unless you that are islanders, is security in it?" That is, in not 
and weaker than the rest, shall get trying; to subdue those from whom 
the better of tne masters of the sea", you have no right to claim obe- 
This is apparently the sense, but the dience. SchoL] 


v. enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings, 
AB xTif ^ey lk tk at hereafter you will also turn your 
A.c.416. arms upon them ? And what is this, but to make 

OL.90.4. . 

Dialogue be- greater the enemies you have already, and to make 
others your enemies, each against their wills, that 
would not else have been so ?" 

99. Ath. " We do not think that they shall be 
ever the more our enemies, who inhabiting any- 
where in the continent, will be long ere they so 
much as keep guard upon their liberty against us. 
But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders 
offended with the necessity of subjection which 
they are already in : these may indeed, by unad- 
vised courses, put both themselves and us into 
apparent danger." 

100. Mel. " If you then to retain your command, 
and your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo 
the utmost of danger : would it not in us 1 , that be 
already free, be great baseness and cowardice, if 
we should not encounter anything whatsoever 
rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into 
bondage ?" 

101. Ath. " No ; if you advise rightly. For you 
have not in hand a match of valour upon equal 
terms, wherein to forfeit your honour ; but rather 
a consultation upon your safety, that you resist not 
such as be so far your overmatches." 

102. Mel. " But we know that, in matter of war, 
the event is sometimes otherwise 2 than according 
to the difference of number in sides : and that if 
we yield presently, all our hope is lost ; whereas 

1 [" Assaredly then, if you &c., 2 [" Is sometimes more uncer- 
it would be in us" &c:] tain or unexpected". Goell.] 


if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep our- v. 
selves up." ' ' 


103. Ath. " Hope, the comfort of danger, when A.c4ie. 
such use it as have to spare,, though it hurt them, Dialogue be- 
yet it destroys them not. But to such as set their 

rest 1 upon it, (for it is a thing by nature prodigal), 
it at once by failing maketh itself known ; and 
known, leaveth no place for future caution 2 . Which 
let not be your own case, you that are but weak, 
and have no more but this one stake. Nor be 
you like unto many men : who though they may 
presently save themselves by human means, will 
yet, when upon pressure of the enemy their most 
apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to 
blind ones ; as divination) oracles, and other such 
things which with hopes destroy men." 

104. Mel. " We think it, you well know, a hard 
matter for us to combat your power and fortune, 
unless we might do it on equal terms. Neverthe- 
less we believe that, for fortune, we shall be nothing 
inferior ; as having the gods on our side, because 
we stand innocent against men unjust : and for 
power, what is wanting in us will be supplied by 
our league with the. Lacedaemonians, who are of 
necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for 
consanguinity's sake and for their own honour, 
to defend us. So that we are confident, not alto- 
gether so much without reason as you think." 

105. Ath. "As for the favour of the gods, we 
expect to have it as well as you : for we neither 

1 [That is, their all.] and whilst one knowing it might be 

a [" But w\th those that are raak- on his guard against it, it still does 

ing a cast for their all, (for &c.), not desert them". That is, they 

though it be known for treacherous, next put hope in chance. Goell.] 


v. do, nor require anything contrary to what man- 
IBAII xvT kind hath decreed, either concerning the worship 
A.c.416. O f the gods, or concerning themselves. For of 
' the gods we think according to the common 
opinion ; and of men, that for certain by necessity 
of nature they will every where reign over such 
as they be too strong for 1 . Neither did we make 
this law, nor are we the first that use it made : but 
as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for 
ever, so also we use it : knowing that you likewise, 
and others that should have the same power which 
we have, would do the same. So that forasmuch 
as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in 
reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the 
opinion you have of the Lacedaemonians, in that 
you believe they will help you for their own 
honour: we bless your innocent minds, but affect 
not your folly. For the Lacedaemonians, though 
in respect of themselves arid the constitutions of 
their own country they are wont for the most 
part to be generous ; yet in respect of others, 
though much might be alleged, yet the shortest 
way one might say it all thus : that most appa- 
rently of all men, they hold for honourable that 
which pleaseth, and for just that which profiteth. 
And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now 
absurd means of safety." 

106. Mel. " Nay, for this same opinion of theirs, 

* ["For neither have we any cerns themselves. For of the gods 

opinions of right and wrong, nor do we believe, and of man we know for 

we aught, at variance with the he- certain, that hy a natural necessity 

lief of men in what concerns the wherever they are the stronger, there 

gods, or to their will in what con- they will reign".] 


we now the rather believe 1 that they will not be- y. 
tray their own colony, the Melians ; and thereby 
become perfidious to such of the Grecians as be 

their friends, and beneficial to such as be their Dialog be-' 

tween the A then- 

enemies. iamandMeUans. 

107- Ath. "You think not then, that what is 
profitable must be also safe, and that which is just 
and honourable must be performed with danger ; 
which commonly the Lacedaemonians are least 
willing of all men to undergo [for others]." 

108. Mel. " But we suppose that they will un- 
dertake danger for us, rather than for any other ; 
and that they think that we will be more assured 
unto them, than unto any other : because for action, 
we lie near to Peloponnesus', and for affection, 
are more faithful than others for our nearness of 

109. Ath. " The security of such as arc at wars, 
consisteth not in the good will of those that are 
called 3 to their aid, but in the power of those 
means they excel in. And this the Lacedaemonians 
themselves use to consider more than any ; and 
therefore, out of diffidence in their own forces, they 
take many of their confederates with them, though 
to an expedition but against their neighbours. 
Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the 
sea, that they will ever pass over into an island." 

110. Mel. " Yea, but they may have others to 

1 [" But we, for this very same sider dangers undergone for us, less 
way of thinking of theirs, do now hazardous than those undergone for 
especially trust to their interest, others, by how much the nearer for 
that they will not betray &c., and aetion we lie to Peloponnesus" &c. 
thereby become untrustworthy to Goell.] 

such of the Grecians" &c ] 3 [" Of those that call others to 

2 [ u We think that they will con- their aid".] 


v, send : and the Cretic sea is wide, wherein to take 
an <>ther is harder for him that is master of it, 
A.c.416. than it is for him that will steal by, to save him- 

OT ftf) 4. * 

self. And if this course fail, they may turn their 
arms against your own territory, or those of your 
confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then 
you shall have to trouble yourselves, no more about 
a territory that you have nothing to do withal, but 
about your own and your confederates 1 ." 

111. Ath. " Let 2 them take which course of these 
they will, that you also may find by experience, 
and not be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet 
gave over siege for fear of any diversion upon 
others. But we observe that, whereas you said 
you would consult of your safety, you have not yet 
in all this discourse said anything, which a man 
relying on could hope to be preserved by : the 
strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; 
and your present power is too short to defend you 
against the forces already arranged against you. 
You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless 
excluding us you make amongst yourselves some 
more discreet conclusion : for [when you are by 
yourselves], you will no more set your thoughts 
upon shame ; which, when dishonour and danger 
stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth 
them 3 . For many, when they have foreseen into 
what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless 

1 ["But about what comes nearer ians never gave over" &c. Goeller.] 
home to you, your confederacy and 3 [" For you will hardly betake 
your own territory". Bekk. Arn.] yourselves to that false shame, 

2 [" You may some day come, by which in dangers leading to mani- 
experience of these things (the in- fest destruction, and therefore dis- 
vasions of Attica by the Pelopon- graceful to incur, has been the ruin 
nesiansV to know that the Athen- of many men". Goell.] 


been so overcome by that forcible word, dishonour, 
that that which is but called dishonour, hath caused 
them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities ; A.e.4io. 
and so to draw upon themselves really, by their Dialogue be. 

i -,. ! . * ill tween the A tl mn- 

madness, a greater dishonour than could have 

befallen them by fortune. Which you, if you 
deliberate wisely, will take heed of ; and not think 
shame to submit to a most potent city, and that 
upon so reasonable conditions, as of league and of 
enjoying your own under tribute : and seeing choice 
is given you of war or safety, do 1 not out of 
peevishness take the worse. For such do take the 
best course, who though they give no way to their 
equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their supe- 
riors ; and towards their inferiors use moderation. 
Consider of it therefore, whilst we stand off; and 
have often in your mind, that you deliberate of 
your country ; which is to be happy 2 or miserable 
in and by this one consultation." 

112. So the Athenians went aside from the 
conference; and the Melians, after they had decreed 3 
the very same things which before they had spoken, 
made answer unto them in this manner : " Men of 
Athens, our resolution is no other than what you 
have heard before ; nor will we, in a small portion 
of time, overthrow that liberty, in which our city 
hath remained for the space of seven hundred 
years since it was first founded. But trusting to 
the fortune by which the gods have preserved it 
hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is 4 , of the 

1 [" Will not" &c.] same answer as they had already 

2 [" Which is your only country, made". These Melians were not the 
and is to be h&ppy" &c. Such is the government, and decreed nothing.] 
sense of this corrupt passage.] 4 [" Of men and of the Lacedae- 

3 [" Having determined on the monians".] 




Lacedaemonians, we will do our best to maintain 
t ^ ie same - But this we offer : to be your friends ; 
A.c.416. enemies to neither side ; and you to depart out of 

OL.90.4. , _ ., ,i i 11 i i 

Dialogue be. our land, after agreement such as we shall both 

tweentheAthen- f r -i 4. 
iansandMeliaDs. minK nt - 

1 1 3. Thus the Melians answered. To which the 
Athenians, the conference being already broken 
off, replied thus : " You are the only men, as it 
seemeth to us, by this consultation, that think 
future things more certain than things seen ; and 
behold things doubtful, through desire to have 
them true, as if they were already come to pass. 
As you attribute and trust the most unto the La- 
cedaemonians, and to fortune and hopes, so will 
The Athenians you be the most deceived". 114. This said, the 
Athenian ambassadors departed to their camp. 
And the commanders, seeing that the Melians 
stood out, fell presently to the war : and dividing 
the work among the several cities, encompassed 
the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians 
a f terwar d s left some forces of their own and of 
their confederates, for a guard both by sea and 
land: and with the greatest part of their army 
went home. The rest that were left, besieged the 

115. About the same time the Argives, making 
a road2 into Phliasia, lost about eighty of their 
men, by ambush laid for them by the men of 

* i i PI 

Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And 
The Athenians the Athenians that lay in Pylus, fetched in thither 
a S reat booty from the Lacedaemonians. Notwith- 
standing w r hich, the Lacedaemonians did not war 3 

The city of 

mentor the 


1 [" Making a treaty of peace, 
such as" &e. 

2 [That is, * 4 an inroad"."] 

3 [" Did not even then war".] 


upon them, [as] renouncing the peace : but gave y. 
leave by edict 1 only, to any of their people that ' ~" 
would to take booties reciprocally in the territory A.C416.' 
of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war The Corinthia 

upon the Athenians : but it was for certain contro- tte 
versies of their own : and the rest of Peloponnesus 
stirred not. 

The Melians also took that part of the wall of TheMeiiaiwre- 
the Athenians by an assault in the night, which heve their tmv11 ' 
looked towards the market-place 2 : and having 
slain the men that guarded it, brought into the 
town both corn and other provision, whatsoever 
they could buy for money*: and so returned and 
lay still. And the Athenians from thenceforth kept 
a better watch. And so this summer ended. 

116. The winter following, the Lacedaemonians ljfteentlM1Dimer 
being about to enter with their army into the ter- 
ritory of the Argives, when they perceived that the 
sacrifices which they made on the border for their 
passage were not acceptable, returned. And the 
Argives, having some of their own city in suspi- 
cion in regard of this design of the Lacedaemonians, 
apprehended some of them ; and some escaped. 

About the same time the Melians took another 
part of the wall of the Athenians ; they that kept 
the siege being then not many. But this done, 
there came afterwards some fresh forces from 
Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates the son 

1 [" By proclamation."] Id indicant ea,qmemoxdefrumen to 

2 [Hoc vix intelligi potest de foro et aliis rebus a Meliis raptis Thucy- 
urbis Meliorum. Puto designari dides dicit. Duk. De foris ituli- 
forum rerum venalium in munitio- taribus vid. i. 62, iii. 6. Goell.] 
nibus Atheniensium, et locum ubi 3 [" And other provision as much 
asservabatur frumentum, et alia ad as they wanted". Bekker &c. t 
ususmilituinquiurbemobsidebant. m^a: vulgo, 



of Demeas. And the town being now strongly 
besieged, there being also within some that prac- 
tised to have it given up, they yielded themselves 
to the discretion of the Athenians : who slew all 
the men of military age, made slaves of the women 
and children 4 ; and inhabited the place with a co- 
lony sent thither afterwards of five hundred men 
of their own. 

1 [It would seem from the threats 
put into the mouth of the Athenian 
speaker (see ch. 93, 111), that the 
same decree which ordered the ex- 
pedition, had also fixed the punish- 
ment to be inflicted on the Melians 
if they resisted : as had been done 
in the case of Scione. The guilt of 
proposing, or at any rate of sup- 
porting the decree, is laid to the 
charge of Alcibiades. Thirl, ch. 24. 
The foregoing dialogue has been 
the subject of much comment, 
which would perhaps have been 
spared, had more attention been 
given to its scope and object. The 
Athenians supposing, truly or 
falsely, that the independence of 
the Melians endangered their em- 
pire by encouraging revolt amongst 
their allies, prepared to subdue 
them : but resolved first to try the 
effect of an embassy to persuade 
them to surrender without a strug- 
gle. The ambassadors were not 
admitted to speak before the popular 
assembly : and thus shut out from 
all opportunity of either sowing dis- 
sension or of appealing to the pas- 
sions of their audience, they found 
themselves reduced to the sober 
arguments of expediency. The 
attempt of the Melians to draw them 
on to the ground of justice, whereon 

their own triumph was certain, is 
met by the declaration of the am- 
bassadors that they do not come 
there to argue that question, but to 
deliberate only on what was for the 
interest of both parties. The Mel- 
ians accordingly proceed to argue, 
that it is not for the interest of the 
Athenians to outrage public feeling 
by the unprovoked invasion of an 
independent state: and if there they 
have the best of the argument, they 
are unable, on the other hand, to 
find any satisfactory answer to the 
question, " where lies your hope of 
safety". There is in this an open 
avowal of the real motives, by which 
nations universally, and individuals 
for the most part, are governed in 
their dealings with each other : 
stripped indeed of the ordinary dis- 
guise of the conventional language 
ofripht and justice, in which those 
motives are usually enveloped. But 
so far as Thucydides is concerned, 
it is difficult to say what were the 
arguments really used on this occa- 
sion, if these were not they. As to 
the Athenians, they were probably 
as much mistaken in the policy even 
of the invasion itself, as they most 
certainly were in the revolting effu- 
sion of blood that followed : which 
could tend to no other end than to 





Sicily described. The causes and pretences of the Sicilian war: 
with the consultation and preparation for the same. Alcibi- 
ades, one of the generals of the army, accused of defacing the 
images of Mercury, is suffered for that present to depart with 
the army. The Athenian army cometh to Rhegium : thence 
to Catana. From thence Alcibiades is sent for home to make 
answer to his accusations : and by the way escaping, goeth to 
Lacednemon. Nicias encampeth near Syracuse : and having 
overcome the army of the Syracusians in battle, returneth to 
Catana. The Syracusians procure aids amongst the rest of 
the Sicilians. Alcibiades instigateth and instructeth the Lace- 
daemonians against his country. Nicias returneth from Ca- 
tana to Syracuse : and encamping in Epipohr, besiegeth the 
city : and beginneth tc enclose them with a double wall, which 
was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the 
eighteenth year of this war. VJ 

1. THE same winter the Athenians, with greater \ EAK xv ^ 
forces than they had before sent out with Laches and A - c - ll - 

ii - - o, -i OL.91.1. 

Eurymedon, resolved to go again into Sicily ; and The Athenians 
if they could, wholly to subdue it: being for the^ 10 

defeat their own object, the seou- a decided and permanent ascend- 

rity of their empire; as they found to ancy of the Hellenic race, must la- 

their cost at the termination of the ment to see both Sparta and Athens 

Sicilian expedition. And those that exhibit such a total laok of the art 

would desire to know what mankind " regere imperio populos'', as to 

might possibly have become under leave that race without a hope.] 




most part ignorant both of the greatness of the 
of the multitude of people, as well 
Greeks as barbarians, that inhabited the same ; and 

The'greltness of that they undertook a war not much less than the 
war against the Peloponnesians. For the compass 
of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a 
ship ; and though so great, is yet divided with no 
more than twenty furlongs, sea measure 3 , from the 

2. It was inhabited in old time, thus ; and these 
were the nations that held it. The most ancient 
inhabitants in a part thereof, are said to have been 
the Cyclopes and Lsestrigones : of whose stock, 
and whence they came or to what place they 
removed, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice 
which the poets have spoken, and which every 
particular man hath learned of them. After them, 
the first that appear to have dwelt therein, are the 
Sicanians, as they say themselves ; nay, before the 
other, as being the natural breed of the island. 
But the truth is, they were Iberians ; and driven 
away by the Ligyans from the banks of Sicanus 2 , 
a river on which they were seated in Iberia. And 
the island from them came to be called Sicania, 

cim which was before Trinacria. And these [two] 

inhabit yet in the western parts of Sicily. After 

Trojans. the taking of Ilium certain Trojans, escaping the 

Cyclopps and 


1 [" Is divided by a space of the 
sea of 20 stadia, so as not to be 
main land". It does not appear 
that there was one measure for the 
land, and another for the sea.] 

2 [Thucydides calls this liver 
" the Sicanus, the river in Iberia": 
but what river he speaks of, is not 

known with any certainty. Iberia 
seems to have been the name of the 
country extending westward of the 
Rhone ; as far, at least, as the Py- 
renees: for whether the Iberians 
were migrators to thejiorth of those 
mountains, is disputed. Nicbulir 
seems to think they were.] 



hands of the Grecians, landed with small boats in 
Sicily : and having planted themselves on the bor- 
ders of the SicanianSj both the nations in one were 
called Elymi ; and their cities were Eryx and 
Egesta 1 . Hard by these came and dwelled also 
certain Phoceans, who coming from Troy, were by 
tempest carried first into Afric, and thence into 
Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy, (for 
there they inhabited), flying from the Opici, having, 
as is most likely and as it is reported, observed the 
strait, and with a fore wind 2 gotten over in boats 
which they made suddenly on the occasion, or 
perhaps by some other means. 

There is at this day a people in Italy called 
Sicxili. And Italy itself got that name after the 
same manner, from a king of Arcadia 3 called 


1 [Segesta, oppidum pervetus, 
quod ab ^Enea fugiente a Trqja, 
atque in hrec loca veniente, condi- 
tum esse demonstrant. Cicero in 
Verr. iv. The Elymians were pro- 
bably composed of different tribes, 
varying in their degrees of affinity 
to the Greeks, though we cannot 
adopt the Greek legend which re- 
presents them as fugitives from 
Troy mixed with Phoceans and with 
followers of Philoctetes ; and Thu- 
cydides himself seems to mark the 
uncertainty of the tradition, by ob- 
serving that the Chalcideans under 
Thepcles were the first Greeks who 
gained a footing in Sicily. Thirl- 
wall. chap. 12.] 

2 ["With a favourable (or aft) 
wind". But whether xarlovrog 
means here a *.' favourable" wind, 
or one '* setting down the current", 
is matter of doubt The current 


was commonly said to run doum 
from the Tyrrhenian into the Sici- 
lian sea. Arn. The name of Opi- 
cans (Oscans or Ausones) was given 
by the Greeks, before the end of the 
4th century of Rome (i.e., before 
352 A.C.), to all the tribes dwelling 
within the limits assigned to Italy 
by Timaeus. Niebuhr, Rom. Hist] 
3 ["Of the Sikeli". Bekker &c., 
(TiicfXwv: vulgo, pctt<W. It was 
not till late that the name of Italy * 
\vas given to the whole region com- 
prised within its natural bounda- 
ries, the Alps and the sea. That 
name in the earliest times was a na- 
tional one in the south, and meant 
no more than the land of the Itali; 
and was not extended to the more 
northerly regions till the Roman 
sway had united the peninsula into 
one state, and by colonization and 
the diffusion of the Latin tongue 




vi. Italus. Of these a great army crossing into Sicily, 
' ' overthrew the Sicanians in battle, and drave them 
into the south and west parts of the same ; and 
instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called 
Sicilia: and held and inhabited the best of the 
land for near three hundred years after their going 
over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. 
And till now they possess the midland and north 
parts of the island. 

Phoenicians. Also the Phoenicians inhabited the coast of Sicily 
on all sides, having taken possession of certain 
promontories 1 and little islands adjacent, for trade's 
sake with the Sicilians. But after that many 
Grecians were come in by sea, the Phoenicians 
abandoned most of their former habitations : and 
uniting themselves dwelt in Motya and Soloeis and 
Panormus 2 , upon the borders of the Elymi ; as rely- 

had moulded its inhabitants into his own days, however, Antiochus 

a single nation. The Greeks, who drew a narrower boundary of Italy : 

regarded none but the (Enotrians by a line from Metapontum to the 

(by which name they designated river Laos. Tarentum he places 

the Pelasgi seated in Lucania and beyond the limits of Italy, in la- 

Bruttium) as Italians, were long pygia. Hence the Tarentines were 

strangers to the wider extent in not embraced under the name 

which the name was applied within Italiots,or Italian Greeks. Niebuhr. 

the country itself, and never so It was in the course of the cen- 

applied it. The region which ori- tury following the beginning of the 

ginally bore the name was, accord- Olympiads, that the Greeks esta- 

ing to them, the peninsula bounded blished themselves on the coast of 

by the isthmus between the Scyl- Sicily ; and spread themselves so 

letic and Napetine gulfs, that is, far over the south of Italy, that it 

the southern part of what was after- acquired the name of the Great or 

wards called Bruttium. It was the Greater Greece. Thirl, eh. 12.] 

from Antiochus, a historian con- * [" And all round Sicily the 

temporary with Herodotus, that it Phoenicians inhabited promontories 

was first learnt that the whole coun- by the sea, which they had taken 

try to the south of Tarentum and off with a fortification, and small 

Posidonia, when it belonged to the islands adjacent 11 &c.] 

(Enotrians, was called Italia. For 2 [Now Palermo : the capital.] 


ing upon their league with the Elymi, and because vi. 
also from thence lay the shortest cut over unto ' - 
Carthage. These were the barbarians, and thus 
they inhabited Sicily. 

3. Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalci- cfaaicidenm. 
deans, under Thucles their conductor, goihg from Abollt ou'Jf 
Euboea, built Naxos, and the altar of Apollo 
Archegetes l , now standing without the city : upon 

which the ambassadors employed to the oracles, 
as often as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed 
to offer their first sacrifice. The next year Archias, 
a man of the Herculean family, carried a colony 
from Corinth, and became founder of Syracuse : Corinthians. 
where first he drave the Siculi out of that island 2 
in which the inner part of the city now standeth ; 
not now environed wholly with the sea, as it was 
then. And in process of time, when the city also 
that is without was taken in with a wall, it became 
a populous city. In the fifth year after the build- 
ing of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcideans, going 
from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the 
Siculi ; and after that Catana : but they that went 
to Catana, chose Euarchus for their founder. 

4 . About the same time in Sicily arrivedalso Lamis, 
with a colony from Megara ; and first built a cer- 
tain town called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacius ; 

1 [The name of the Delphian god tended the worship of Apollo on the 

had now attained throughout Pelo- Mediterranean. Muell. ii. 3. The 

ponnesus the universal respect Oewpoi (ambassadors) were men sent 

which it so long enjoyed : it had led yearly by the mother-country, to he 

the way to the settlement and con- present at certain solemn festivals 

quest of that peninsula, and hence of the colony, carrying with them 

he wa called the leader and founder sacrifices and gifts. Goell.] 

of the Dorians. ^The regulation of 2 Nasos, Ortygia : an island, part 

colonies by the Delphian oracle was of the city of Syracuse. [17 ir6\i i\ 

the chief instrument which ex. I vr6g: the rest was then called ij *&>.] 

I 2 







Rhodians and 

where for a while after he governed the estate of 
his colony in common with the Chalcideans of 
Leontium. But afterwards, when he was by them 
thrust out, and had builded Thapsus, he died ; and 
the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of 
Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called 
Megara-Hyblaea l . And after they had there inha- 
bited two hundred and forty- five years, they were 
by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the 
city and territory. But before they were driven 
thence, namely one hundred years after they had 
built it, they sent out Pammilus and built the city 
of Selinus. This Pammilus came to them from 
Megara, their own metropolitan city : and so 
together with them founded Selinus. Gela was 
built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Anti- 
phemus, that brought a colony out of Rhodes, and 
by Entymus, that did the like out of Crete, jointly. 
This city was named after the name of the river 
Gela ; and the place where now the city standeth, 
and which at first they walled in, was called 
Lindii 2 . And the laws which they established were 

1 [" And the rest being driven 
forth from Thapsos, and Hyblon, 
a king of the Sikeli, letting them 
take the place and instigating them 
to settle there, built Megara" &c.] 

2 [" But the place where now the 
citadel stands, and which was the 
first that was walled in, is called 
Lindii". Nomen hoc primordiis 
colonies inditum cst, quia Anti- 
phemus et Rhodii, ejus socii, max- 
imam partem Lindo, urbe Rhodia, 
venerant. Goell. The plural form 
of the name, like that of Acforwoi, 
illustrates what Thucydides calls a 

general custom in the earliest times, 
that the several tribes gave their 
own names to the countries where 
they settled. When the Lindians 
first arrived in Sicily, they called 
their first fortified settlement, esta- 
blished probably on the top of a 
hill or cliff, by no other name than 
their own. Afterwards as the set- 
tlement grew and the buildings ex- 
tended down into the plain and to 
the river, so that what was once the 
whole town was 'now only a small 
part of it, the new and enlarged 
town was distinguished by a local 


the Doric. About one hundred and eight years 

after their own foundation, they of Gela built the 

city of Acragante, calling the city after the name 

of the river : and for their conductors chose Aris- 

tonous and Pystilus, and gave unto them the laws 

of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates that zanc first 

came from Cume, a Chalcidean city in Opicia l : but 

afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to 

people it, out of Chalcis and the rest of Eubcea ; 

and their conductors were Perieres and Cratse- 

menes ; one of Cume, the other of Chalcis. And 

the name of the city was at first Zancle, so named 

by the Sicilians because it hath the form of a 

sickle ; and the Sicilians call a sickle zanclon. But 

these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence 

by the Saimans and other people of Ionia 2 ; that in 

their flight from the Medes, fell upon Sicily. After other Ionians - 

this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drave out the 

Samians ; and peopling the city with a mixed people 

of them and his ow r n, instead of Zancle called the 

place by the name of his own country from whence 

he was anciently descended, Messana 3 . 

5. After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, 

name derived from the river which the people of the whole district : as 

ran beside it; hut the original city, in Amiens, Ambiani ; Tours, Tu- 

now become a citadel, retained its rones ; Rheims, Rhemi ; &c. Arn.] 

old national name. So at Argos, ! [The name, in the geography of 

the citadel, which was the old Pe- the Greeks of the time of Thucy- 

jasgian settlement, retained its dides, for the coast of the Tyrrhen- 

Pelasgian name Larissa ; the more ian sea, from the Tiber southwards 

modern city, which grew up at its as far as the confines of (Enotria: 

feet, received the name which be- that is, nearly as far as Paestum and 

longed formerly to the whole coun- the river Silarus. Arn.] 

try, and was called Argos. France 2 [Samians and Milesians. He- 

supplies many instances of towns rodotus, vi. 22.] 

having succeeded to the name of 3 [See iii. 86, note.] 




Acre, Cas- 


A.C. 483. 


The cause and 
pretence of the 
Athenians to 
invade it. 

Simus, and Sacon ; the most of which colony were 
Chalcideans ; but there were also amongst them 
certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished part 
of a sedition, called the Myletidse. Their language 
grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric: 
but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed. Acrse 
and Casmense were built by the Syracusians : 
Aerae, twenty years after Syracuse ; and Cas- 
mense, almost twenty after Acrae. Camarina was 
at first built by the Syracusians, very near the 
hundred and thirty-fifth year of their own city ; 
Dascon and Meriecolus being the conductors. 
But the Camarinseans having been by the Syracu- 
sians driven from their seat by war for revolt, 
Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time, 
taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom 
of certain Syracusian prisoners, became their 
founder, and placed them in Camarina again. 
After this again, having been driven thence by 
Gelon, they were planted the third time in the 
same city 1 . 

6. These were the nations, Greeks and barba- 
rians, that inhabited Sicily. And though it were 
thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to 
send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all 
under their subjection; which was the true motive; 
but as having withal this fair pretext, of aiding their 
kindred and new confederates 2 . But principally 

1 [Hippocrates &c., " he became 
the founder and colonized anew 
Camarina. And being again over- 
turned by Gelon, it was a third 
time new-colonized by Geloans". 
TfXffav for Fg\wvo, is a correction 
of Wesseling adopted by Poppo, 

Goeller, and Arnold. Tertia urbis 
instauratio debetur Gelois, qui 
multis a Gelonis morte annis in 
earn commigrarunt. Goell.] 

2 [The kindred refers to all such 
as were lonians, that is, Chalcide- 
ans ; such as the Leontines, Naxi- 


they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of vi. 
Egesta, who were at Athens and earnestly pressed 
them thereto* For bordering on the territory of 
the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about cer- 
tain things concerning marriage, and about a piece 
of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And 
the Selinuntians having leagued themselves w T ith 
the Syracusians, infested 1 them with war both by 
sea and by land. Insomuch as the Egestaeans, 
putting the Athenians in mind of their former 
league with the Leontines made by Laches, prayed 
them to send a fleet thither in their aid ; alleging, 
amongst many other things, this as principal : that 
if the Syracusians, who had driven the Leontines 
from their seat, should pass without revenge taken 
on them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest 
of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the 
whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be 
dangerous lest hereafter some time or other, being 
Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Do- 
rians for affinity, and being a colony of the Pelopon- 
nesians join with the Peloponnesians that sent them 
out, to pull down the Athenian empire : that it were 
wisdom, therefore, with those confederates they yet 
retain, to make head against the Syracusians ; and 
the rather, because for the defraying of the war the 
Egestseans would furnish money sufficient of them- 
selves. Which things when the Athenians had often 
heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the 
Egestsean ambassadors and of their advocates and 

ans, Catanaeans : the new confede- over to the Athenians by Phceax in 

rates, to some of the remaining v. 4. Haack. This is a mistake as to 

people of Sieify, as the Camarinaeans Camarina : see 75. iii. 80. Poppo.] 
and Agrigentines, who were brought l [" Blockaded them".] 


VL patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta ; 
to see &***> whether there were in their treasury 

A.c.416. an d temples so much wealth as they said there 

was, and to bring word in what terms the war 

stood between that city and the Selinuntians. And 

ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly. 

A.c.415. 7- The same winter the Lacedaemonians and 

Theu^dmon. their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having 

ians waste part (j rawn ou t their forces into the territory of the 

ot Argohca, and ( J 

put the outlaws Argives, wasted a small part of their fields, and 

ofArgosinto . , . - , , . 

orneffi. carried away certain cart- loads of their corn. 
Thence they went to Ornese, and having placed 
there the Argive outlaws, left with them a few 
others of the rest of the army : and then making a 
composition for a certain time, that they of Ornese 
and those Argives should not wrong each other, 
they carried their army home. But the Athenians 
arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six 
hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came 
also forth with their whole power, and joining 
with them, sat down betimes in the morning 1 
before Ornese. But when at night the army went 
somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out ; 
and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled 
Orneae to the ground, and went home. And so 
also did the Athenians not long after with their 

The Athenians galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain 
Mace 'horsemen by sea, part of their own, and part 
Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into 

1 [" Sat down for one day". Achaean inhabitants of Orneae, who 

Orneae, Tiryns, and Mycenae, were appear to have remained unsub- 

amongst the towns dispeopled by dued till about 580^ afterwards 

Argos to replenish her own popula- gave their name of Orneatans to all 

tion : see v. 28, note. The old the subject periceci of Argos,] 


Methone ! , and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. 
And the Lacedaemonians sent unto the Chalcideans 
upon Thrace, who held peace with the Athenians 
from ten days to ten days, appointing them to aid 
Perdiccas. But they refused. And so ended the 
winter, and the sixteenth year of this war written 
by Thucydides. 

8. The next summer, early in the spring, the YEAR \vu. 
Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the de cree th? 
ambassadors of Egesta with them : and brought in ^32f :lnd 

silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of Nicias > and 

9i-ii 11 141 Lamachus for 

sixty galleys , which they would entreat the Athe- general*. 
nians to send thither. And the Athenians having 
called an assembly, and heard both from the Eges- 
taean and their own ambassadors, amongst other 
persuasive but untrue allegations, touching their 
.money, how they had great store ready both in 
their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of 
sixty galleys into Sicily, and Alcibiades the son of 
Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lama- 
chus the son of Xenophanes, for commanders with 
authority absolute : the which were to aid the 
people of Egesta against the Selinuntians, and 
withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leon- 
tines anew in their city ; and to order all other the 
aifairs of Sicily as they should think most for the 
profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the 
people assembled again, to consult of the means 

1 [" Methone on the borders of usual pay : but the same which we 
Macedonia''.] have already seen to have been 

2 [This is a talent for a month's given to those that served at the 
pay of each ship's crew: which, siege of Potidrea, iii. 17: owing 
taking the crew at two hundred perhaps to the same reason, the 
men, would be a drachme per day distance from home and probable 
for every man. This is double the length of the service. Arn.] 




how most speedily to put this armada in readiness; 
and to decree such things as the generals should 
further require for the expedition. But Nicias 
having heard l that himself was chosen for one of 
the generals, and conceiving that the state had not 
well resolved, but affected the conquest of all 
Sicily, a great matter, upon small and superficial 
pretences, stood forth, desiring to have altered this 
the Athenians' purpose, and spake as followeth : 

9. " Though this assembly was called to delibe- 
rate of our preparation, and of the manner how to 
set forth our fleet for Sicily : yet to me it seemeth, 
that we ought rather once again to consult, whe- 
ther it be not better not to send it at all ; than 
upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair, 
and upon the credit of strangers, to draw upon 
ourselves an impertinent war. For my own part, 
I have honour by it : and for the danger of my 
person, I esteem it the least of all men : (not 
but that I think him a good 2 member of the com- 
monwealth, that hath regard also to his own person 
and estate ; for such a man especially will desire the 
public to prosper for his own sake) : but as I have 
never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak 
anything that is against my conscience, for gaining 
to myself a pre-eminence of honour: but that only 
which I apprehend for the best. And although I 
am sure, that if I go about to persuade you to 
preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard 

1 [Bekker and the rest, CLKOVGIOG : 
" having against his will been 
chosen", &c. Vulgo, aKovoag. In 
support of the first, Duker cites 
Nicias, oh. 12 : " if there be any 
man here, (uaptvog aipc&ic), that is 

glad to be chosen' 1 &e. : and Her- 
mocrates, ch. 34 : " for that the 
man of most experience has the 
charge against his wUV\ See also 
Plutarch, Alcib. 18. GoelL] 
8 [An equally good" &c.] 


things certain for uncertain and future, my words vi. 
will be too weak to prevail against your humour : ^^ 
yet this I must needs let you know, that neither A.CUIS 
your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to oration 
be achieved. 10. For I say, that going thither 
you leave many enemies here behind you, and 
more you endeavour to draw hither. You perhaps 
think that the league will be firm, that you have 
made with the Lacedaemonians ; which, though as 
long as you stir not, may continue a league in 
name, (for so some have made it of their own 
side 1 ), yet if any considerable forces of ours chance 
to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, 
as having made the peace constrained by calami- 
ties, and upon terms of more dishonour and neces- 
sity than ourselves : besides, in the league itself 
we have many things controverted. And some 
there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they 
none of the weakest : whereof some are now in 
open war against us 2 , and others, because the 
Lacedaemonians stir not, maintain only a truce 
with us from ten to ten days 3 , and so are con- 
tented yet to hold their hands. But perad- 
venture, when they shall hear that our power is 
distracted, which is the thing we now hasten to 
do, they will be glad to join in the war with the 
Sicilians against us ; the confederacy of whom 
they would heretofore have valued above many 

1 ["For to that end have the 2 [As the Corinthians. The Elei- 

practices been directed of some, ans and Megareans had not ac- 

both amongst ourselves and our cepted it] 

enemies''. Meaning Alcibiades, and 3 [A truce that might be re- 

theephorsCleobulus and Xenares: nounced at the end of every ten 

see v. 36. Suhol.] days. These were the Boeotians.] 


other. It behoveth us l therefore to consider of 
things, and not to run into new dangers, 
A.c.415. when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, 
s nor seek a new dominion before we assure that 
which we already have. For the Chalcideans of 
Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet un- 
reduced : and from others in divers parts of the 
continent, we have but doubtful obedience. But 
the Egestaeans, being forsooth our confederates 
and wronged, they in all haste must be aided : 
though to right us on those by whom we have a 
long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer. 
11. And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans 
into subjection, we could easily also keep them so : 
but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet 
being many and far off, we should have much ado 
to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness 
to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep; 
and failing, should lose the means for ever after to 
attempt the same again 2 . As for the Sicilians, it 
seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, 
that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall 
under the dominion of the Syracusians, than they 
are now : and yet this is it that the Egestaeans 
would most aifright us with. For now the states 
of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in 

1 [" So that it behoveth a certain open revolt, and are yet unreduced". 

person (Alcibiades) to consider of Goell.] 

these things, and not to endanger 2 [" And failing, should be in a 

our city whilst it is yet at sea, (not very different plight from what we 

yet safe in port), and not to grasp at were before attacking them". The 

new dominion before we are sure Sicilians at present, if not subjects, 

of that we have already : if so it are still not enemies : but that will 

be, that the Chalcideans Thrace- not be so, after an attack upon 

ward have been so many years in them which shall miscarry. Schol.] 


favour of the Lacedaemonians, to take part against 
us : whereas then, being reduced into one, it is 

5 O * 

not likely they would hazard with us state against 
state 1 . For by the same means that they, joining 
with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our do- 
minion, by the same it would be likely that the 
Peloponnesians would subvert theirs. The Grecians 
there will fear us most, if we go not at all ; next, 
if we but show our forces and come quickly away. 
But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently 
despise us, and join with the Grecians here to 
invade us. For we all know, that those things are 
most admired which are farthest off, and which 
least come to give proof of the opinion conceived 
of them. And this, Athenians, is your own case 
with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates : 
whom because beyond your hope you have over- 
come in those things for which at first you feared 
them 2 , you now in contempt of them turn your 
arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed 
up upon the misfortunes of our enemies : but to 
be confident then only, when we have mastered 
their designs 3 . Nor ought we to think that the 
Lacedaemonians set their minds on anything else, 
but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair 
their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow: and 
the rather, because they have so much and so long 
laboured to win an opinion in the world of their 

1 [ u Whereas in the other case, you now in contempt" &c. Goell.] 
it is not likely that one power would 3 [" Then only, when we are 
molest the other".] masters of our own minds, or of 

2 [" Whom because beyond your ourselves''. GoelL " Of their, the 
hope (considering what your fear of enemy's minds" : that is, by fairness 
them used to be) you have overcome, or superior ability. Am,] 


valour. The question with us therefore, if we be 
advised, will not be of the Egestseans in Sicily, 
A.c.4i5. but how we may speedily defend our city against 
the hisidiation of them that favour the oligarchy 1 . 
12. We must remember also that we have had now 
some short recreation from a late great plague and 
great war, and thereby are improved both in men 
and money ; which it is most meet that we should 
spend here upon ourselves, and not upon those 
outlaws which seek for aid : seeing it maketh for 
them, to tell us a specious lie ; who contributing 
only words whilst their friends bear all the danger, 
if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if 
ill, undo their friends for company. Now if there 
be any man here 2 , that for ends of his own, as 
being glad to be general, especially being yet too 
young to have charge in chief, shall advise the 
expedition, to the end he may have admiration 
for his expense upon horses, and help from his 
place to defray that expense : suffer him not to 
purchase his private honour and splendour with 
the danger of the public fortune. Believe rather 
that such men, though they rob the public, do 
nevertheless consume also their private wealth. 
Besides 3 , the matter itself is full of great difficulties, 
such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, 
much less hastily to take in hand. 13. And I 

1 [The question &c. "will not a He glanceth at Alcibiades. 

be about these Sicilian barbarians, [Tarn sumptuosum erat Athenis, et 

the Egestaeans, but how to be with- vero in plurimis GrasciaD partibus 

out loss of time on our guard equos alere, ut documentum esset 

against a city plotting against us magnarumopum,etputareturindi- 

through their oligarchical govern- care opulentiam et indanobilitatera 

ment". See i. 19: "theLacedaemon- majorum. Go,ell.] 

ians drew them to embrace" &c.] 3 [" And that the matter" Arc.] 


seeing those now sit by and abet 1 the same man, vi. 
am fearful of them : and do on the other side ex- y EAB xv 
hort the elder sort, (if any of them sit near those A.c.4i5. 

\ i -IT i i OL.91.1. 

other), not to be ashamed to deliver their minds oration 
freely, as fearing that if they gave their voice 
against the war they should be esteemed cowards ; 
nor to doat (as they do) upon things absent 2 ; 
knowing that by passion the fewest actions, and 
by reason the most do prosper : but rather for the 
benefit of their country, which is now cast into 
greater danger than ever before, to hold up their 
hands on the other side, and decree : " that the 
Sicilians, within the limits they now enjoy 3 , not 
misliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the 
shore in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the 
Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound 
.their differences between themselves". And for 
the Egestseans, to answer them in particular, thus : 
" that as without the Athenians they had begun 
the war against the Selinuntians, so they should 
without them likewise end it : and that we shall 
no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make 
such men our confederates, as when they do injury, 

1 [7rapaKt\tv<rro\ie: " persons that a [" To doat on what they have 
have got possession of any office of not got; knowing that by passion 
state as president, epistates, sena- men rarely succeed, hut hy fore- 
tor &c., by contrivance or other sight very often : but on behalf of 
illegal means:" as interpreted by their country, which is making a 
Goeller. He adds, that they appear cast of greater peril than ever be- 
to be the followers of the societies fore, to hold up their hands" &c.] 
or clubs mentioned in viii. 54 : see 3 [That is to say, the Sicilians 
note ibid. But he does not explain were not to sail in the Grecian seas, 
how Alcibiades, now playing the nor the Grecians on the coast of 
part of a demagogue, could have any Sicily, with more than one ship of 
connection with any of the clubs, all war. A common stipulation : see ii. 
of which were aristocratical,] 7. Hi. 7 1 . iv. 78. vi. 52. viii. 56. Am.] 


we must maintain it, and when we require their 
assistance, cannot have it". 14. And you the presi- 
dent, if you think it your office to take care of the 
commonwealth, and desire to be a good member 
of the same, put these things once more to the 
question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. 
Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of 
the assembly) that before so many witnesses, it 
will not be made a crime 1 : but that you shall 'be 
rather thought a physician of your country, that 
hath swallowed down evil counsel. And he truly 
dischargeth the duty of a president, who laboureth 
to do his country the most good, or at least will 
not willingly do it hurt." 

15. Thus spake Nicias. But the most of the 
Athenians that spake after him, were of opinion 
that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree 
already made not to be reversed : yet some there 
Motives of AW- were that said to the contrary. But the expedition 
as most of all pressed by Alcibiades the son of 
Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, 
with whom he was likewise at odds in other 
points of state, and also for that he had glanced 
at him invidiously in his oration : but principally 
for that he affected to have charge, hoping that 
himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily 
and Carthage to the state of Athens : and withal, 
if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth 
and glory. For being in great estimation with the 

1 [" Considering, if you dread putting the question a second time, 

putting the question a second time, was a mode of reviewing the decrees 

that a violation of the laws has no- of the people not consistent with 

thing criminal in it, when done the established forms of the Athen- 

before so many witnesses". The ian assembly.] 


citizens, his desires were more vast than for the 
proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of 
horses and other his expenses, was meet : which 
proved afterwards none of the least causes of the 
subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For 
most men fearing him, both for his excess in things 
that concerned his person and form of life, and for 
the greatness of his spirit in every particular 
action he undertook, as one that aspired to the 
tyranny, they became his enemy 1 . And although 
for the public he excellently managed the war, yet 
every man, privately displeased with his course of 
life, gave the charge of the wars to others, and 
thereby not long after overthrew the state. Al- 
cibiades at this time stood forth, and spake to this 

. 16. " Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto THE ORATION OP 
me more than to any other to have this charge : 
and withal I think myself (for I must needs begin 
with this, as having been touched by Nicias) to be 
worthy of the same. For those things for which 
I am so much spoken of, do indeed purchase glory 
to my progenitors and myself: but to the com- 
monwealth they confer both glory and profit. For 
the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, 
even above the truth, by reason of my brave ap- 
pearance at the Olympic games : whereas before 
they thought easily to have warred it down. For 
I brought thither seven chariots, and not only won 
the first, second, and fourth prize 2 , but carried 

1 [" They became his enemy as ever did before : and I was vietor, 
oiie that aspired." cScc.] and was besides second and fourth, 

2 ["For I ran seven chariots, and carried in all other things a 
which is more than any private man magnificence" &e.] 






..,..* . 



Oration of 

also in all other things a magnificence worthy the 
honour of the victory. And in such things as these, 
as there is honour to be supposed according to tha 
law ; so is there also a power conceived upon sight 
of the thing done. As for my expenses in the city 
upon setting forth of shows 1 9 or whatsoever else is 
remarkable in me, though naturally it procure envy 
in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an 
argument of our greatness. Now, it is no unpro- 
fitable course of life 2 , when a man shall at his 
private cost not only benefit himself, but also the 
commonwealth. Nor doth he that beareth himself 
high upon his own worth, and refuseth to make 
himself fellow with the rest, wrong the rest : for 
if he were in distress, he should not find any man 
that w r ould share with him in his calamity. There- 
fore, as we are not so much as saluted when we 
be in misery ; so let them likewise be content to 
be contemned of us when we flourish ; or if they 
require equality, let them also give it. I know 
that such men, or any man else that excelleth in 
the glory of anything whatsoever, shall as long as 
he liveth be envied, principally of his equals, and 
then also of others amongst whom he converseth : 

1 \opriyiat: the exhibition of 
masks, games, and other festivals. 
[The Choregi were ten in number, 
one for each tribe. It was their 
business to provide the chorus in 
all dramatic entertainments, as well 
as in the dithyrambic or lyric recit- 
ations, in the festival of the great 
Dionysia. They paid the expenses 
of the training of the chorus, and 
also of its maintenance during the 
interval: and they furnished the 

dresses and whatever else was re- 
quired by the chorus in the per- 
formance of its part. Am. The 
expenses of the office required a 
fortune of at least three talents: and 
as no man would accept it willingly, 
the office went through the tribe in 
a certain order. Herm. 161.] 

2 [" It is no unprofitable object". 
Vulgo, Bekker, Qoeller, titiivota. 
Duker, Bauer, Arnold t &vout : taking 
it in an ironical sense.] 


but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed 
of them, though there be none ; and his country 
will boast of him, not as of a stranger or one that 
had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citi- 
zen and one that had achieved worthy and laudable 
acts. This being the thing I aim at, and for which 
I am renowned 1 , consider now whether I adminis- 
ter the public the worse for it or riot. For having 
reconciled unto you the most potent states of 
Peloponnesus without much either danger or cost, 
I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake all that 
ever they had upon the fortune of one day of 
Mantineia 2 . 

17- And this hath my youth and madness, sup- 
posed to have been very madness 3 , with familiar 
and fit words wrought upon the power of the 
Pelopomiesians : and shewing reason for my pas- 
sion, made my madness now no longer to be feared 4 . 
But as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is 
esteemed fortunate, make you use of both our 
services. And abrogate not your decree touching 
the voyage into Sicily, as though the power were 
great you are to encounter withal. For the number 
wherewith their cities are populous, is but of pro- 
miscuous nations, easily shifting and easily admitting 
new corners ; and consequently not sufficiently 

1 [" Renowned in my private 4 [" And this is the work of my 
life 11 .] youth, and what is called my mon- 

2 [" From which though they strous folly. So did I deal with the 
escaped, they have not even yet re- Peloponnesian power with all dis- 
covered their confidence. And this creetness of speech, and gaining 
hath my youth" &c.] credit hy my vehemence obtained 

3 (Vapci tyvow : heyond nature, helief for my words. And now no 
" monstrous". Acn. " Beyond my longer dread it (my folly) : hut as 
years": in reply to Nicias, icae rb long" &c. Arn. Vulgo, 

a, ic. r. X.inch.l2.Goell.] Oat: Bekker &c., w*0<$/3i/<y0. 

K 2 




armed, any of them, for the defence of their bodies, 
nor furnished, as the custom of the place appointeth, 
to fight for their country 1 . But what any of them 
thinks he may get by fair speech, or snatch from 
the public by sedition, that only he looks after ; 
with purpose, if he fail, to run the country. And 
it is not likely, that such a rabble should either 
with one consent give ear to what is told them, or 
unite themselves for the administration of their 
affairs in common : but if they hear of fair offers, 
they will one after one be easily induced to come 
in ; especially if there be seditions amongst them, 
as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are 
neither so many men of arms as they boast of; nor 
doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there 
in all, as the several cities have every one reckoned 
for their own number. Nay, even Greece hath much 
belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in 
all this war past 2 . So that the business there, for 
all that T can by fame understand, is even as I 
have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall 
have many of the barbarians, upon hatred of the Sy- 
racusians, to take our parts against them there: and 
if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing 
to hinder us at home. For our ancestors having 
the same enemies, which they say we leave behind 
us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Persian be- 
sides, did nevertheless erect the empire we now have 

1 [" For their cities swarm with 
a motley population, and easily ad- 
mit of changes and new forms in 
their constitutions: and for this 
reason no one is furnished to fight 
as for his own country, either in 
respect of his personal appoint- 

ments, or of the means of public 
defence". See ch. 36, note.] 

* [" Greece was much deceived 
as to the number of her heavy- 
armed soldiers, and was scarcely 
sufficiently armed in this present 
war". Goell.] 


by our only odds of strength at sea. And the hope 
of the Peloponnesians against us was never less 
than now it is, though their power were also as 
great as ever : for they would be able to invade 
our land, though we went not into Sicily ; and by 
sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we 
shall leave a navy sufficient to oppose theirs be- 
hind us 1 . 

18. "What therefore can we allege with any 
probability for our backwardness : or what can we 
pretend unto our confederates, for denying them 
assistance ? Whom we ought to defend, were it 
but because w r e have sworn it to them, without 
objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. 
For we took them not into league, that they should 
come hither with their aids : but that by troubling 
our enemies there, they might hinder them from 
coming hither against us. And the way whereby 
we, and whosoever else hath dominion, hath 
gotten it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring 
of their associates that required it, whether they 
were Greeks or barbarians. For if we should all 
sit still, or stand to make choice 2 which were fit to 
be assisted and which not, we should have little 
under our government of the estates of other men, 
but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown 
mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend 
themselves against him when he shall invade, but 

1 [" And the hope &e. was never 2 [" Or stand to make distinc- 

less than now : and be they never tion of races". Bekker c., 0tAo- 

so determined, by land indeed they Kptvoiev: vulgo, ^iXotcpo/ouv. "We 

are strong enough to invade us should be making but small addi- 

though we wentrnot into Sicily, but tion to our present dominion, but 

by sea they can do us no harm; should rather put that self-same 

for we shall leave" &c.] empire to hazard'*.] 




to anticipate him, that he invade n6t at all. Nor 
is it in our power to be our own carvers, how 
much we will have subject to us ; but considering 
the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek 
to subdue those that are not under our dominion, 
as to keep so those that are : lest if others be not 
subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected 
unto them. Nor are we to weigh quietness in the 
same balance that others do, unless also the insti- 
tution of this state were like unto that of other 
states. Let us rather make reckoning, by enter- 
prising abroad 1 to increase our power at home, 
and proceed on our voyage ; that we may cast 
down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians, 
and show them the contempt and slight account 
we make of our present ease, by undertaking this 
our expedition into Sicily. Whereby, either con- 
quering those states we shall become masters of 
all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the 
benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And 
for our security to stay, if any city shall come to 
our side, or to come away if otherwise, our galleys 
will afford it. For in that we shall be at our own 
liberty, though all the Sicilians together were 
against it 2 . 

" Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to 
laziness, and to the stirring of debate between the 
young men and the old, avert you from it : but 
with the same decency 3 wherewith your ancestors, 
consulting young and old together, have brought 
our dominion to the present height, endeavour you 

1 [" There", in Sicily.] 

2 [" For at sea we shall beat all 
the Sicilians put together* 1 . Bekkcr 

and the rest, vavKpdroptg : vulgo, 
3 [" The accustomed order".] 



likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that 
youth or age, one without the other, is of any 
effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and 
the exaetest judgments tempered together, is it 
that doth the greatest good ; and that a state as 
well as any other thing will, if it rest, wear out of 
itself ; and all men's knowledge decay ; whereas 
by the exercise of war experience will continually 
increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting 
the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, 
this is my opinion : that a state accustomed to be 
active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be sub- 
jected by the change : and that they of all men are 
most surely planted, that with most unity 1 observe 
the present laws and customs, though not always 
of the best." 

1 9. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when 
they had heard him together with the Egestseans 
and Leontine outlaws, who being then present 2 
entreated, and objecting to them their oath begged 
their help in form of suppliants, were far more 
earnestly bent upon the journey than they were 
before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not 
alter their resolution with his oration, but thought 
he might perhaps put them from it by the greatness 
of the provision, if he should require it with the 
most, stood forth again and said in this manner 3 . 

20. "Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you THE OPTION OF 
violently bent on this expedition, such effect may it mcu8 ' 

pose, but that by tbe vastness of the 
provision, if he should require a 
great one, he might perhaps bring 

the same arguments he could no about a change of mind, stood 
longer divert them from their pur- forth again 1 ' c.] 

1 ["With most constancy".] 

2 [" Coming forward".] 

['* And fficias, seeing that by 


take as is desired. Nevertheless I shall now deli- 
ver m y pi n i n upon the matter as it yet standeth 1 . 
A.c.415. As far as we understand by report, we set out 
against great cities, not subject one to another, 
nor needing innovation, whereby they should be 
glad, out of hard servitude, to admit of easier 
masters ; nor such as are likely to prefer our go- 
vernment before their own liberty ; but many, (as 
for one island), and those Greek cities 2 . For be- 
sides Naxos and Catana, (which too I hope will join 
with us for their affinity with the Leontines), there 
are other seven, furnished in all respects after the 
manner of our own army ; and especially those t\vo 
against which we bend our forces most, Selinus 
and Syracuse. For there are in them many men 
of arms, many archers, many darters, besides many 
galleys and a multitude of men to man them. They 
have also store of money, both amongst private 
men and in their temples. This have the Selinun- 
tians. The Syracusians have a tribute beside, 
coming in from some of the barbarians. But that 
wherein they exceed us most, is this : that they 
abound in horses, and have corn of their own, not 
fetched in from other places. 21. Against such a 
power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and 
with it a small army ; but there must great forces 
go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do any- 
thing worthy of our design, and not to be kept by 
their many horsemen from landing 3 ; especially if 
the cities there, terrified by us, should now hold 

1 [" The present matter'*.] Selinus, Agrigentum, Messana, 

2 [" And the Greek cities, for Himera, Catana. Goell] 

one island, in number many". The 3 [ u And not be cooped up by 
"other seven", are Syracuse, Gela, their many horsemen".] 


all together, and none but the Egestaeans prove 
our friends and furnish us with a cavalry to resist VEVR 
them. And it would be a shame either to come A c j 
back with a repulse, or to send for a new supply oration o 
afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our 
enterprise at first. Therefore we must go suffi- 
ciently provided from hence, as knowing that we 
go far from home, and are to make war in a place 
of disadvantage, and not as when we went as con- 
federates to aid some of our subjects here at home 1 , 
where we had easy bringing in of necessaries to 
the camp from the territories of friends. But w r e 
go far off, and into a country of none but strangers, 
and from whence in winter there can hardly come 
a messenger unto us in so little as four months. 
22. Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to 
take with us many men of arms, of our own, of 
our confederates, and of our subjects : and also 
out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get, either 
for love or money : and also many archers and 
slingers, whereby to resist their cavalry ; and much 
spare shipping 2 , for the more easy bringing in of 
provision. Also our corn, I mean, wheat and bar- 
ley parched, we must carry with us from hence in 
ships 3 ; and bakers from the mills, hired, and made 
to work by turns, that the army, if it chance to be 
weather-bound, may not be in want of victual. 
For being so great, it will not be for every city to 
receive it. And so for all things else, we must as 

1 [" And shall have to carry on * [" And in ships we must be far 

a war, not like one amongst your superior".] 

subject states liere, when you have 3 [ u In ships of burthen; and 

gone as the ally of one against an- bakers, pressed into the service from 

other ; where we have had 1 * &c.] the mills, in proportion". Arn.] 




vi. much as we can provide them ourselves, and not 
re ty on others. Above all, we must take hence as 
much money as we can : for as for that which is 
said to be ready at Egesta, think it ready in words, 
but not in deeds. 23. For although we go thither 
with an army not only equal unto theirs, but also 
(excepting their men of arms for battle) in every- 
thing exceeding it : yet so shall we scarce be able 
both to overcome them, and withal to preserve our 
own. We must also make account, that we go to 
inhabit some city in that foreign and hostile 
country, and either the first day we come thither 
to be presently masters of the field 1 , or failing, be 
assured to find all in hostility against us. Which 
fearing, and knowing that the business requires 
much good advice and more good fortune, (which 
is a hard matter, being we are but men), I would 
so set forth as to commit myself to fortune as little 
as I may, and take with me an army that in likeli- 
hood should be secure. And this I conceive to 
be both the surest course for the city in general, 
and the safest for us that go the voyage. If any 
man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my 

24. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the 
Athenians would, upon the multitude of the things 
required, abandon the enterprise ; or if he were 
forced to go, he might go with the more security* 
The Athenian* But the Athenian s gave not over the desire they 
' kad of the voyage for the difficulty of the prepara- 
tion, but were the more inflamed thereby to have 

1 [ u And we must consider our- hostile race: who must the first day 
selves like those that go to make a they land straightway make them* 
bcttlement amongst a foreign and selves masters of the field, or" &c ] 



it proceed ; and the contrary fell out of that which 
he before expected 1 . For they approved his coun- 
sel, and thought now there would be no danger at A.c.4i. 
all. And every one alike fell in love with theent 
enterprise : the old men, upon hope to subdue ^ 
the place they went to, or that at least so great 
a power could not miscarry ; and the young men, 
upon desire to see a foreign country, and to gaze 2 , 
making little doubt but to return with safety. As 
for the common sort and the soldiers, they made 
account to gain by it not only their wages for the 
time, but also so to amplify the state in power, as 
that their stipend should endure for ever. So that 
through the vehement desire thereunto of the most, 
they also that liked it not, for fear if they held up 
their hands against it to be thought evil affected to 
the state, were content to let it pass. 25. And in 
the end a certain Athenian stood up, and calling 
upon Nicias, said he ought not to shift off nor 
delay the business any longer ; but to declare 
there before them all, what forces he would have 
the Athenians to decree him. To which unwillingly 
he answered and said, he would consider of it first 3 
with his fellow-commanders. Nevertheless, for so 
much as he could judge upon the sudden, he said 
there would need no less than one hundred galleys ; 
whereof for transporting of men of arms, so many 
of the Athenians' own as they themselves should 
think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their 
confederates : and that of men of arms in all, of 
their own and of their confederates, there would 

1 [" The contrary of what he in- that now there would be no" &c.] 
tended. For they considered that 3 [" And know hy inquiry". Schol.] 
he approved of the expedition, and 8 [" More at leisure".] 


be requisite no less than five thousand ; but rather 
more, if they could be gotten, and other provision 
proportionable. As for archers, both from hence 
and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else 
should seem necessary, they would provide it them- 
selves and take it with them 1 . 

26. When the Athenians had heard him, they 
presently decreed that the generals should have 
absolute authority, both touching the greatness of 
the preparation and the whole voyage, to do 
therein as should seem best unto them for the 
commonwealth. And after this, they went in hand 
with the preparation accordingly ; and both sent 
unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers at 
home. The city had by this time recovered her- 
self from the sickness and from their continual 
wars, both in number of men fit for the wars, 
grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in 
store of money gathered together by means of the 
peace : whereby they made their provisions with 
much ease 2 . And thus were they employed in pre- 
paration for the voyage. 

27- In the meantime the Mercuries of stone 
throughout the whole city of Athens, (now there 

1 [" And as for the rest of the public mind was entirely occupied 
armament in proportion, both by this one thought : all conversa- 
archers from hence and from Crete tion turned upon this subject. The 
&c., that they (himself and the ge- young greedily listened to the de- 
nerals) would provide it" &c.] scriptions with which the veterans 

2 [" The city had just recovered who had already served in Sicily, 
itself during the armistice from the fed their curiosity : and in the pa- 
effects of the sickness and the con- la>stra would interrupt their exer- 
tinual war, both in number of youth cises to trace the form of the island 
grown up and in stock of money : in the sand, and to discuss its posi- 
so that there was a more ready sup- tion with respect to Africa and Car- 
ply of all things". At Athens the thage. Thirl] 


were many of these of square stone set up by the vi. 
law of the place, and many in the porches of private ' Y 7 Att ' XV 7 X N 
houses and in the temples 1 ), had in one night most A.c.4i. 
of them their faces pared. And no man knew throughout 
who had done it: and yet great rewards out of J2 
the treasury had been propounded to the disco- 
verers ; and a decree made, that if any man knew 
of any other profanation, he might boldly declare 2 
the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman, 
And they took the fact exceedingly to heart, as 
ominous to the expedition, and done withal upon 
conspiracy for alteration of the state and dissolu- 
tion of the democracy. 

28. Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the 

. T , 11 *i accused for hav- 

city, and certain serving-men, revealed something, ing in moc k<>ry 
not about the Mercuries, but of the paring of the ^^ O e f ^ 
statues of some other of the e*ods, committed formerly ny*<**of 

-ii-i their 

through wantonness and too much wine by young 
men; and withal, how they had in private houses acted 
the mysteries of their religion in mockery: amongst 
whom they also accused Alcibiades. This they 
that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in 

1 [" That is to say, the square were not citizens, whereby having 
figure, of which by the custom of first obtained afaia, impunity, they 
the place there are so many in pri- might denounce any public wrong- 
vate doorways and in the temples", doer. The citizen could do the 
The square form of these images is same by the <<rayy\ia,a proceeding 
variously explained : as signifying, attended with less danger and ex- 
that as the master of eloquence and pense to the informer, and needing 
truth, on whichever side it fell it no a&ta. See Henn. 133. The 
alighted safely ; or that eloquence first trace of the existence of a party 
had no need of hands or feet, or of sworn to the overthrow of the demo- 
any of the bodily powers.] cracy, is supposed to be that men- 

2 [" He might with impunity de- tioned by Thucydides, i. 107 : the 
nounce the same". The ^WOIQ, disco very of which party and of their 
denunciation or information, was intrigues with Sparta led to the 
the proceeding open to those that battle of Tanagra. 164.] 


the way that they could not constantly bear chief 
sway with the people, making account to have the 
A.c.4i5. primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of 
and exceedingly aggravated ; exclaiming, that both 
the mockery of the mysteries and the paring of 
the Mercuries tended to the deposing of the people, 
and that nothing therein was done without him ; 
alleging for argument his other excess in the 
ordinary course of his life, not convenient in a 
popular estate. 29. He 1 at that present made his 
Apology, and was there ready, if he had done any 
T is " ot suc k th^g' to answer ^ before he went the voyage, 
(for by this time all their preparation was in readi- 
ness), and to suffer justice if he were guilty, and 
if absolved to resume his charge : protesting 
against all accusations to be brought against him 
in his absence, and pressing to be put to death 
then presently if he had offended ; and saying, that 
it would not be discreetly done, to send away a 
man accused of so great crimes with the charge 
of such an army before his trial. But his enemies, 
fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should 
have had the favour of his army, and lest the people, 
which loved him because the Argives and some of 
the Mantineans served them in this war only for 
his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter 
off and hastened his going out 2 , by setting on other 
orators to advise, that for the present he should 
go, and that the setting forward of the fleet should 

1 [ u He on the spot both made dition) to stand his trial whether he 

answer to the informations against had done any of these things ; and 

him, and declared himself ready if he had, to staffer justice" c.] 
before sailing (for by this time 3 [" Turned it off and prevented 

every thing was ready for the expe- it" : that is, his trial at that time.] 


not be retarded, and that at his return he should V i. 
have a day assigned him for his trial : their purpose ' ~ UI ' xv ~7 
being, upon further accusation, which they might A.r.4i. 
easily 1 contrive in his absence, to have him sent 
for back to make his answer. And thus it was 
concluded that Alcibiades should go. 

30. After this, the summer being now half spent, The Athenian 
they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of ^ 1>utteth ( 
the confederates, and the ships that carried their 
corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of the 
provision that went along, they before appointed to 
meet [upon a day set] at Corcyra, thence all toge- 
ther to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promon- 
tory of lapygia. But the Athenians themselves, T hc a 
and as many of their confederates as were at 
Athens, upon the day appointed 2 , betimes in the 
morning came down into Peirseus and w r ent aboard 
to take sea. With them came down in a manner 
the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants 
as strangers : the inhabitants to follow after such 
as belonged unto them, some their friends, some 
their kinsmen, and some their children, filled both 
with hope and lamentations ; hope of conquering 
what they went for, and lamentation, as being in 
doubt whether ever they should see each other any 
more, considering what a way they \vere to go 
from their own territory : (and now when they 
were to leave one another to danger, they appre- 
hended the greatness of the same more than they 
had done before when they decreed the expedi- 
tion : nevertheless their present strength, by the 

1 [" Could better contrive".] perhaps refers to the " clay set'* for 

* {" Upon a day' 1 &c. Hobbes meeting at Corcyra.] 


vi. abundance of everything before their eyes prepared 
journey, gave them heart again in behold- 
**) : b ut *he strangers and other multitude came 
only to see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible 
design ! . 

31. For this preparation, being the first Grecian 
power that ever went out of Greece from one only 
city, was the most sumptuous and the most glo- 
rious of all that ever had been sent forth before it 
to that day. Nevertheless for number of galleys 
and men of arms, that which went forth with 
Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Agnon car- 
ried with him to Potidsea, was not inferior to it. 
For there went four thousand men of arms, three 
hundred horse, and one hundred galleys, out of 
Athens itself; and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty 
galleys, besides many confederates that accom- 
panied him in the voyage. But they went not far, 
and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this 
fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished 
for both kinds of service, in which of them soever 
it should have occasion to be employed, both with 
shipping and land-soldiers. For the shipping, it 
was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the 
captains of galleys and of the city. For the state 
allowed a drachma a day to every mariner: the 
empty galleys 2 which they sent forth, being of 

1 [ u As a thing worth seeing, and is Hermann's account of the mode 
surpassing belief". Valla, Portus.] of maintaining the Athenian navy. 

2 Empty, in respect of those that " When with the extended naval 
carried provision. [" For the state power of Athens, the old division of 
allowed a drachme a day to every the people into forty -eight, and later 
mariner, and furnished empty gal- into fifty Naukraria\eaeh of which 
leys, of the swift ones sixty, and of provided a ship, became extinct, the 
such as carried" &c. The following generals appointed every year from 



nimble ones sixty, and of such as carried their 
men of arms forty more : and the captains of gal- 
leys both put into them the most able servants ; 
and besides the wages of the state, unto the 
[uppermost bank of oars, called the] Thranitse, 
and to the servants, gave somewhat of their own ; 
and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon 


amongst the richest citizens the 
necessary number of Trierarchs, one 
for every ship : which the Trierareh 
thereupon had at his own cost to fit 
out and keep in repair, the state 
providing nothing: more than the 
empty vessels and the pay for the 
ship's company. It is believed that 
later the expenses of Trierareh, like 
those of Choregus, were divided 
between two. When however the 
command of the ship in person, ori- 
ginally part of the duty of Trierareh, 
became less essential, thereupon 
sprung up the custom for the Trier- 
arch to sell by auction to him that 
would undertake it on the lowest 
terms, the charge of the entire 
trierarchy: a mischief which the 
regulation of the Symmorii, made 
A.C..'*57, raised to a still greater 
height. It was then that the twelve 
hundred wealthiest citizens became 
permanently bound to the duty of 
Trierareh ; and were for that pur- 
pose divided into twenty Symmorii ; 
and each of these again into Syn- 
teleia), of sixteen members at the 
most, each Synteleia having the 
charge of providing for a ship ; at 
less cost however than formerly, 
because the state now provided 
the furniture of the vessel. The 
richest amongst the Symmorii made 
the ready outlay, and afterwards 
divided it amongst the rest: not 

unfreqnently contriving to rid 
themselves of all contribution : al- 
though being the same for all, their 
share was therefore proportionally 
small. Demosthenes, in Olymp. ex. 
first re-established the just propor- 
tion : whereby with the possession 
of a certain fortune was combined 
the duty of maintaining a trireme : 
so that the less rich, up to that 
amount, had the privilege of becom- 
ing a member of a Synteleia ; the 
richer, on the contrary, in propor- 
tion to their means had to take the 
charge of more than one ship". 
Antiq. 161. The fortune which 
by the law of Demosthenes sub- 
jected the possessor to the charge 
of one trireme, was ten talents : 
under which amount, the possessor 
might enter the Synteleia. The 
number of ships which one man 
might be charged with) seems to 
have been limited to three. See 
Dem. pro Cor. At the present 
time, there appear to have been 
elected annually four hundred 
Trierarchs : and a fortune exceeding 
eight talents, as Goeller says, sub- 
jected to this duty, which no one 
was liable to two years consecu- 
tively. The Naukraria% above- 
mentioned, were divisions of the 
four 0uXa! of Athens ; each of which 
was divided into three Phratriae, 
and each Phratria into four Nau- 


his own galley, both in the badges 1 and other 
rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have 
his galley, both in some ornament arid also in 
swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the land 
forces, they were levied with exceeding great 
choice 2 , and every man endeavoured to excel his 
fellow in the bravery of his arms and utensils that 
belonged to his person. Insomuch as amongst 
themselves, it begat quarrel about precedency 3 : 
but amongst other Grecians, a conceit that it was 
an ostentation rather of their power and riches, 
than a preparation against an enemy. For if a 
man enter into account of the expense, as w r ell of 
the public, as of private men that went the voyage ; 
namely, of the public, what was spent already in 
the business, and what was to be given to the 
commanders to carry with them ; and of private 
men, what every one had bestowed upon his 
person, and every captain on his galley, besides 
w r hat every one was likely, over and above his 
allowance from the state, to bestow on provision 
for so long a warfare, and what the merchant 4 
carried with him for traffic, he will find the 
whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a 
great many talents. And the fleet was no less 
noised amongst those against whom it was to 

krarisD. Bocckh says " that each chosen out of the best lists" : that is, 

Naukraria furnished two horsemen composed of none hut citizens, and 

and one ship, KOI vavv fjiiav, whence those all within the military age. 

perhaps the name".] Compare Herod, iv, 135. Arn.] 

1 <7if/ma : the images, which 8 [" It hegat contention amongst 
heing set on the fore part of the themselves, each striving in his own 
vessel, did give it the name for the station to surpass the rest".] 

most part. 4 [" What either soldier or mer- 

2 [caraXoyot XP 1 ?* 5 " ^ : " were chant carried" &c.] 


go, for the strange boldness of the attempt and 
gloriousness of the show, than it was for the exces- 
sive report of their number, for the length of the 
voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so 
vast future hopes in respect of their present power 1 . 
32. After they were all aboard, and all things 
laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence 
was commanded by the trumpet ; and after the 
wine had been carried about 2 to the whole army, 
and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had 
drunk a health to the voyage 3 , they made their 
prayers, such as by the law w r ere appointed for 
before their taking sea, not in every galley apart, 
but all together, the herald pronouncing them. 
And the company from the shore, both of the city 
and whosoever else wished them well, prayed with 
them. And when they had sung the Paean and 
ended the health, they put forth to sea : and hav- 
ing at first gone out in a long file, galley after 
galley, they after went a vie by yEgiria 4 . Thus 
hasted these to be at Corcyra: to which place 

1 [" And the fleet was not less 3 airsvSovTtQ. It was a form 
noised about for the strange bold- amongst the Grecians and other 
ness of the attempt and the glori- nations then, both before great en- 
ousness of the show, than for the terprises to wish good fortune, and 
excessive greatness of the expedi- at the making of league and peace 
tion as compared with those against to ratify what they did, by drinking 
whom they were setting forth ; and one to another. [What is here called 
for that it was the most distant cxpe- " drinking to each other", is the or- 
dition from home ever attempted, dinary ceremony of a libation (wine 
and with the greatest hopes of the poured into the sea). " And when 
future, if compared with their pre- both the epibatae and the generals 
sent means". See Thucydides' own had from golden and silver cups 
opinion of what the expedition was made their libations". See the liba- 
capable of, ii. 65.} tion by JSneas ; in ^Ineid. v. 776.] 

2 [" Had been mixed throughout * [" They vied with each other as 
the whole army".] ' far as ^Egina".] 

L 2 



' ' * also the other army of the confederates were 


A c.415. assembling. 

Th^syracL At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voy- 
ians, upon the a ~ e f rom divers places : nevertheless it was long 

ferae of their or o 

coming, do some ere anything would be believed. Nay. an assembly 

believe it, and ,.,,,, . i i 

being there called, orations were made such as 


follow on both parts : as well by them that be- 
lieved the report touching the Athenian army to 
be true, as by others that affirmed the contrary. 
And Hermocrates the son of Hermon, as one that 
thought he knew the certainty, stood forth and 
spake to this effect : 

THE ORATION OF 33. " Concerning the truth of this invasion, 
though perhaps I shall be thought, as well as other 
men, to deliver a thing incredible ; and though I 
know, that such as be either the authors or relaters 
of matter incredible, shall not only not persuade, 
but be also accounted fools : nevertheless, I will 
not for fear thereof hold rny tongue, as long as the 
commonwealth is in danger ; being confident that 
I know the truth hereof somewhat more certainly 
than others do. The Athenians are bent to come 
even against us, (which you verily wonder at), and 
that with great forces both for the sea and land : 
with pretence indeed to aid their confederates the 
Egestseans and replant the Leontines ; but in truth 
they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and espe- 
cially of this city of ours ; which obtained, they 
make account to get the rest with ease. Seeing 
then they will presently be upon us, advise with 
your present means, how you may with most ho- 
nour 1 make head against them ; that you may not 

1 [" How you may best" c.] * 


be taken unprovided through contempt, nor be 
careless through incredulity ; and that such as 
believe it, may not be dismayed with their auda- 
ciousness and power. For they are not more able oration of 

t -i i i i TVT ^i Hcrmocrates. 

to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them. Neither 
indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some 
advantage unto us : nay, it will be much the better 
for us, in respect of the rest of the Sicilians. For 
being terrified by them, they will the rather league 
with us. And if w r e either vanquish, or repulse 
them without obtaining what they came for, (for I 
fear not at all the effecting of their purpose); verily 
it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion 
not unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have 
been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or barba- 
rians, sent far from home, that have not prospered 
ill. Neither are these that come against us, more in 
number than ourselves and the neighbouring cities: 
for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. 
And if for want of necessaries in a strange terri- 
tory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it will 
be left to us against whom they bend their councils, 
though the greatest cause of their overthrow should 
consist in their own errors. Which was also the 
case of these very Athenians, who raised them- 
selves by the misfortune of the Medes ; (though it 
happened for the most part contrary to reason) ; 
because in name 1 they went only against the Athe- 
nians. And that the same shall now happen unto 
us, is not without probability. 

34. " Let us therefore with courage put in readi- 
ness our own forces ; let us send to the Siculi, to 

1 [" Through the report that they went" &c. Goell.] 


confirm those we have, and to make peace and 
league with others ; and let us send ambassadors 
to the rest of Sicily, to show them that it is a 
common danger ; and into Italy, to get them into 
our league, or at least that they receive not the 
Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best 
course to send also to Carthage : for even they are 
not without expectation of the same danger. Nay, 
they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will 
bring war upon them also, even to their city 1 . So 
that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the 
trouble will come home to their own door, they 
will perhaps, either secretly or openly, or some 
way 2 assist us. And of all that now are, they are 
the best able to do it, if they please. For they 
have the most gold and silver : by which the wars 
and all things else are the best expedited. Let us 
also send to Lacedsemon and to Corinth, praying 
them not only to send their succours hither with 
speed, but also to set on foot the war there. But 
that which I think the best course of all, though 
through an habit of sitting still you will hardly be 
brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you what 
it is. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all yet 
if we and most of the rest 3 , should draw together 
our whole navy, and with two months' provision 
go and meet the Athenians at Tareritum and the 
promontory of lapygia ; arid let them see, that they 
must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf 
before they fight for Sicily : it would both terrify 

them the most, and also put them into a considera- 

f _____ _ 

1 [ u Will some time or another some way or another. Arnold], 
invade their city".] 3 [" And as many as possible of 

2 [Anglice : openly or secretly, or the rest".] 


tion, that we, as the watchmen of our country, vi. 
come upon them out of an amicable territory, (for 
we shall be received at Tarentum), whereas they 
themselves have a great deal of sea to pass with all 
their preparations, and cannot keep themselves in 
their order for the length of the voyage : and that 
for us, it will be an easy matter to assail them, 
coming up slowly as they do and thin 1 . Again, if 
lightening their galleys, they shall come up tous more 
nimbly and more close together, we shall charge 
upon them already wearied 2 , or we may, if we please, 
retire again into Tarentum. Whereas they, if 
they come over but with a part of their provisions, 
as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of 
victuals in those desert parts ; and either staying 
be there besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave 
behind them the rest of their provision, and be 
dejected, as not assured of the cities whether they 
will receive them or not. I am therefore of opinion, 
that dismayed with this reckoning they will either 
not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they 
spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to 
explore how many and in what place we are, the 
season will be lost and winter come :i ; or deterred 
with our unlooked-for opposition, they will give 
over the voyage. And the rather, for that as I 
hear the man of most experience amongst their 

1 [Bekker &c., icar' oXtyov: " few 8 [** I am therefore from this rea- 
at a time". Vulgo, Kara Xoyov. soiling of opinion, that excluded 
Hobbes has followed the Scholiast, hence they would not *o much as 
or an interpolation of Portus in his put over from Corcyra ; but that 
Latin translation.] either whilst they are spending time 

2 [" If they should use their oars, &c., their operations will be driven 
we might charge them weary with into the winter ; or that deterred 
rowing, or we might" c.] with our" &c. Valla.] 



commanders hath the charge against his will ; and 
would take a light occasion to return, if he saw 
any considerable stop made by us in the way. And 
I am very sure, we should be voiced amongst them 
to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are 
men's minds ; and they fear more such as they 
hear will begin with them, than such as give out 
that they will no more but defend themselves : 
because then they think the danger equal. Which 
would be now the case of the Athenians. For 
they come against us with an opinion that we will 
not fight : deservedly contemning us, because we 
joined not with the Lacedaemonians to pull them 
down. But if they should see us once bolder 
than they looked for, they would be terrified more 
with the unexpectedness than with the truth of our 
power itself. Be persuaded therefore, principally 
to dare to do this ; or if not this, yet speedily to 
make yourselves otherwise ready for the war ; and 
every man to remember, that though to show con- 
tempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, 
yet those preparations are the surest, that are 
made with fear and opinion of danger 1 . As for the 
Athenians, they come ; and I am sure are already 
in the way, and want only that they are not now 

35. Thus spake Hermocrates. But the people 
of Syracuse were at much strife amongst them- 
selves: some contending, that the Athenians would 
by no means come, and that the reports were not 

1 ["That the time for showing be, to consider preparation made 

con tempt of one's enemy, is the heat with fear as the mpst secure, and 

of fight : but that at the present therefore to act as if in danger* 1 , 

moment the most useful thing would Compare ii. 1 1 . Goell .] 



true ; and others, that if they came they would do 
no more harm than they were likely again to 
receive. Some contemned and laughed at the 
matter : but some few there were that believed 
Hermocrates, and feared the event. But Athena- 
goras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and 
at that time most powerful with the commons, 
spake as followeth : 

36. " He is either a coward or not well affected THE ORATION OF 
to the state, whosoever he be, that wishes the 
Athenians not to be so mad as coming hither to 
fall into our power. As for them that report such 
things as these and put you into fear, though I 
wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their 
folly, if they think their ends not seen. For they 
that are afraid 1 of anything themselves, will put 


1 [" That have privately some 
fear*' : that is, that have good cause 
to be afraid of somewhat. For the 
right understanding of this speech, 
some knowledge is requisite of the 
leading events of the history of the 
Greek cities in Sicily : and of the 
result of those events, the present 
state of parties there. Syracuse, 
like other Dorian colonies, contained 
originally three different classes : 
the original colonists, the ya^opot 
(Herod, vii. 155), who conquered 
and divided the land, and formed 
the iroXirevfjia or governing hody : 
the natives whom they reduced to 
slavery, called KvXXvpun (a name not 
understood) : and the #r7/KO, a vast 
body of exiled and discontented 
persons from Greece, who had sub- 
sequently bee invited to reinforce 
the original colonists, without how- 
ever being received into the TTO\I- 

But the Dorian states of 
Sicily and Italy had, unlike those 
of Peloponnesus, admitted the de- 
mus into the city. Hence the great 
size of their cities : and a still more 
important consequence. For the 
demus was found to be what Gelo 
called it, uyo(Kf}/ia fixapirwraroi/ 
(Herod, vii. 156),amost unwelcome 
inmate : and was ever struggling to 
force its way into the government, 
and, above all, to obtain a redivi- 
sion (civttcW/iof) of the lands. The 
gamori and their cyllyrii stood to 
the demus in the same relation as 
the patricians and their clients to 
the plebeians at Rome : and the 
change in the constitution took 
much the same course, first to a 
politeia, and thence in time to an 
absolute democracy. lu 492, the 
union of the demus and the slaves 
drove the gamori into exile. But 



the city into affright, that they may shadow their 
own with the common fear. And this may the 
reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but 
framed on purpose by such as always trouble the 

Athenagoras. ,, n A. # i 1*1 i . 

state, liut if you mean to deliberate wisely, make 
not your reckoning by the reports of these men, but 
by that which wise men and men of great experi- 

confusion and anarchy, the fruit of 
the supineness of the men of pro- 
perty (Arist. v. 3), soon made the 
people glad to submit to the tyranny 
of Gelo, though bringing back in 
his train the ejected gamori. His 
dynasty was overthrown in 4f>6, and 
again made way for a politeia. The 
foreign mercenaries, whom he had 
admitted to the rights of citizen- 
ship, were disfranchised : and upon 
their flying to arms, were driven 
from the city, and settled at Mes- 
sana : and the estates which Gelo 
had provided them with at the ex- 
pense of the aristocracy, were re- 
stored to their former owners. The 
example of Syracuse was followed 
by the Greek cities in general : the 
tyrants were ejected and democratic 
constitutions established through- 
out Sicily. But though at first at 
peace amongst themselves, inter- 
nally they enjoyed but little tran- 
quillity. The multitude were ill 
satisfied with barren political privi- 
leges, which resigned the real ad- 
vantages (in their eyes) of the revo- 
lution to those that had regained 
their estates. The ava^aa^ioQ formed 
the exciting topic with them : and 
the attempts of demagogues by that 
handle to re-establish tyranny, are 
said to have been the origin of an 
institution at Syracuse similar to 

ostracism at Athens, called petal- 
ism : the laurel-leaf serving the 
purpose of the oyster-shell. But 
being found to end only in deter- 
ring the best citizens from taking 
part in public affairs, it was soon 
abandoned. The distracted state 
of affairs encouraged theSikel chief, 
Ducctius, to attempt the restoration 
of the empire of his countrymen. 
The jealousy of the growing power 
of Syracuse, especially of her con- 
quests in the Sikel country, the 
fruit of the war of Ducetius, engen- 
dered a war between that state and 
Agrigentum : in which most of the 
Greek cities sided with one or other 
of the rival states. But the victory 
over the Agrigentine party at Hi- 
mera (452), finally established the 
supremacy of Syracuse over all the 
Dorian, if not all the Grecian states 
of Sicily, except Camarina. Her- 
mocrates, a young noble, is the 
leader of the aristocratical party: 
whilst Athenagoras seems to have a 
kind of tribunician authority, as 
official advocate of the commons. 
This is the period of the Syracusan 
constitution, which is alluded to 
with approbation by Aristotle (v. 
10). But the Athenian expedition 
was the cause of further changes : 
see vii. 87, note. See Muell. iii. 9: 
Thirl, ch. xxii.] 


ence, such as I hold the Athenians to be, are likely vi. 
to do. For it is not probable,, that leaving the Pe- ^ n ' xvii ^ 
loponnesians and the war there not yet surely ended, A.c.4i5. 
they should willingly come hither to a new war omtion of* 
no less than the former : seeing, in my opinion, Athfnmgoras - 
they may be glad that we invade riot them, so many 
and so great cities as we are. 37. And if indeed 
they come, as these men say they will : I think 
Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than 
Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better fur- 
nished ; and that this our own city is much stronger 
than the army which they say is now coming, 
though it were twice as great as it is. For I know 
they neither bring horses with them nor can they 
get any here, save only a few from the Egestseans, 
nor have men of arms so many as we, in that they 
are to bring them by sea 1 . For it is a hard matter to 
come so far as this by sea, though they carried no 
men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry 
with them all other their necessaries ; which can- 
not be small against so great a city. So that I am 
so far from the opinion of these others, that I 
think the Athenians, though they had here another 
city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it, and 
should from thence make their war, yet should not 
be able to escape from being destroyed, every man 
of them ; much less now, when all Sicily is their 
enemy 2 . For in their camp, fenced with their 

1 [" Nor have men of arms so for there will he no division), and in 
many as we, not at least coming in a camp pitched hy men just landed 
their fleet".] from their ships, with tents and 

2 [Though they had here &e. other equipments such as necessity 
" they would, scarcely be able to may supply them with, and never 

able for our horsemen to stir far 

escape &c. : much less when all able for our horsemen 
Sicily is their enemy, (as it will be, abroad". Arn. Goell.] 


galleys, they shall be cooped up, and from their 
tents, and forced munition, never be able to stir 
far abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. 
In short, I think they shall never be able to get 
| anc ft n g . so m^k above theirs do I value our own 

38. " But these things, as I said before, the 
Athenians considering, I am very sure will look 
unto their own ; and our men talk here of things 
that neither are, or ever will be l : who I know have 
desired, not only now but ever, by such reports as 
these or by worse, or by their actions, to put the 
multitude in fear, that they themselves might rule 
the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it 
often, they may one day effect it : and for us, we 
are 2 too poor-spirited either to foresee it ere it be 
done, or foreseeing to prevent it. By this means 
our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition 
and contention, not so much against the enemy as 
within itself ; and sometimes also to tyranny and 
usurpation. Which I will endeavour (if you will 
second me) so to prevent hereafter, as nothing 
more of this kind shall befall you : which must be 
done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then 
by punishing the authors of these plots, not only 
when I find them in the action, (for it will be hard 
to take them so), but also for those things which 
they would and cannot do. For one must not only 
take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath 
already done, but strike him first for his evil pur- 
pose ; for if a man strike not first, he shall first be 
stricken. And as for the few ', I shall in somewhat 

1 [" Nor can be".] [" Lest we should be".] 


reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them, vi. 
and in somewhat advise them ! . For this, I think, - YEAB A XV ~; 
will be the best course to avert them from their A,c.4i. 
bad intentions. Tell me forsooth, (I have asked 2 omionof 
this question often), you that are the younger sort, Atheaa s ras - 
What would you have ? Would you now 3 bear 
office ? The law allows it not : and the law was 
made because ye are not [now] sufficient for go- 
vernment, not to disgrace you when you shall be 
sufficient 4 . But forsooth, you would not be ranked 
with the multitude ! But what justice is it, that 
the same men should not have the same privileges ? 
39. Some will say, that the democracy is neither a 
well-governed nor a just state : and that the most 
wealthy are aptest to make the best government. 
But 1 answer first, democracy is a name of the 
whole ; oligarchy, but of a part. Next, though 
the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure : 
yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the mul- 
titude upon hearing the best judge. Now in a 
democracy all these, both jointly and severally, 
participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy, 
they allow indeed to the multitude a participation 
of all dangers : but in matters of profit, they not 
only encroach upon the multitude, but take from 
them and keep the whole. Which is the thing 
that you the rich 5 and the younger sort affect : but 
in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, 
O ye the most unwise of all men, unless you know 

1 [" Which must he done, first by 2 [" Asked myself.'] 

gaining you the many &c. : (for one 3 [That is, " before your time' 1 .] 

must not only take revenge &c.) : 4 [" Rather than to disgrace you 

and on the other hand the fwv, by as sufficient".] 

in somewhat reproving them'* &c.] 6 [dwapivoi: u the nobles".] 


vi. that what you affect is evil, and if you know not 
that, you are the most ignorant of all the Gre- 
c ^ ans I know ; 01% ye most wicked of all men, if 
oration or' knowing it you dare do this 1 : 40. yet I say, 
t enagoras. j n f orm yourselves better, or change your pur- 
pose and help to amplify the common good of 
the city, making account that the good amongst 
you shall not only have an equal, but a greater 
share therein than the rest of the multitude ; 
whereas if you will needs have all' 2 , you shall run 
the hazard of losing all. Away therefore with 
these rumours, as discovered and not allowed. 
For this city, though the Athenians come, will 
be able to defend itself with honour. And we 
have generals to look to that matter. And if they 
come not' 3 , (which I rather believe), it will not, 
upon the terror of your reports, make choice of 
you for commanders, and cast itself into voluntary 
servitude : but taking direction of itself, it both 
judgeth your words virtually as facts 4 , and will not 
upon words let go her present liberty, but endea- 
vour to preserve it by not committing the same 
actually to your discretion." 

41. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of their 
generals rising up, forbade any other to stand 
forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand to 
this effect : 

1 [" But even yet, yc most un- 2 [" Whereas if you aflect other 

wise of all men : (ye are either the matters, (than the common good), 

most stupid of all the Grecians, if you shall run &C."] 
you do not know that you are pre- 3 [" And if there be not any of 

paring mischief for yourselves, or these things true, as I believe there 

the most wicked, if you know that is not, &c."] 
and yet dare do it) : even yet, I 4 [That is, that they will be as 

say", tkc. Arn. Bekker and the treacherous in their acts as false iu 

rest put a full stop at ro\/*cm.] their words. Goell.] 





"It is no wisdom, neither for the speakers to 
utter such calumnies one against another, nor for 
the hearers to receive them. We should rather 
consider, in respect of these reports, how we may 
in the best manner, both every one in particular 
and the city in general, be prepared to resist them 
when they come. And if there be no need, yet to 
furnish the city with horses and arms and other 
habiliments of war, can do us no hurt. As for the 
care hereof and the musters, we will look to it : 
and will send men abroad both to the cities and 
for spials : and do whatsoever else is requisite. 
Somewhat we have done already : and what more 
we shall hereafter find meet 1 , we will from time 
to time report unto you/' 

Which when the general had said, the Syracu- 
sians dissolved the assembly. 

42. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, 
both they and their confederates. And first the 
generals took a view 2 of the whole army, and put 
them into the order wherein they were to anchor 
and make their naval camp : and having divided 
them into three squadrons, to each squadron they 
assigned a captain by lot 3 , to the end that being 
at sea they might not come into want of water, or 
harbours, or any other necessaries, where they 
chanced to stay ; and that they might otherwise 
be the 4 more easy to be governed, when every 

1 [ u And whatsoever we may find each general ; to the end that they 
out, we will" &c.] might not by sailing together come 

2 [tTTt&Taaw: " a second review": into want of water" &c. The gene- 
that is, on the uniting of the army; nils were three : see ch. 8. Bekker 
there having probably been one of &c., /ict irXkovrtc : vulgo, avair\e- 
its parts before sailing. Am.] ovrc-] 

8 [" They assigned by lot one to 4 [" More orderly and more" &c.] 


squadron had his proper commander. After this 
they sent before them three galleys into Italy and 
Sicily, to bring them word what cities in those 
parts would receive them : whom they appointed 
to come back and meet them, that they might know 
whether they might be received or not before they 
The quantity of put in. 43. This done, the Athenians with all 
fa^ provisions 1 put out from Corcyra towards 
Sicily ; having w r ith them in all one hundred and 
thirty-four galleys, and tw r o Rhodian long-boats of 
fifty oars a-piece. Of these, a hundred w r ere of 
Athens itself: whereof sixty were expedite, the 
other forty for transportation of soldiers : the rest 
of the navy belonged to the Chians and other the 
confederates. Of men of arms, they had in all 
five thousand one hundred. Of these, there were 
of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred en- 
rolled, and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, 
called] Thetes, hired for defence of the galleys 2 . 
The rest were of their confederates, some of them 
being their subjects : of Argives there were five 
hundred : of Mantineans and mercenaries, two 

1 [" With such an armament as been so in earlier times, it may still 
that described".] be assumed that it was not long 

2 [eTrifiarai : marines. Seeiii. 95. before they began to serve as light- 
The 1500 Athenians were IK ica- armed and in the fleet; and that 
raX<Jyov, sometimes called IK ru>v in cases of great urgency they 
rdZtwv. All citizens were subject to served as heavy-armed, as did even 
the expense and duties of hoplita 1 , many of the metcacij without how- 
and were enrolled accordingly: and ever being bound to this duty. It 
to them are opposed the dfifiog x//t\6c is probable therefore that they were 
and Thetes, as also the allies. Goell. armed at the public expense. Thu- 
From a lost passage of Aristo- cyclides accordingly mentions thetes 
phanes, the thetes, like the proletarii amongst the heavy-armed : but dis- 
among the Romans, are stated not tinguishes them from the heavy- 
to have been subject to military armed levied IK tcaraXoyov. Boeckh, 
duty. But though that may have The marines are so levied in viii.24.] 


hundred and fifty. Their archers in all, four hun- vi. 
dred and eighty : of which eighty were Cretans. 
Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of 
light-armed Megarean fugitives, one hundred and 
twenty : and in one vessel made for transportation 
of horses, thirty horsemen. 

44. These were the forces that went over to the 
war at first. With these went also thirty ships 
carrying necessaries, wherein went also the bakers, 
and masons, and carpenters, and all tools of use 
in fortification : and with these thirty ships went 
one hundred boats by constraint l ; and many other 
ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army 
for trade : which 2 then passed all together from 
Corcyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet 
being come to the promontory of lapygia and to 
Tarentum, and such other places as every one 
could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, 
neither received of the states there into any city 
nor allowed any market 3 , having only the liberty 
of anchorage and water, (and that also at Taren- 
tum and Locri 4 denied them), till they were at 

1 [Vessels belonging to private colony was a Heracleid; though 
individuals pressed into the service Taras is called a son of Neptune, 
by the state. See ch. 22.] because they carried over his wor. 

2 [" All which" &c.] ship from Taniarum to Italy. The 

3 [That is, the cities would sell fruitful and luxuriant soil, the soft 
them no provisions. Ayopa signifies and voluptuous climate, and the 
the thing sold, as well as the market, commerce for which Tarentum was 
Goeller.] well situated (though never actively 

4 [The most celebrated of all die carried on), engendered that effe- 
Lacedajmonian colonies, and one minacy of character, which gave 
which really proceeded from Sparta, countenance to the fable that the 
was Tarentum. The history of its founders were irapQeviai, sons of 
origin, though buried in fable, is unmarried women. The Locri an s 
connected with that of the first who in 683 founded Locri, must 
Messenian war. The leader of the also have had Spartan leaders : since, 



Rhegium, where they all came together again, and 
settled their camp in the temple of Diana (for 
neither there were they suffered to come in) with- 
out the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a 
market. And when they had drawn their galleys 
to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt with 
the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to aid the 
Leontines, Chalcideans likewise. To which was 
answered, that they would take part with neither ; 
but w r hat the rest of the Italians 1 should conclude, 
that also they would do. So the Athenians lay 
still, meditating on their Sicilian business, how 
they might carry it the best ; and withal expected 
the return from Egesta of the three galleys which 
they had sent before them, desiring to know if so 
much money were there or not, as was reported 
by their messengers at Athens. 

45. The Syracusians in the meantime from divers 
parts, and also from their spies, had certain intel- 
g, prepare for licence that the fleet was now at Rhegium : and 

their defence. & G 

therefore made their preparations with all diligence, 
and were no longer incredulous ; but sent unto the 
Siculi, to some cities men to keep them from revolt- 
ing ; to others, ambassadors ; and into such places 
as lay upon the sea 2 , garrisons : and examined the 
forces of their own city by a view taken of the 

as their coins show, they paid par- ! ['IraXiwrai : Italiots, the name 

ticular honours to the Dioscuri, and of the Greek settlers in Italy, in 

in time of distress in war the statues distinction to the 'IraXoi, Italians, 

of those gods were sent to them or natives. The same distinction 

from Sparta, as to a people of the holds hetween the SwccXiwrai and 

same origin. MuelL i. 6. As to the the SuecXot, the Sicilians and the 

TrapOtvicu, Aristotle (v. 7) seems not Sikeli : that is, the Greek settlers 

to doubt the truth of the story of and the natives.] . 

their having been the founders of 2 [irtpiiroXia : "and to the stations 

Tarentum.] of the national guards, garrisons".] 


arms and horse, whether they were complete or V r. 
not ; and ordered all things as for a war at hand. *- ' * 

' o y VKAR xvii. 

and only not already present. A.c.4i. 

46. The three galleys sent before to Egesta The hope of'th 
returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; and brought 1 ^ i ^ f 
word, that for the rest of the money promised 
there was none, only there appeared thirty talents. 
At this the generals were presently discouraged ; 
both because this first hope was crossed ; and be- 
cause also the Rhegians, whom they had already 
begun to persuade to their league, and whom it 
was most likely they should have won, as being of 
kin to the Leontines and always heretofore favour- 
able to the Athenian state, now refused. And 
though to Nicias this news from the Egestaeans was 
no more than he expected, yet to the other two it 
was extreme strange. But the Egestaeans, when The fraud of the 
the first ambassadors from Athens went to see Kgest8eans 
their treasure, had thus deceived them. They 
brought them into the temple of Venus in Eryx 1 , 
and showed them the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, 
censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity ; 
which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great 
deal above their true value in money. Then they 
feasted such as came with them 2 , in their private 
houses ; and at those feastings exhibited all the 
gold and silver vessels they could get together, 
either in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow 
in other as well Phoenician as Grecian cities, for 
their own. So all of them in a manner 3 making 
use of the same plate, and much appearing in 

1 Eryx was a city near Egesta, reme". rptr/ptruiv, see Herod, v. 85.] 
and subject to it. 8 [" All for the most part making 

8 [" Those that came in the tri- use of the same plate".] 

M 2 


every of those houses, it put those which came 
with the ambassadors 1 into a very great admira- 
tion : insomuch as at their return to Athens, they 
strove who should first proclaim what wealth they 
had seen. These men, having both been abused 
themselves and having abused others, when it 
was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta, 
were much taxed by the soldiers. But the generals 
went to counsel upon the business in hand. 
The several 47- Nicias was of this opinion : that it was best 
genTraZtouch- to go presently with the whole fleet to Selinus, 
l"li! ow to F against which they w r ere chiefly set forth; and 
The opinion of if the Egestseans would furnish them with money 
for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon 
the occasion ; if not, then to require maintenance 
for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, 
and staying with them by force or composition to 
bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace : and 
thence passing along by other of those cities, to 
make a show of the power of the Athenian state, 
and of their readiness to help their friends and 
confederates ; and so to go home, unless they 
could light on some quick and unthought-of means 
to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some 
of the other cities to their own league : and not to 
put the commonwealth in danger at her own 

The opinion of 48. Alcibiades said, it would not do well to have 
come ou t from Athens with so great a power, and 
then dishonourably without effect to go home 
again : but rather to send heralds to every city 
but Selinus and Syracuse, and assay to make the 

1 [" It put the Athenians of the triremes into" &c.] 


Siculi revolt from the Syracusians, and others to 
enter league with the Athenians, that they might 
aid them with men and victual : and first to deal 
with the Messanians, as being seated in the passage, 
and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming 
in, and having a port and harbour 1 sufficient for 
their fleet : and when they had gained those cities, 
and knew what help they were to have in the war, 
then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus, unless 
these would agree with the Egestaeans and the 
other suffer the Leontines to be replanted. 

49. But Lamachus was of opinion, that it was The opinion of 
best to go directly to Syracuse, and to fight with Lamacbus - 
them as soon as they could at their city, whilst 
they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the 
greatest. For that an army is always most terrible 
at first : but if it stay long ere it come in sight, 
men recollect their spirits, and contemn it the 
more 2 when they see it. Whereas if it come upon 
them suddenly while they expect it with fear, it 
would the more easily get the victory, and every- 
thing would affright them ; as the sight of it (for 
then they would appear most for number) and the 
expectation of their sufferings, but especially the 
danger of a present battle. And that it was likely 
that many men might be cut off in the villages 
without, as not believing they would come ; and 
though they should be already gotten in, yet the 
army, being master of the field and sitting down 
before the city, could want no money : and the 
other Sicilians would then neglect leaguing with 

1 ["As having a port and station my". In iv. 1 Messana is said to 
whence conveniently to attack and have the TrpofffioXt] of Sicily. Goell/] 
watch the movements of the cue- 2 [ u Contemn it rather".] 





OL 91 1 

but is denied. 

the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no 
longer standing off and spying who should have 
the better. And for a place to retire unto and 
anchor in 1 , he thought Megara most fit: being 
desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea 
nor land. 

50. Lamachus said this : but came afterwards 
to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades 
, w fth his own galley having passed over to Messana, 
an( j propounded to them a league and not pre- 
vailed, they answering that they would not let the 
army in but allow them only a market without the 

The Athenians walls, returned back to Rhegium. And presently 
the generals having out of the whole fleet maimed 
threescore galleys, and taken provision aboard, 
went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest 
of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. 

and to Catana. The Naxians having received them into the city, 
they went on by the coast to Catana. But the 
Catanseans receiving them not, (for there were 
some within that favoured the Syracusians), they 
entered the river of Terias ; and having stayed there 
all that night, went the next day towards Syracuse 

They send ten leisurely 2 with the rest of their galleys ; but ten they 
sent before into the great haven, [not to stay 3 , but] 
^ Q discover if they had launched any fleet there, 
and to proclaim from their galleys, that the Athe- 
nians were come to replant the Leontines on their 


1 [*' And whence to watch for which are unmeaning, are not in 
opportunities to attack the enemy", the Greek. " They sent forward 
Goeller.] ten of their galleys to sail to the 

2 [" In column". Bekker &c., great haven, and discover &c. ; and 
iiri KiptoQ: some MSS. 7rncatpo>c.] to approach the city and proclaim 

3 [These words " not to stay 1 ', from their galleys &c."] 


own, according to league and affinity, and that 
therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syra- 
cuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians 
as to their friends and benefactors. And when 
they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the 
city, and the havens, and the region where they 
were to seat themselves for the war, they returned 
to Catana. 

5 1 . An assembly being called at Catana, though Catana 
they refused to receive the army they admitted the 8urpmed - 
generals, and willed them to speak their minds. 

And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration and the 
citizens at the assembly, the soldiers having secretly 
pulled dow r n a little gate which was but weakly 
built 1 , entered the city, and were walking up and 
down in the market. And the Catanseaus, such 
as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, 
for fear stole presently out of the town, being not 
many. The rest concluded the league with the 
Athenians, and willed them to fetch in the rest of 
the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians 
went back to Rhegium : and rising from thence, 
came to Catana with their whole army together 2 . 

52. Now they had news from Camarina, that if The Athenia 
they would come thither, the Camarinseans would 

join with them ; and that the Syracusians were received - 
manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole 
army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse ; 

1 [" 111 walled-up". Goell. Am.] that the former would be the proper 

2 [" And made their camp", expression for those coming from 
Bekker and Goeller read ia7rXv- Rhegium to Catana, hut is not 
aavriSy " the Athenians crossed the applicable to those going from Ca- 
strait to Rhegium" ; instead of tana to Rhegium, on account of the 
TrXf utfovrtc, which is simply *' they difference in the course owing to 
went to Rhegium". Arnold says the formation of the coast.] 




where not finding any navy manned, they went on to 
Camarina 4 . And being come close up to the shore, 
they sent a herald unto them. But the Cama- 
rinaeans would not receive the army ; alleging that 
they had taken an oath, not to receive the Athen- 
ians with more than one galley, unless they should 
have sent for more of their own accord. Having 
lost their labour, they departed ; and landed in a 
part of the territory of Syracuse, and had gotten 
some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming 
out, and killing some stragglers of the light-armed, 
they returned again to Catana. 

53. Here they find the galley called Salaminia, 
come thither from Athens, both for Aicibiades, who 
was commanded to come home to purge himself of 
such things as were laid to his charge by the state, 
and also for other soldiers that were with him, 
whereof some were accused for profanation of the 
mysteries, and some also for the Mercuries 2 . For 
the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, pro- 
ceeded nevertheless in the search of those that 
were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and 
the Mercuries. And making no inquiry into the 
persons of the informers, but through jealousy ad- 
mitting of all sorts, upon the reports of evil men 
apprehended very good citizens and cast them 
into prison : choosing rather to examine the fact 
and find the truth by torments 3 , than that any man, 

1 [avOig: " they again continued 
along the coast to Camarina". Am .] 

2 [" And also for others of the 
army, against whom as well as him 
there were informations relating to 
the profanation of the mysteries, and 
also to the affair of the Mercuries".] 

3 [" They thought it better to 
sift the matter thoroughly and get 
at the truth, than that owing to the 
had character of the informer any 
one, even having the character of a 
good citizen, should he accused and 
escape unquestioned". Hobbeshas 





how good soever in estimation, being once accused 
should escape unquestioned. For the people, having 
by fame understood that the tyranny of Peisistratus 
and his sons was heavy in the latter end ; and 
withal, that neither themselves nor Harmodius, 
but the Lacedaemonians overthrew it 1 : were ever 
fearful, and apprehended every thing suspiciously. 

54. For the fact of Aristogeiton and Harmodius Digression 
was undertaken upon an accident of love: which p^gTrl 
uiifolding at large, I shall make appear that neither 
any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report so 
any certainty either of their own tyrants or of the 
fact. For the old Peisistratus dying in the tyranny, 

taken the scholiast's interpretation 
of (Bacraviaai TO Trpay/Ltct : which can 
scarcely mean torture applied to the 
person accused. Valla and Portus 
take it in its natural sense.] 

1 [The Athenian democracy re- 
ceived their first great impulse from 
a quarter, whence it might have 
been little looked for: from oli- 
garchical Sparta. The Alcmiuonida?, 
whom fearof Peisistratus had driven 
from Athens, on the death of Ilip- 
parchus settled at Delphi, and there 
contrived to bribe the Pythoness to 
bid all that came to the oracle from 
Sparta, whether in a public or pri- 
vate character, to rid Athens of her 
tyrants. Her habitual reverence 
for the commands of her god, backed 
by her eagerness to lay hold of 
every opportunity to carry out her 
favourite policy, was too much for 
her friendly feelings towards the 
family of Peisistratus : and Hippias 
was driven from Athens. But a 
short experience made her sensible 
that she had mistaken (as she did 
again, a century and more later, in 

the peace of Antalcidas) the relative 
strength of the aristocratical and 
democratical parties. Athens too, 
hitherto nowise superior to her 
neighbours, was no sooner released 
from the shackles of her tyrants and 
in the enjoyment of a regular 
government, than she surpassed 
them all in warlike qualities. With 
this too came to light the treason 
of the Pythoness : supposed to have 
been the work of Cleisthenes, the 
leader of the democracy. Cleomenes 
was therefore dispatched with an 
army to the aid of the sinking party 
of Isagoras, which was nevertheless 
forced to seek its safety in flight : 
not however before Cleomenes had 
been master of the Acropolis, and 
there found prophecies, left behind 
(purposely perhaps) by the Peisis- 
tratidcc, announcing dire evils to 
befall Sparta from Athens. And 
Sparta hereupon was ready, but for 
the strenuous protest of the confede- 
rates, to have undone her own work 
and recalled Hippias to Athens. 
See Herod, v. 68-9ti.] 


vi. not Hipparchus, as the most think, but Hippias, 

AC 514 ^ W ^ was k* s e ldest son, succeeded in the govern- 

OL.66.8. ment. Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of 

his youth, of great beauty, was in the power of one 

Aristogeiton, a citizen of a middle condition that 

was his lover. This Harmodius having been soli- 

cited by Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus, and 

not yielding, discovered the same unto Aristogeiton. 

He apprehending it (as lovers use) with a great 

deal of anguish, and fearing the power of Hip- 

parchus, lest he should take him away by force, 

fell presently, as much as his condition would per- 

mit, to a contriving how to pull down the tyranny. 

In the meantime Hipparchus, having again at- 

tempted Harmodius and not prevailed, intended, 

though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as 

if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him 

some disgrace 1 . For neither was the government 

otherwise heavy till then, but carried without their 

evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants 2 

held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long 

time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth 

part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed 

their wars, and administered their religion worthily. 

In other points they were governed by the laws 

formerly established, save that these took a care 

ever to prefer to the magistracy men of their own 

adherence. And amongst many that had the an- 

nual office of archon, Peisistratus also had it, the 

son of Hippias, of the same name with his grand- 

twv: from TTiyXdc, mud, 2 [" These, tyrants as they were, 

signifies the offering of any species held"&e. G61. The tenth of all rents 

of insult, by word or deed, whether &c., levied by Peisistratus, was re- 

cognizable by law or not. Goell.] duced by his sons to a twentieth.] 


father ; who also, when he was archon, dedicated 
the altar of the twelve gods 1 in the market-place, 
and that other in the temple of Apollo Pythius. 
And though the people of Athens, amplifying 
afterwards that altar which was in the market- 
place, thereby defaced the inscription : yet that 
upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Py- 
thius, is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat 
obscure, in these words : 

Peisistratus the son of Hippias 

Erected this to stand 
I'tJi Temple of Apollo Pythius, 

Witness of his command. 

55. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, 
had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it 
by a more exact relation than other men : and it 
may be known also by this. It appears that of all 
the legitimate brethren, this only had children : as 
is both signified by the altar, and also by that 
pillar, which for a testimony of the injustice of the 
tyrants was erected in the Athenian citadel. In 
which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus 
or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, which 
he had by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias the 
son of Hyperechidas : for it is probable that the 
eldest was first married. And in the forepart of the 
pillar, his name after his father's was the first : not 
without reason, as being both next him in age, 

1 [The altar of the twelve gods, tances were measured throughout 

which is mentioned hy Herodotus Attica. On the sides of the road, 

(vi. 108) as heing in existence in ousts of Hermes were placed hy 

520, is supposed hy Goeller to have Hipparchus to serve as mile-stones, 

been the central point whence, from " And that other of Apollo in the 

the time of Peisistratus, the dis- temple of Pythium".] 


vi. and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed 
AC 514" could Hippias have easily taken on him the govern- 
OL.66.3. ment on a sudden, if his brother had died seised of 
the tyranny, and he been the same day to settle it 
on himself. Whereas he retained the same with 
abundant security, both for the customary fear in 
the people and diligence in the guard 1 ; and was 
not to seek like a younger brother, to whom the 
government had not continually been familiar. 
But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfor- 
tune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards that 
he was also tyrant. 

56. This Harmodius therefore that denied his 
suit, he disgraced as he before intended. For 
when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to 
be present to carry a little basket in a procession, 
they rejected her again when she came : and said 
that they had never warned her at all, as holding 
her unw r orthy the honour 3 . This was taken heavily 
by Harmodius ; but Aristogeiton, for his sake, was 
far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with 
the rest of the conspirators, he 3 made all things 

1 [" Whereas he both retained the is since called. On the expulsion 
same with abundant security, owing of the Cadmeiaris by the Argives, 
to his having long accustomed the the Gephyncans were left in posses- 
people to dread him and to his sion of Tanagra : but the subse- 
habitual attention to his guards, quent irruption of the Boeotians 
and was not to seek" &c. Goell.] drove them to Athens (see iii. 61, 

2 [" As being unfit for the office, note). If therefoie the icavriQopoi 
This being taken heavily by Har- or basket-carrier sin the Panathcna>a 
inodius, Aristogeiton too was for his and other festivals were chosen 
sake for more exasperated (than strictly tvyiv&v, from the virgins 
before)". Both Harmodius and of pure blood, the sister of ilarmo- 
Aristogeiton were, according to He- dius, as of foreign origin, was un- 
rodotus (v. 55), descended from the doubtedly liable to exception on 
Gepbyraeans, a Phoenician race that that ground.] 

came with Cadmus to Bocotia, as it 3 [" They made all things" &c.] 


ready for the execution of the design. Only they vi 
were to stay the time of the holiday called the 
Great Panathensea, upon which day only such citi- 
zens as lead the procession might, without suspi- 
cion, be armed in good number. And they were 
to begin the fact themselves ; but the rest were to 
help them against the halberdiers l . Now the con- 
spirators, for their better security, were not many ; 
for they hoped that such also as were not privy to 
it, if they saw it once undertaken 2 , being upon this 
occasion armed, would assist in the recovery of 
their own liberty. 

57- When this holiday was come, Hippias was 
gone out of the city into the place called Ceramei- 
cum with his guard of halberdiers, and was order- 
ing the procession how it was to go. And Harmo- 
dius and Aristogeiton, with each of them a dagger, 
proceeded to the fact. But when they saw one of 
the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias, 
(for Hippias was very affable to all men), they 
were afraid, and believed that they were discovered 
and must presently have been apprehended. They 
resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be re- 
venged first upon him that had done them the 
wrong, and for whose sake they had undergone all 
this danger ; and, furnished as they were, ran [furi- 
ously] into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a 
place called Leocorium 3 , without all regard of 
themselves fell upon him, and with all the anger 

1 The guard of Hippias the tyrant A thens, taking its name from the 

2 [" If any number, however three daughters, sacrificed, accord- 
small, should make a beginning".] ing to report, by their father Leos to 

3 [" The temple called Leoco- Minerva for the safety of the city, 
rium". A temple of Minerva at at the bidding of the Delphic oracle.] 


vi. in the world, one upon jealousy, the other upon 
*A.C6u." disgrace, struck and slew him. Aristogeiton, for the 
OL.60.3. present, by means of the great confluence of people, 
escaped through the guard ; but taken afterwards, 
was ungently handled 1 ; but Harmodius was slain 
upon the place. 58. The news being brought to Hip- 
pias in the Cerameicum, he went not towards the 
place where the fact was committed, but presently 
unto those that were armed for the solemnity of 
the shows and were far off, that he might be with 
them before they heard of it : and composing his 
countenance [as well as he could] to dissemble the 
calamity, pointed to a certain place, and com- 
manded them to repair thither without their arms. 
Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would 
have told them somewhat. But having commanded 
his guard to take those arms away, he then fell 
presently to picking out of such as he meant to ques- 
tion, and whosoever else was found amongst them 
with a dagger. For with shields and spears to be 
in [the head of] the procession, was of custom. 

59. Thus was the enterprise first undertaken 
upon quarrel of love, and then upon a sadden fear 
followed this unadvised adventure 2 of Harmodius 
and Aristogeiton. And after this time the tyranny 
grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been be- 
fore. And Hippias standing more in fear, not 
only put many of the citizens to death, but also 

1 [This is understood to mean, evidence was considered material, 

that he was put to very severe tor- torture was applied as a matter of 

ture to extort from him the names course : as however ready they 

of his accomplices. This was a might be to give their -evidence, it 

practice not confined to Athens. To was considered worthless without it.] 
slaves, and even foreigners, whose 8 [" This desperate feat".] 


cast his eye on the states abroad, to see if he might vi. 
get any security from them in this alteration at ^ c 514 ^ 
home. He therefore afterwards (though an Athe- 
nian and to a Lampsacen 1 ) gave his daughter Arche- 
dice unto ^Eantidas the son of Hippocles, tyrant of 
Lampsacus ; knowing that the Lampsacens were in 
great favour with King Darius. And her sepulchre 
is yet to be seen with this inscription : 

Archedice, tlie daughter of King Hippias, 

Who in his time 
Of all the potentates of Greece was prime, 

This du$t doth hide. 
Daughter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was, 

Yet free from pride. 

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years 
more in Athens, and was in the fourth deposed by A.C 510. 
the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmseonides, 
went under truce to Sigeium, and to ^Eantidas at 
Lampsacus, and thence to King Darius: from 
whence, twenty years after in his old age, he came A.c.4oo. 
to Marathon with the Medan army. 

60. The people of Athens bearing this in mind, AC.US. 
and remembering all they had heard concerning Tht^ea^Jy 
them, were extremely bitter and full of jealousy 
towards those that had been accused of the myste- 

_ i , n , i i j tlieauthorsofthe 

nes : and thought all to have been done upon offences touch- 
some oligarchical or tyrannical conspiracy. And M 
whilst they were passionate upon this surmise, 
many worthy men had already been cast in 
prison : and yet they were not likely so to give 
over, but grew daily more savage, and sought to 

1 A woman of Athens, a city to a man of Lampsacus, a city infa- 
flourishing for letters and civility, mous for barbarity and effeminacy. 







One of the pri- 
soners is per- 
suaded by a fel- 
low-prisoner to 
appeach some 
man, whether 
true or not true ; 
and doth so. 

Divers men 
accused of the 
paring of the 

apprehend more still. Whilst they were at this 
pass, a prisoner 1 that seemed most to be guilty, was 
persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to accuse 
somebody, whether it were true or not true : (for 
it is but conjectural on both sides ; nor was there 
ever, then or after, any man that could say cer- 
tainly who it was that did the deed) : who brought 
him to it by telling him, that though he had not 
done it, yet he might be sure to save his own life, 2 
and should deliver the city from the present sus- 
picion : and that he should be more certain of his 
own safety by a free confession than by coming to 
his trial if he denied it. Hereupon, he accused 
both himself and others for the Mercuries. The 
people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty 
(as they thought) of the fact, and having been 
much vexed before to think that the conspirators 
should never [perhaps] be discovered to their 
multitude 3 , presently set at liberty the accuser, and 
the rest with him whom he had not appeached : 
but for those that were accused, they appointed 
judges 4 , and all they apprehended they executed : 
and having condemned to die such as fled, they 
ordained a sum of money to be given to those that 
should slay them. And though it were all this 

1 [This prisoner was Andocides, 
the orator. As Thucydides could 
not satisfy himself as to the credit 
due to his story, it would be pre- 
sumption for any one now to pro- 
nounce upon it But the narrative 
which we have still remaining from 
the hand of Andocides himself, in 
an oration composed some years 
after in his own defence, raises a 
strong suspicion that it had at most 

but a very slender ground-work of 
truth. Thirl, ch. xxv.] 

2 [" Yet by obtaining a promise 
of pardon he might both save his 
own life and deliver" &c. " by a 
free confession under a promise of 
pardon, than" &e.] 

8 [" That those who were con- 
spiring against the multitude".] 

4 [" They went through the forms 
of trial".] 


while uncertain whether they suffered justly or 
unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a manifest 
ease for the present. 

6 1 . But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took 
it extreme ill through the instigation of his ene- 
mies, the same that had opposed 1 him before he 
went. And seeing it was certain, as they thought, 
for the Mercuries ; the other crime also concern- 
ing the mysteries, whereof he had been accused, 
seemed a great deal the more to have been com- 
mitted by him upon the same reason and conspiracy 
against the people. For it fell out withal, whilst Preemption. 
the city was in a tumult about this, that an army 5SSI. 
of the Lacedaemonians was come as far as the 
isthmus upon some design against the Boeotians 2 . 
These therefore they thought were come thither, 
not against the Boeotians 3 , but by appointment of 
him ; and that if they had not first apprehended 
the persons appeached, the city had been betrayed. 
And one night they watched all night long in their 
arms in the temple of Theseus within the city. 
And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos were at 
the same time suspected of a purpose to set upon 
the people there : whereupon the Athenians also 
delivered unto the Argive people those hostages 4 
which they held of theirs in the islands, to be 
slain. And there were presumptions 5 against Al- 
cibiades on all sides. Insomuch, as purposing by AiciMwies sent 
law to put him to death, they sent, as I have said, for home< 

1 [ u That set upon him".] 3 [" Not on an understanding 

3 [" That an army, no great one, with the Boeotians" ] 

of the Lacedaemonians was come as 4 [The 300 Argives suspected of 

far as the isthnrus upon some prac- Lacedaemonisin : see v. 84.] 

tice with the Boaotians" (against 5 [" And suspicion beset Alcihi- 

the Athenians).] ades on all sides'*.] 




the galley called Salaminia into Sicily, both for 
him, and the rest with him that had been accused: 
but gave command to those that went, not to 
apprehend him, but to bid him follow them to 
make his purgation ; because they had a care not 
to give occasion of stir either amongst their own 
or their enemy's soldiers ; but especially, because 
they desired that the Mantineans and the Argiyes, 
who they thought followed the war by his persua- 
sion, might not depart from the army. So he and 
the rest accused with him in his own galley, in 
company of the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail 
for Athens. But being at Thurii they followed 
no further, but left the galley and were no more 
to be found : fearing indeed to appear to the accu- 
sation 1 . They of the Salaminia made search for 

1 [" Fearing to go home to meet 
their trial with the present prejudice 
existing against them". Gocll. Arn. 
That Alcibiades and the rest should 
have declined a trial will surprise 
no one, when it is considered, 
amongst other indications of the 
temper of the Athenian people and 
the sort of trial they were likely to 
have, that the story of the principal 
informer, Dioclides,was this : that he 
knew the mutilators of the Hermes- 
busts, that they amounted to 300 
persons, that on the night of the 
outrage he had seen them enter the 
orchestra of the theatre, that he 
stood behind a pillar and could dis- 
cern, by the light of the moon which 
shone full in their faces, the fea- 
tures of almost all, that he did not 
see the outrage perpetrated, but the 
next day meeting some of the 300 
he taxed them with the deed, which 

they admitted and gave him money 
to be silent : and that on this evi- 
dence, uncorroborated and unques- 
tioned, it was resolved by the council 
of 500 (which was invested with ex- 
traordinary powers for investigating 
the supposed conspiracy) to arrest 
and put to the torture forty-two 
persons named in a list given in by 
Dioclides, two in this list being 
members of the council. This in- 
former was crowned and drawn in a 
chariot to the council-house, to be 
entertained amongst the privileged 
guests at the public table. He after- 
wards confessed himself to be an 
impostor, and suffered death. Su- 
perstition seems to have had its 
share in producing this popular 
madness. There are many indica- 
tions, that during* the war, while 
the public morals were more and 
more infected with licentiousness, 


Alcibiades and those that were with him, for a 
while: but not finding him, followed on their 
course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, 
passed shortly after in a small boat from Thurii 
into Peloponnesus ; and the Athenians proceeding 
to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned 
both him and them to death. 

62. After this, the Athenian generals that re- The 
mained in Sicily, having divided the army into two, j^ 
and taken each his part by lot, went with the and E s esta - 
whole towards Selinus and Egesta : with intention, 
both to see if the Egestseans would pay them the 
money, and withal to get knowledge of the designs 
of the Selinuntians and learn the state of their 
controversy with the Egestseans. And sailing by 
the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on 
that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they 
came to Himera, the only Grecian city in that part 
of Sinily : which not receiving them, they went 
on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of ThrvtaU 


and the new sceptical opinions were number of devotees than before, 
spreading among the upper classes, especially among the women. Such 
superstition was gaining ground were the orgies of the Thracian 
in the great hody of the people, goddess Cotytto, those of the god 
The proceedings and disclosures Sabazius, the Phrygian Bacchus, 
which followed the mutilation of the worship of Rhea or Cybele, and 
the Hermes-busts, though the result of Adonis. Some of these rites, as 
of political intrigues, are still no the secret orgies of Cotytto, appear, 
to be overlooked as illustrations of like the Roman Bacchanalia, to have 
the state of religion. And the re- been used as a cover for the grossest 
mains of the old comedy contain licentiousness. It was generally 
many allusions to the introduction noticed as an ill omen, that the 
of new rites, all of a mystic and en- festival of Adonis, which was cele- 
thusiastic nature, and belonging to hrated by the women with repre- 
foreignand barbarous superstitions, sentation of funeral exsequies, fell 
which seem either to have been on the day on which the Sicilian ex- 
imported during this period into pedition was decreed. See Thirl. 
Athens, or to have attracted a greater ch. xxv. xxxii.] 

N 2 




-..--- - 


\. C. 415. 

the Sicanians enemy to the Egestaeans, and a sea- 
town ; and having made the inhabitants slaves, 
delivered the town to the Egestseans, whose horse- 
forces were there with them. Thence the Athe- 
nians with their landsmen returned through the 
territory of the Siculi to Catana ; and the galleys 
went about with the captives. Nicias going with 
the fleet presently from Hyccara to Egesta, when 
he had dispatched with them his other business, 
and received thirty talents of money, returned to 
the army. The captives they ransomed ; of which 
they made one hundred and twenty talents more. 
Then they sailed about to their confederates of the 
Siculi, appointing them to send their forces : and 
with the half of their own they came before Hybla 
The end of the in the territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it 
not. And so ended this summer. 

63. The next winter the Athenians fell presently 
, to make preparation for their journey against Sy- 
racuse : and the Syracusians, on the other side, 
prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the 
Athenians had not presently, upon the first fear and 
expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they 
got every day more and more heart. And because 
they went far from them into those other parts of 
Sicily, and assaulting Hybla could not take it, 
they contemned them more than ever : and prayed 
their commanders, (as is the manner of the multi- 
tude, when they be in courage), seeing that the 
Athenians came not unto them, to conduct them 
to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, which 
were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the 
camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns asked 
them, whether they came not rather to dwell in 




the land of another than to restore the Leontines 
to their own. ^ 

64. The Athenian generals having observed this, 
and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' Niciasim strata- 

whole power as far as might be from the city, to i 

be able in the meantime without impeachment, encamping by 

,.,.,.,, . Syracuse. 

going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some 
convenient place to encamp in; for 1 they knew 
they should not be able to do it so well in the face 
of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to 
march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen 
being many would greatly annoy the light-armed 
and other multitude, they themselves having no 
horsemen there : whereas thus they might possess 
themselves of a place, where the horse could not 
do them any hurt at all to speak of, (now the 2 
Syracusian outlaws that were with them, had told 
them of a place near the temple Olympieium 3 , 
which also they seized) : I say, the Athenian gene- 
rals, to bring this their purpose to effect, contrived 
the matter thus. They send a man, of whose 
fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion 
of the Syracusian commanders no less a friend of 

1 [*' For they knew they should of the Olympian Jupiter seems to 

not be so well able (to effect their have originated with the Achueans, 

object) if they should disembark who also in other places conse- 

in the face of an enemy prepared crated temples to Jupiter alone. 

against them ; or if they should be But it is remarkable that in no 

known to be marching by land, for Doric country was there any great 

that" &c.] establishment of the worship of this 

3 [" Some Syracusian outlaws".] god : but wherever it occurred, it 

3 L'lhe Syracusans derived this was connected with and subordinate 

worship of Jupiter from that at to that of some other deity. Muell. 

Olympia in Elis: Archias, their ii. 10. The Syracusans reckoned 

founder, having.been accompanied their time by the office of the Am- 

by one of the I amid SB, the sacred phipolis, or high priest of the Olym- 

family of Olympia. The worship pieium.] 


vj. theirs. This man was a Catansean, and said he 
YAB xvu came fr m Catana,, from such and such, whose 
A.c.415. names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of 
their well-willers in that city. He told them that 
the Athenians lay every night within the town, 
and far from their arms ; and that if with the 
whole power of their city, at a day appointed be- 
times in a morning they would come to their 
camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut 
the Athenians in and set on fire their galleys ; by 
which means, the Syracusians assaulting the palli- 
sado, might easily win the camp 1 : and that the 
Catanseans that were to help them herein were 
many, and those he came from already prepared 
for it. 

65. The Syracusian commanders, having been 
also otherwise encouraged, and having intended a 
preparation 2 to go against Catana though this 
messenger had not come, did so much the more 
unadvisedly believe the man ; and straightways 
being agreed of the day on which they were to be 
there, sent him away. These commanders (for by 
this time the Selinuntians and some other their 
confederates were come in) appointed the Syracu- 
sians universally to set forwards by a day 3 . And 
when all their necessaries were in readiness, and 
the day at hand on which they were to be there, 
they set forwards towards Catana, and encamped 

1 [" The army": that is, the bat itvai iiri Karavrjv : omnino sus- 
Athenians in the camp, as distin- pecturn habeo hunc locum". " Hav- 
guished from those in Catana. Goell. ing intended to have been prepared 
Arn.] to go" &c. Goell.] 

2 \waptffKtvdff9cu," a preparation 1 ', 3 [" Gave orders to the Syracu- 
is set down by Arnold as an inter- sians to be ready for the expedition 
polation. Duker says : " siifficie- with all their forces".] 


the night following upon the banks of the river 
Simaethus in the territory of the Leontines. The 
Athenians upon advertisement that they were set 
forth, rising with their whole army, both them- 
selves and such of the Siculi and others as went 
with them 1 , and going aboard their galleys and 
boats in the beginning of the night set sail for 
Syracuse. In the morning betimes the Athenians 
disbarked over against Olympieium 2 , to make their 
camp. And the Syracusian horsemen, who were 
at Catana before the rest, finding the camp risen, 
came back to the foot and told them : whereupon 
they w r ent all together back to the aid of the city 3 . 
66. In the meantime, the way the Syracusians had The Athenians 
to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their } m^nA&a? 
camp at leisure in a place of advantage : wherein 
it was in their own power to begin battle when 
they list, and where both in and before the battle 
the Syracusian horsemen could least annoy them. 
For on one side there were walls, and houses, and 

1 ["That had come to join them".] became suburbs of the city. The 

2 [" The Olympieium".] circuit of the ancient walls of this 

3 [Syracuse is said by Plutarch to Pentapolis was, according to Strabo, 
have been a city not inferior to 180 stadia: which agrees pretty 
Athens: and must therefore have nearly with the result of modern 
contained at one time about'200,000 surveys. The territory of the city 
inhabitants. Ortygia, the ancient extended toward the north to that 
city, called also Nijffoc, and by the of the Leontines : on the south it 
Romans Insula, Arx> Urbs y Penin- was conterminous with that of the 
5M/a, was (except Temenites) the Camarinwans. ManyoftheSikelian 
only name of the various quarters cities were tributary to it. The 
of the city known to Thucydides. population has in modern times 
That which was afterwards called returned within its ancient limits of 
Acradina, he calls ri\v *> yr6\iv. Ortygia : and docs not now exceed 
The name Temenites afterwards at the utmost 40,000, and is accord- 
became changed for Neapolis : and ing to some far less. See Goelier, 
in time Tyca and Epipolac also ch. 66, note.] 




The Athenians 

trees, and a lake that kept them off ; on the other 
side steep rocks : and having felled trees hard by 
and brought them to the sea-side, they made a 
pallisado both before their galleys and towards 
Dascon 1 . And on that part that was most acces- 
sible to the enemy, they made a fort with stone, 
(the best they could find, but unwrought), and with 
wood ; and withal pulled down the bridge of the 
river Anapus. Whilst this w r as doing, there 
came none to empeach them from the city. The 
first 2 that came against them were the Syracusian 
horsemen ; and by and by after, all the foot toge- 
fa er j^^ though at first they came up near unto 
the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the 
Athenians came not out against them, they retired 
again ; and crossing to the other side of the Helo- 
rine highway, stayed there that night. 

6/. The next day the Athenians and their con- 
to fight federates prepared to fight, and were ordered thus. 
The Argives and the Mantineans had the right w T ing, 
the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of 
their confederates in the other wing. That half of 
the army which stood foremost, was ordered by 
eight in file : the other half towards their tents, 
ordered likewise by eights, was cast into the form 
of a long square 3 , and commanded to observe dili- 
gently where the rest of the army was in distress, 
and to make specially thither. And in the middest 

1 [" They made a stockade along 
the line of their galleys ; and close 
to Dascon, where it was most easy 
of access to the enemy, hastily 
erected a fort with unhewn stones 
c." Bekk. Arn. Goeller's punctu- 
ation agrees with that of Hobbes.] 

2 [" nut first the Syracusan horse- 
men came to help, and then after- 
wards all the foot too was collected 
together. And they marched up at 
first near, but after &c".] 

3 [" Of a hollow square". For the 
difference in the Athenian and Sy- 


of these so arranged, were received such as carried 
the weapons and tools of the army 1 . 

The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, 
who were Syracusians of all conditions and as 
many of their confederates as were present, by 
sixteens in file : (they that came to aid them, w r ere 
chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of 
the Geloans, about two hundred ; and of the Cama- 
rinaeans, about twenty horsemen and fifty archers) : 
the cavalry they placed in the right point of the 
battle, being in all no less than a thousand two 
hundred, and with them the darters. But the 
Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias 
went up and down the army, from one nation to 
another : to whom and to all in general he spake 
to this effect : 

68. " What need I, sirs, to make a long exhorta- THE ORATION OF 
tion, when this battle is the thing for which we all 
carne hither 2 ? For in my opinion, the present 
preparation is more able to give you encourage- 
ment, than any oration how well soever made, if 
with a weak army. For where we are together, 
Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of 
the islanders, how can we choose among so many 
and good confederates, but conceive great hope of 
the victory : especially against tag and rag, and not 
chosen men, as we are ourselves, and against Sici- 
lians, w r ho though they contemn us, cannot stand 
against us ; their skill not being answ r erable to 


racusian tactics, see iv. 03. note.] talion, who are here for one and the 

1 [* l And in the middle of these, same contest": that is, u we are all 
who formed the reserve, they placed engaged in one common cause, and 
the baggage-carriers".] ' should he mutually encouraged by 

2 [" What need we a long exhor- the sight of each other". Arn.] 



Oration of 

The battle 
between the 

their courage ? It must be remembered also that 
we be far from our own, and not near to any 
amicable territory but such as we shall acquire by 
the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, 
is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to 
theirs, ' You are to fight for your country 1 . I say 
to you, You are to fight out of your country, where 
you must either get the victory, or not easily get 
away ; for many horsemen will be upon us. Re- 
member therefore every man his own worth, and 
charge valiantly : and think the present necessity 
and strait we are in, to be more formidable than 
the enemy." 

69. Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led 
it presently to the charge. The Syraeusians ex- 
pected not to have fought at that instant : and 
the city being near, some of them were gone 
away ; and some for haste came in running ; and 
though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself 
in where was the greatest number. For they wanted 
neither willingness nor courage, either in this or 
any other battle ; being no less valiant, so far forth 
as they had experience, than the Athenians : but 
the want of this made them, even against their 
wills, to abate also somewhat of their courage. 
Nevertheless though they thought not the Athe- 
nians would have begun the battle, and were 
thereby constrained to fight upon a sudden, yet 
they resumed their arms, and came presently for- 
ward to the encounter. 

And first, the casters of stones 1 and slingers 
and archers of either side, skirmished in the middest 

1 [" The throwers of stones", qui saxa non fundis, sed manibus 
Xi0o/36Xoi, lapidatores, milites erant, emittebant". Goell.] 


between the armies, mutually chasing each other, 
as amongst the light-armed was not unlikely. 
After this, the soothsayers brought forth their 
sacrifices according to the law of the place 1 ; and 
the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the 
battle. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians 
for their country and their lives for the present, 
and for their liberty in the future : on the other 
side, the Athenians to win the country of another 
and make it their own, and not to weaken their 
own by being vanquished : the Argives arid other 
free confederates, to help the Athenians to conquer 
the country they came against, and to return to 
their own with victory : and their subject confe- 
derates came also on with great courage, princi- 
pally for their better safety, as desperate if they 
overcame not ; and withal upon the by, that by 
helping the Athenians to subdue the country of 
another, their own subjection might be the easier. 
?0. After they were come to hand-strokes, they 
fought long on both sides. But in the meantime 
there happened some claps of thunder and flashes 
of lightning, together with a great shower of rain : 
insomuch as it added to the fear of the Syracu- 
sians, that were now fighting their first battle and 
not familiar with the wars ; whereas to the other 

1 [" According to custom". It is battle of Platsea, Pausanias induced 
not meant that the Syracusans only tbe Lacedaemonians and Tegeetaus 
offered the usual sacrifice. The to support with patience a murder- 
Greeks in general always sacrificed ous attack by the Persiaa archers, 
before battle (see iv. 92, v. 10.) ; and till the sacritice appeared fair (He- 
waited to engage till the sacrifice rod. ix. (31) : that is, till the move- 
was pronounced propitious : a cus- ment of the Persians gave him the 
torn which was of course turned to opportunity for charging with ad- 
account by the general. At the \antage.] 


vj. side that had more experience, the season of the 
'~~ > * year 1 seemed to expound that accident ; and their 


A.C.4U. greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance 
of their enemies, in that they were not all this 
while overcome. When the Argives first had made 
the left wing of the Syracusians to give ground, 
and after them the Athenians had also done the 
like to those that were arranged against them : 
The Athenians then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently 
have the victoiy. ^^^ an( j put to flight. But the Athenians pur- 
sued them not far ; because the Syracusian horse- 
men, being many and unvanquished 2 , whensoever 
any men of arms advanced far from the body of 
the army, charged upon them, and still drave them 
in again : but having followed as far as safely they 
might in great troops, they retired again and 
erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied 
themselves in the Helorine way, and recovered 
their order as well as they could for that time, sent 3 
a guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should 
take the treasure there : and returned with the rest 
of the army into the city. 71. The Athenians went 
not to assault the temple ; but gathering together 
their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and 
stayed that night upon the place. The next day 
they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their 
dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain 
about two hundred and sixty : and gathered up 
the bones of their own 4 . Of the Athenians and 

1 [That is, winter. See the next 3 [opus : " notwithstanding their 
chapter.] defeat sent" &c.] 

2 [" Because the Syracusan horse- 4 [Ut in patriam relata, ibi sepe- 
men being &c., checked them, and lirentur, ut arbitror : quod et de 
whensoever" &c.] Themistoclis ossibus quidam pro- 


their confederates there died about fifty. And 
thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, 
they returned to Catana '. For it was now winter ; 
and to make war there, they thought it yet unpos- 
sible before they had sent for horsemen to Athens, 
and levied other amongst their confederates there 
in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether 
over-mastered in horse ; and before they had also 
both levied money there and received more from 
Athens, and made league with certain cities, which 
they hoped after this battle would the more easily 
hearken thereunto ; arid before they had likewise 
provided themselves of victuals and other things 
necessary, as intending the next spring to under- 
take Syracuse again. 72. With this mind they 
went to winter at Naxos and Catana. 

The Syracusians after they had buried their Hermocrates en. 
dead, called an assembly : and Hermocrates the 
son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to 
any in wisdom, and in war both able for his expe- 
rience and eminent for his valour, standing forth 
gave them encouragement, and would not suffer 
them to be dismayed with that which had happened. 
" Their courage," he said, " was not overcome, 
though their want of order had done them hurt. 
And yet in that they w r ere not so far inferior, as it 
was likely they would have been : especially being 
{as one may say) home-bred artificers, against the 
most experienced in the war of all the Grecians 2 . 

diderunt,etdeEumenePlutarchus. 2 [*' And bein^ moreover like 

Notus est x omnibus scriptoribus men, if one may so say, without any 

bicmosveterum.Duk. For the bones knowledge of a trade (idwrag) op. 

of Themistodes, see also i. 1 38.] posed to the most experienced of all 

1 [" And with the spoils of their Greece". Am." That they had 

enemies they returned" &cj also been greatly hurt" &c.] 


vi. That they had also been hurt by the number of 
Y*ABxvir the* 1 " generals and commanders/' for there were 
A.CUI*. fifteen that commanded in chief "and by the 
many supernumerary soldiers under no command 
at all ! . Whereas if they would make but a few 
and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter 
for such as want it, to increase as much as might 
be the number of their men of arms, and compel 
them in other things to the exercise of discipline, 
in all reason they were to have the better of the 
enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep 
their order would be learnt by practice 2 : and both 
of these would still grow greater ; skill, by prac- 
tising with danger ; and their courage would grow 
bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill. And 
for their generals, they ought to choose them few 
and absolute, and to take an 8 oath unto them, to 
let them lead the army wheresoever they thought 
best. For by this means, both the things that 
require secrecy would the better be concealed, and 
all things would be put in readiness with order 
and less tergiversation." 
amiis chosen 73. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, 

lwithtW decreed al1 that he advised: and elected three 
generals, him, Heracleides the son of Lysimachus, 
and Sicanus the son of Exekestus. They sent also 
ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as well 
to obtain a league with them 4 , as also to persuade 

'["And the disorder and anarchy 3 [r6 opiciov: " the oath". The 

of the many": that is, " of the pri- usual oath of unlimited obedience, 

vates".] taken when any commander was 

2 [" They were to have the better invested with unlimited authority. 

of their enemy : when to their cour- Arnold.] 

age, which they have already, should 4 ["Both that an allied force 

be added good order in action".] might join them". Arnold.] 



the Lacedaemonians to make a hotter war against 
the Athenians, and to declare themselves in the 
quarrel of the Syracusians : thereby either to with- 
draw them from Sicily, or to make them the less 
able to send supply to their army which was there 

74. The Athenian army at Catana sailed pre- r\ Athenians 
sently to Messana, to receive it by treason of some ^Cuffon. 
within : but the plot came not to effect. For Al- 
cibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, 

being resolved to fly, and knowing what was to be 
done 1 , discovered the same to the friends of the 
Syracusians in Messana : who with those of their 
faction slew 2 such as were accused, and being 
armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to 
have the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians, 
after thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous 
weather, provision also failing and nothing suc- 
ceeding, returned again to Naxos : and having 
fortified their camp with a pallisado, they wintered 
there ; and dispatched a galley to Athens for 
money and horsemen, to be with them early in 
the spring. 

75. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall A.C. 415.4. 

. OL. 01. 2 

before their city, all the length of the side towards Th 
Epipolse 3 including Temenites : to the end, if they 

1 [" For Alcibiades, upon leav- and broken ground, that rose with 
ing his command on being sent for a continual ascent from the city to- 
home, knowing that he would have wards the western and inland parts: 
to fly, and being aware of what was from whence was visible the whole 
about to be done, discovered'* &c.] interior of the city. Its highest 

* [" First slew &c., and then fall- part, and the ground immediately 

ing into sedition and arming them- adjacent to it, consisted of three 

selves, obtained" &c.] continuous hills, standing in a 

3 [T& kiriiro\&c; Anglice Over ton. straight line. By the principal of 

Epipola? was the name of the steep these, Euryelus, which formed the 




A. C. 415 4. 

Ou 01. 2. 
and burn the 
tents of the 
Athenians by 

both from the 

chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily 
enclosed as when they were in a narrower compass. 
And they put a guard into Megara, and another 
into Olympieium ; and made pallisadoes on the sea- 
side at all the places of landing. And knowing 
that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they 
marched with all the power of the city unto Ca- 
tana : and after they had wasted the territory, and 
burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians 
had lodged before, returned home. And having 
heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to 
Camarina, according to a league made before in 
the time of Laches 1 , to try if they could win them 
the friendship of to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose 
it. For they suspected that the Camarinseans had 
sent those succours in the former battle, with no 
great good will : and that now they would take 
part with them no longer, seeing the Athenians 
had the better of the day, but would rather join 
with the Athenians upon the former league. Her- 
mocrates therefore and others being corne to Ca- 
marina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and 
others from the Athenians, when the assembly was 
met, Hermocrates desiring to increase their envy 
to the Athenians 2 , spake unto them to this effect : 
76. "Men of Camarina, we come not hither 

Syracuse unto 
Camarina, for 


extremity of Epipolae, was the 
ascent from the parts about the 
river Anapus, and from the inland 
country, and from Megara, Tbapsos, 
and Leon. Goell. " including rbv 
rtpevtTrjv" : a name of Apollo, ap- 
parently so called from rc/icwc, in 
like manner as Diana Nemorensis 
Aricii extra Romam from nemus. 
This name of Apollo, Temenitcs, 

became that of the quarter where his 
rtptvoc stood. And that it stood in 
Ncapolis, which after the time of 
Thucydides became* the name of 
this quarter of the city, appears 
from Cicero iv. Verr, 73. Goell.] 

1 [Seeiii. 86.] 

2 [" To be beforehand in accus- 
ing the Athenians". Bekker &c., 


upon fear that the forces of the Athenians here vi. 
present may affright you : but lest their speeches \^ K \ VJJ * 
which they are about to make, may seduce you, A car, 4. 
before you have also heard what may be said by orauonuf " 
us. They are come into Sicily with that pretence Hwrmocratcs - 
indeed, which you hear given out, but with that 
intention which we all suspect : and to me they 
seem not to intend the replantation of the Leon- 
tines, but rather our supplantation. For surely 
it holdeth not in reason, that they who subvert the 
cities yonder, should come to plant any city here : 
nor that they should have such a care of the Leon- 
tines, because Chalcideans, for kindred's sake, when 
they keep in servitude the Chalcideans themselves 
of Eubcea, of whom these here are but the colonies. 
But they both hold the cities there, and attempt 
those here, in one and the same kind. For when 
the lonians, and the rest of the confederates their 
own colonies 1 , had willingly made them their 
leaders in the war to avenge them of the Medes, 
the Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, 
to some the not sending of their forces 2 , to some 
their war amongst themselves, and so to the rest 
the most colourable criminations they could get, 
subdued them all to their obedience. And it was 
not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, 
nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians 
made head against the Medes : but the Athenians 
did it to make them serve, not the Medes, but them, 
and the Grecians to change their master, as they 
did, not for one less wise, but for one worse wise. 

1 [&irb cr0u> v j^ u of their own free " those descended from themselves", 
choiee". Goell. Am. Hobhes has from Portus and the Scholiast.} 
taken " their colonies", that is, 3 [See i. 0.] 



77. " But in truth we come not to accuse the 
Athenian state, though it be obnoxious enough, 
before you that know sufficiently the injuries they 
have done, but far rather to accuse ourselves : who 
though we have the examples before our eyes of 
the Grecians there brought into servitude for want 
of defending themselves, and though we see them 
now, with the same sophistry of replanting the 
Leontines and their kindred, and aiding of their 
confederates the Egestseans, prepare to do the like 
unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better 
courage make them to know that we be not 
lonians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, that 
changing serve always the Mede or some other 
master, but that we are Dorians and freemen, corne 
to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free 
country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city 
after city, w r hen we know that that only way we 
are conquerable : and w r hen we find them wholly 
bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance 
with their words, and causing some to wear each 
other out with war upon hope of their confederacy, 
and winning others by other fit language, they may 
have the power to do us hurt 1 ? But we think, 
though one of the same island perish, yet if he 
dwell far off, the danger will not come to us ; and 
before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that 
suffereth before us 2 . 78. If any therefore be of this 
opinion, that it is not he, but the Syracusian that 

1 [" And seeing them wholly bent 2 [" And think we, that if a neigh- 

upon this, to draw some &c., and to hour, a distant one, perish before 

cause some &c., and to beguile us, the danger will not reach us: 

others as, finding apt matter to but that he that has ill fortune 

address to each, they best may", before us, is the only one that is to 

Goellcr.] be unlucky" ?] 


is the Athenian's enemy ; and thinketh it a hard vi. 
matter that he should endanger himself for the ; E ; R I XVU ; 
territory that is mine : I would have him to con- A.C.IKU. 

J . . OL 01. 2 

sider, that he is to fight not chiefly for mine, but omtion of 
equally for his own in mine, and with the more 1Ierniocrttles - 
safety for that I am not destroyed before and he 
thereby destitute of my help, but stand with him 
in the battle. Let him also consider that the 
Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracu- 
sians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of 
me to make himself the stronger by your friend- 
ship ] . If any man here envieth, or also 2 feareth 
us, (for the strongest are still liable unto both), and 
would therefore wish that the Syracusians might 
be weakened to make them more modest, but not 
vanquished for their own safety's sake : that man 
hath conceived a hope beyond the power of man. 
For it is not reasonable" that the same man should 
be the disposer both of his desires and of his for- 
tune. And if his aim should fail him, he might, 
deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to 
enjoy 4 my prosperity again. But this will not be 
possible to him that shall abandon me, and not 
undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet 
in effect the same that I do. For though it be our 
power in title, yet in effect it is your own safety you 
defend. And you men of Camariiia, that are bor- 
derers and likely to have the second place of danger, 
you should most of all have foreseen this, and not 
have aided us so dully. You should rather have come 

1 [" But by pretending to hate eusan". Goeller.l 
me (the Syrftcusun), to gain thereby 8 [ u Or cwn feareth us",] 
the friendship (lictivov) of the Sieil- * [" Possible"."! 
ian that is the enemy of the Syra- ' [" To envy"."] 

O 2 


to us : and that which, if the Athenians had come 
first against Camarina, you should in your need 
have implored at our hands, the same you should 
now also have been seen equally to hearten us 
^j^ to fc ee p ^g f rom yielding. But as yet, nei- 
ther you nor any of the rest have been so forward. 
79. Perhaps upon fear, you mean to deal evenly 
between us both, and allege your league with the 
Athenians. You made no league against your 
friends, but against your enemies, in case any 
should invade you : and by it you are also tied to 
aid the Athenians, when others wrong them ; but 
not when, as now, they wrong their neighbour. 
For even the Rhegians, who are also Chalcideans, 
refuse to help them in replanting the Leontines ; 
though these also be Chalcideans. And then it 
were a hard case, if they suspecting a bad action 
under a fair justification, are wise without a reason 1 ; 
and you, upon pretence of reason, should aid your 
natural enemies, and help them that most hate you 
to destroy your more natural kindred. 

" But this is no justice ; to fight with them injus- 
tice, and not to stand in fear of their preparation. 
Which, if we hold together, is not terrible : but is, 
if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be dis- 
united. For neither when they came against us, 
being none but ourselves, and had the upperhand 
in battle, could they yet effect their purpose ; but 
quickly went their ways. 80. There is no reason 
therefore we should be afraid, when we are all 
together, but that we should have the better will 

kes an antithesis to it. " And you", tv\6y<p 
: which, as in many other " with a reasonable pretext, should 
cases, seems all that can be said for aid your" &c.] 



to unite ourselves in a league : and the rather, 
because 1 we are to have aid from Peloponnesus. 


who every wav excel these men in military suffi- A.c.4i4. 

OL 91 2 

ciency. Nor should you think that your purpose 2 oration r * 

to aid neither, as being in league with both, is nemocratps - 

either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves : 

for it is not so just in substance, as it is in the 

pretence. For if through want of your aid, the 

assailed perish and the assailant become victor : 

what do you by your neutrality, but leave the safety 

of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do 

evil ? Whereas it were more noble in you, by 

joining with the wronged and with your kindred, 

both to defend the common good of Sicily, and 

keep the Athenians, as your friends, from an act 

of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that 

to demonstrate plainly, to you or to any other, the 

thing you already know, is no hard matter 3 : but 

we pray you, and withal if you reject our words 

we protest, that whereas the lonians, who have ever 

been our enemies, do take counsel against us, you, 

that are Dorians as well as we, betray us. And if 

they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that 

they do it, yet they only shall have the honour of 

it : and for the prize of their victory, they will have 

none other but even the authors of their victory : 

but if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the 

cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty. 

Consider therefore now and take your choice, 

whether you will have the servitude without the 

1 [" Especially as aid will be league" &c. Bekker &c., irpo/u)- 

hcre from" &c*.] Qtiav : vulgo, irpoQvpiav.] 

8 [" That forecast of yours, to 3 \oi>$lv Ipyov eZvai: *' is of no 

aid neither forsooth, as being in profit". Goeller.] 



present danger : or saving yourselves with us, both 
avoid the dishonour of having a master, and 
escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be 

81. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him Euphe- 
mus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus : 
THE ORATION OF 82. "Though our coming were to renew our 
former league, yet seeing we are touched by the 
Syracusian, it will be necessary we speak some- 
thing here of the right of our dominion. And the 
greatest testimony of this right he hath himself 
given ; in that he said, the lonians were ever ene- 
mies to the Dorians. And it is true 1 . For being 
lonians, we have ever endeavoured to find out 
some means or other, how best to free ourselves 
from subjection to the Peloponnesians that are 
Dorians, more in number than we and dwelling 
near us. After the Medan war, having gotten us a 
navy, w r e were delivered thereby from the command 
and leading of the Lacedaemonians : there being 
no cause why they should rather be leaders of us 
than we of them, save only that they w r ere then 
the stronger. And when we were made com- 
manders of those Grecians which before lived under 
the king, w r e took upon us the government of them: 
because we thought, that having power in our 

1 [" But the matter stands thus", rians and lonians : that Megara 

It cannot be said that the lonians and ^Egina carried on border-wars 

were ever enemies to the Dorians, with Athens, but the whole race 

Mueller (i. 8.) observes, that it is took no part in the contest : and 

remarkable that during the whole that in regard to the important 

of the time in which Sparta was island of Salamis, Sparta in her cha- 

founding her empire, (that is, down racter of umpire actually awarded 

to the sixth century A.C.), we read the possession of it to Athens, to 

of no serious contest between Do- the great detriment of Megara.] 


hands to defend ourselves, we should thereby be 
the less subject to the Peloponnesians. And to say 
truth, we subjected the lonians and islanders (whom AXUU 4. 

, * - i i i 11- OL. 91. 2. 

the Syracusians say we brought into bondage being omtimi of 
our kindred) not without just cause 1 : for they Tvi i >lll ' nin '- 
came with the Medes against ours, their mother 
city : and for fear of losing their wealth durst not 
revolt, as we did, that abandoned our very city. 
But as they were content to serve, so they would 
have imposed the same condition upon us. 83. For 
these causes, we took upon us our dominion over 
them ; both as worthy of the same, in that we 
brought the greatest fleet and promptest courage 
to the service of the Grecians, whereas they, 
with the like promptness in favour of the Medes, 
did us hurt ; and also as being desirous to procure 
ourselves a strength against the Peloponnesians. 
And follow any other we will not 2 , seeing we alone 

1 ["And tuning ourselves be- ians, furnished 100 ships, and the 
come the leaders (/jyt/ioytg) of those islanders 17: both armed after the 
who were before subject to the king, Hellenic fashion. This was the 
we continue such: thinking that so Pelasgian race, which afterwards, 
having power to defend ourselves, as well as the 12 Ionic states from 
we should be less in the power of Athens, was called Ionic. The 
the Peloponnesians, and, to speak .'Eolians, armed after the Hellenic 
plainly, having subdued, but not fashion, and anciently, as the Greeks 
without just cause, the lonians and say, called Pelasgi, furnished <>0 
islanders, <S;c. For they cumc" See. ships. The Hellespontians, colonists 
The Dorians of Asia, armed after of the lonians and Dorians, (save 
the Hellenic fashion and sprung those of A by dos, who were left by 
from Peloponnesus, furnished 30 Xerxes to guard the bridge), fur- 
ships. The lonians, who so long as nished 100 ships, armed after the 
they were seated in what is now Hellenic fashion. Herod, tii. 93-d/) 
called Achaia, and before the com- 2 [" And we use no specious 
ing of Dannus and Xuthus to Pe- phrases, as that we alone &e. ; or 
loponnesus,were,as the Grcekssay, that we have put ourselves into 
called &giulan Pelasgi, but in the danger for the liberty of them (the 
time of Ion son of Xuthus, Ion. Dorians and islanders) more than 





A.C. 415-4. 
OL. 91. 2. 
Oration of 


have pulled down the barbarian, and therefore 
have right to command ; or at least have put our- 
selves into danger more for the liberty of the Pelo- 
ponnesians, than of all the rest of Greece, and our 
own besides. Now to seek means for one's own 
preservation, is a thing unblameable. And as it is 
for our own safety's cause that we are now here, so 
also we find that the same will be profitable for 
you. Which we will make plain from those very 
things which they accuse, and you, as most for- 
midable, suspect us of : being assured, that such as 
suspect with vehement fear, though they may be 
won for the present with the sweetness of an ora- 
tion, yet when the matter comes to performance, 
will then do as shall be most for their turn. 

" We have told you that we hold our dominion 
yonder upon fear ; and that upon the same cause 
we come hither now, by the help of our friends to 
assure the cities here ; and not to bring you into 
subjection, but rather to keep you from it. 84. And 
let no man object, that we be solicitous for those 
that are nothing to us : for as long as you be pre- 
served, and able to make head against the Syracu- 
sians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending 
of forces to the Peloponnesians 1 . And in this 
point you are very much unto us. For the same 
reason, it is meet 2 also that we replant the Leon- 
tines; not to subject them, as their kindred in 

that of all Greece, our own amongst 
the rest. But to seek means" &c. 
Bekker &e., oi Ka\\uirovftiQa : vul- 
go, OVK a\\^ iTrofitOa.} 

1 [" And let no one suppose that 
we be solicitous for those that are 
nothing to us ; remembering, that 

so long as you be preserved, from 
the very fact of your being strong 
enough to make head against the 
Syracusans, we are less likely to be 
annoyed by their sdnding of forces 
to the Pt'loponnesians"/] 
3 [It is reasonable* 1 .] 


Eubcea, but to make them as puissant as we can : V i 
that being near, they may from their own territory ," EAU 4 XV ~* 

weaken the Syracusiaris in our behalf. For as for A.CUIS-L' 
. , , ~ . OL. 91. 2. 

our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies 

without their help ; and the Chalcidean (whom 
having made a slave yonder, the Syracusian said, 
we absurdly attempt to vindicate into liberty here) 
is most beneficial to us there without arms, paying 
money only ; but the Leontines, and other our 
friends here, are the most profitable to us when 
they are most in liberty. 

85. " Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, no- 
thing can be thought absurd if profitable; nor any 
man a friend, that may not be trusted to. Friend 
or enemy he must be, according to the several 
occasions. But here it is for our benefit not to 
weaken our friends, but by our friends' strength 
to weaken our enemies. This you must needs 
believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command 
over our confederates, as every of them may be 
most useful to us : the Chians and M ethymnseans 
redeem their liberty with providing us some gal- 
leys ; the most of the rest, with a tribute of money 
somewhat more pressing. Some again of our 
confederates are absolutely free, notwithstanding 
that they be islanders, and easy to be subdued : the 
reason whereof is this ; they are situate in places 
commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable 
therefore, that here also we will so order our affairs 
as shall be most for our own turn, and most 
according to our fear, as we told you, of the Syra- 
cusians. 9 For they affect a dominion over you ; 
and having by advantage of your suspicion of us 
drawn you to their side, will- themselves by force, 


or (if we go home without effect) by your want of 
fr* en ds, have the sole command of Sicily : which, 
if you join with them, must of necessity come to 
pass. For neither will it be easy for us to bring 
gQ g reat f orces again together 1 : nor will the Syra- 
cusians want strength to subdue you, if we be 
absent. Him that thinketh otherwise, the thing 
itself con vinceth. 80. For when you called us in 
to aid you at the first, the fear you pretended was 
only this : that if we neglected you, the Syracu- 
sians would subdue you, and we thereby should 
participate of the danger 2 . And it were unjust, 
that the argument you would needs have to prevail 
then with us, should now have no effect with your- 
selves ; or that you should be jealous of the much 
strength we bring against the power of the Syra- 
cusians, w r hen much rather you should give the 
less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay 
here without you : and if becoming perfidious we 
should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold 
them : both in respect of the length of the voyage, 
and for want of means of guarding them ; because 
they be great, and provided after the manner of 
the continent 3 . Whereas they, not lodged near you 
in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of 
greater potver than this of ours 4 , will be always 

1 [" For neither would it be easy on and saw you ^ot under by the 

even for us to deal with so great a Syracusans, we too should be in 

force, when united in one; nor danger". Trpoadtiv dicuntur pas- 

without us, would you find these tores, quum frondem manu qua- 

here (the Syracusans) a feeble tientes, pecus quo volunt ducunt. 

enemy".] Duker.] 

a [TTpoatiovrtG 0o/3oj> : " the fear 3 [And therefore, suth as a raari- 

you held up before our eyes, was no time power could not deal with.] 

other than this : that if we looked 4 [That is, " than this power 


watching their advantages against you : and when 
an opportunity shall be offered against any of your 
cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they 
have already made to appear, both in their pro- 
ceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. 
And yet have these the face to move you ] against 
us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept 
Sicily from falling into their hands. But we, on 
the other side, invite you to a far more real safety ; 
and pray you, not to betray that safety which we 
both of us hold from one another at this present, 
but to consider, that they by their own number 
have way to you always, though without confede- 
rates ; whereas you shall seldom have so great an 
aid again to resist them. Which if through your 
jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if 
it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least 
part of the same, when their coming can no more 
do you good. 

87- " But, Camarinseans, be neither you nor 
others moved with their calumnies. We have told 
you the very truth, why w r e are suspected : and 
summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to 
prevail with you thereby. We say, we command 
yonder, lest else we should obey ; and w r e assert 
into liberty the cities here, lest else we should 
be harmed by them : many things we have to 
be doing, because many things we are forced to 
beware of : and both now and before, we came not 
uncalled ; but called as confederates to such of you 
as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of 

what we do, nor go about as censors (which were 

which we have brought here".] men that know not what you are 

1 [ u To move you, as if you were about, against us 11 Kce.] 


vi. now hard to do) to divert us ; but as far as this 
humour and fashion of ours may be for your 

o'u'i*a" Wn serv * ce > so ^ ar ta ^ e an ^ use it : an ^ think not 
oration of' the same hurtful alike to all, but that the greatest 


places 1 , though we be not of any side, yet both he 
that looketh to be wronged, and he that contriveth 
to do the wrong, by the obviousness of the hope that 
the one hath of our aid, and of the fear that the other 
hath of their own danger, if we should come, are 
brought by necessity, the one to moderation against 
his will, the other into safety without his trouble. 
Refuse not therefore the security now present, 
common both to us that require it, and to your- 
selves 2 . But do as others use to do ; come with us : 
and instead of defending yourselves always against 
the Syracusians, take your turn once, and put them 
to their guard as they have done you/' 
The resolution of 88. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinseans 
lnty stood thus affected. They bare goodwill to the 
Athenians, save that they thought they meant to 
subjugate Sicily : arid were ever at strife with the 
Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they 
were afraid that the Syracusians, that were near 
them, might as well get the victory as the other, 
they had both formerly sent them some few horse, 
and also now resolved for the future to help the 
Syracusians, but underhand and as sparingly as 
possible : and withal that they might no less seem 

1 [" For in every place, that even come we are like to put him in some 

where we are not at hand, yet he jeopardy, they are both brought"c.] 

that looketh &c., and he that con- 2 [" Refuse not therefore this se- 

triveth See., for the obvious expect- curity, both common to him that 

ation each hath, one of meeting requires it, and now present to 

with our aid, the other, that if we yourselves".] 


to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, 
especially after they had won a battle, to give for 
the present an equal answer unto both 1 . So after 

Or 01 2 

deliberation had, they answered thus : " That foras- 
much as they that warred, were both of them their 
confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their 
oath for the present to give aid to neither". And 
so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways. 

And the Syracusians made preparations for the 
war by themselves 2 . 

The Athenians being encamped at Naxos, treated The Athenian* 
with the Siculi, to procure as many of them as J^'.,,]!? wm ! le 
they might to their side. Of whom, such as in- 
habited the plain and were subject to the Syra- 
cusians, for the most part held off : but they that 
dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a 
free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, 
presently agreed with the Athenians 8 ; and brought 
corn into the army, and some of them also money. 
To those that held off, the Athenians went with 
their army : and some they forced to come in, and 
others they hindered from receiving the aids and 
garrisons of the Syracusians 4 . And having brought they bring the 

__ fleet to Oat an a: 

1 [" But fearing lest the Syra- of the inland parts, who had been 
cusans, that were near them, should from all time independent, agreed 
even without their aid get the vie- straightway, all hut a few, with the 
tory, they at the first sent those Athenians". at ouc;<mc, a term 
(rovg) few horse : and now resolved chosen rather than 7ro\i, or even 
for the future in fact rather to sup- Kw/xai, to denote the absolutely bur- 
port the Syracusans, but as spar- barian habits of those Sikeli, whose 
ingly as possible ; but for the pre- habitations had nothing in them 
sent, that they might no less &c., in approaching to civil union. Am.] 
words to give equal answer to each".] 4 ["But others they were bin- 

8 [" And the Syracusans pre- dered (from forcing to come in) by 

pared themselVes for the war. And the Syracusans sending garrisons 

the Athenians" &c.] and supporting them with suc- 

[ 4< But the scattered inhabitants cours".] 





OL. 91. 2. 


nto He 

their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the 
winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at 
Catana, and re-erected their camp formerly burnt 
by the Syracusians. They sent a galley also to 
i Carthage, to procure amity and what help they 
could from thence : and into Hetruria 1 , because 

1 [*c Tvpffijviav. If we search 
for the traces of their diffusion, the 
Pelasgi will appear to he one of the 
greatest nations of Europe : extend- 
ing in their migrations almost as 
widely as the Celts. Thessalian, 
Sikclian, Tyrseuian, Pelasgian : 
these are only various names of a 
nation extending from the Po and 
Arno almost to the Bosporus: and 
it was hy no arbitrary fiction that 
/Esehyhis makes Pclasgus, son of 
TraXaixQojv, boast that his people 
were masters of the whole country 
west of the Strymon. The regions 
of the east, again, were overrun 
with Pelasgic tribes. Lemnos, 
Imbros, arid Samothrace, were well 
known Pelasgian settlements even 
down to the historical period : they 
inhabited Lesbos and Chios before 
the Greeks, and, as it is said, the 
whole of Ionia from Mycale and of 
^Eolis. But all that was left in 
later times of this immense race, 
were detached and widely-scattered 
remnants, like those of the Celtic 
tribes in Spain : which, like them 
too, were conceived to be, not the 
fragments of a great people, but 
settlements formed, like those of the 
Greeks, by dispersed migrations and 
colonizations. Tyrsenia was the 
name by which the Greeks, in early 
times, designated the whole of 
western Italy. We find a line of 
Tyrsenian settlements, whose Pe- 

la^gic origin is well established, 
along the whole coast of the sea, 
which thence derives its name, from 
Pisa down to the borders of (Eno- 
tria. In the historical age, however, 
the nation peculiarly so called by 
the Greeks were the Etruscans : 
\\ith whom their colonies in Sicily 
and Italy were continually forming 
relations of war or peace, and whose 
fame stood high in Hellas itself for 
power, arts, and wealth. It was 
forgotten that the Etruscans, who 
called themsehes Rascna, and ap- 
pear to have been of Roetian (Rbo3- 
tian) origin, and neither in language 
nor laws to have had the remotest 
resemblance to the Greeks or Pc- 
lasgi, had gotten the name of Tyr- 
rhenians only by having conquered 
Tyrrhenia, and become the masters 
of those Tyrrhenians who did not 
quit their homes. And from Tyr- 
rhenia retaining its name after this 
conquest, two entirely different 
races came to be called Tyrrhenians 
by the G reeks: the Pelasgi on the 
coast of Asia and the islands in the 
north of the yEgean, and the Etrus- 
cans. As to the former, it was evi- 
dently the custom at the time of the 
Peloponncsian war, to call the old 
Pelasgian inhabitants of Lemnos 
and Imbros Tyrsenian Pelasgi. 
They were the descendants of the 
Pelasgi, who, after the Dorian inva- 
sion, left Bcrotia, and obtained for 



some cities there had of their own accord promised 
to take their parts. They sent likewise to the 
Siculi about them and to Egesta, appointing them 
to send in all the horse they could : and made ready 
bricks, and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary 
for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as 
intending to fall in hand with the war early the 
next spring. 

The ambassadors of Syracuse which were sent 
to Corinth and Lacedsemon, as they sailed by 

' J J 

endeavoured also to move the Italians to a regard 
of this action of the Athenians 1 . Being come to 


a time settlements in Attica on con- 
dition of labouring for the state 
(ii. 17, note). After ousting the 
Minyie and abiding long in lA'innos 
and linbros, being compelled by 
tbe Athenians to migrate anew, 
they shaped their course, some to 
the Hellespont, some to the coast of 
Thrace and the peninsula of Mount 
Athos. Hence Thueydides (iv. 10t>) 
says that Athos was inhabited by a 
Pclasgic race, the Tyrsenians who 
had previously settled in Attica and 
Lemnos. They came originally, as 
the story runs, from the south of 
Etruria: and must undoubtedly 
have called themselves Tyrsenians. 
Their first appearance however was 
in Acarnania: and all that Pau- 
sanias could learn of their extrac- 
tion, was that they were Sikelians : 
a name which had extended across 
the Ionian sea to Epirus. And the 
probability is that they came, not 
from the Tiber, but from Epirus : 
and the Pelasgic extraction of the 
Epirots having been forgotten in 
the time of Thueydides, they were 
the only Pelasgi then known in 

gc Syracuse. 

ra ? a j'! nftlu \ 

orinthians ana 

southern Hellas. When the Greek 
settlements were founded in Italy, 
the Etruscans had not yet made 
their appearance. It is to the Pe- 
lasgi, and not to the Etruscans, we 
must refer the lines wherein He- 
siod speaks of Agrius and Latinns 
as ruling the renowned Tyrsenians : 
and they must be the pirates that 
infested the western seas before the 
Greeks sent colonies to Sicily, and 
that with the Carthaginians (about 
540 A. C.) defeated the Phocaeans 
(see Herod, i. 16(5). Subsequently 
all the pirates of the lower sea seem 
to have been regarded by the Greeks 
as Tyrrhenians. About 500 A.C. 
the Etruscans were at the height 
of their power, and commanded the 
whole Tyrrhenian sea. The defeat 
of their fleet by Hiero in 474, seems 
to have broken their maritime 
power: in the course of this cen- 
tury they lost the whole country 
beyond the Apennines, and in three 
centuries more were swallowed up 
in the Roman empire. See Niebuhr, 
(Enotrians and Pelasgi.] 

1 [" They endeavoured to move 




. * ,, ,. 


OL. 01. 2. 

Alcibiades at 
instigateth the 
against his 


Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid 
upon the title of consanguinity. The Corinthians 
having forthwith, for their own part, decreed 
cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from 
themselves along with these to Lacedaemon : to 
help them to persuade the Lacedaemonians, both to 
make a more open war against the Athenians at 
home, and to send some forces also into Sicily. At 
the same time that these ambassadors were at 
Lacedaemon from Corinth, Alcibiades w r as also 
there with his fellow-fugitives : who presently upon 
their escape passed over from Thurii first to Cyl- 
lene, the haven of the Eleians, in a ship, and after- 
wards went thence to Lacedaemon, sent for by the 
Lacedaemonians themselves, under public security. 
For he feared them for his doings about Mantiueia. 
And it fell out, that in the assembly of the Lace- 
daemonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians, and Al- 
cibiades made all of them the same request. Now 
the ephores and magistrates, though intending to 
send ambassadors to Syracuse to hinder them from 
compounding with the Athenians, being yet not 
forward to send them aid, Alcibiades stood forth 
and sharpened the Lacedaemonians : inciting them 
with words to this effect : 

89. " It will be necessary that I say something 
first concerning mine own accusation, lest through 
jealousy of me, you bring a prejudicate ear to the 
common business. My ancestors having on a 
certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving 

the Italiots not to disregard what 
the Athenians were about, as aimed 
equally at themselves". Of the 
Italiots, the Taren tines and Lo~ 

crians were connected by blood or 
alliance with the Peloponnesians : 
the Metapontians, Thin-inns, and 
Rhegians with the Athenians.] 


you 1 , I was the man that restored the same again; 
and showed you all possible respect, both other- 
wise, and in the matter of your loss at Pylus. 
Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to 
make a peace at Athens, by treating the same with 
my adversaries you invested them with authority, 
and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in 
applying myself afterwards to the Mantineans and 
Argives, or in anything else I did you hurt, I did 
it justly : and if any man here were causelessly angry 
with me, then when he suffered, let him be now 
content again, when he knows the true cause of 
the same. Or if any man think the worse of me 
for inclining to the people, let him acknowledge 
that therein also he is offended without a cause. 
For we have been always enemies to tyrants ; and 
what is contrary to a tyrant, is called the people : 
and from thence hath continued our adherence to 
the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by 
democracy, it was necessary in most things to 
follow the present course ; nevertheless we have 
endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth with 
the now 7 headstrong humour of the people. But 
others there have been, both formerly and now, 
that have incited the common people to worse 
things than I 2 : and they are those that have also 
driven out me. But as for us, when we had the 
charge of the whole, we thought it reason", by what 
form it<was grown most great and most free, and 

1 [" Renounced your irpotviav": in what form <Scc.,in that to preserve 
see iii. 70, note : and v. 43.] it : (for such of us as have any jtulg- 

2 ["To the wickeder measures".] ment know &e.: hut of confessed 

3 [" We however hecaine leaders madness nothing new can he said): 
of the democracy, thinking it reason and we thought it not safe" &c.] 







A. C. 41 5-4. 
OL. 01. 2. 
Oration of 

in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. 
For though such of us as have judgment, do know 
well enough what the democracy is, and I no less 
than another, (insomuch as I could inveigh against 
it ; but of confessed madness nothing can be said 
that is new), yet we thought it not safe to change 
it, when you our enemies were so near us. 

90. " Thus stands the matter touching my own 
accusation. And concerning what we are to con- 
sult of, both you and I, if I know anything which 
you yourselves do not, hear it now 1 . We made 
this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue 
the Sicilians; after them the Italians 2 ; after them, 
to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage 
itself. If these or most of these enterprises suc- 
ceeded, then next we should have undertaken Pe- 
loponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek 
forces there 3 , and with many mercenary barbarians, 
Iberians and others of those parts, confessed to be 
the most warlike of the barbarians that are now. 
We should also have built many galleys besides 
these which we have already, (there being plenty of 
timber in Italy) ; with the which besieging Pelo- 
ponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof 
with our land forces, upon such occasions as should 
arise from the land, some by assault and some by 
siege 4 , we hoped easily to have debelled it and 

1 ["And concerning what you 
are to consult about, and I, if I 
know aught more than you, am to 
advise, hear it now".] 

2 [" The Italiots". " The domi- 
nion of Carthage"; that is, Sardinia, 
Cornea, and probably some of the 
states of Africa. Am.] 

3 [" If these, in whole or in part, 
succeeded,we were now to undertake 
Peloponnesus, having gained the 
accession of the whole power of the 
Greeks there, and hiring many of 
the barbarians" &cv] 

4 [" With which besieging Pelo- 
ponnesus round, and by attacks by 


afterwards to have gotten the dominion of all 
Greece. As for money and corn to facilitate some 
points of this, the places we should have conquered 
there, besides what here we should have found, 
would sufficiently have furnished us. 

91. kC Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth 
it, you have heard what is the design of the fleet 
now gone ; and which the generals there, as far as 
they can, will also put in execution. Understand 
next, that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot 
possibly hold out. For the Sicilians, though inex- 
pert, if many of them unite may well subsist : but 
that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power 
already beaten, and withal kept from the use of 
the sea l , should withstand the forces of the Athen- 
ians already there, is a thing impossible. Arid if 
their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and 
soon after Italy also : and the danger from thence 
which I foretold you, would not be long ere it fell 
upon you. Let no man therefore think that he 
now consulteth of Sicily only, but also of Pelopon- 
nesus, unless this be done with speed. Let 2 the 
army you send be of such, as being aboard may 
row, and landing presently be armed : and (which 
I think more profitable than the army itself) send 
a Spartan for commander, both to train the sol- 
diers already there, and to compel unto it such as 
refuse. For thus will your present friends be the 
more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to 

land with our army at the same but that the Syracusans &c., and 

time, of the cities taking some by withal blockaded by the fleet, 

assault and some walling in" &c.] should withstand 11 &c.] 

1 ["For the Sicilians, though very a ["Unless this be done witfc 

inexpert, yet if they could closely speed, and an army bo embarked 

unite, might even yet get the better: for those parts, of such as" &t\] 



you with the more assurance. It were also good 
to make war more openly upon them here : that 
the Syracusians seeing your care may the rather 
hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send 
supply to their army. You ought likewise to for- 
tify Deceleia in the territory of Athens, a thing 
which the Athenians themselves most fear, and 
reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in 
this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most, is 
to know certainly what he most feareth, and to 
bring the same upon him. For in reason a man 
therefore feareth a thing most, as having the pre- 
cisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As 
for the commodities which yourselves shall reap, 
and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying ; letting 
much pass, I will sum you up the principal. What- 
soever the territory is furnished withal 1 , will come 
most of it unto you, partly taken, and partly of its 
own accord. The revenue of the silver mines in 
Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they have 
from their land or from their courts of justice 2 , 
will presently be lost : and, which is worse, their 
confederates will be remiss in bringing in their 
revenue : and will care little for the Athenians, if 
they believe once that you follow the war to the 
utmost. That any of these things be put in act 
speedily and earnestly, men of Lacedsemon, it 
resteth only in yourselves : for I am confident, and 

1 [That is, the live and dead 
stock; slaves, cattle, trees, &c. Am.] 

2 [The courts of justice would 
be closed, the citizens' whole time 
being occupied with the war : and 
the state would thereby lose the 

fees and fines arising from the suits 
of its own citizens, and what is 
more serious, from the suits of their 
allies, who were obliged to resort to 
the tribunals at Athens. Boeckli. 
Seev. 18, note.] 


I thiuk I err not, that all these things are possible 
to be done* 

92. " Now I must crave this : that I be neither 
the worse esteemed, for that having once been 
thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst 
the greatest enemies of the same against it ; nor 
yet mistrusted, as one that speaketh with the zeal 
of a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of 
them that drave me out, I shall not, if you take my 
counsel, fly your profit. Nor are you enemies so 
much, who have hurt but your enemies, as they 
are, that have made enemies of friends. I love 
not my country, as wronged by it, but as having 
lived in safety in it 1 . Nor do I think that I do 
herein go against any country of mine ; but that I 
far rather seek to recover the country I have not. 
And he is truly a lover of his country, not that 
refuseth to invade the country he hath wrongfully 
lost : but that desires so much to be in it, as by 
any means he can he will attempt to recover it. 
I desire you therefore, Lacedaemonians, to make 
use of my service in whatsoever danger or labour 
confidently: seeing you know, according to the 
common saying, if I did hurt you much when I was 
your enemy, I can help you much when I am your 
friend. And so much the more, in that I know 
the state of Athens, and but conjectured at yours. 
And considering you are now in deliberation upon 
a matter of so extreme importance, I pray you 
think riot much to send an army both into Sicily 
and Attica : as well to preserve the great matters 

1 ["I retain not my love of coun- but wherein I lived in safety in it 
try, wherein 1 am wronged by it, as one of the citizens".] 



ians resolv 

into Sicily. 

The Athenians 


that are there with the presence of a small part of 
your force, as also to pull down the power of the 
Athenians both present and to come : and after- 
wards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have 
the leading of all Greece ; not forced, but volun- 
tary and with their good affection." 

93. Thus spake Alcibiadcs. And the Lacedse- 
Hionians, though before this they had a purpose of 
their own accor d to send an army against Athens, 
but had delayed and neglected it 1 : yet when these 
particulars were delivered by him, they were a 
great deal the more confirmed in the same, con- 
ceiving that what they had heard was from one 
that evidently knew it. Insomuch as they had set 
their minds already upon the fortifying of Deceleia, 
and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily, 
for the present 2 . And having assigned Gylippus 
the son of Cleandridas, unto the Syracusian am- 
bassadors for chief commander 3 , they willed him 
to consider, both with them arid the Corinthians, 
how best for their present means, and with greatest 
speed, some help might be conveyed unto them in 
Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians 
to send him two galleys presently to Asine, and to 
furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have 
them ready to sail when occasion should serve. 
This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedsemon. 

In the meantime the galley arrived at Athens, 
which the generals sent home for money and 
horsemen. And the Athenians upon hearing, de- 

t : " had delayed it 3 [" And appointing Gylippus, 
through circumspection" .~] the son of Cleandridas, commander 

2 [" Sending forthwith".] of the Syracusans".] 


creed to send both provision and horsemen ! to the 
army. So the winter ended : and the seventeenth 
year of this war written by Thucydides. 

94. In the very beginning of the next spring 
the Athenians in Sicily departed from Catana, and 
sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily. The inha- 
bitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, 
the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven 
out, and now possess the territory themselves. 
Landing here, they wasted the fields : and having 
assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracu- 
sians, not taking it, they went presently back, part 
by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. 

And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the The Athenians 
same and burnt up their corn : and lighting on le^^^f 
some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of ^^JJ 
them ; and having set up a trophy, went all again 
on board their galleys. Thence they returned to 
Catana, and took in victual : then with their whole 
army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the 
Siculi ; which yielding on composition, they de- 
parted, and in their way burnt up the corn of the 
Inessseans arid the Hyblaeans. Being come again Tiu y 
to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty me^ 
horsemen 2 arrived from Athens, without horses, 
though not without the furniture, supposing to have 
horses there : and thirty archers on horseback, and 
three hundred talents of silver. 

95. The same spring the Lacedaemonians led forth TheL 
their army against Argos, and went as far as to 
Cleonse : but an earthquake happening, they w r ent 

1 (" To send both the money and 3 [" The 250 horsemen": those 
the horsemen .] mentioned in the last chapter.] 


home again. But 1 the Argives invaded the terri- 
tor y f Thyrea, confining on their own ; and took 
A.c.414. a great booty from the Lacedaemonians, which they 
The Argils take sold for no less than twenty-five talents. 

Not long after 2 , the commons of Thespise set 
that had the overnment; but not 

upon the few,but prevailing, were part apprehended, and part 

with ill success. r 1*1 i % i < i i 

escaped to Athens, the Athenians' 5 having also 
aided them. 

96. The Syracusians the same summer, when 
they heard that the Athenians had horsemen sent 
to them from Athens, and that they were ready 
now to come against them, conceiving that if the 
Athenians gat not Epipolae, a rocky ground and 
lying just against the city 4 , they would not be 
able, though masters of the field, to take in the 
city with a wall : intended therefore, lest the enemy 
should come secretly up, to keep the passages by 
which there was access unto it with a guard ;> . For 
- the rest of the place is to the outside high and 
steep, falling to the city by degrees, and on the 
inside wholly subject to the eye. And it is called 
by the Syracusians, Epipolae 6 , because it lieth 
above the level of the rest. The Syracusians, 
coming out of the city with their whole power into 
a meadow by the side of the river Atiapus betimes 
in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fellow- 
commanders had already received their charge), 

1 [" And after this".] the rest, Qtjpaiw. vulgo, &0*ivaiw.'] 

2 [" And the same summer, not 4 [ u Overhanging the city".] 
long after".] 5 [" For that in no other way 

3 [" And the Thebans coming to could they get up. For the rest 
help, were part apprehended and of the place" &c.] * 

part escaped" c. Bekker and 6 [Anglice, OvertonJ] 


were there taking a view of their arms : but 1 first 
they had set apart seven hundred men of arms, 
under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, 
both to guard Epipolse, and to be ready together 
quickly upon any other occasion wherein there 
might be use of their service. 97- The Athenians 
the day following, having been already mustered, 
came from Catana with their whole forces, and 
landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or 
seven furlongs from Epipolse, unperceived, and laid 
their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is 
almost an island, lying out into the sea and joined 
to the land with a narrow isthmus ; not far from 
Syracuse, neither by sea nor land And the naval 
forces of the Athenians, having made a pallisado 
across the said isthmus, lay there quiet 2 . But the 
land soldiers marched at high speed towards Epi- 
polse, and gat up by Euryelus before the Syracu- 
sians 3 could come to them from out of the meadow, 
where they were mustering. Nevertheless they 
came on, every one with what speed he could, not 
only Diomilus with his seven hundred, but the rest 
also. They had no less to go from the meadow 
than twenty-five furlongs, before they could reach 
the enemy. The Syracusians therefore coming up 
in this manner 4 , and thereby defeated in battle at 

1 [" And they first set apart".] fleet at Thapsos, a peninsula pro- 

2 [" And the Athenians on the jecting with a narrow isthmus into 
morrow of the same night (that is, the sea, not far distant from Syra- 
at the same time with the Syracu- cuse either by sea or land) : and 
sans) were reviewing their army: their naval forces had palisadoed the 
(they had unperceived put in with isthmus, and were lying quiet in 
their army from Cataua at the place Thapsos".] 

called Leon, distant from Epipola? 3 [" Saw them or could come to 

six or seven stadia, and had landed them" &e.] 

their infantry, and stationed their 4 ["^Disorderly manner".} 


vi. Epipolae, withdrew themselves into the city. But 
Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. 

A.c.414, The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and 

OL. 912 . 

delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their 


dead under truce ; and came down the next day to 
The Athenians the city. But when none came out to give them 

fortify Labda. ^^ they retired again . an( J bu ij t a f ort up()n 

Labdalum 1 , in the very brink of the precipices of 
Epipolse, on the side that looketh towards Megara, 
for a place to keep their utensils and money in 
when they went out either to fight or to work. 

98. Not long after, there came unto them from 
Egesta three hundred horsemen : and from the 
Siculi, namely 2 the Naxians and some others, about 
one hundred : and the Athenians had of their own 
two hundred and fifty ; for which they had horses, 
part from the Egestaeans and Catanreans, and part 
they bought. So that they had together in the 
whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having 
put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went 
down to Syca 3 , and raised there a wall in circle 
very quickly ; so that they struck a terror into the 
Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who 
therefore coming forth, intended to have given 
them battle, and no longer to have neglected the 
matter. But when the armies were one set against 
the other, the Syracusian generals perceiving their 
own to be in disarray, and not easily to be em- 
battled, led them again into the city, save only a 

1 [A continuation of the tumuli the city, [owi): by Li vy and Cicero 

at the summit of Epipola?, perhaps written Tyca and Tycha. The latter 

so called from its resemblance to (Verr. iv.) speaks of a temple of 

the Greek letter la mbda. Goell.] Fortune existing in 'that district. 

8 ["And Naxians".] The " wall in a circle" is the wall 

3 A.temple of Fortune, part of of circumvallation.] 


certain part of their horsemen ; which staying, vi. 
kept the Athenians from carrying of stone and 
straggling far abroad from their camp. But the 
Athenians with one squadron 1 of men of arms, toge- 
ther with their whole number of horse, charged 
the horsemen of the Syracusians and put them to 
flight : of whom they slew a part, and erected a 
trophy for this battle of horse. 

99. The next day the Athenians fell to work The 
upon their wall, to the north side of their circular l t ^ 
wall 2 : some building, and some fetching stone and ^ 
timber, which they still laid down to\vard the place * 
called Trogilus, in the way by w r hich the wall the city.' 
should come with the shortest compass from the 
great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by 
the persuasion of their generals, and principally of 
Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with 
their whole power against the Athenians any more : 
but thought fit rather, in the way where the Athe- 
nians were to bring their wall, to raise a counter- 
wall ; which, if they could but do before the wall 
of the Athenians came on, it w r ould exclude their 
further building : and if the Athenians should set 
upon them as they were doing it, they might send 
part of the army to defend it, and pre-occupate 

i ft cation 
i they lay 
1 wht-re- 

) pia : " oiie tribe". From ranged in their tribes (Herod, vi. 

this, amongst other passages, it ap- 111). And Nestor, in II. ii. 3tf2, 

pears that the Athenians observed bids Agamemnon separate the men 

the custom, common amongst other by tribes and phratria), "so that 

nations, of retaining the distinction tribe may support tribe, and phra- 

of tribes in the arrangement of their tria phratria". Hence the word 0v- 

anny. The same appears of the XOTTIC is used by Homer for pix*? 

Messenians, in iii. i)0 : of the Spar- or battle.] 

tuns, in v. lot and of the Syracu- 2 ["The Athenians fell to work 

sans, vi. 100. So at the battle of upon the northern part of their 

Marathon, the Athenians were ar- wall of drcmuvallation".] 


\i. the accesses to it with a pallisado : and if they 
wou ld come with their whole army to hinder them, 

A.c.4i4. then must they also be forced to let their own 

OL 91 2 

The syracusians work stand still. Therefore they came out ; and 
beginning at their own city, drew a cross- wall 
beneath the circular fortifications of the Athenians ; 
and set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive 
trees which they felled in the ground belonging to 
the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come 
about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the 
Syracusians were 1 masters of the places near the 
sea ; and the Athenians brought their provision to 
the army from Thapsus by land. 

100. The Syrcusians, when they thought both 
their pallisado and wall sufficient; and considering 
that the Athenians came not to impeach them in the 
work, as they that feared to divide their army and 
to be thereby the more easy to be fought withal, 
and that also hasted to make an end of their own 
wall wherewith to encompass the city, left one 
squadron 2 for a guard of their works, and retired 
with the rest into the city. And the Athenians 
cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their 
water to drink was conveyed under ground into 
the town. And having observed also, that about 
noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and 

1 [" Were as yet masters".] of new citizens : and as in ch. 72, 

2 [$v\$v piav: see eh. 98, note, the number of generals appears to 
Arnold believes there is noinforma- be fifteen, it may be supposed that 
turn of the number of tribes at Sy- as in Athens the generals were ten, 
raeuse : for though at Corinth there corresponding to the ten tribes, and 
were eight, this would be no rule the same in other democratieal 
for its colony, placed under such states, so in Syracuse the tribes 
different circumstances, and receiv- were fifteen. Of the aqueduct, or 
ing from time to time such numbers conduit, the traces are yet extant.] 


that some of them were also gone into the city, 
and that such as were remaining at the pallisado 
kept but negligent watch ; they commanded three 
hundred chosen men of arms, and certain other 
picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, 
to run suddenly to that counter-wall of the Syra- 
sians. The rest of the army divided in two, went 
one part with one of the generals to stop the suc- 
cour which might be sent from the city ; and the 
other with the other general to the palisado next 
to the gate 1 [of the counter- wall] . The three hun- 
dred assaulted and took the pallisado ; the guard 
whereof forsaking it, fled within the wall into the 
temple ground: and with them entered also their 
pursuers ; but after they were in were beaten out 
again by the Syracusians, and some slain, both of 
the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then 
the whole army went back together, and pulled 
down the wall and plucked up the pallisado : the 
pales whereof they carried with them to their camp, 
and erected a trophy. 

101. The next day, the Athenians beginning at The Athenian. 
their circular wall 2 , built onwards to that 
over the marshes, which on that part of 
looketh to the great haven, and by which the way haven - 
to the haven, for their wall to come through the 

tc? modo est portula muni- begun in ch.90. Hanc celeritatem 
menti alicujus, per quam milites circummunitionis si quis cum Plu- 
praDsidii exeunt et intrant, plerum- tarcho miretur, comparet Epipolas 
que palis a subito hostium impetu viginti diebus inuro triginta stadi- 
munita : mode, est portula postica orum circumdatas apud Diodorum 
mcenium urbis. Hie, TrvXfc est por- xiv. 18: comparet ingentia opera 
tula partis urbis, quae ex Teinenite circa Carthaginem spatio viginti die- 
in Epipolas ferebat. Goeller.] ruin noctiumque a Scipione ducta, 
8 [ u Beginning from their wall et obsidionem Numantiae. Goeiler. 
ofcircumvallation". It was already See Plutarch. Nicias, 17.] 


plain and marsh, was the shortest. As this was 
doing, the Syracusians came out again and made 
another pallisado, beginning at the city, through 
the middle of the marsh ; arid a ditch at the side 
of it, to exclude the Athenians from bringing their 
wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they 
had finished their work as far as to the crag, 
assaulted the pallisado and trench of the Syracu- 
sians again. And having commanded their galleys 
to be brought about from Thapsus into the great 
haven of Syracuse, about break of day went 
straight down into the plain ; and passing through 
the marsh, where the ground was clay and firmest, 
The Athenians [and partly] upon boards and planks, won both 

take their pali- * -, -i i i 111 11 

sado again. the trench and pallisado, all but a small part, 
betimes in the morning ; and the rest not long 
after. And here also they fought ; and the victory 
fell to the Athenians : the Syracusians, those of 
the right wing, fled to the city ; and they of the 
left, to 1 the river. The three hundred chosen 
Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched 
at high speed towards the bridge. But the Syra- 
cusians fearing to be prevented, (for most of the 
horsemen were in this number) 2 , set upon these 
three hundred : and putting them to flight, drave 
them upon the right wing of the Athenians, and 
following affrighted also the foremost guard 3 of the 
s siain. wing. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them 
with a few archers from the left wing of their own, 

1 [" By the liver": that is, to- 3 [$ irpurr) QvXaiv}. Velim do- 

wards the bridge.] ceri quacnam in pugna sit irpwrri 

8 [" But the Syracusans fearing QvXnicft cornuum. Intorim suspi- 

to be prevented, and also having cari licebit, fortassis Ifcgendum esse 

there the greater'part of their horse- 0i>X?) : vide cap. 98. Duk. Arnold 

men, set upon" ike."] has adopted 


and with [all] the Argives : and passing over a 
certain ditch, having but few with him, was de- 
serted and slain 1 with some six or seven more. 
These the Syracusians hastily snatched up, and 
carried into a place of safety beyond the river 2 : 
and when they saw the rest of the Athenian army 
coming towards them, they departed. 102. In 
the meantime, they that fled at first to the city, 
seeing how things went, took heart again; and 
re-embattled themselves against the same Athenians 
that stood ranged against them before ; and withal 
sent a certain portion of their army against the 
circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epi- 
polae ; supposing to find it without defendants, and 
so to take it. And they took and demolished the ] 
outworks ten plethers 3 in length : but the circle ] 
itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be 
left within it for infirmity. For he commanded 
his servants to set fire on all the engines, and 
whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall: 
knowing there was no other possible means to save 
themselves for want of men. And it fell out ac- 
cordingly : for by reason of this fire they came 
no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians having 
by this time beaten back the enemy below, were 
coming up to relieve the circle : and their galleys 
withal (as is before mentioned) were going about 
from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they 
above perceiving, speedily made away, they and 

1 [" And being deserted by all Olyinpieium. See chap. 75.] 

but a few of those that had passed the 3 The plether, according to Sui- 

ditch with him,was slain with" &c.] das, contains 68 cubits. [The cubit 

2 [Beyond the river they were was a foot and a half: the plethroh 
in safety, having possession of the is said by Goeller to be 100 feet,] 


the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city : 
with opinion that they could no longer hinder 
them, with the strength they now had, from bring- 
ing their wall through unto the sea. 

103. After this the Athenians erected a trophy, 
and delivered to the Syracusians their dead under 
truce : and they on the other side delivered to the 
Athenians the body of Lamachus and of the rest 
slain with him. And their whole army, both land 
and sea forces, being now together, they began to 
enclose the Syracusians with a double wall from 
Epipolae and the rocks unto the sea-side. The ne- 
cessaries of the army were supplied from all parts 
of Italy. And many of the Siculi, who before 
stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took 
part now with the Athenians ; to whom came also 
three penteconteri [long boats of fifty oars a-piecej 
from Hetruria ; and divers other ways their hopes 
were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when 
there came no help from Peloponnesus, made no 
longer account to subsist by war ; but conferred, 
both amongst themselves and with Nicias, of com- 
position : for Lamachus being dead, the sole com- 
mand of the army was in him. And though nothing 
w r ere concluded, yet many things (as was likely 
w r ith men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged 
than before) were propounded unto Nicias, and 
more amongst themselves. And 1 -the present ill 
success had also spread some jealousy amongst 
The Syracusians them, one of another. And they discharged the 
generals under whose conduct this happened, as if 
their harm had come either from their unluckiness 

1 [" For the present ill success" &e,] 


or from their perfidiousness : and chose Heracleides, 
Eucles, and Tellias in their places. 

7 * 

104. Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedse- 
mon and the Corinthian galleys were already at 
Leucas, purposing with all speed to go over into 
Sicily. But when terrible reports came unto them 
from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that Syra- 
cuse was already quite enclosed, Gylippus had 
hope of Sicily no longer; but desiring to assure Italy, 
he and Py then a Corinthian, with two Laconic and 
two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the 
Ionic sea to Tarentum : and the Corinthians w r ere 
to man ten galleys of their own, two of Leucas, 
and three of Ambracia, and come after. Gylippus 
went first from Tarentum to Thurii, as ambassador, 
by his father's right, who was free of the city of 
Tarentum 1 : but not winning them to his side, he 

i <* Went first on an embassy kings, gerontes, ephors, generals, 

from Tarentum to Thurii, on the all alike: but to explain how the 

strength of his father's having been practice could exist consistently 

a citizen of the latter place". Both with the banishment from the state 

father and son are a striking ex- of the precious metals. Ofitsuni- 

ample of the singular venality of veisal prevalence the oracle leaves 

the Spartan character. The father no doubt : a ^iXoxprjfiaria <nraprav 

Cleandridas, the counsellor of king 6XT, uXXo 8k oi^lj/, " avarice, and 

Pleistoanax (v. 16), was charged nothing else, will be the ruin of 

with receiving a bribe from Pericles Sparta". SeeHerm. 46. Clean- 

(A.C. 445) to withdraw their army, dridashad been of eminent serviceto 

when invading Attica after the the Thurians, in concluding a peace 

battle of Coroneia (iii. 68, note), between them and the Tarentines, 

Cleandridas fled from his trial, was with whom they were at war: which 

condemned to death in his absence, was followed in 433 by the found- 

and finished his days in a voluntary ing of Heracleia. The earliest 

exile. The son Gylippus, charged mention of the Lucanians is on the 

with a like offence, ended his life occasion of the skill and courage 

by starvation. The difficulty is, not displayed by him in leading the 

merely to account for an unusually Thurians against them. But in 

strong propensity to a vice, which 389 the Thurians were defeated, 

seems to have prevailed amongst and almost exterminated near Lao*, 



put out again, and sailed along the coast of Italy. 
Passing by the Terineean gulf, he was put from the 
shore by a wind which in that quarter bloweth 
strongly against the north 1 , and driven into the 
main sea ; and after another extreme tempest 
brought in again into Tarentum : where he drew 
up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the 
th weather, and repaired them. Nicias, hearing that 
he came, contemned the small number of his gal- 
leys, as also the Thurians had before, supposing 
them furnished as for piracy: and appointed no 
watch for them yet. 

105. About the same time of this summer, the 
Lacedaemonians invaded the territory of Argos, 
they and their confederates : and wasted a great 
part of their land. And the Athenians aided the 
Argives with thirty galleys : which most apparently 
broke the peace between them and the Lacedae- 
monians. For before, they went out from Pylus 
with the Argives and Mantineans, but in the na- 
ture of freebooters ; and that also riot into Laconia, 
but other parts of Peloponnesus 2 . Nay, when the 
Argives have often entreated them but only to land 
with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted 
never so little of their territory to return, they 
would not. But now, under the conduct of Pytho- 
dorus, Lsespodius, and Demaratus, they landed in 
the territory of Epidaurus Lirnera, and in Prasise, 

of which the Lucanians had made valov KO\TTOJ/, are incapable of ex- 

themselves masters. See Niehuhr, planation, and by Goeller are in- 

vol. i. p. 96.] eluded in brackets.] 

1 [" By a wind sitting in the 2 [" And that rather about the 

north": that is, blowing from the rest of Peloponnesus, than into 

north. The words nard rbv rspi- Laconia".] 


and there and in other places wasted the country : V f. 
arid gave unto the Lacedaemonians a most justi- 
fiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After 
this, the Athenians being departed from Argos 
with their galleys, and the Lacedaemonians gone 
likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia : and 
when they had wasted part of their territory, and 
killed some of their men, returned. 


Or.. 91. 2. 

Q 2 





Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse : checketh the fortune of the 
Athenians : and cutteth off their works with a counter-wall. 
The Lacedaemonians invade Attica and fortify Deceleia. 
The confederates of each side are solicited for supplies to be 
sent to Syracuse. Two battles fought in the great haven : 
in the first of which the Syracusians are beaten, in the second 
superior. Demosthenes arriveth with a new army : and 
attempting the works of the enemy in Epipolse by night, is 
repulsed with great slaughter of his men. They fight the 
third time : and the Syracusians having the victory, block up 
the haven with boats. A catalogue of the confederates on 
each side. They fight again at the bars of the haven : where 
the Athenians losing their galleys, prepare to march away by 
land. In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally 
subdued by the Syracusians. The death of Nicias and De- 
mosthenes, and misery of the captives in the quarry. Which 
happened in the ninteenth year of this war. 

1. GYLTPPUS and Pythen, having repaired their 
galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to 
Locri Epizephyrii 1 . And upon certain intelligence 

1 [These Locrians, who take their tion of their city ; besides which the 

name from the promontory Epize- Spartans are said to have colonized 

phyrium, were for the most part Locri in the first Messenian war. 

descendants of the Ozolian and It may therefore he considered as a 

Opunlian Locrians: but Syracusaus Doric state: its constitution was 

contributed largely to the founda- oligarchical, and in this state as well 


now, that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but vu. 

coming with an army there was entrance still by ;~/ XVI 

Epipolse ; they consulted whether it were better A.CUU. 

to take Sicily on their right hand, and adventure 

into the town by sea ; or on the left, and so first to 

go to Himera, and then taking along both them and 

as many other as they could get to their side, to go 

into it by land. And it was resolved to go to 

Himera : the rather, because the four Attic galleys, 

which Nicias, though he contemned them before, 

had now when he heard they were at Locri sent 

to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. 

Having prevented this guard, they crossed the 

strait : and touching at Rhegium and Messana by 

the way, came to Himera. Being there, they pre- They took the 

vailed so far with the Himeneans, that they not 

only followed them to the war themselves, but also 

furnished with armour such of Gylippus and Py- 

then's mariners as wanted : for at Himera they 

had drawn their galleys to land. They likewise 

sent to the Selimmtiaris, to meet them at a place 

assigned with their whole army. The Geloans also, 

and other 1 of the Siculi, promised to send them 

forces, though not many : being much the willinger 

to come to the side, both for that Archonidas was 

lately dead, (who reigning over some of the Siculi 

in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, 

was friend to the Athenians), and also for that 

Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedaemon with 

as Opus are found the hundred by the laws given to them by Za- 
families, which by virtue of their leucus about 650 A.C,: the ear- 
nobility enjoyed a large share of the liest written code which existed in 
government: their dialect moreover Greece.] 
was Doric. They were governed l [" And certain of the Sikeli".] 


vii. a good will to the business. Gylippus, taking with 
own ma riners and sea-soldiers, for whom 
S otten arms, at the most seven hundred, 
and Himeraeans with armour and without in the 
whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and 
some light-armed Selinuntians, with some few 
horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi in all about 
one thousand, marched with these towards Sy- 

The Corinthian 2. In the meantime, the Corinthians with the 
rest of their galleys putting to sea from Leucas, 
made after C as tlie Y we re] every one with what 
speed he could : and Gongylus, one of the Corinth- 

keepeth the Sy- . r J y 

i-acusians from lan commanders, though the last that set forth, 
compounding. arr j ve( j rst at Sy racuse w ith one galley, and but 

a little before the coming of Gylippus. And finding 
them ready to call an assembly about an end of the 
war, he hindered them from it, and put them into 
heart : relating, how both the rest of the galleys 
were coming, and also Gylippus the son of Clean- 
dridas for general, sent unto them by the Lacedae- 
monians. With this the Syracusians were re-con- 
firmed, and went presently out with their whole 
army to meet him : for they understood now that 
he was near j . He, having taken legas, a fort, in 
his w r ay, as he passed through the territory of the 
Gyiippus arnv Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolae : 
cth at Syracuse an( j g e t t i n g U p by Euryelus, where also the Athe- 
nians had gotten up before, marched together with 
the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. 
At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had 
finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs 

1 [" For they understood that he was already near".] 


towards the great haven 1 ; save only a little next V n. 
the sea, which they were yet at work on. And on 
the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus and 
the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid L - U1 - 3 - 
ready upon the place : and the work was left in 
some places half, and in some wholly finished. So 
great was the danger that Syracuse was now 
brought into. 

3. The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of oyisppiw ofr,> r . 
Gylippus, though somewhat troubled at first, yet ^live^aT 
put themselves in order to receive him. And he, truct} to be gone 


making a stand when he came near, sent a herald 
to them ; saying, that if they would abandon Sicily 
within five days with bag and baggage, he was 
content to give them truce. Which the Athe- 
nians contemning, sent him away without any 
answer. After this, they were putting themselves 
into order of battle one against another : but 
Gylippus finding the Syracusians troubled, and 
not easily falling into their ranks, led back his 
army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the 
Athenians out against him, but lay still at his 
own fortification. And Gylippus seeing he came 
not up, withdrew his army into the top called 
Temenites 2 ; where he lodged all night. The next 
day, he drew out the greater part of his army, and 
embattled them before the fortification of the 
Athenians, that they might not send succour to 
any other place ; but a part also they sent to the 

fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those * m 

1 [" And he chanced to come at harbour, of seven or eight stadia : 

the critical moment, at which the save" <Scc.] 

Athenians had already finished a * [That is, the rock which sepa- 

double wall reaching to the great rated Tycha and Neapolis.] 


vii. they found within it : for the place was out of 
EA* xvjiL sight to the Athenians. The same day the Syra- 
A.c.414. cusians also took an Athenian galley, as it entered 

into the great haven. 
The Syracusians 4. After this, the Syracusians and their confede- 
ouuh 1 ^ rates began a wall through Epipolse, from the city 
P towards the single cross wall 1 upwards: that the 
of the waii ot Athenians, unless they could hinder it, mierht be 

the Athenians. > . . ' . ' f 

excluded from bringing their own wall any further 
on. And the Athenians by this time, having made 
an end of their wall to the sea, were come up 
again : and Gylippus (for some part of the w r all 
was but weak) rising with his army by night, went 
to assault it. But the Athenians also knowing it, 
(for they lodged all night without the wall), went 
presently to relieve it : which Gylippus perceiving, 
again retired 2 . And the Athenians, when they 
had built it higher, kept the watch in this part 
themselves : and divided the rest of the wall to 
The Athenians the charge of their confederates. Also it seemed 

fortify Plenty. 

rium. It is a promontory over against the city, 
which shooting into the entrance of the great 
haven straiteneth the mouth of the same : which 
fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing 
in of necessaries to the army. For by this means, 
their galleys might ride nearer to the haven 3 of 
the Syracusians : and not upon every motion of 
the navy of the enemies, to be to come out against 

rb iyicapffiov : " towards that is, their wall of circumvalla- 

the cross wall of the Syracusans" : tion, which ran across this new wall. 

that is, so as to meet the/orwer cross Thirl. " in a cross direction" : that 

wall, which had been taken by the is, across the Athenian wall. Am.] 
Athenians, vi. 100. G61.~ u towards 2 [ u Retreated hastily".] 
the cross wall of the Atfanians" : 9 The lesser haven, [Laccius]. 


them, as they were before, from the bottom of the 
[great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly 
now upon the war by sea : seeing his hopes by 
land diminished since the arrival of Gylippus. 
Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to 
that place, he built about it three fortifications, 
wherein he placed his baggage ; and where now 
also lay at road both his great vessels of carriage, 
and the nimblest of his galleys 1 . Hereupon prin- 
cipally ensued the first occasion of the great loss 
of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, 
and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out 
also to fetch in wood, they were continually inter- 
cepted by the Syracusian horsemen, that were 
masters of the field. For the third part of the 
Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a little town 
called Olympieium 2 , to keep those in Plemmyrium 
from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias 
was advertised moreover of the coining of the rest 
of the Corinthian galleys : and sent out a guard of 
twenty galleys, with order to wait for them about nesu8 - 
Locri and Rhegium, and the passage there into 

5. Gyliopus in the meantime went on with the oyiippu* geth 

11 i i -n i i 1-1 i on ^ith his wall, 

wall through Epipolse, using the stones laid ready and %hteth with 
there by the Athenians 3 ; and withal drew out the ttict 
Syracusians and their confederates beyond the 
point of the same, and ever as he brought them he finished hu 

, i . , . , i i A i - wall, and utterly 

forth put them into their order; and the Athenians, excluded the 

1 [" And his fighting galleys".] themselves : and kept the Syracu- 

2 [ u At Polichne near the Olym- sans and their allies continually 
pieiutn". Goeller.] drawn out and in hattle array in 

3 [" Using the stones which the advance of the wall. And the 
Athenians had before laid there for Athenians, on the other side, &c,"] 






proceeding of 
the wall of the 

on the other side, embattled themselves against 
them. Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the 
battle : and being come to hands, they fought be- 
tween the fortifications of them both, where the 
Syracusians and their confederates had no use at 
all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their 
confederates being overcome, and the Athenians 
having given them truce to take up their dead and 
erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army, 
and told them, that this was not theirs, but his 
own fault ; who by pitching the battle so far within 
the fortifications, had deprived them of the use 
both of their cavalry and darters ; and that there- 
fore he meant to bring them on again : and wished 
them to consider, that for forces they were nothing 
inferior to the enemy ; and for courage, it were a 
thing not to be endured, that being Peloponnesians 
and Dorians, they should not master and drive out 
of the country lonians, islanders, and a rabble of 
mixed nations. 

6. After this, when he saw his opportunity, he 
brought out the army again. Nicias and the Athe- 
nians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin 
the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall 
in hand 1 : (for by this time it wanted but little of 
passing the point of theirs, and proceeding, would 
give the enemy advantage, both to win if he fought, 
and not to fight unless he listed) 2 : did therefore 
also set forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, 
when he had drawn his men of arms farther with- 

1 [" The wall which was now they fought and conquered, or 
drawing near to theirs".] whether they fought not": that is, 

2 ["And proceeding, would make victory would no longer he of any 
it all one to the Athenians whether use to them. Goell.] 


out the walls than he had done before, gave the vn. 
onset. His horsemen and darters he placed upon 
the flank of the Athenians, in ground enough, to 
which neither of their walls extended. And these 
horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon 
the left wing of the Athenians next them, put them 
to flight : by which means the rest of the army 
was by the Syracusians overcome likewise, and 
driven headlong within their fortifications. The 
night following, the Syracusians brought up their 
wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so as they 
could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly 
unable, though masters of the field, to enclose 
the city. 

7. After this, the other twelve galleys of the The rest of the 
Corinthians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians, unde- j 
scried of the Athenian galleys that lay in wait for] 

them, entered the haven, under the command of thatweresetto 

watch them. 

Erasinides, a Corinthian : and helped the Syracu- 
sians to finish what remained to the cross wall 1 . 

Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily, raising Gyii PP n 8 goeth 
forces both for sea and land, and soliciting to his s^ieth^to^. 
side all such cities as formerly either had not been nus for 
forward, or had wholly abstained from the war. 
Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians 
and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedsemon and 
Corinth, to procure new forces to be transported 
either in ships or boats, or how they could ; be- 
cause the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the 

1 [ u Helped the Syracusans to beyond the Athenian wall : which 

build up to the eross wall": that is, Goeller explains, by supposing that 

the wall of the Athenians, which in their haste they built the extremity 

crossed the Syracusan wall. In the at the Athenian line first, and the 

last chapter, the Syracusans are said Corinthians now helped them to fill 

to have already brought their wall up the interval.] 





A C.414. 

Nicias writeth to 
Athens tor sup- 
ply, and to be 
eased of his 

The Athenians 
besiege Araphi- 

The end of the 



like. In the meantime, the Syracusians both 
manned their navy, and made trial of themselves, 
as intending to take in hand that part also : and 
were otherwise exceedingly encouraged. 

8. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength 
of the enemy and his own necessities daily increas- 
ing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at 
other times and often, upon the occasion of every 
action that passed : and now especially, as finding 
himself in danger, and that unless they quickly 
sent for those away that were there already, or 
sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope 
of safety. And fearing lest such as he sent, through 
want of utterance or judgment 1 , or through desire 
to please the multitude, should deliver things other- 
wise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter : 
conceiving that thus the Athenians should best 
know his mind, whereof no part could now be 
suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore 
enter into deliberation upon true grounds. With 
these letters, and other their instructions, the 
messengers took their journey. And Nicias in the 
meantime having a care to the well guarding of 
his camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary 

9. In the end of this summer, Euetion, general 
for the Athenians, with Perdiccas, together with 
many Thracians warring against Amphipolis, took 
not the city ; but bringing his galleys about into 
Strymon, besieged it from the river, lying at Ime- 
rseum. And so this summer ended. 

1 0. The next winter, the messengers from Nicias 

[Bekker &c.,fu/rj;i;jc: " of memory'*. Goell. Am. vulgo, 



arrived at Athens ; and having spoken what they vii. 
had in charge, and answered to such questions as 
they were asked, they presented the letter : which 
the clerk of the city 1 , standing forth, read unto the 
Athenians, containing as followeth : 

11." Athenians, you know by many 2 other my THE LETTER OF 
letters what hath passed formerly : nor is it less 
needful for you to be informed of the state we are 
in, and to take counsel upon it, at this present. 
When we had in many battles beaten the Syracus- 
ians, against whom we were sent, and had built 
the walls within which we now lie, came Gylippus 
a Lacedaemonian, with an army out of Pelopon- 
nesus, and also out of some of the cities of Sicily ; 
and in the first battle was overcome by us : but in 
the second, forced by his many horsemen and 
darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon 
giving over our walling up of the city for the mul- 
titude of our enemies, we now sit still. Nor 3 can 
we indeed have the use of our whole army, because 
some part of the men of arms are employed to de- 
fend our walls. And they have built a single wall 
up to us, so that now we have no more means to 

1 [There were three different secre- last edition Bekkerhas included in 
taries. The secretary of the Pry- brackets the word TroXXaTc. Goeller 
taneium, who was chosen hy lot, obsenes that the Athenians had not 
and changed with each Prytaneia : yet been twelve months in Sicily ; 
he had charge of the votes and pro- and the passage being four months 
ccedings of the council. Another (see vi. 21), Nicias could scarcely 
was elected by the council, to take in that time have sent many mes- 
charge of the laws. The third, the sages. Consistently with ch. 8, the 
one here meant, was chosen by the word tTrwroXaTc must be taken in 
people, and read documents, when the sense of oral despatches. Thirl.] 
necessary, to. the assembly and the ' [ 44 We now sit still: (for we can- 
council. Herm. 127.] not have the use of our whole army 

2 [" In other messages^. In his &c.) : and they have built'* &e.] 


vii. enclose it, except one should come with a great 

YBAExvin arm Y ai *d win that cross wall of theirs by assault. 

A.c.414. And so it is. that we who seemed to besiege others, 

OL 91 8 

Letter of Nicias. are besieged ourselves for so much as concerneth 
the land : for we cannot go far abroad by reason 
of their cavalry. 12. They have also sent ambas- 
sadors for another army into Peloponnesus : and 
Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both 
to solicit such to join with him in the war as 
have not yet stirred, and of others to get, if he 
can, both more land-soldiers and more munition 
for their navy. For they intend, as I have been 
informed, both to assault our wall by land with 
their army, and to make trial what they are able 
to do with their navy by sea. For 1 though our 
fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous 
at first, both for soundness of the galleys and en- 
tireness of the men: yet our galleys are now soaked' 2 
with lying so long in the water, and our men con- 
sumed. For we want the means to haul a-land 
our galleys, and trim 1 ' them : because the galleys 
of the enemy, as good as ours and more in number, 
do keep us in a continual expectation of assault, 
which they manifestly endeavour 4 . And seeing it 
is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have 
therefore liberty to dry their galleys at their plea- 
sure : for they lie not, as we, in attendance upon 
others. 13. Nay, we could hardly do it, though 
we had many galleys spare, and were not con- 

1 [" And let none think it so great care. Hemsterh. ad Lucian. Cont.] 
a matter that they should attack us 4 [ u Keep us in continual expect . 
even by sea. For though" c.] ation of an assault. And they are 

2 ["" Are now leaky".] manifestly practising themselves ; 

3 [&ai//vat : naves subductas sic- and it is in their own choice" e,] 


strained, as now, to keep watch upon them with vii. 
our whole number. For should we abate though y ~ B A XVI ~ 
but a little of our observance, we should want pro- A.C 414. 

, . , ' r OL.91.8. 

vision: which as we are, being to pass so near Letter o 
their city, is brought in with difficulty. And hence 
it is, that our mariners both formerly have been, 
and are now wasted. For our mariners, fetching 
wood and water and foraging far off, are inter- 
cepted by the horsemen : and our slaves 1 , now we 
are on equal terms, run over to the enemy. As 
for strangers, some of them having come aboard by 
constraint, return presently to their cities ; and 
others having been levied at first with great wages, 
thinking they came to enrich themselves rather 
than to fight, now they see the enemy make so 
strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their 
expectation and especially with their navy, partly 
take pretext to be gone that they may serve the 
enemy, and partly, Sicily being large, shift them- 
selves away every one as he can. Some there are 
also, who having bought here Hyccarian slaves 2 , 
have gotten the captains of galleys to accept of them 
in the room of themselves, and thereby destroyed 
the purity of our naval strength. 14. To you I 
write, who know how small a time any fleet conti- 
nueth in the height of vigour : and how few of the 
mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course 
of a galley and how to contain the oar. But of all, 
my greatest trouble is this : that being general, I 
can neither make them do better, (for your natures 
are hard to be governed), nor get mariners in any 

1 [Qfpairovw;. " ministri nauta- 2 Those were they which Nicias, 
rum" : sic Qtp&irovrte militum sunt, upon the taking of Hyccara, made 
iv. 16. Goeller.] sale of himself. [See vi. 62.] 


other place, (which the enemy can do from many 
places),andmustof necessity have themfrom whence 
A.C 4u. we brought both those we have and those we have 

OL.91 3. , . Jp . _ XT J 

letter of Nidus, lost 1 . For our now confederate cities, JNaxos and 
Catana, are not able to supply us. Had the enemy 
but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy 
that now send us provision, seeing what estate we 
are now in and you not help us, would turn to 
them, the war were at an end and we expugned 
without another stroke. 

" I could have written to you other things more 
pleasing than these, but not more profitable : see- 
ing it is necessary for you to know certainly the 
affairs here, when you go to council upon them. 
Withal, because I know your natures to be such, 
as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards 
when things fall not out accordingly you will call 
in question them that write it, I thought best to 
write the truth for my own safety's sake. 1 5. And 
now think thus: that though we have carried our- 
selves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which 
we came at first hither, unblameably ; yet since all 
Sicily is united against us, and another army ex- 
pected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for 
those we have here are not enough for the enemy's 
present forces) either to send for these away, or to 
send hither another army, both of land and sea-sol- 
diers, no less than the former, and money not a little; 
and also a general to succeed me, who am able no 
longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone 
[in the kidneys]. I must crave your pardon 2 . I 

1 ["Nor get supplies for the ships daily consumption limited to 
from any place, (which the enemy what we hrought with us". Arn.] 
&c.), but our stock in hand and our 2 [" Consideration: for I &c."j 


have done you many good services in the conducts V n. 
of your armies, when I had my health. What you 
will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and 
delay it not. For the enemy will soon have fur- 
nished himself of his Sicilian aids: and though 
those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you 
look not to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as 
before, and partly by preventing you with speed." 

16. These were the contents of the letter of 
Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it The , 
read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, l 
yet for the present, till such time as others chosen Synu 
to be in commission might arrive, they joined with 
him two of those that were already in the army, 
Menander and Euthydemon : to the end that he 
might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his 
sickness. They concluded likewise to send another 
army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athen- 
ians enrolled, and of their confederates. And for 
fellow-generals with Nicias, they elected Demos- 
thenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the 
son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away presently 
for Sicily about the time of the winter solstice, with 
ten galleys and twenty 1 talents of silver, to tell 
them there that aid was coming, and that there 
was care taken of them. 17- But Demosthenes 
staying, made preparation for the voyage to set 
out early the next spring : and sent unto the con- 
federates, appointing what forces they should pro- 
vide, and to furnish himself amongst them with 
money and galleys and men of arms. 

The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about T 

* twenty galley s to 

1 [Haack. Popp. Thirl. Am. 130V-Goell. Bekk. "20"] 


VIT. Peloponnesus, to watch that none should go over 
into Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For 

A.c.413. the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come 
to to them and had brought news of the amendment 

of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that 
^gy ^ad sent thither those other galleys before : 

their forces into J J 

Sicily. but now they were encouraged a great deal more, 

and prepared men of arms to be transported into 
Sicily in ships 1 ; and the Lacedaemonians did the 
like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians 
manned five-and-twenty galleys, to present battle 
to the fleet that kept watch at Naupactus : that the 
ships with the men of arms, whilst the Athenians 
attended these galleys so embattled against them, 
might pass by unhindered. 

1 8. The Lacedannonians, as they intended before, 
and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians 

andfortifjDece- an( j Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the 

Jeia, supposing A t 

the Athenians to Athenians' new supply for Sicily prepared likewise 
e to invade Attica ; thereby to divert them. And 
Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying 
of Deceleia, and by no means to war remissly. 
But the Lacedaemonians were heartened thereunto 
principally, because they thought the Athenians 
having in hand a double war, one against them 
and another against the Sicilians, would be the 
easier pulled down : and because they conceived 
the breach of the last peace was in themselves 2 . 
For in the former war, the injury proceeded from 2 
their own side : in that the Thebans had entered 
Platsea in time of peace; and because also, whereas 

1 [ In ships of burthen".] was in them" (the Athenians).] 

2 " The first breach of the peace 3 [" Rather from their own side".] 


it was inserted in the former articles, that arms 
should not be carried against such as would stand 
to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial 
when the Athenians offered it. And they thought 
all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them 
for that cause : remembering amongst others, the 
calamity at Pylus. But when the Athenians with 
a fleet of thirty sail 1 had spoiled part of the terri- 
tory of Epidaurus, and of Prasiae and other places, 
and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had 
taken booty in the country about ; and seeing that 
as often as there arose any controversy touching 
any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedaemo- 
nians offering trial by judgment, they refused it : 
then indeed, the Lacedaemonians conceiving the 
Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves 
had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to 
the war. And this winter, they sent about unto 
their confederates to make ready iron, and all 
instruments of fortification. And for the aid they 
were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they 
both made provision amongst themselves, and 
compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. 
So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of 
the war written by Thucydides. 

19. The next spring, in the very beginning, 
earlier than ever before 2 , the Lacedaemonians and i 
their confederates entered with their array into ; 
Attica, under the command of Agis the son of 
Archidamus, their king. And first they wasted 
the champagne country ; and then went in hand 
with thew^ll at Deceleia, dividing the work amongst 

1 [For this expedition, see vi. 105.] 2 [" Very early indeed".] 

R 2 


the army, according to their cities. This Deceleia 
* s ^ rom ^ ie Cl ^ ^ Athens, at the most ', but one 

A.c.413. hundred and twenty furlongs : and about as much 
or a little more from Boeotia. This fort they made 
in the plain, and in the most opportune place that 
could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of 
the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their con- 
federates in Attica, went on with their fortification. 
The Peioponnes- They in Peloponnesus, sent away their ships with 
the men of arms about the same time into Sicily : 
O f w hi c h the Lacedaemonians, out of the best of 
their Helotes and men made newly free 2 , sent in 
the whole six hundred, and Eccritus a Spartan for 
commander : and the Boeotians three hundred, 
under the conduct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, 
and Hegesander, a Thespian. And these set forth 
first, and put to sea at Tamarus in Laconia. After 
them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hun- 
dred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, and 
part mercenary Arcadians ; and Alexarchus, a Co- 
rinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two 
hundred with them that went from Corinth, and 
Sargeus a Sicyoniau for captain. Now the twenty- 
five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter, 
lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which 
were at Naupactus, till such time as the men of 
arms in the ships from Peloponnesus might get 
away : for which purpose they were also set out 
at first, that the Athenians might not have their 
minds upon these ships so much as upon the 

20. In the meantime also the Athenians, whilst 

1 [" About 120 stadia'*.] 2 [vcodapwtov : see v. 34, note.] 


Deceleia was fortifying, in the beginning of the 
spring, sent twenty 1 galleys about Peloponnesus 
under the command of Charicles the son of Apollo- 
dorus ; with order when he came to Argos, to take 
aboard the men of arms which the Argives were 
to send them, according to league 2 : and sent away The Athenians 
Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, 
with threescore galleys of Athens and five of Chios, 
and one thousand two hundred men of arms of the 
roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they 
could get, provided by their subject confederates 
of all other necessaries for the war 3 . But he had 
order to join first with Charicles, and help him to 
make war first uponLaconia. So Demosthenes went 
to /Egina, and stayed there both for the remnant 
of his own army, if any were left behind, and for 
Charicles till he had taken aboard the Argives. 

21. In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gyiippus per. 
Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, bringing with racuS 
him from the cities he had dealt withal as great by 8ea * 
forces as severally he could get from them. And 
having assembled the Syracusians, he told them 
that they ought to man as many galleys as they 
could, and make trial of a battle by sea : and that 
he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the 
benefit of the war, which should be worthy the 
danger. Hermocrates also was none of the least 
means of getting them to undertake the Athenians 
with their navy : who told them, " that neither the 

1 [ u Thirty galleys".] a [ u As many of the islanders as 

3 [" With order to go also to they could get from all sides, and 

Argos, and summon on shipboard, from the rest of their allies, their 

according to the league, the hopliUe subjects, getting whatsoever they 

of the Argives''.] might have of use for the war".] 


vii. Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary, or from 
everlasting ; but were more inland men than the 
Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the 
Medes : and that to daring men, such as the Athe- 
nians are, they are most formidable that are as 
daring against them ; for wherewith they terrify 
their neighbours, which is not always the advan- 
tage of power, but boldness of enterprizing, with 
the same shall they in like manner be terrified by 
their enemies 1 ". "He knew it," he said, "cer- 
tainly, that the Syracusians by their unexpected 
daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get 
more advantage in respect of the fear it would 
cause, than the Athenians should endamage them 
by their odds of skill." He bade them therefore to 
make trial of their navy, and to be afraid no longer. 
The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus 
and Hermocrates, and others if any were, became 
now extremely desirous to fight by sea : and pre- 
sently manned their galleys. 

22. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew 
out his whole power of land soldiers in the begin- 
n j n g o f j^ght, meaning to go himself and assault 
the fortifications in Plemmyrium' 2 : withal the gal- 
leys of the Syracusians, by appointment, thirty-five 
of them came up towards it out of the great haven; 
and forty-five more came about out of the little 
haven, where also was their arsenal, with purpose 
to join with those within, and to go together to 

1 [** They (the Syracusans) too, in the rear of the Athenian lines, 
may in like manner strike the same crossed the Anapus, and came upon 
fear into them' 1 .] Plemmyrium along the table-land 

2 [He marched out of the city hy extending from the sea to the fort 
Epipolae, descended into the plain and temple of Olympieium. Am,] 


Plemmyrium, that the Athenians might be troubled 
on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly 
manned sixty galleys to oppose them; with twenty- 
five of them they fought with the thirty-five of 
the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the 
rest went to meet those that came about from the 
little haven 1 . And these fought presently before 
the mouth of the great haven, and held each 
other to it for a long time ; one side endeavouring 
to force, the other to defend the entrance. 23. In 
the meantime, Gylippus (the Athenians in Plemmy-" t ^" ork \ <(f 

> J l l \ ^ J the Athenians in 

rium being now come down to the water side, and 
having their minds busied upon the fight of the 
galleys) betimes in the morning, and on a sudden 
assaulted the fortifications before they could come 
back again to defend them ; and possessed first 
the greatest, and afterwards the two lesser : for 
they that watched in these, when they saw the 
greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. 
They that fled upon the losing of the first wall, 
and put themselves into boats and into a certain 
ship, got hardly into the camp : for whilst the Sy- 
racusians in the great haven had yet the better in 
the fight upon the water, they gave them chase 
with one nimble galley-. But by that time that 

1 [" From the dock-yard".] had in the double-wall from the 

2 ["And the men in the first- crugof Temenitcs to the sea, where, 
taken fort, so many at least as as appears in chap 11, was sta- 
cseaped to certain boats and mer- tioned a part of their army. And 
chant-ships, with some difficulty to keep up the communication he- 
reached the camp : for the Syracu- tween Plemmyrium and the double- 
sans at this time having the best of wall, they still kept a naval camp in 
the fight with the ships in the great the hay (/iwxv) f lne rei *t haven 
haven, they "were chased by one near Dascon : for that all their ships 
nimble galley". "The camp'*, that did not remove to Plemrnyriuxn, 
is, the camp which the Athenians appears from eh. 4 and 53. To that 


vii. the other two walls w T ere taken, the Syracusians 
KA ' ," upon the water were overcome : and the Athenians 

ir>AK AlX< * 

A.c.4i3. which fled from those two walls got to their camp 
The Athenians with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys 
urj that fought before the haven's mouth, having 
beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder ; 
and falling foul one on another, gave away the 
victory unto the Athenians : \A ho put to flight not 
only them, but also those other by whom they had 
before been overcome within the haven, and sunk 
eleven galleys of the Syracusians and slew most of 
the men aboard them, save only the men of three 
galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own gal- 
leys they lost only three. When they had drawn 
to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys, and 
erected a trophy in the little island over against 
Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp. 

24. The Syracusians, though such were their 
success in the battle by sea, yet they won the for- 
tification in Plemmyrium; and set up three trophies, 
for every wall one. One of the two walls last 
taken, they demolished: but two they repaired, 
and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these 
walls, many men were slain, and many taken alive : 
and their goods, which altogether was a great 
matter, were all taken. For the Athenians using 
these works for their storehouse, there was in 
them much wealth and victual belonging unto 
merchants, and much unto captains of galleys. 
For there were sails within it for forty galleys, be- 
sides other furniture ; and three galleys drawn to 

naval camp first of all, therefore, be- Plemmyrium; and thence to the 
took themselves the fugitive* from double-wall. Goell.] 


land. And this loss of Plemmyrium, was it that vii. 
most and principally impaired the Athenians' 
army. For the entrance of their provision was 
now no longer safe ; for the Syracusians lying 
against them there with their galleys, kept them 
out, and nothing could be brought in unto them 
but by fight: and the army besides was thereby 
otherwise terrified and dejected. 

25. After this the Syracusians sent out twelve 
galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a 
Syracusian. Of which one carried ambassadors 
into Peloponnesus, to declare what hope they had 
now of their business, and to instigate them to a 
sharper war in Attica. The other eleven went into 
Italy, upon intelligence of certain vessels laden 
w : ith commodities coming to the Athenian army : 
which also they met with, and destroyed most of 
them ; and the timber, which for building of gal- 
leys the Athenians had ready framed, they burned 
in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went 
to Locri : and riding here, there came unto them 
one of the ships that carried the men of arms of 
the Thespians, whom the Syracusians took aboard, 
and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians 
that watched for them with twenty galleys at Me- 
gara, took one of them, and the men that were in 
her ; but could not take the rest : so that they 
escaped tln*ough to Syracuse. There was also a 
light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the 
piles which the Syracusians had driven down 
before their old harbour 1 , to the end that the gal- 

1 [" Their old (i/*w<roirwv) (locks the u dock -yard": iir/vcioi', a " town 
under cover": wherein ships were having a dock-yard". See li. 84, 
built or repaired, vwpwv (ch. *22) i. 30, and the scholiast. GoelL] 


vii. leys might ride within, and the Athenians not 
annoy them by assault. The Athenians having 
brought to the place a ship of huge greatness 1 , 
fortified with wooden turrets and covered against 
fire, caused certain men with [little] boats to go 
and fasten cords unto the piles, and so broke 2 them 
up with craning. Some also the divers did cut 
up with saws. In the meantime the Syracusians 
from the harbour 3 , and they from the great ship, 
shot at each other: till in the end the greatest 
part of the piles were by the Athenians gotten up. 
But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles 
which lay hidden. For some of them they had so 
driven in, as that they came not above the water : 
so that he that should come near, was in danger to 
be thrown upon them as upon a rock 4 . But these 
also for reward, the divers went down and sawed 
asunder. But the Syracusians continually drave 
down other in their stead. Other devices they had 
against each other, as was not unlikely between 
armies so near opposed : and many light skirmishes 
passed, and attempts of all kinds were put in 
execution. The Syracusians moreover sent am- 
bassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciotes, 
and some Lacedaemonians, unto the cities about 
them 5 : to let them know that they had won Plem- 
myrium ; and that in the battle by sea, they were 
not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but 

" of the burthen 2 [*' Dragged them up".] 

often thousand talent*"; or, accord- 3 [" The covered docks"'.] 

ing to those who use the form /it/- 4 [' So that it was dangerous to 

jota^opov, of ten thousand ampho- sail near them, lest not seeing them 

ra:: the burthen of ships being one should be stranded as on a 

reckoned in both talents and am- rock".] 

phone.] 5 [That is to say, in Sicily.] 


by their own disorder ; and also to show what 
hope they were in in other respects, and to entreat 
their aid both of sea and land forces : forsomuch 
as the Athenians expecting another army, if they 
would send aid before it came whereby to over- 
throw that which they had now there, the war 
would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of 

26. Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he Demosthenes in 
was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were forimrtii*!! wck y 
gotten together, put to sea from /Egina, and sailing |^ d itt Ij * 
into Peloponnesus joined with Charicles and the 
thirty galleys that were with him. And having 
taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, 
came to Laconia ; and first wasted part of the ter- 
ritory of Epidaurus Limera. From thence going 
to that part of Laconia which is over against the 
island Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo 1 , 
they wasted a part of the country : and fortified 
an isthmus there, both that the Helotes might have 
a refuge in it running away from the Lacedaemo- 
nians, and that freebooters from thence, as from 
Pylus, might fetch in prizes from the territory 
adjoining. As soon as the place was taken in, 
Demosthenes himself went on to Corcyra, to take 
up the confederates there, with intent to go thence 
speedily into Sicily. And Charicles having stayed 
to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, 
went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens : 
and the Argives also went home. 

27- The same winter also came to Athens a 

thousand and three hundred targetiers, of those 


1 [" To where is the temple of conia". Cythera was also the name 
Apollo, opposite to Cythera of La- of a town in Cyprus.] 


vn. called Machaerophori ] of the race of them that are 
called Dii : and were to have gone with Demos- 
thenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athe- 
nians resolved to send them back again into 
' Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to enter- 
into Sicily. t a j n them only for the war in Deceleia : for their 
pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day. 
as. For Deceleia being this summer fortified first by 
the whole army, and then by the several cities 
maintained with a garrison 2 by turns, much enda- 
maged the Athenians ; and weakened their estate, 
both by destroying their commodities and consum- 
ing of their men, so as nothing more. For the 
former invasions, having been short, hindered them 
not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the 
rest of the time. But now, the enemy continually 
lying upon them, and sometimes with greater 
forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary 
garrison making incursions and fetching in booty, 
Agis the king of Lacedaemon being always there 
in person and diligently prosecuting the war : the 
Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted. 
For they were not only deprived of the fruit of the 
land, but also above twenty thousand of their 
slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest 
part were artificers : besides they lost all their 
sheep and oxen. And by the continual going out 
of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to 
Deceleia and defending the country, their horses 
became partly lamed through incessant labour in 
rugged grounds, and partly wounded by the 

1 [** Of the Thracian sword-men 2 [" With garrisons that infested 
of the Dian race". See ii. 90.] the country hy turns".] 


enemy. 28. And their provision, which formerly vii. 
they used to bring in from Eubcea by Oropus the 
shortest way, through Deceleia by land, they were 
now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost about 
the promontory of Sunium. And whatsoever the 
city was wont to be served withal from without, 
it now wanted : and instead of a city was become 
as it were a fort. And the Athenians watching on 
the battlements of the wall, in the day time by 
turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, 
all at once (except the horsemen), part at the walls 
and part at the arms, were quite tired 1 . But that 
which pressed them most, was that they had two 
wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so 
great, as no man would have believed till now they 
saw it. For being besieged at home from the for- 
tification of the Peloponnesians, no man would 
have imagined that they should not only not have 
recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also 
besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less 
than Athens : and therein so much have exceeded 
the expectation of the rest of the Grecians both in 
power and courage, (who in the beginning of this 
war conceived, that if the Peloponnesians invaded 
their territory, some of them, that they might hold 
out two years, others three, no man more), as that 
in the seventeenth year after they were first in- 
vaded they should have undertaken an expedition 
into Sicily, and being every way weakened already 
by the former war, have undergone another, not 
inferior to that which they had before with the 

1 [" And the city was obliged to Athenians were harrasscd both 
bring from abroad all things alike: summer and winter, with watching 
and instead of a city &c. For the on the battlements" &c.] 


Peloponnesians. Now their treasure being by 
these wars, and by the detriment sustained from 
Deceleia, and other great expenses that came upon 
them, at a very low ebb, about this time they im- 
posed on such as were under their dominion, a 
twentieth part of all goods passing by sea for a 
tribute 1 ; by this means to improve their comings 
in. For their expenses were not now as before ; 
but so much greater, by how much the war was 
greater : and their revenue besides cut off. 
The ThmcJans 29. The Thraciatis, therefore, that came too late 
their wV^ * g w ^^ Demosthenes, they presently sent back, 
'as being unwilling to lay out money in such a 
scarcity : and gave the charge of carrying them 
back to Diitrephes, with command as he w r ent 
along those coasts, (for his way was through the 
Euripus), if occasion served, to do somewhat 
against the enemy. He accordingly landed them 
by Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some small 
booty. Then 2 going over the Euripus from Chalcis 
in Euboea, he disbarked again in Bceotia and led 
his soldiers towards Mycalessus ; and lay all night 
at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, which is 
distant from Mycalessus about sixteen furlongs. 
The next day he cometh to the city, being a very 
great one 3 , and taketh it : for they kept no watch, 
nor expected that any man would have come in 
and assaulted them so far from the sea. Their 

1 [The exhaustion of her allies, 166. This continued to he paid 

brought ahout by the extraordi- to the end of the war. Goell.] 

nary war-taxes imposed over and 3 [* And in the evening going 

above the standing tribute, obliged over" &c.] 

Athens at this time to commute all 3 [ u At day-break lie cometh to 

their taxes into one of a twentieth the city, being no great one". Bekk. 

of all imports and exports. Herm. &c., ov juyaXy : vulgo ou deest.) 


walls also were but weak, in some places fallen vu. 
down, and in others low-built : and their erates ' * 

7 ~ YEAR XIX. 

open through security. The Thracians entering A.c4ia. 
into M ycalessus, spoiled both houses and temples, The barbarous 
slew the people, without mercy on old or young, Thrldans^ 
but killed all they could light on, both women 
and children ; yea, and the labouring cattle, and 
whatsoever other living thing they saw. For the 
nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are ex- 
treme bloody, equal to any of the barbarians. 
Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, 
besides other disorder 1 , all forms of slaughter that 
could be imagined : they likewise fell upon the 
school-house, which was in the city a great one, 
and the children newly entered into it ; and killed 
them every one. And the calamity of the whole 
city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also 
was it more unexpected and more bitter. 30. The 
Thebans hearing of it, came out to help them : and 
overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, 
both recovered the booty, and chased them to the 
Euripus and to the sea, where the galleys lay that 
brought them. Some of them they killed : of those 
most in their going aboard ; for swim they could 
not ; and such as were in the [small] boats, when 
they saw how things went a-land, had thrust off 
their boats, and lay without the Euripus 2 . In the 

1 [" Other no small disorder".] lower empire there was a bridge 

8 [PPP' Goell. Arn.: *u> TO&V- over the Euripus, which was natu- 

/aaroc, "out of bow-shot": vulgo et rally called &vypa. But it is 

Bekk.: *w fruy/iaroc, "beyond the absurd to suppose that the Athen- 

bridge over the Euripus". The ians would have made Euboea 

corrupt (the hitter) reading main- accessible by land, when it was so 

tained its hold on the MSS. the important to her to keep it under 

more easily, that in the time of the the protection of her navy. Ar- 


vii. rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved them- 
selves not unhandsomely against the Theban horse- 
men, by whom they were charged first : but run- 
ning out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, 
according to the manner of their country, defended 
themselves well, and lost but few men in that 
action. But some also they lost in the city itself, 
whilst they stayed behind for pillage. But in the 
w r hole of thirteen hundred there were slain [only] 
two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and others 
that came out to help the city, there were slain, 
horsemen and men of arms, one with another 
about twenty ; and amongst them Scirphondas of 
Thebes, one of the governors of Boeotia : and of 
the Mycallesians there perished a part 1 . Thus 
w r ent the matter at Mycalessus : the loss which it 
received being, for the quantity of the city, no less 
to be lamented than any that happened in the 
w r hole war. 

31. Demosthenes going from 2 Corcyra after his 
fortifying in Laconia, found a ship lying in Pheia 
of Elis, and in her certain men of arms of Corinth, 
ready to go into Sicily. The ship he sunk : but 
the men escaped, and afterwards getting another 
ship went on in their voyage. After this, Demos- 
thenes being about 3 Zacynthus and Cephallenia, 
took aboard their men of arms, and sent to Nau- 
pactus for the Messenians. From thence he crossed 
over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzea and 

nold. " For in the rest of the re- l [pspoc rt : " a considerable part 

treat" &c. Their loss was greatest of the whole". Goell. Arn.] 

in getting aboard : not great in the * [" To Corcyra". * Bekker &c, 

rest of the retreat, because they be- M : vulgo, IK.*] 

haved therein not amiss.] 3 [" Arriving at".] 


Anactoriura, which belonged to the Athenians. vn. 
Whilst he was in these parts, he met with Eury- "~ iR A x jj 
medon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter A c * 1 *- 

OL. 91 3 

unto the army with commodities 1 : who told him Eurymeaon* 
amongst other things, how he had heard by the JSl^oat 
way after he was at sea, that the Syracusians had ^^^f 
won Plemmyrium. Conon also, the captain of the tokin g of 

i iiTii Plemmyrium. 

Naupactus, came to them, and related that the 
twenty-five galleys of Corinth that lay before Nau- 
pactus would not give over war and yet delayed to 
fight 2 : and therefore desired to have some galleys 
sent him, as being unable with his eighteen to give 
battle to twenty-five of the enemy. Whereupon 
Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten galleys more iT 
to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole Slclly " 
fleet, by Conon himself 3 : and went themselves 
about furnishing of what belonged to the army. 
Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra, and having 
appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied 
men of arms : for now giving over his course to 
Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having 
been elected with him in the charge of general : 
and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in 
the parts about Acarnania, 

32. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which 
after the taking of Plemmyrium had been sent 

1 [ u He met with Eurymedon the end of June: which gives six 

returning from Sicily ; who had at months for the voyage to Sicily and 

the time before-mentioned in winter back ] 

taken the supply of money to the 2 [" And were about to fight".] 

army, and had been sent back : who 3 [They send away ten galleys 

told him e." He was despatched to " with Conon : and go themselves 

Sicily at the winter solstice (see ch. about completing the assembling of 

16): his arrival in Sicily is not their army". The galley sat Naupac- 

noticed. Goeller says it was now tus were originally 20: seech. 17.] 



vii. unto the cities about 1 , having now obtained and 
levied an army amongst them, were conducting the 
same to Syracuse. But Nicias, upon intelligence 
thereof, sent unto such cities of the Siculi as had 
the passages arid were their confederates, the Cen- 
ing to Syracuse toripines, Halicvjeans, and others, not to suffer 

from the neigh- r * J 

cities, the enemy to go by, but to unite themselves and 

. stop them : for that they would not so much as 
offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigen- 
tines had already denied them. When the Sicilians 
were marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had 
desired them, put themselves in ambush in three 
several places : and setting upon them unawares 
and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of 
them, and all the ambassadors save only one, a 
Corinthian : which conducted the rest that escaped, 
being about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse. 33. About 
the same time came unto them also the aid of the 
Camarinsearis, five hundred men of arms, three 
hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also 
the Geloans sent them men for five galleys 2 , besides 
four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen. 
For now all Sicily 3 , except the Agrigentines, who 
were neutral ; but all the rest, who before stood 
looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against 
the Athenians. [Nevertheless], the Syracusians, 
after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held 
their hands ; and assaulted not the Athenians for a 

Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army 
now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the 

1 [Selinus and Him era are par- 3 [" Sent them *a navy to the 
ticulary meant, whose route lay number of five ships".] 
along the southern coast Am.] 3 [ u Almost all Sicily".] 



continent with the whole army to the promontory 
of lapygia 1 . From thence they went to the Choc- 
rades, islands of lapygia : and here took in certain 
lapygian darters to the number of two hundred 
and fifty, of the Messapian nation. Arid having 
renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who 
reigned there and granted them those darters, 
they went thence to Metapontum 2 , a city of Italy. 
There by virtue of a league, they got two galleys 


1 ["Having their army from Cor- 
cyra and the continent now ready, 
crossed the Ionian sea with &c." 
lapypia embraced the south- 
eastern part of Italy, according to 
the more ancient writers, from Me- 
tapontum, or including that city, 
from the Sins to mount Garganus, 
or as the Greeks called it, mount 
Drion ; which seems to have been 
the southern limit of Omhrica in 
their early geography. This exten- 
sive country is said by the Greeks 
to have been inhabited by three 
distinct tribes, the Messapians, the 
Pcucetians, and the Daunians : by 
the first, on the peninsula to the 
east of Tarentura ; by the Peuce- 
tians, to the north of them along 
the coast from Brundusium to Ba- 
rium ; between which and mount 
Garganus lay the Daunians. The 
name lapygia is the same with 
Apulia : the Latin termination iciw 
in Appicus, which is the same as 
Apulus, being contracted in Oscan 
into ix ; thus making Apix. No 
good Roman writer would ever say 
lapygia instead of Apulia : nor any 
good Greek wliter the reverse, 

8 [Metapontum was founded by 

a body of Ach&ans, at the invitation 
of Sybaris: herself also of Achaean 
origin and mistress of the country 
afterwards called Lucania, and the 
founder of Posidonia (Pscstutn) and 
Laos. By the industrious cultiva- 
tion of her highly fertile territory 
Metapontum afterwards attained to 
extraordinary wealth. She became 
united with Sybaris and Croton and 
their four colonies in a league simi- 
lar to the Achajan league. The ex- 
traordinary city Sybaris, which has 
received opprobrium probably alto- 
gether unmerited, at all events 
much exaggerated, was in 510 A.C. 
utterly destroyed by Croton : the 
first irremediable wound sustained 
by Magna Gra?cia, followed by a 
bloody revolution in which Croton 
wore herself out. The Messapians, 
who had extended their dominion 
fur into CEnotria, had become before 
the present time the object of jea- 
lousy and alarm to the neighbour- 
ing tribes : and the Peucetians and 
Daunians, leagued with the Taren- 
tines, had destroyed their power. 
They were still the enemies of the 
Tarentines, and as such therefore 
the friends of the Athenians. Nic- 
buhr. See also Muell. ii. 3.] 
S 2 





The battle by 

and Athenians. 

and three hundred darters : which taken aboard, 
along the shore till they came to the 
territory of Thurii. Here they found the adverse 
faction to the Athenians to have been lately driven 
out in a sedition. And because they desired to 
muster their army here, that they might see if 
any were left behind ; and persuade the Thurians 
to join with them freely in the war, and, as things 
stood, to have for friends and enemies the same 
that were so to the Athenians : they stayed about 
that in the territory of the Thurians. 

34. The Peloponnesians and the rest, who w r ere 
at the same time in the twenty-five galleys that 
the connthians f Qr sa f e g uar( j o f the ships lay opposite to the gal- 

~ r J irl o 

leys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves 
for battle, and with more galleys l , so as they were 
little inferior in number to those of the Athenians, 
went to an anchor under Irineus of Achaia in Rhy- 
pica. The place where they rode was in form like 
a half moon ; and their land forces they had ready 
on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and 
other their confederates of those parts 2 , embattled 
upon the points of the promontory ; and their 
galleys made up the space between, under the 
command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian. Against 
these the Athenians came up with thirty-three 
galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. 
The Corinthians at first lay still ; but afterwards 
when they saw their time, and the signal given, 

1 [" About the same time the Pe- having made ready for action and 

loponnesians in the twenty- five gal- manned some additional galleys, so 

leys, who to cover the passage to as they were &c."] 

Sicily of the transports were lying 2 [That is, the Achaians ; who had 

opposite to the galleys in Naupactus, now all sided with Sparta. Am.] 


they charged the Athenians, and the fight began. V n. 
They held each other to it long. The Athenians 
sunk three galleys of the Corinthians : and though 
none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made 
unserviceable, which having encountered the Co- 
rinthian galleys a-head, were torn on both sides 
between the beaks and the oars by the beaks l of 
the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same 
purpose. After they had fought with equal for- 
tune, and so as both sides challenged the victory ; 
though yet the Athenians were masters of the 
wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and 
because the Corinthians came not out to renew the 
fight ; they at length parted. There was no chas- 
ing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either 
side ; because the Peloponnesians and Corinthians 
fighting near the land easily escaped, nor was there 
any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the 
Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Co- 
rinthians presently set up a trophy as victors ; in 
regard that more of the Athenian galleys were 
made unserviceable, than of theirs ; and thought 
themselves not to have had the worse, for the same 
reason that the others thought themselves not to 
have had the better. For the Corinthians think 
they have the better, when they have not much 
the worse 2 : and the Athenians think they have the 
worse, when they have not much the better. And 
when the Peloponnesians were gone and their 

1 [" Were struck and stove in on caps, were two beams projecting 

the bows by the heads of the Co- from the bows for holding the beak.] 

rithian galleys, which had their 2 [" Thought they had the better, 

cpotides made stouter for this very if they had not &c. : and the Athen- 

object". The epotides, literally ear- ians thought 5cc."] 




army by land dissolved, the Athenians also set up 
a trophy in Achaia, as if the victory had been 
theirs ; distant from Erineus, where the Pelopon- 
nesians rode, about twenty furlongs. This was the 
success of that battle by sea. 
Demosthenes 35. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thu- 

aml Euiymedon . ,, f . ,. J ,i ,1 

come along the nans had put in readiness to go with them seven 
hundred men of arms and three hundred darters, 
commanded their galleys to go along the coast to 
Croton 1 ; and conducted their land soldiers, having 
first taken a muster of them all upon the side of 
the river Sybaris, through the territory of the 
Thurians. But coming to the river Hylias, upon 


1 [The Crotoniatce, according to 
Herodotus (viii. 47), were by race 
Achajans : but Mueller observes 
that the colony must have been 
established under the authority of 
Sparta ; Apollo and Hercules, the 
Doric god and hero, being both 
worshipped there with especial 
honour, and the early constitution 
being also Doric. Croton was the 
soil whereon Pythagoras made the 
experiment of his real aristocracy. 
The single galley sent by this state 
to assist the Greeks at the battle of 
Salarais, was the sole instance of 
support given to their cause by any 
state beyond the limits of Greece: 
Herod, ibid. Thurii was a scion of 
Sybaris, also an Achaean colony and 
contemporaneous with Croton(A.C. 
710). About sixty years after the 
overthrow and destruction of their 
city by Croton, the descendants of 
the exiled Sybarites succeeded in 
again forming a settlement on its 
site : but in a few years were again 
forced to fly by the jealousy of Cro- 

ton. The exiles now applied for 
help to Sparta and Athens : and by 
the latter state were favourably re- 
ceived. Under the usual guidance 
of an oracle, the new city, called 
Thurii from a fountain which rose 
there, was built with geometrical 
regularity near the former site of 
Sybaris. Amongst the new settlers 
were Herodotus the historian, and 
Lysias the orator. The Sybarite 
exiles, however, not being content 
to live on terms of equality with the 
new settlers, dissensions arose, in 
which the former are said to have 
been exterminated. The remaining 
Thurians then invited adventurers 
to join them from Greece on terms 
of perfect equality. In imitation of 
the Athenians, they divided them- 
selves into ten tribes, named after 
the different nations of which the 
colony was composed. Of these, 
four represented Athens, Ionia, 
Euboea, and the islands ; three Pe- 
loponnessus ; and three the north of 
Greece. See Thirl, ch. xviii.] 


word sent them from the men of Croton, that if V u. 
the army went through their territory it should be 
against' their will, they marched down to the sea- 
side and to the mouth of the river Hylias ; where 
they stayed all that night, and were met by their 
galleys. The next day embarking, they kept along 
the shore and touched at every town saving Locri, 
till they arrived at Petra in the territory of 

36. The Syracusians in the meantime, upon 
intelligence of their coming on, resolved to 

again what they could do with their navy ; and ? vith t thc ^ ien - 

. . J . ians there before 

with their new supply of landmen, which they had the supply cam. 

gotten together on purpose to fight with the Athe- 

nians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon should 

arrive. And they furnished their navy, both other- Their manner of 

wise and according to the advantages they had t * r g l ^"f 

learnt in the last battle, arid also made shorter the 

heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger ; and 

made beaks to them of a great thickness, which 

they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the 

sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six 

cubits long 1 : in such manner as the Corinthians 

had armed their galleys a-head, to fight with those 

before Naupactus. For the Syracusians made 

account, that against the Athenian galleys not so 

built, but weak before, as not using so much to 

meet the enemy a-head as upon the side by fetch- 

ing a compass, they could not but have the better ; 

and that to fight in the great haven many galleys 

in not much room, was an advantage to them : for 

1 [' And pkced in the bows thick galley, six cubits long both within 
epotides, supported by beams run- and without" : that is, six cubits 
ning along them to the sides of the within the galley, and six without.] 


vii. that using the direct encounter, they should break 
*KAB xix. w frh their firm and thick beaks the hollow and 
A c 413. infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies ; and 
that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would 
want means both to go about and to go through 
them 1 , which was the point of art they most relied 
on. For as for their passing through, they would 
hinder it themselves as much as they could : and 
for fetching compass, the straitness of the place 
would not suffer it. And that fighting a-head, 
which seemed before to be want of skill in the 
masters [to do otherwise], was it they would now 
principally make use of : for in this would be their 
principal advantage. For the Athenians, if over- 
come, w r ould have no retiring but to the land, which 
was but a little way off and little in compass, near 
their own camp 2 : and of the rest of the haven 
themselves should be masters. And the enemy 
being pressed, could not choose, thronging toge- 
ther into a little room and all into one and the 
same place, but disorder one another : which was 
indeed the thing, that in all their battles by sea did 
the Athenians the greatest hurt ; having not, as the 
Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to 
retire unto 3 . And to go about into a place of 
more room, they having it in their power to set 
upon them from the main sea, and to retire again 
at pleasure, they should never be able ; especially 

1 (VepiTrXovv, diiKw\ovv : see i. 49, harbour : and the short distance of 
note.] the line of battle from the shore 

2 L" If driven back, could make no would not admit of performing 
anacrousis save to the land": "that, the anacrousis (see i. 49, note) with 
namely, opposite their own camp", proper effect.] 

The Syracusans were in possession 3 [ u Wherein to execute the ana- 
of all the rest of the shore of the crousis".] 


having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's V ii. 
mouth not being large. 

37. The Syracusians having devised thus much 
over and above their former skill and strength 1 , 
and far more confident now since the former 
battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army 
and with their navy at once. The landmen from 
the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and 
brought them to the w r all of the Athenians' camp 
upon the side toward the city 2 : and from Olym- 
pieium, the men of arms all that were there, and 
the horsemen and light armed of the Syracusians 
came up to the wall on the other side. And by and by 
after 3 , came sailingforth also the galleys of the Syra- 
cusians and their confederates. The Athenians, that 
thought at first they would have made the attempt 
only with their landmen, seeing also the galleys on 
a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion ; 
and some of them put themselves in order upon 
and before the walls, against those that came from 
the city : and others went out to meet the horse- 
men and darters, that w r ere coming in great num- 
bers and with speed from Olympieium and the 
parts without: others again went aboard, and 
withal came to aid those ashore. But when the The 
galleys were manned they put off, being seventy- 
five in number; and those of Syracuse about 
eighty. 38. Having spent much of the day in 
charging and retiring and trying each other, and 

1 [" The Syracusans having the case of the Syracusans. Arnold, 

thus adapted their plans to their Goeller.] 

present knowledge and power". 2 [" Against so much of it as 

What in ordinary cases would he fronted the city".] 
had seamanship, was well suited to 3 [" And straight hereupon".} 


vii. performed nothing worth the mentioning, save 
that the Syracusians sunk a galley or two of the 
Athenians, they parted again : and the land sol- 
diers retired at the same time from the wall of the 
Athenian camp. The next day the Syracusians 
lay still, without showing any sign of what they 
meant to do. Yet Nicias seeing that the battle by 
sea was with equality, and imagining that they 
would fight again, made the captains to repair 
their galleys, such as had been torn 1 : and two 
great ships to be moored without those piles which 
he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be 
instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed 
about two acres' breadth 2 asunder : to the end, if 
any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely 
run in and again go safely out at leisure. In per- 
forming of this, the Athenians spent a whole day 
from morning until night. 

o Athenians 39. The next day the Syracusians assaulted the 
Athenians again with the same forces', both by 
sea and land, that they had done before ; but be- 
gun earlier in the morning ; and being opposed 
fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of 
the day, now again as before, in attempting upon 
The strat^em of each other without effect. Till at last Ariston the 
n of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most expert 
master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, 
persuaded the commanders in the navy to send 
to such in the city as it belonged to, and com- 
mand that the market should be speedily kept 
at the sea- side, and to compel every man to bring 

1 [" Such as had any damage : there \vere several of these ships.] 
and moored ships of burthen with- 2 [" Two plethra": see vi. J02,n.] 
out the piles &c." It appears that 3 [" The same mauncrof attack 7 '.] 


thither whatsoever he had fit for meat, and there vn. 
to sell it : that the mariners disbarking, might 
presently dine by the galleys' side, and quickly 
again unlooked-for assault the Athenians afresh 
the same day. 40. This advice being liked, they 
sent a messenger, and the market was furnished. 
And the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern 1 
towards the city ; and disbarking, dined there right 
on the shore. The Athenians, supposing they had 
retired towards the city as vanquished, landed at 
leisure : and amongst other business went about the 
dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to have 
fought again the same day. But the Syracusians 
suddenly going aboard, came towards them again : 
and the Athenians, in great tumult and for the 
most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length 
with much ado went out to meet them. For a 
while they held their hands on both sides, and but 
observed each other. But anon after, the Athe- 
nians thought not fit, by longer dallying, to over- 
come themselves with their own labour, but rather 
to fight as soon as they could ; and thereupon at 
once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and 
the fight began. The Syracusians received [and 
resisted 2 ] their charge ; and fighting, as they had 
before determined, with their galleys head to head 
with those of the Athenians, and provided with 
beaks for the purpose, brake the galleys of the 
Athenians very much between the heads of the 
galleys and the oars. The Athenians were also 
annoyed much by the darters from the decks ; but 

Kpovaaptvot: " re- irpvpvav rpovtraerflae, in order to 
treating". avaKpovaaoQai, to row retreat] 
astern in order to charge again; 3 [Vulgo, >//*ui/ovro: Bckk. om.] 


vii. much more by those Syracusians, who going about 
in small boats passed under the rows of the oars 
of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their 
sides, threw their darts at the mariners from 
thence 1 . 

41. The Syracusians having fought in this man- 
ha the victory. ner with the utmost o f the j r strength, in the end 

gat the victory : and the Athenians, between the 
[two] ships, escaped into their harbour. The 
Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those 
ships : but the dolphins hanging from the masts 2 
over the entrance of the harbour, forbade them 
to follow any further. Yet there were two galleys, 
which upon a jollity after victory approached them, 
but both were lost : of which one with her men 
and all was taken. The Syracusians, after they 
had sunk seven galleys of the Athenians and torn 
many more, and of the men had taken some alive 
and killed others, retired, and for both the battles 
erected trophies : and had already an assured hope 
of being far superior by sea, and also made account 
to subdue the army by land. And they prepared 
to assault them again in both kinds. 

Demosthenes 42. In the meantime Demosthenes and Eury- 
niedon arrived with the Athenian supply ; being 3 
about seventy-three galleys, and men of arms, of 
their own and of their confederates, about five thou- 
sand ; besides darters, as well barbarians as Greeks, 

1 [Through the port-holes, which powerful enough to break clean 

were large enough to admit at least through any galley on which the 

a man's head : see Herod, v. 33.] dolphin fell. The ships were 

3 [" From the beams". These moored, not abreast, Jbut one after 

beams seem to have been of consi- another in two files. Goell.] 
derable size, and the whole engine 3 [ u With the foreign ships".] 


not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other VH. 
provision sufficient. For the present it not a little 
daunted the Syracusians and their confederates, to 
see no end of their danger ; and that, notwith- 
standing the fortifying in Deceleia, another army 
should come now equal and like unto their former; 
and that their power should be so great in every 
kind. And on the other side, it was a kind of 
strengthening after weakness to the Athenian 
army that was there before. Demosthenes, when 
he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to 
loiter and fall into Nicias his case : for Nicias, 
who was formidable at his first coming, when he 
set not presently upon Syracuse but wintered at 
Catana, both grew into contempt, and w r as pre- 
vented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with 
an army out of Peloponnesus : the which, if Nicias 
had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been 
so much as sent for : for supposing themselves to 
have been strong enough alone, they had at once 
both found themselves too w r eak, and the city been 
enclosed with a wall ; whereby, though they had 
sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did: 
Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he 
also even at the present and the same day was most 
terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to 
make use of this present terribleness of the army. 
And having observed that the cross wall of the 
Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians 
from enclosing the city, was but single ; and that * 

if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolae, through Epipoi 

i * ^i .1 ,1 i ^ i to exclude the 

and again of the camp there, the same might easily 
be taken, (for none would have stood against 
them) : hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his 


VH. shortest way to the dispatching of the war. For 
VBAR xixf either he should have success, he thought, and so 
A.c.413. w i n Syracuse, or he would lead away the army, 
and no longer without purpose consume both the 
Athenians there with him and the whole state. 
The Athenians therefore went out, and first wasted 
the territory of the Syracusians about the river 
Anapus ; and were the stronger, as at first, both 
by sea and land. For the Syracusians <Jurst neither 
way go out against them, but only with their horse- 
men and darters from Olympieium. 43. After 
this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall 
which the Athenians had built to enclose the city 
withal 1 , with engines. But seeing the engines 
were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, 
and that having assaulted it in divers parts with 
the rest of his army, he was notwithstanding put 
back, he resolved to spend the time no longer ; but 
having gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest in 
commission thereunto, to put in execution his de- 
sign for Epipolse, ,as was before intended. By day, 
it was thought impossible not to be discovered, 
either in their approach or in their ascent. Having 
therefore first commanded to take five days' provi- 
sion of victual, and all the masons and workmen, 
as also store of casting weapons, and whatsoever 
they might need, if they overcame, for fortifica- 
tion : he and Eurymedon and Menander, with the 
whole army, marched about midnight to Epipolae, 

1 [" The cross wall of the Syra- means the cross wall of the Syra- 

cusans". Bekker &c,, iraparuxio- cusans, from the latter, which he 

/mroc: vulgo,<47rorx<Tjiaroc. Thu- applies to the Athenian wall of 

cyilides carefully distinguishes the circumvallation. See Lucianu de 

former word, by which he always Conscr. Hist c. 38. GoelU] 


leaving Nicias in the camp. Being come to Epi- vii. 
poise at Euryelus, where also the army went up 
before, they were not only not discovered by the 
Syracusians that kept the watch, but ascending 1 
took a certain fortification of the Syracusians there, 
and killed part of them that kept it. But the 
greatest number escaping, ran presently to the 
camps, of which there were in Epipolse three walled 
about without the city, one of Syracusians, one of 
other Sicilians, and one of confederates 2 , and car- 
ried the news of their coming in, and told it to 
those six hundred Syracusians that kept this part 
of Epipolae at the first ; who presently went forth 
to meet them. But Demosthenes and the Athe- 
nians lighting on them, though they fought va- 
liantly, put them to flight ; and presently marched 
on 8 , making use of the present heat of the army 
to finish what he came for before it were too late : 
and others [going on] in their first course took 
the cross-wall of the Syracusians, they flying that 
kept it, and were throwing down the battlements 
thereof. The Syracusians, and their confederates, 
and Gylippus and those with him, came out to 
meet them from their camps : but because the 
attempt was unexpected and in the night, they 
charged the Athenians timorously, and were even 

1 ["Advancing". At Euryelus formed immediately under the walls 

they were already at the summit of the city. The six hundred Syra- 

of the heights. The fortification cusans were probably stationed 

taken was apparently on the very higher on the slope, perhaps at the 

crest of the slope, on or neat the point where the cross wall termi- 

spot which the Athenians had for- Bated. Arn. Goell.] 
merly fortified at Labdalum. Arn.] s [lc ri> 7rp<W0iv: that is, they 

8 [" One of the Syracusans, one marched on without staying to take 

of the other Sicilians", &c. The thecrosswall. <brdrijc*'p<n/c"m 

three camps appear to have been their first course", is unexplained.] 


vii. at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians 
advanced more out of order, [chiefly] as having 
already gotten the victory, but 1 desiring also quickly 
to pass through all that remained yet unfoughteii 
with, lest through their remissness in following 
they might again rally themselves ; the Boeotians 
withstood them first, and charging forced them to 
turn their backs. 

44. And here the Athenians were mightily in 
disorder and perplexed : so that it hath been very 
hard to be informed of any side, in what manner 
each thing passed. For if in the day time, when 
things are better seen, yet they that are present 
cannot tell how all things go, save only what every 
man with much ado seeth near unto himself: how 
then in a battle by night, (the only one that hap- 
pened between great armies in all this war), can a 
man know 2 anything for certain ? For though the 
moon shined bright, yet they saw one another no 
otherwise than as by the moonlight was likely : so 
as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were 
a friend or not. And the men of arms on both 
sides, being not a few in number, had but little 
ground to turn in. Of the Athenians, some were 
already overcome, others 3 went on in their first 
way. Also a great part of the rest of the army 
was already, part gotten up, and part ascending, 
and knew not which way to march. For after the 
Athenians once turned their backs, all before them 
was in confusion 4 ; and it was hard to distinguish 

1 [" And desiring".] 3 [" Others, not worsted".] 

3 [' Could any one have known" 4 ["For all before them, the flight 

fit c. : apte ad hunc locum. Goeller, having taken place, was already in 

Arnold.] confusion, and it was hard 


of anything for the noise. For the Syracusians vir. 

and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each 

other and received the assailants with exceeding 

great shouts : (for they had no other means in the 

night to express themselves) : and the Athenians 

sought each other, and took for enemies all before 

them, though friends and of the number of those 

that fled ; and by often asking the word, there 

being no other means of distinction, all asking at 

once they both made a great deal of stir amongst 

themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy. 

But they did not in like manner know the word of 

the Syracusians ; because these, being victorious 

and undistracted, knew one another better: so 

that when they lighted on any number of the 

enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the 

enemy escaped as knowing the watchword ; but 

they, when they could not answer, were slain. 

But that which hurt them most was the tune of 

the Paean : which being in both armies the same, 

drave them to their wits' end. For the Argives 

and Corcyrseans, and all other of the Doric race on 

the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Psean, 

terrified the Athenians on one side : and the enemy 

terrified them with the like on the other side. 

Wherefore at the last 1 , falling one upon another in 

divers parts of the army, friends against friends, 

and countrymen against countrymen, they not 

only terrified each other, but came to hand-strokes 

and could hardly again be parted. As they fled The Athenians 

before the enemy, the way of the descent from flj 

1 [" When they were once thrown All Dorians, as Spartans, Argives, 
into confusion, falling" &c. The Corinthians, and Syracusans, had 
paean varied according to the tribe, the same. Muell. ii, 6. j 



vii. Epipolae by which they were to go back being but 
strait, many of them threw themselves down from 
the rocks, and died so. And of the rest that gat 
down safely into the plain, though the greatest 
part, and all that were of the old army by their 
knowledge of the country, escaped into the camp : 
yet of these that came last, some lost their way ; 
and straying in the fields, when the day came on 
were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen that 
ranged the country about. 

45. The next day the Syracusians erected two 
trophies; one in Epipolse at the ascent 1 , and an- 
other where the first check was given by the 
Boeotians. The Athenians received their dead 
under truce. And many there were that died, both 
of themselves and of their confederates : but the 
arms taken were more than for the number of the 
slain. For of such as were forced to quit their 
bucklers and leap down from the rocks, though some 
perished, yet some there also were that escaped. 

46. After this, the Syracusians having by such 
unlooked-for prosperity recovered their former 

hope to win the courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Aerri- 

Athenian camp. , . t- J . . 

gentum, being in sedition ; to bring that city, if 
they could, to their obedience 2 . And Gylippus 
went again to the Sicilian cities" by land, to raise 
yet another army, as being in hope to take the 
camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how 
the matter had gone in Epipolse. 
The Athenian 47- In the meantime the Athenian generals went 

1 [That is to say, at Euryelus : " perducere veluti vitulum ostensa 

see ch. 2/J fronde". Arn. Goell.] 

* [" To bring over the city, and * [" To the rest of Sicily 1 *. 

induce it to send succours". v*a- Bekker &cc., Ig ri)v uAX/jv ZuciXfay: 

is well explained by Retake, vulgo, Jc 2 ] 


to council upon their late overthrow, and present vii. 
general weakness 1 of the army. For they saw not *~^ B * ^ 
only that their designs prospered riot, but that the A.c.4is. 
soldiers also were weary of staying. For they commandm 
were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a^tTdo 1 ! 
double cause ; this being the time of the year most 
obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they 
lay moorish and noisome : and all things else ap- 
peared desperate. Demosthenes 2 thought fit to The advice of 

, , - . / i Demosthenes. 

stay no longer ; and since the execution of his 
design at Epipolae had failed, delivered his opinion 
for going out of the haven, whilst the seas were 
open, and whilst, at least with this addition of gal- 
leys, they were stronger than the army of the 
enemy. " For it was better," he said, " for the 
city to make war upon those which fortify against 
them at home, than against the Syracusians ; see- 
ing they cannot now be easily overcome : and there 
was no reason why they should spend much money 
in lying before the city." This was the opinion of 

48. Nicias, though he also thought their estate The opinion of 
bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness Nlcias 
discovered 3 ; and by decreeing of their departure 
openly with the votes of many, to make known the 
same to the enemy ; for if at any time they had a 
mind to be gone, they should then be less able to 
do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, 
inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, 

1 [" Discouragement".] failed, he gave his vote for losing 

1 f* Demosthenes therefore was of no time in going off, whilst the 

opinion &c: 6uf,as he was minded sea" &c,] 

even when the attempt was ha- * [" Was unwilling in terms to 

warded at Epipohu, so, since it had confess their weakness".] 

T 2 


vii. put him into some hope that it might yet grow 
worse than their own, in case they pressed the 
siege ; especially being already masters of the sea, 
far and near, with their present fleet 1 . There was 
moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse, 
that desired to betray the state into their hands : 
and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered 
him not to rise and be gone. All which he know- 
ing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion 
to be of, and did yet consider ; nevertheless openly 
in his speech, he was against the withdrawing of 
the army : and said, " that he was sure the people 
of Athens would take it ill, if he went thence 
without their order : for that they were not to 
have such judges as should give sentence upon 
their own sight of things done, rather than upon 
the report of calumniators; but such as would 
believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse 
them of. That many, nay most of the soldiers 
here, who now cry out upon their misery 2 , will 
there cry out on the contrary ; and say the gene- 
rals have betrayed the state, and come away for a 
bribe. That he 3 would not therefore, knowing the 
nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put 
to death unjustly, and charged with a dishonour- 
able crime by the Athenians, rather than, if he 
must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand 
of the enemy by his own adventure 4 . And yet/' 
he said, " the state of the Syracusians was still 
inferior to their own. For paying much money to 

1 [" For they would wear them 3 [" Cry out that their affaire 

out by want of money ; especially were desperate**.] * 
being now, with their present fleet, 3 [" That he at any rate**.] 
more decidedly masters at sea".] 4 [tfi<t : " in his own person".] 


strangers, and laying out much more on forts 1 vii. 
[without and about the city] ; having also had a 
great navy a year already in pay ; they must needs 
want money at last, and all these things fail them 2 . 
For they have spent already two thousand talents, 
and are much in debt besides. And whensoever 
they shall give over this course and make pay no 
longer, their strength is gone 3 ; as being auxiliary, 
and not constrained to follow the war, as the 
Athenians are. Therefore it was fit/' he said, " to 
stay close to the city ; and not to go away as if 
they \vere too weak in money, wherein they were 
much superior." 

49. Nicias, when he spake this, assured them 
of it 4 , as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely 
and their want of money ; and that there were 
some that desired to betray the city to the Athe- 
nians, and sent him word not to go. Withal 
he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as 
being before overcome, he had not 5 . As for lying 
where they did, Demosthenes would by no means 
hear of it. But if the army might not be car- 
ried away without order from the Athenians, but 
must needs stay in Sicily ; then, he said, they 
might go 6 to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by 
their landmen they might invade and turn much 

1 f iv TTtpiTroXioic : seevi.45,n.] is manifest from the last chapter, 

1 ["They were badly off now, that he did not disclose his intrigues 

and in course of time would not with the party in Syracuse,] 

know how to get on".] 6 [Nicias relied on his knowing 

* [" And as soon as ever they fail &c : " and was encouraged, as on the 

in the pay of any part of their forces, former occasion, by his confidence 

be it never so inconsiderable, their in the fleet". GoelL Duker says 

affairs are ruined".] of this passage, u huec mini aenig- 

4 [" In saying this, Nicias' reli- inata sunt".] 

ance was upon his knowing" &c. It * [" They must rise and go" &c.] 




of the country to them 1 and wasting the fields of 
the enemies, weaken the Syracusians ; and be to 

. J 

A.c,4i3. jfight with their galleys in the main sea, and not 
in a narrow, (which is the advantage of the enemy), 
but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill 
should be theirs ; and where they should not be 
forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and 
fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In 
sum he said, he by no means liked to stay where 
they were : but with all speed, no longer delaying 
the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon 
also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless, upon the 
contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth 
and procrastination in the business ; and a suspi- 
cion withal, that the asseveration 2 of Nicias was 
grounded on somewhat that he knew above the 
rest. And thereupon the Athenians deferred their 
going thence, and stayed upon the place. 
urn. 50. In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus re- 

eth with another . i /-* <^. ** * i 

turned unto Syracuse. Sicanus without his pur- 
p ose at Agrigentum ; for whilst he was yet in Gela, 
the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of 
the Syracusians was turned into friendship 3 : but 
Gylippus not without another great army out of 
Sicily, besides the men of arms, which having set 
forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, 
were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of 
Afric. For having been driven into Afric, and the 
Cyrenaeans having given them two galleys with 

1 [' Whence with their landmen &c., Qptyovrat : vulgo, 

they might overrun much of the 2 [" The confidence".] 

country and subsist themselves, 3 [ u The party that was for friend- 

whilst they weakened their enemies ship with the Syracusans hud been 

by wasting their territory**. Bekker driven out**. Goell. Am.] 


pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Eues- 
peritae 1 besieged by the Africans ; and having over- 
come the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a 
town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians ; 
where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but 
two days and a night's sail over ; and from thence 
they crossed the sea to Selinus. As soon as they 
were come, the Syracusians again presently pre- 
pared to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and 
land. The Athenian generals seeing them have 
another army, and their own 2 not bettering, but 
every day growing worse than other, but especially 
as being pressed to it by the sickness of the sol- 
diers, repented now that they removed not before : 
and Nicias being now no longer against it as he 
was, but desirous only that it might not be con- 
cluded openly 3 , gave order unto all as secretly as 
was possible to put forth of the harbour, and to be 
ready when the sign should be given. But when The Athenian* 
they were about it, and everything was ready, the ^^r^uT 
moon happened to be eclipsed : for it was full ^, {*** 

* * * of an eclipse of 

moon. And not only the greatest part of th 
Athenians 4 called upon the generals to stay, but 

1 [A people to the west of Burca, called" &c. Pericles, who had 

and to the north of the Auschisa). gained from Anaxagoras some more 

Herod, iv. 171.] correct notions of the heavenly 

3 [" Their own affairs".] bodies than were common in his 
8 [That is to say, he did not wish time, had ventured on the occasion 

a council of war to he held, at which of the expedition about Pelopon- 

the taxiarchs and trierarchs would nestis in 430 (ti. 5(>) to disregard an 

be present, and the question decided eclipse of the sun : and explained 

by open voting. And the generals its real cause, by showing that the 

being avroKpdroptc, (having abso- same effect was produced by a cloak 

lute authority), might act on their held up between the sun and the 

own responsibility. Am.] eyes of the bystanders. But the 

4 [" Lookiug upon it as ominous, nature of an eclipse of the moon 


Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition 
and observations of that kind somewhat too much) 
said that it should come no more into debate 
whether they should go or not, till the three times 
nine days were past, which the soothsayers appoint 
in that behalf. And the Athenians, though upon 
going, stayed still for this reason. 
s 51. The Syracusiaiis also having intelligence of 
this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the 
Athenians much the more : for that they confessed 
themselves already too weak for them, both by 
sea and land ; for else they would never have 
sought to have run away. Besides, they w r ould 
not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, 
and become the harder to be warred on ; but had 
rather thereright, and in a place most for their 
own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To 
which end they manned their galleys ; and after 
they had rested 1 as long as was sufficient, when 
they saw their time, the first day they assaulted 
the Athenians' camp. And some small number of 
men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied 
out against them by certain gates : and the Syra- 

was still less generally understood, auspicious sign, three days' delay 

Unfortunately the astronomer Me- was eommonly held sufficient. But 

ton did not accompany the expedi- the soothsayers of Nicias enjoined 

tion, having, it is said, feigned that the retreat should be deferred 

madness to avoid it : and one of the for three times nine days, that is, 

most intelligent among the sooth- till the next full moon. See Thirl, 

sayers, Stilbides, was lately dead. ch. 20. There is some difference of 

Still, if none of the rest could have opinion whether " three", or " three 

been found to declare, as appears times nine days'' is the proper 

to have been the opinion of Phiio- reading : founded mainly upon a 

chorus, one learned on those ques- passage of Diodorus.] 
tions (Plut. Nicias), that for a re- l [" And after essaying them- 

treating army the veiling of one of solves". Bekker &e., &vtirup&vro : 

the celestial luminaries was an some MSS.,avt*ai>ovro.] 


cusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat 1 VH. 
them back into the camp. But the entrance being ^ AU " XJ ^; 
strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost ; A c l13 - 
and men of arms some, but not many. 52. The 2 Thcs y racuMans 
next day they came out with their galleys, seventy- AU^M* again 
six in number, and the Athenians set forth against by * ea * 
them with eighty-six ; and being come together, 
they fought. Eurymedon had charge of the right 
wing of the Athenians ; and desiring to encompass 
the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own 
galleys in length more towards the shore ; and 
was cut off by the Syracusians, that had first over- 
come the middle battle of the Athenians, from the 
rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the haven ; 
and both slain himself, and the galleys that were 
with him lost. And that done, the rest of the 
Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore. 
53. Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the 
enemy vanquished, and carried past the piles and 
their own harbour, came with a part of his army 
to the pier 3 to kill such as landed, and to cause 
that the Syracusians might the easier pull the 
enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof themselves 

1 [ u And putting to flight the Goell. After following the city- 
rest, heat them hack" &c.] wall for some way, till it turned off 

2 [" And this day, the Syracusans in an inland direction, the xi?X>) 
retreated. But the next day they then continued along the edge of the 
came out with their galleys seventy- harhour : forming a sort of narrow 
six in number ; and at the same causeway hetween the sea on one 
time marched against the fortiflca- side, and the marshy ground on the 
tions with their infantry. And the other. And the ground heing thus 
Athenians set forth" &c.] narrow, the Syracusans, as soon as 

3 [" To the causeway". xqXq is they were heaten, were naturally 
here not an artificial mole, but one driven off the causeway into the 
of the prominencies forming and marshy ground on their right-hand, 
embracing the bay near Diiscou. called the marsh of Lysimeleia. Am.] 


vii. were masters. But the Tuscans, who kept guard 
m *kat P art ^ or *^ e Athenians, seeing them coming 
AXX413. that way in disorder, made head : and charging 
these first 1 , forced them into the marsh called 
Lysimeleia. But when afterwards a greater number 
of the Syracusians and their confederates came to 
help them, then also the Athenians, to help the 
Tuscans, and for fear to lose their galleys, fought 
with them ; and having overcome them, pursued 
them, and not only slew many 2 of their men of 
arms, but also saved the most of their galleys, and 
brought them back into the harbour. Neverthe- 
less the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the 
men taken in them. And amongst the rest they 
let drive before the wind (which blew right upon 
the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and 
brands set on fire, to burn them. The Athenians 
on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, 
devised remedies for the fire : and having quenched 
the flame and kept the ship from coming near, 
escaped that danger. 

54. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, 
both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms 
which they intercepted above before the camp, 
where also they took the horses. And the Athen- 
ians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight 
of those^ footmen which the Tuscans drave into 
the marsh, and for those which they themselves 
put to flight with the rest of the army. 
The Athenians 55. When the Syracusians had now manifestly 
overcome their fleet 3 ; (for they feared at first the 

1 [ But the Tyrseni, who &c, 2 [" Some few". -Bekker &c., 
made head: and charging the first ov TroXXo^c : vulgo, om. 06.] 
they met, forced fcc".] 3 [" JSven their fleet".] 


supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes) ; vii. 
the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of 
heart. And as they were much deceived in the 
event, so they repented more of the voyage 1 . For 
having come against these cities, the only ones that 
werefor institution like unto their own, andgoverned 
by the people as well as themselves 2 , and which 
had a navy and horses and greatness ; seeing they 
could create no dissension amongst them about 
change of government, to win them that way, nor 
could subdue it with the greatness of their 
forces when they were far the stronger, but mis- 
prospered in most of their designs ; they were then 
at their wits' end : but now, when they were also 
vanquished by sea, (which they would never have 
thought), they were much more dejected than ever. 
56. The Syracusians went presently about the 
haven without fear, arid meditated how to shut up 
the same: that the Athenians might not 3 steal 
away without their knowledge, though they would, victory 
For now they studied not only how to save them- 
selves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athen 
ians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, 
that their own strength was at this present the 
greater ; and that if they could vanquish the 
Athenians and their confederates both by sea and 
land, it would be a mastery of great honour to 
them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all 
the rest of Greece should be 4 one part freed by it, 
and the other part out of fear of subjection here- 

1 [" Were utterly out of heart, 2 [See vi. 36, note.] 
and great was their dismay : hut 8 [" Might no longer" &c.] 
far greater still their repenting of 4 [" Should he straightway one 

the voyage".] part freed*'.] 



vii. after : for it would be impossible for the Athenians, 
with the remainder of their strength, to sustain 
the war that would be made upon them afterwards. 
And they being reputed the authors of it, should 
be had in admiration, not only with all men now 
living, but also with posterity. And to say truth, 
it was a worthy mastery ; both for the causes 
shewn, and also for that they became victors not 
of the Athenians only, but many others their con- 
federates ; nor again they themselves alone, but 
their confederates also, having been in joint com- 
mand with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, 
and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and 
of the business by sea performed the greatest part 
The nations that themselves 1 . The greatest number of nations, ex- 
^syr^uleln" ce pt the general roll of those which in this war 
oAer" 6 side r adhered to Athens and Lacedsemon, were together 
at this one city. 

57. And this number on both sides, against 
Sicily and for it, some to help win, and some to 
help save it, came to the war at Syracuse : not on 
any pretence of right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, 
but as profit or necessity severally chanced to 
induce them 2 . The Athenians being Ionic, went 
against the Syracusians that be Doric, voluntarily. 
With these, as being their colonies, went the Lem- 
nians and Imbrians 3 , and the ./Eginetae that dwelt 



For the 

1 [" Having opened the way to 
the greatest part of it themselves. 

greatest number" Sec. 

t^a, metaphor taken from 
cutting a way before one through a 
forest. Arn.Goell.] 

2 [" For so many as follows, on 
both sides, against Sicily and for it, 

those with the Athenians to help 
win, and those with the Syracusans 
to help save it, came to the war at 
Syracuse, not siding with each other 
according to justice or kindred, but 
rather as profit" &c.] 

3 [Lemnos and Irabros (Herod. 
v. 26) were in the reign of Darius at 


in J5gina then, all of the same language and insti- 
tutions with themselves : also the Hestiseans of 
Euboea 1 . Of the rest, some went with them as A.c.4is. 
their subjects, and some as their free confederates ; ' 

and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries : as 
the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carys- 
tians, from Euboea: Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from 
out of the islands : Milesians, Samians, and Chians, 
from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as 
free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys, 
And these were almost all of them lonians, de- 
scended from the Athenians ; except only the 
Carystians, that are of the nation of the Dryopes 2 . 
And though they were subjects and went upon 
constraint, yet they were lonians against Dorians 3 . 
Besides these there went with them ^Eolians : 
namely, the Methymnseans, subjects to Athens, not 
tributaries of money but of galleys ; and the Tene- 
dians and ^Enians, tributaries. Now here, ^Eolians jEmana. 
were constrained to fight against ^Eolians 4 ; namely, 
against their founders the Boeotians, that took 
part with the Syracusians. But the Platseans, and piat a n 
only they, being Boeotians 5 , fought against Boeo- 

the close of the sixth century A.C. the Hestiaeans, see i. 1 14.] 
still occupied by the Pelasgians 2 [See iv. 54, note. Herodotus 

who migrated thither from Attica (via. 46) reckons the Styrians 

(see vi. 88, note). Lemnos was co- amongst the Dryopes.] 
Ionized with Athenians by Milti- 3 [" Yet at any rate as lonians 

ades some years before the battle of against Dorians they still followed". 

Marathon (Herod, vi. 140): and Popp. Goell. Arn. "Iw^c ye : vulgo 

Imbros may have been colonized et Bekk. re.] 
by him in his flight from the Cher- 4 [See iii. 2, note.] 
sonese to Athens (ibid. 41).] 6 [jcaravrocpd: "being outright 

1 ["And moreover the Hestisoans, Breotians": not like the Methym- 

dwelling in Hestiaea in Euboea: all naeans, descended from a common 

of the same language" &c. For stock, but actual Bosotians them- 

the ^Eginetae, tee ii. 27: and for selves. Arn. But see iii. (5 1, note.] 




. , *.... 



Rhodiaus and 





tians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cythe- 
reans, Doric both 1 , by constraint bore arms; one 
of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the 
Lacedaemonians, with the Athenians against the 
Lacedaemonians that were with Gylippus ; and the 
other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent 
Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who 
were also Doric, but against their own colony, the 
Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. 
Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there 
went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians : 
not but that they were free states, but because 
they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athe- 
nians, who were masters of the sea. And the Cor- 
ey raeans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, 
fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracu- 
sians, though a colony of the one, and of kin to 
the other : which they did necessarily, (to make the 
best of it 2 ) ; but indeed no less willingly, in respect 
of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Mes- 
senians now so called, in Naupactus, were taken 
along to this war ; and the Messenians at Pylus, 
then holden by the Athenians. Moreover the Me- 
garean outlaws 3 , though not many, by advantage 
taken of their misery, were fain to fight against 
the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. 
But now the rest of their army was rather volun- 
tary. The Argives not so much for the league, as 
for their enmity against the Lacedaemonians and 
their present particular spleen 4 , followed the Athe- 

1 [For Rhodes, see iii. 104, note: 
Cythera, iv. 53, 54.] 

2 ["As they pretended". 

3 [See iv. 66-74.] 

4 ["Each man's present parti- 
cular interest". Bekker &c., &0e- 
\iag : vulgo deest. Valla has " uti- 


nians to the war though Ionic, against Dorians. vn. 
And the Mantineans arid other Arcadian mercena- y EAR ' xn j 
ries went with them, as men accustomed ever to A c 413 - 

OL. 91. 4. 

invade the enemy shewed them : and now for gain Mantineans and 

, , . , . - A other Arcadians. 

had for enemies, as much as any, those other Arca- 
dians which went thither with the Corinthians. 
The Cretans and ^Etolians were all 1 mercenary : Cretans. 
and it fell out, that the Cretans, who together with 
the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took 
not part with their colony, but fought against it 
willingly for their hire 2 . And some Acarnanians 
also went with them for gain : but most of them 
went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and 
for good will to the state of Athens. And thus 
many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then 
of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of sedi- 
tious times 3 , there went with them to this war the 
Thurians and Metapontians : of Greek Sicilians, 
the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of barbarian, the Naxi 
Egestseans, who also drew with them the most of 
those Greek Sicilians 4 . Without Sicily, there went 
with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels between Tuscans. 
them and the Syracusians; and some lapygian 
mercenaries. These were the nations that followed 
the army of the Athenians. 

58. On the other side, there opposed them on 

1 [" Were also mercenary".] and Metapontians, as having been 

2 [" That the Cretans, who &c., overtaken in such necessities at that 
unwillingly for their hire, came not time, necessities belonging to sedi- 
with, but against their colony", tious times, went with them". Ne- 
Bekker &c., aicovrac: Valla, ultra, cessities such, as to force them to 
" And some of the Acarnanians, fly their country and join the Athen- 
for love of gain but more for love ians. Arn. Goell.] 

of Demosthenes" &c.] 4 [" Of the Sikeli". Bekker &c., 

8 [" Of Italiots the Thurians <nict\&v: vulgo, ( 


vii. the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinseans their 

'YEAR xiT borderers : and beyond them again the Geloans : 

A.c.4i3.' and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond 

racusians. them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These 

Camarinieans. Q f g^ty that j^ opposite tO 

Himereeans. Afric. Then the Himerseans, on the side that 

lieth on the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only 

Grecians inhabiting, and only aided them. These 

were their confederates of the Greek nation within 

Sicily ; all Dorians and free states. Then of the 

sicuii. barbarians there, they had the Siculi 1 , all but what 

revolted to the Athenians. For Grecians without 

Lacedemonians. Sicily, the Lacedaemonians sent them a Spartan 

commander, with some Helotes and the rest freed- 

men 2 . Then aided them both with galleys and with 

Corinthians, land-men, the Corinthians only ; and for kindred's 

^Cckrtes. sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes : out of 

Arcadian merce- Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians : 

na CT 'It* 

and Sicyomans on constraint : and from without 
Peloponnesus, the Boeotians. To the foreign aids 
the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added 
more in every kind than as much again : for they 
got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, 
great store, and other number in abundance. And 
to all these again the Syracusians themselves 
added, as I may say, about as much more, in respect 
of the greatness both of their city and of their 

59. These were the succours assembled on either 
part, and which were then all there : and after 

1 [" The Sikeli alone, all" &c.] freeman) : then aided" &c. See 

2 [" Sent them a Spartan general, Neodamodes, v. 34, note.] 

but the rest neodamodes and helots : 3 [Sicyon was reduced by Sparta 
(now neodamode is equivalent to in 418 : see v. 81.] 


them came no more, neither to the one side nor the 
other. No marvel then, if the Syracusians 1 thought 
it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already 
gotten they could add the taking of the whole 
Athenian army, so great as it was ; and hinder 
their escape both by sea and land. Presently The syracni 
therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the JJi"^ tlie 
mouth of the great haven, being about eight fur- 
longs wide, with galleys laid cross and lighters and 
boats upon their anchors : and withal prepared 
whatsoever else was necessary in case the Athenians 
would hazard another battle ; meditating on no 
small matters in anything. 

60. The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of 
the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, 
thought good to go to council upon it. And the 
generals and commanders of regiments 2 having 
met and considered their present want, both other- 
wise and in this, that they neither had provision 
for the present, (for upon their resolution to be 
gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the 
sending in of any more), nor were likely to have 
for the future unless their navy got the upper 
hand : they resolved to abandon their camp above, 
and to take in some place, no greater than needs 
they must a , near unto their galleys, with a wall ; 

1 ["And their allies". Bekker&c.] above", is meant the upper ex- 

2 [ratapxot : see iv. 4, note. It tremity of the Athenian lines, where 
seems to be the opinion of Sclice- they extended to the Kpj/ivoc, the 
man n, as cited by Goeller, that the cliff of Kpipolae, and were most 
taxiarch of the tribe commanded distant from the sea-shore. The 
die hoplita? of his tribe in the field.] Athenians were now, as observed by 

3 [" No greater than they needs Nicias, more like a besieged than a 
must for their baggage and their besieging army : the enemy having 
sick, near" &c. By the " camp a free communication with the sur- 



vii. and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the 
rest of the army, and to man every galley they 
had, serviceable and less serviceable : and having 
caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it 
out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana ; if 
not, to make their retreat in order of battle by 
land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest 
way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or 
Grecian, that they should best be able to reach 
unto before the enemy. 

As they had concluded, so they did. For they 
both came down to the shore from their camp 
above : and also manned every galley they had, 
and compelled to go aboard every man of age of 
any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was 
manned to the number of one hundred and ten 
galleys : upon which they had many archers and 
darters, both Acarnaiiians and other strangers, and 
all things else provided according to their means 
and purpose '. And Nicias, when almost every- 
thing was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be de- 
jected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary 
to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity 
of victual desirous as soon as could be to fight, 
called them together, and encouraged them then 
the first time 2 with words to this effect : 
THE ORATION 61. " Soldiers, Athenians and other our confe- 
derates, [though] the trial at hand will be common 
to all alike, and will concern the safety and country 

rounding country by means of Epi- ! [" And such a purpose" : of 

polae, whilst their cavalry, with a gaining the victory, not by skill, but 

safe retreat at Olympieium, could by the landsmen on board. Arnold, 

act on the rear of the Athenian Goeller.] 

lines, and prevent them from getting 2 ["And first of all exhorted", 

provisions. Am. Goell.} Befeker &c., re : vulgo, r<5r*.] 



no less of each of us than of the enemy : (for if our V n. 
galleys get the victory, we may every one see his " ' * 
native city again) : yet 1 ought we not to be dis- A.c.4is. 
couraged like men of no experience, who failing in orationof NIC 
their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suit- 
able to their misfortunes. But you Athenians here 
present, having had experience already of many 
wars, and you our confederates, that have always 
gone along with our armies, remember how often 
the event falleth out otherwise in war than one 
would think : and in hope that fortune will once 
also be of our side, prepare yourselves to fight 
again in such manner as shall be worthy the num- 
ber you see yourselves to be. 62. What we thought 
would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, 
against such a multitude of galleys as will be there, 
and against the provision of the enemy upon their 
decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we 
have with the masters now considered them all ; 
and as well as our present means will permit, 
made them ready. For many archers and darters 
shall go aboard : and that multitude, which if we 
had been to fight in the main sea we would not 
have used, because by slugging the galleys it would 
take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be 
useful here, where we are forced to make a land- 
fight from our galleys. We have also devised, 
instead of what should have been provided for in 
the building of our galleys 2 , against the thickness 
of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to 
lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels : 

1 [" And we ought not to be dis- was called for to fit our ships to 
couraged".] encounter the thick epo tides of the 

8 ["We have also devised what enemy, which did most&c.".] 

U 2 


vn. whereby (if the men of arms 1 do their part) we 
may keep the galleys which once come close up 
from falling back again. For we are brought to a 
necessity now, of making it a land-fight upon the 
water : and it will be the best for us neither to 
fall back ourselves, nor to suffer the enemy to do 
so ; especially when, except what our men on land 
shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile. 
63. Which you remembering, must therefore fight 
it out to the utmost, and not suffer yourselves to 
be beaten back unto the shore : but when galley 
to galley shall once be fallen close, never think 
any cause worthy to make you part, unless you 
have first beaten off the men of arms of the enemy 
from their decks. And this I speak to you rather 
that are the men of arms, than to the mariners : 
inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you 
that fight above ; and in you- it lieth even yet to 
achieve the victory for the most part with the 
landmen. Now for the mariners, I advise, and 
withal beseech them, not to be too much daunted 
with the losses past ; having now both a greater 
number of galleys, and greater forces upon the 
decks. Think 3 it a pleasure worth preserving, 
that being taken, by your knowledge of the lan- 
guage and imitation of our fashions, for Athenians 
(though you be not so), you are not only admired 

1 [" If the marines do" &c.] cWActc stood nearly on the fool- 

3 [" In us". Bekker &c.] ing of Athenian citizens (see ii.31, 

3 ["And to bear in mind that note). But that they received more 

pleasure, how worthy it is to be pre- protection from injury than the 

served, that being taken" &c. This citizens, or were in any respect 

is addressed to the metceci, who better off, seems to 'be considered 

formed a large part of the seamen as an exaggeration. They had not 

x)f the Athenian navy. Of these the in fact the full rights of citizens.] 


for it through all Greece, but also partake of our vii. 
dominion in matter of profit, no less than our- ' ' ^ 

* 7 YEAR XIX. 

selves ; and for awfulness to the nations subject A.c.8. 

J -. *.- C XT- ^ Oi,91.4. 

and protection from injury, more. You therefore oratiouof Nict 
that alone participate freely of our dominion, can- 
not with any justice betray the same. In despite 
therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often 
vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who as long as 
our fleet was at the best durst never so much as 
stand us, repel them : and make it appear that 
your knowledge even with weakness and loss, is 
better than the strength of another with fortune. 
64. Again, to such of you as are Athenians, I 
must remember this : that you have no more such 
fleets in your harbours, nor such able men of arras; 
and that if aught happen to you but victory, your 
enemies here will presently be upon you at home ; 
and those at home will be unable to defend them- 
selves, both against those that shall go hence, and 
against the enemy that lieth there already. So 
one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Sy- 
racusians, against whom you yourselves know with 
what intent you came hither : and the other part 
which is at home, shall fall into the hands of the 
Lacedaemonians. Being therefore in this one battle 
to fight both for yourselves and them, be therefore 
valiant now if ever : and bear in mind every one 
of you, that you that go now aboard, are the land 
forces, the sea forces, the w r hole estate and great 
name of Athens. For which, if any man excel 
others in skill or courage, he can never shew it 
more opportunely than now, when he may both 
help himself with it and the whole." 

65. Nicias having thus encouraged them, com- 



manded presently to go aboard. Gylippus and the 
Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians 
meant to fight, by seeing their preparation. Be- 
sides, they had advertisement of their purpose to 
cast iron grapnels into their galleys ; and as for 
everything else, so also for that they had made 
provision. For they covered the fore-part of their 
galleys, and also the decks for a great way, with 
hides : that the grapnels cast in might slip, and not 
be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylip- 
pus likewise and the other commanders used unto 
their soldiers this hortative : 

TUB ORATION OF 66. "That not only our former acts have been 
.UN honourable, but that we are to fight now also for 
further honour, men of Syracuse and confederates, 
the most of you seem to know already ; for else you 
never would so valiantly have undergone it 1 : and 
if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as 
he ought, we w r ill make it appear unto him better. 
For whereas the Athenians came into this country, 
with design first to enslave Sicily, and then if that 
succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece ; 
and whereas already they had the greatest domi- 
nion of any Grecians whatsoever, either present or 
past : you, the first that ever withstood their navy, 
wherewith they were everywhere masters, have in 
the former battles overcome them, and shall in 
likelihood overcome them again in this. For men 
that are cut short where they thought themselves 
to exceed, become afterwards further out of 
opinion with themselves than they would have 
been if they had never thought so : and when they 

[Undergone" what you have 1 '.] 


come short of their hope in things they glory in, VH. 
they come short also in courage of the true / ^~ J "* 
strength of their forces. And this is likely now to A.CUIS. 
be the case of the Athenians. 67- Whereas with oration of 
us it falleth out, that our former courage, wherewith Ae 
though unexperienced we durst stand them, being s eneral8 
now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the 
stronger 1 , giveth to every one of us a double hope. 
And in all enterprises, the greatest hope conferreth 
for the most part the greatest courage. As for 
their imitation of our provisions, they are things 
we are acquainted withal, and we shall not in any 
kind be unprovided for them. But they, when 
they shall have many men of arms upon their 
decks, being not used to it ; and many, as I may 
term them, land-darters 2 , both Acarnanians and 
others, who would not be able to direct their darts 
though they should sit 3 ; how can they choose but 
put the galleys into danger, and be all in confusion 
amongst themselves, moving in a fashion not their 
own 4 ? As for the number of their galleys, it will 
help them nothing : if any of you fear also that, as 
being to fight against odds in number. For many 
in little room are so much the slower to do what 
they desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our mu- 
nition 5 . But the very truth you shall now under- 
stand by these things, whereof we suppose we 
have most certain intelligence. Overwhelmed 

1 [ u Of having overcome the tionlcss as they will be. Goell. Arn.] 

strongest and being therefore" &c.] 4 That is, according to the mo- 

8 AicovTUTTai xipffdioi. Such as tion of the galley, not steadily as 

being upon land could use their upon land. 

darts, but not tottering upon the & [** And very easy to injure with 

water. the devices adopted by us": that is, 

3 ["Sitting still": that is, mo- the thick epotides &c.] 


YII: with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which 
are in at this present, they are grown despe- 

AC.IU. rate; not trusting to their forces, but willing to 
oration of * put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as 
well as they may ; that so they may either go out 
^y f orce? or e } se make their retreat afterward by 
land, as men whose estates cannot change into the 

68. " Against such confusion, therefore, and 
against the fortune of our greatest enemies now 
betraying itself into our hands, let us fight with 
anger: and with an opinion, not only that it is 
most lawful to fulfil our hearts' desire upon those 
our enemies, that justified their coming hither 
as a righting of themselves against an assailant ; 
but also, that to be revenged on an enemy, is both 
most natural, and, as is most commonly said, the 
sweetest thing in the world 1 . And that they are 
our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well 
enough know ; seeing them come hither into our 
dominion to bring us into servitude. Wherein if 
they had sped, they had put the men to the 
greatest tortures, the women and children to the 
greatest dishonesty, and the whole city to the most 
ignominous name 2 in the world. In regard 
whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so 
tender, as to think it gain if they go away without 
putting you to further danger ; for so they mean 
to do, though they get the victory : but effecting 
(as it is likely we shall) what we intend, both to 

1 [" Most lawful against enemies, shall have the opportunity of aveng- 

to justify, as vengeance taken upon ing ourselves on our enemy, said to 

a future aggressor, the satiating of be the sweetest" &c. Goell.] 

the miners desire, but also that we 2 The name of subject, 


be revenged of these, and to deliver unto all vir. 
Sicily their liberty, which they enjoyed before, ^"^ * 
but now is more assured. Honourable is that A.CUIS. 
combat 1 , and rare are those hazards, wherein the 
failing bringeth little loss, and the success a great 
deal of profit." 

69. When Gylippus and the commanders of the ist September. 
Syracusiaris had in this manner encouraged their 
soldiers, they presently put their men on board ; 
perceiving the Athenians to do the same. Nicias Nidus encour- 
perplexed 2 with this present estate, and seeing ^ lhissolaiers 
how great and how near the danger was, being 
now on the point to put forth from the harbour ; 
and doubting, as in great battles it falleth out, that 
somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and 
that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, 
called unto him again all the captains of galleys, 
and spake unto them every one by their fathers, their 
tribes, and their proper names, and entreated 
every one of them that had reputation in any kind, 
not to betray the same ; and those whose ances- 
tors were eminent, not to deface their hereditary 
virtues ; remembering them of their country's li- 
berty, and the uncontrolled power of all men to 
live as they pleased: and saying whatsoever else 
in such a pinch men are accustomed, not out of 
their store, to utter things stale 3 , and in all occa- 
sions the same, touching their wives, children, and 
patrial gods, but such things as being thought by 

1 [" But that it were an honour- 3 [" Their country, the most free 

able struggle, to effect, as is likely in the word, and the uncontrolled 

we shall, what we intend, to he re- power in it of all men" &c : " not 

venged &c. And those are the caring though they seem to utter 

rarest of hazards, wherein" &c.] things stale, although on all occa- 

: terrified.] sions the same" &c. Goell.] 



them available in the present discouragement, they 
use to cry into their ears. And when he thought 

. J 

A.c.413. he had admonished them, not enough, but as 
He prepared to much as the time would permit him, he went his 
fight * way, and drew out those forces that were to serve 

on laud on the sea-side : and embattled them so as 
they might take up the greatest length of ground 
they were able, thereby so much the more to con- 
firm the courage of them that were aboard. And 
Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus, (for those 
of the Athenian commanders went aboard), putting 
forth of the harbour 1 , went immediately to the 
lock of the haven, and to the passage that was 
left open, with intention to force their way out. 
70. But the Syracusians and their confederates, 
being out already with the same number of galleys 
they had before, disposed part of them to the guard 
of the open passage 2 , and the rest in circle about 
the haven ; to the end they might fall upon the 
Athenians from all parts at once, and that their 
land-forces might withal be near to aid them 
wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syra- 
cusian navy commanded Sicanus and Agathar- 
chus, each of them over a wing ; and Pythen, with 
the Corinthians, had the middle battle. After the 
Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at 
the first charge they overcame the galleys placed 
there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open 
the bars thereof. But when afterwards the Syra- 

1 [" Putting forth of their own was any such passage, and the 

station". The words, " and to the word &eic7r\ouv, in Thucydides, 

passage" &c., are considered hy always meaning some; naval evolu- 

Poppo and Goeller to be an inter- tion.] 
polatiou : it not appearing that there * [ Of the mouth of the harbour".] 


cusians and confederates came upon them from vn. 
every side, they fought not at the lock only, but *^~^ 
also in the haven itself : and the battle was sharp. A.r.4ia. 

Oi 91 4 

and such as there had never before been the like. The Athenians 
For the courage wherewith the mariners on both *'^' racusiaas 
sides brought up their galleys to any part 1 they 
were bidden, was very great, and great was the 
plotting and counterplotting, and contention one 
against another of the masters : also the soldiers, 
when the galleys boarded each other, did their ut- 
most to excel each other in all points of skill that 
could be used upon the decks 2 : and every man, in 
the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear 
the foremost. But many galleys falling close 
together in a narrow compass, (for they were the 
most galleys that in any battle they had used, and 
fought in the least room : being little fewer on the 
one side and the other than two hundred), they 
ran against each other but seldom, because there 
was no means of retiring nor of passing by, but 
made assaults upon each other oftener,as galley with 
galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall 
foul 3 . And as long as a galley was making up, 
they that stood on the decks used 4 their darts and 
arrows. and stones in abundance: but being once 
come close, the soldiers at hand-strokes attempted 
to board each other. And in many places it so fell 
out, through want of room, that they which ran 

1 [o7ror, " whenever".] no room for anacrousis or diecplous, 

2 [" Also the marines, when &c., were few : whilst the (irpoafioXai) 
did their best that the service on running aboard of each other, as 
deck might not be behind the rest of one galley might chance to fall foul 
the skill displayed".] of another in flight or attack, were 

3 [ u The (ty/3oXi) charges on the far more frequent". See i. 41>, note.] 
enemy's side, owing to there being 4 [tar* avr}v : " against it".] 


vn. upon a galley on one side, were run upon them- 
selves on the other ; and that two galleys, or some- 
times more,were forced to lie aboard of one ; and 
that the masters were at once to have a care, not 
in one place only, but in many together, how to de- 
fend on the one side, and how to offend on the 
other : and the great noise of many galleys fallen 
foul of one another, both amazed them and took 
away their hearing of what their directors directed. 
For 1 they directed thick and loud on both sides, 
not only as art required, but out of their present 
eagerness: the Athenians crying out to theirs to 
force the passage, and now if ever valiantly to lay 
hold upon their safe return to their country ; and 
the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, 
how honourable a thing to every one of them it 
would be to hinder their escape, and by this vic- 
tory to improve every man the honour of his 
own country. Moreover, the commanders of 
either side, where they saw any man without ne- 
cessity to row a-stern, would call unto the captain 
of the galley by his name, and ask him, the Athe- 
nians, whether he retired because he thought the 
most hostile land to be more their friend than the 
sea, which they had so long been masters of 2 : the 
Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that 
the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to 
fly, they would nevertheless fly from the flyers. 
The diversity of Jl. Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the 
land-men had a conflict, arid sided with them 

1 [" Of what their keleusta said. 2 [" Which they had with no 

For load was the exhorting, and small labour made themselves 

loud the shouting on hoth sides masters of". BekL Goell. Arn., ov 

amongst the Jtelcusta:". Seeii.84,n.] SC6\iyov TTOVOU : vulgo,om. ir6vov.] 


in their affections 1 : they of the place, contending vii. 
for increase of the honours they had already '" ' ~ N 


gotten ; and the invaders, fearing a worse estate A.C 413. 

i i ii- -w-i , i . OL.oi.4. 

than they were already m. For the Athenians, fight from the 
who had their whole fortune at stake in their shore * 
galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they 
had never been in the like : and were thereby of 
necessity to behold the fight upon the water with 
very different passions 2 . For the sight being 
near, and not looking all of them upon one and 
the same part, he that saw their own side prevail 
took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that 
they would not deprive them of their safety : and 
they that saw them have the worse, riot only 
lamented, but shrieked outright; and had their 
minds more subdued by the sight of what was 
done, than they that were present in the battle 
itself. Others that looked on some part where 
the fight w r as equal, because the contention con- 
tinued so as they could make no judgment on it, 
with gesture of body on every occasion agreeable 
to their expectation, passed the time in a miserable 
perplexity 3 . For they were ever within a little 
either of escaping, or of perishing. And one 
might hear in one and the same army, as long as 
the fight upon the water was indifferent, at one 
and the same time lamentations, shouts that they 
won, that they lost: and whatsoever else a great 
army in great danger is forced differently to utter. 

1 [" During this doubtful con- sidered to be a corrupt passage.] 

flict on the water, the army on the 3 [" Moving their bodies in their 

shore of both sides had also their extreme fear in sympathy with their 

struggle and contention of mind".] thoughts, passed their time as ill as 

3 [" And were thereby" &c. Con- the worst of them". Am.] 


vn. They also that were aboard suffered the same : till 
" ' s at last the Syracusians and their confederates, 


A.c.413. after long resistance on the other side, put them to 
The Athenians flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them with 
** great clamour and encouragement of their own to 

the shore. And the sea-forces making to the 
shore, some one way and some another, except 
only such as were lost by being far from it, 
escaped into the harbour 1 . And the army that 
was upon the land, no longer now of different pas- 
sions, with one and the same vehemence' 2 , all with 
shrieks and sighs unable to sustain what befel, ran 
part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the 
camp : and the residue, who were far the greatest 
number, fell presently to consider every one of the 
best way to save himself. And this was the time 
wherein of all other they stood in greatest fear 3 , 
and they suffered now the like to what they had 
made others to suffer before at Pylus. For the 
Lacedaemonians then, besides 4 the loss of their 
fleet, lost the men which they had set over into the 
island: and the Athenians now, without some acci- 
dent not to be expected, were out of all hope to 
save themselves by land. 

72. After this cruel battle, and many galleys 
and men on either side consumed, the Syracusians 
and their confederates, having the victory, took up 
the wreck and the bodies of their dead : and 
returning into the city, erected a trophy. But 
the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their 
present loss, never thought upon asking leave to 

1 [" All that were not taken on 8 [" The same im-pittse".] 
the water, reaching the shore 3 [" Consternation".] 
escaped to the camp".] 4 ["% the loss &c., lost also" &c.] 



take up their dead or wreck : but fell immediately 

to consultation how to be gone 1 the same night. 

And Demosthenes coming unto Nicias, delivered 

his opinion for going once again aboard, and 

forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the 

next morning, saying that their galleys which were 

yet remaining and serviceable were more than 

those of the enemy : for the Athenians had yet left 

them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. 

But when Nicias approved the advice, and would 

have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused 

to go aboard : as being not only dejected with 

their defeat, but also without opinion of ever 

having the upperhand any more. Whereupon they 

now resolved all to make their retreat by land. 

73. But Hermocrates of Syracuse suspecting their The stratagem of 

purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous SS^^, 

that so great an army, going away by land and oftheAthenians 

sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should 

there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates : 

and admonished them, that it was not fit, through 

negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time 

to go their ways, (alleging what he thought best 

to the purpose) ; but that all the Syracusians and 

their confederates should go out and fortify in 

their way, and prepossess all the narrow passages 

with a guard. Now they were all of them of the 

same opinion no less than himself, and thought it 

fit to be done : but they conceived withal, that the 

soldier now joyful and taking his ease after a sore 

battle, being also holiday, (for it was their day of 

sacrifice to Hercules 2 ), would not easily be brought 

1 [That is, how to retreat by land. 2 [As Dorians, the Syracusans wor- 
" But Demosthenes" c.] shipped the Dorian hero Hercules.] 





vii. to obey. For through excess of joy for the victory, 
they would most of them, being holiday, be drink- 
ing ; and look for anything rather than to be 
persuaded at this time to take up arms again and 
go out 1 . But seeing the magistrates upon this 
consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermo- 
crates not prevailing, of his own head contrived 
this. Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the 
w f orst of their way in the night, and so at ease 
out-go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent cer- 
tain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, 
to the Athenian camp : who approaching so near 
as to be heard speak, called to some of them to 
come forth, as if they had been friends of the 
Athenians ; (for Nicias had some within that used 
to give him intelligence) ; and bade them to advise 
Nicias not to dislodge that night, for that the Syra- 
cusians had beset the ways ; but that the next day, 
having had the leisure to furnish their army, they 
might march away. 74. Upon this advertisement 
they abode that night, supposing it had been with- 
out fraud 2 . And afterwards, because they went not 
presently, they thought good to stay there that 
2d September, day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack 
up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, 
and begone, leaving all things else behind them 
save what was necessary for their bodies. But 
ylippus and the Syracusians, with their land 
forces, went out before them : and not only stopped 

theway " 

1 ["They would most of them be 2 ["And having so said, they 

drinking in the feast : and that they went their way : and the Athenians 

might expect to persuade them to reported what they had heard to their 

any thing rather than at this time generals; who suspecting no fraud, 

to take up anns &c."] 

upon this report abode that night'*.] 


up the ways in the country about by which the vn. 
Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard 
at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood 
embattled to receive and stop their army in such 
places as they thought convenient. And with 
their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the 
Athenians, and towed their galleys away from the 
shore. Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athe- 
nians themselves meant to have done : but the 
rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any 
place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into 
the city 1 . 

75. After this, when everything seemed unto r<i September. 
Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they march ow ay "* 
dislodged, being now the third day from their ^^^ 
fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not 
only for the particulars 2 , as that they marched 
away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that 
instead of their great hopes they had endangered 
both themselves and the state : but also for the 
dolorous objects which were presented both to the 
eye and mind of every of them in particular, in the 
leaving of their camp. For their dead lying un- 
buried, when any one saw his friend on the ground, 
it struck him at once both with fear and grief. 
But the living that were 3 sick or wounded, both 
grieved them more than the dead, and were more 
miserable. For with entreaties and lamentations 
they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken 
along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or 

1 [" And the rest at their leisure 2 [" Not on one account only*'.] 

and without opposition they towed * [** That were left behind, both 

away wheresoever each had drifted, wounded and sick, were to the living 

and hauled" &c.] far more grievous than the dead".] 

VOL. IX. - X 


vii. familiars, and hanging on the necks of their com- 
rades 1 , and following as far as they were able : and 
when the strength of their bodies failed, that they 
could go no further, with ah-mes ! and imprecations 
were there left. Insomuch as the whole army, 
filled with tears and irresolute 2 , could hardly get 
away ; though the place were hostile, and they had 
suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, 
more than with tears could be expressed: but 3 
hung down their heads, and generally blamed 
themselves. For they seemed nothing else but 
even the people of some great city expugned by 
siege, and making their escape. For the whole 
number that marched, were no less one with an- 
other than forty thousand men. Of which not only 
the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought 
he should have occasion to use ; but also the men 
of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, 
carried their victuals under their arms, partly for 
want and partly for distrust of their servants, who 
from time to time 4 ran over to the enemy ; but at 
this time went the greatest number. And yet 
what they carried was not enough to serve the 
turn : for not a jot more provision was left remain- 
ing in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of 
others 5 , and that equal division of misery, which 
nevertheless is wont to lighten it, in that we suffer 

1 [" Departing comrades".] * [" Who before this, but now in 

2 [" And in tbis straight".] greatest numbers, ran over" &c. It 
8 ["And besides their grief there must be borne in mind, that the 

was a general dissatisfaction with Greek soldier did not, like the Ro- 

themselves : for they seemed" &c. man, carry his own provisions.] 
" of a city expugned, and that no 6 [" The rest of tkeir ignominy 5 * : 

small one. For the whole number " especially considering from 

that marched" &c.] what splendour and glory" &c.] 


with many, at this time so much as thought light 
in itself. And the rather, because they considered 
from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed 
before, into how low an estate they were now 
fallen. For never Grecian army so differed from 
itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to 
enslave others, they departed in greater fear of 
being made slaves themselves ; and instead of 
prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, 
they went back again with the contrary maledic- 
tions 1 ; and whereas they came out seamen, they 
departed landmen, and relied not upon their naval 
forces but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, 
in respect of the great danger yet hanging over 
them, these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable. 

76. Nicias, perceiving the army to be dejected, 
and the great change that was in it, came up to 
the ranks, and encouraged and comforted them as 
far as for the present means he was able. And as 
he went from part to part he exalted his voice 
more than ever before, both as being earnest in 
his exhortation, and because also he desired that 
the benefit of his words might reach as far as 
might be. 

77- " Athenians and confederates, we must hope THE OPTION 
still, even in our present estate. Men have been 
saved ere now from greater dangers than these are. 
Nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either 
for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we 
are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage 
of none of you in strength of body, (you see how 
I am in my sickness), nor am I thought inferior to 


["Omens". GoelL] 

X 2 


vii. any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of 
' ' * mine own private person or otherwise, am never- 
A.c.418.* theless now in as much danger as the meanest of 
you. And yet I have worshipped the gods fre- 
quently according to the law, and lived justly and 
unblameably towards men. For which cause my 
hope is still confident of the future : though these 
calamities, as being not according to the measure 
of our desert, do indeed make me fear. But they 
may perhaps cease. For both the enemies have 
already had sufficient fortune : and the gods, if 
any of them have been displeased with our voyage, 
have already sufficiently punished us. Others have 
invaded their neighbours as well as we : and as 
their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, 
so their punishment also hath been tolerable. And 
we have reason now, both to hope for more favour 
from the gods ; (for our case deserveth their pity 
rather than their hatred) ; and also not to despair 
of ourselves, seeing how good and how many men 
of arms you are, marching together in order of 
battle 1 . Make account of this, that wheresoever 
you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves 
you are a city : such as not any other in Sicily 
can either easily sustain, if you assault, or remove, 
if you be once seated. Now for your march, that 
it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves ; 
making no other account any of you, but what place 
soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he 
win it, must be his country and his walls 2 . March 

1 [" And surveying yourselves, that wheresoever you please to sit 

your men of arms how good, and in down" &e.] 

your ranks how many you are, de- * [" By winning it, he will there- 

spair not too much, but consider by gain both country and walls".] 


you must with diligence, both night and day alike, vii. 
for our victual is short : and if we can but reach 
some amicable territory of the Siculi, (for these are 
still firm to us for fear of the Syracusians), then 
you may think yourselves secure. Let us there- 
fore send before to them, and bid them meet us 1 , 
and bring us forth some supplies of victual. In 
sum, soldiers, let me tell you it is necessary that 
you be valiant ; for there is no place near, where 
being cowards you can possibly be saved : whereas 
if you escape through the enemies at this time, you 
may every one 2 see again whatsoever anywhere he 
most desires ; and the Athenians may re-erect the 
great power of their city, how low soever fallen. 
For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, 
are the city." 

78. Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal 
about the army, and where he saw any man straggle 
and not march in his rank, he brought him about 
and set him in his place. Demosthenes having 
spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much 
to those soldiers under him. And they marched 
forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion, 
and then those with Demosthenes in the rear 3 . 
And the men of arms received those that carried 
the baggage, and the other multitude, within them. 
When they were come to the ford of the river The Athenians 
Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracu- march - 

1 [" They have been sent to and * [" And they marched arranged 

told to meet us". Bekker &c., *rpo- in a hollow oolong, the division of 

TriTre/iirrai : vulgo, irpoirtyireTt.] Nicias leading the way, and that of 

8 [" The rest of you shall see Demosthenes following". Bekker 

again &c., and you, Athenians, &c., irp&Tov piv ijyofywvov : vulgo 

shall re-erect &c."] desunt.J 


vii. sians and their confederates embattled against them 
A*x" on ^ e bank : but these they put to flight, and 
A.c.418. having won the passage marched forward. But 
the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and 
their light-armed plied them with their darts, in 

- the flank. This day the Athenians marched forty 

furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a 

4th September, certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, 
they marched forwards about twenty furlongs ; and 
descending into a certain champaign ground, en- 
camped there, with intent both to get victual at 
the houses, (for the place was inhabited), and to 
carry water with them thence : for before them in 
the w r ay they were to pass, for many furlongs toge- 
ther there was but little to be had. But the Syra- 
cusians in the meantime got before them, and cut 
off l their passage with a wall. This was at a steep 
hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a 
torrent with steep and rocky banks : and it is 

cth September, called Acrseum Lepas". The next day the Athe- 
nians went on : and the horsemen and darters of 
the Syracusians and their confederates, being a 
great number of both, pressed them so with their 
horses and darts, that the Athenians after long 
fight were compelled to retire again into the same 

4 [ u And were cutting off": that one of the valleys which fall into 

is, during this halt of the Athcn- that of the Anapus : hut heing un- 

ians.] able to force their passage in this 

2 [XgTraf, according to Goeller, direction, they fell back upon the 
signifies rupes: "the top of the coast, intending to follow the coast- 
rock". It must he remembered, road through the low country near 
that the object of the Athenians was the sea till they should arrive at 
to penetrate far enough into the in- another valley, when they would 
terior to reach the country of the again turn inland; and make a 
Sikeli. This they attempted in the second attempt to penetrate to their 
first instance to effect, by ascending friends the Sikeli. Am.] 


camp ; but now with less victual than before, be- V n. 
cause the horsemen would suffer them no more to 
straggle abroad. 79. In the morning betimes they 
dislodged, and put themselves on their march 
again, and forced their way to the hill 1 which the 
enemy had fortified ; where they found before them 
the Syracusian foot embattled in great length 
above the fortification [on the hill's side] : for the 
place itself was but narrow. The Athenians com- 
ing up assaulted the wall : but the shot of the 
enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the 
hill, (for they could easily cast home from above), 
making them unable to take it, they retired again 
and rested. There happened withal some claps of 
thunder and a shower of rain, as usually falleth out 
at this time of the year, being now near autumn : 
which further disheartened the Athenians, who 
thought that also this did tend to their destruction. 
Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians 
sent part of their army to raise a wall at their 
backs, in the way they had come : but this the 
Athenians hindered, by sending against them part 
of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with 
their whole army into a more champaign ground 2 , 
lodged there that night : and the next day went 7th 
forward again. And the Syracusians with their 
darts, from every part round about, wounded many 
of them ; and when the Athenians charged, they 
retired, and when they retired, the Syracusians 
charged ; and that especially upon the hindmost, 
that by putting to flight a few they might terrify 

the whole army. And for a good while the A then- 


1 [" And sought to force and win in great depth abore" &c.] 
the hill" &c. Goell. fc * embattled * [" More towards the plain".] 




most, and m 

order; but De- 

ians in this manner withstood them : and after- 
wards, being gotten five or six furlongs forward, 
they rested in the plain : and the Syracusians went 
from them to their own camp. 

80. This night it was concluded by Nicias arid 
Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their 
arm Y> anc * the want already of all necessaries, and 
that many of their men in many assaults of the 

J J f 

enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as tar 
as they possibly could 1 : not the way they pur- 
posed before, but toward the sea ; which was the 
contrary way to that which theSyracusiansguarded. 
Now this whole journey of the army lay not to- 
wards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, 
Camarina and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian 
as barbarian, that way. When they had made 
many fires accordingly, they marched in the night: 
and (as usually it falleth out in all armies, and 
most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright 
and terror, especially marching by night and in 
hostile ground, and the enemy near) were in con- 
fusion 2 . The army of Nicias leading the way, kept 
together and got far afore ; but that of Demos- 

1 ["The miserable estate kc., 
both from the want *cc. and from 
many being wounded, to leave hum- 
ing all the fires they could and lead 
away the army as far &c." It being 
now manifest that to reach the 
Sikelian country by the valley from 
Syracuse, was utterly hopeless, the 
generals resolved to change the line 
of retreat, and to penetrate into the 
nterior by the valley of the Cacy- 
paris, terminating on the sea-coast 
about six or seven miles to the 

southward of the Anapus. To effect 
this they proposed to gain a march 
upon the enemy by setting out at 
night, and falling back towards the 
sea till they came into the road from 
Syracuse to Helorus : and then to 
follow this road in a direction pa- 
rallel to the coast, till they reached 
the Cacyparis, when they would 
turn again to the right and once 
more move towards the interior. 
2 [" A panic seized them".] 


thenes, which was the greater half, was both severed vii. 
from the rest and marched more disorderly. Ne- *~ ' ^ 
vertheless, by the morning betimes they got to the A.c.4i3. 
sea-side, and entering into the Helorine way they sth September. 
went on towards the river Cacyparis, to the end 
when they came thither to march upwards along 
the river's side through the heart of the country. 
For they hoped that this way the Siculi, to 
whom they had sent, would meet them. When 
they came to the river, here also they found a 
certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their 
passage with a wall and with piles. When they 
had quickly forced this guard, they passed the 
river, and again marched on to another river, called 
Erineus : for that was the way which the guides 
directed them 1 . 

81. In the meantime the Syracusians and their 
confederates, as soon as day appeared, and that 
they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them 
accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his 
consent, followed them with speed the same way, 
which they easily understood they were gone ; and 
about dinner time overtook them. When they Demosthenes 
were come up to those with Demosthenes, who 

were the hindmost, and had marched more slowly "I?? 

' J and 13 

and disorderly than the other part had done, as 
having been put into disorder in the night, they 
fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian 
horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up 

1 [Finding the enemy already on their guides informing them that by 

the Cacyparis, they were afraid of ascending this they might gain the 

finding the Valley stopped at the interior ; and here, as they hoped, 

upper end ; and therefore marched might anticipate the enemy. Ar- 

on to the next, that of the Erineus: nold.] 

; as he can 


VIT. into a narrow compass, the more easily now 1 , be- 
cause they were divided from the rest. Now the 
army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred 
and fifty furlongs 2 further on. For he led away the 
faster, because he thought not that 3 their safety 
consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily ; but 
rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting 
when they could not choose. But Demosthenes 
was both in greater and more continual toil, in 
respect that he marched in the rear, and conse- 
quently was pressed by the enemy 4 : and seeing 
the Syracusiansjpursuing him, he went not on, but 
put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he 
was encompassed, and reduced, he and the Athe- 
nians with him, into great disorder. For being 
shut up 5 within a place enclosed round with a wall, 
and which on either side had a way [open] amongst 
abundance of olive trees ; they were charged from 
all sides at once with the enemy's shot. For the 
Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not 
in close battle, upon very good reason. For to 
hazard battle against men desperate, was not so 
much for theirs, as for the Athenians' advantage. 
Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared 
themselves somewhat ; because they were loth to 
wear themselves out 6 before the end of the busi- 
ness ; and thought by this kind of fight to sxibdue 

1 [''Indeed". Bekker &c., 8%: the enemy : and at this time, know- 
one MS. jjdif.] ing the Syracusans were pursuing 

2 [" As much as fifty stadia", him, he was more taken up with 
Bekker &e, ical trivT^Kovrai vulgo, ordering his men for battle than in 
iKarbv K. tr.] marching on, till &c."] 

8 [" That in their present condi- * [" Being driven back in confu- 
tion their safety &c. J1 ] sion". Arn.] 

4 [" And was the first to sustain fl [" To be taken off".] 


and take them alive. 82. Whereupon, after they V n. 
had plied the Athenians and their confederates all 
day long from every side with shot, and saw that 
with their wounds and other annoyance they were 
already tired : Gylippus and the Syracusians and 
their confederates first made proclamation, that if 
any of the islanders would come over to them, they 
should be at liberty. And the men of some few 
cities went over. And by and by after, they made Demosthenes 
agreement with all the rest that were with Demos- yieldeth 
thenes ; that they should deliver up their arms, 
and none of them be put to death, neither vio- 
lently, nor by bonds, nor by want of the neces- 
sities of life. And they all yielded, to the number 
of six thousand men : arid the silver they had, 
they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow 
of targets ; and filled with the same four targets. 
And these men they carried presently into the 

Nicias, and those that were with him, attained 
the same day to the river Erineus ; which passing, 
he caused his army to sit down upon a certain 
ground more elevate than the rest. 83. Where the 
Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, oth September. 
that those with Demosthenes had yielded them- 
selves ; and willed him to do the like. But he, not 
believing it, took truce for a horseman to enquire 
the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and The offer of 
word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to 
Gylippus and the Syracusians : saying, that he was ac B P |ed - 
content to compound on the part of the Athenians, 
to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had 
laid out, so that his army might be suffered to de- 
part ; and that till payment of the money were 


made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, 
every hostage rated as a talent. But Gylippus and 
the Syracusians refusing the condition, charged 
them ; and having hemmed them in, plied them 
with shot, as they had done the other army, from 
every side till evening. This part of the army was 
also pinched with the want both of victual and 
other 1 necessaries. Nevertheless observing the 
quiet of the night, they were about to march. 
But no sooner took they their arms up, than the 
Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Where- 
upon the Athenians finding themselves discovered, 
sat down again : all but three hundred, who break- 
ing by force through the guards, marched as far 
ioth September, as they could that night 2 . 84. And Nicias, when 
it was day, led his army forward ; the Syracusians 
and their confederates still pressing them in the 
same manner, shooting and darting at them from 
every side. The Athenians hasted to get the river 
Asinarus; not only because they were urged on 
every side by the assault of the many horsemen 
and other multitude, and thought to be more at 
ease when they were over the river, but out of 
weariness also and desire to drink. When they 
were come unto the river, they rushed in without 
any order, every man striving who should first get 
over. But the pressing of the enemy, made the 
passage now more difficult 3 . For being forced to 
take the river in heaps, they fell upon and trampled 
one another under their feet ; and falling amongst 

1 Vulgo, aXXtuv : Bekk. &c. otn.J no longer; and every man striving 

2 r* Went off in the night as they to get over first, and* the enemy 
could".] tying upon them, made the passage 

8 [" They rush in , observing order now difficult".] 


the spears and utensils of the army, some perished vii. 
presently; and others catching hold one of an- 
other 1 , were carried away together down the 
stream. And [not only] the Syracusians standing 
along the farther bank, being a steep one, killed 
the Athenians with their shot from above, as they 
were many of them greedily drinking, and trou- 
bling one another in the hollow of the river : but 
the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them 
with their swords, and those especially that were 
in the river 2 . And suddenly the water was cor- 
rupted : nevertheless they drunk it, foul as it was 
with blood and mire ; and many also fought for it. 
85. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the 
river, and the army was utterly defeated, part at 
the river, and part (if any gat away) by the horse- ioth September. 
men; Nicias yielded himself unto Gylippus, (having 
more confidence in him than in the Syracusians) : 
to be for his own person at the discretion of him 
and the Lacedaemonians, and 3 no further slaughter 
to be made of the soldiers. Gylippus from thence- 
forth commanded to take prisoners. So the residue, 
except such as were hidden from them, (which 
were many), they carried alive into the city. They 

1 [" And entangled (in the bag- went down and slew them in the 
gage) sank down". Goell. Arn. It river. And the water was quickly 
is said a little below, that the men spoiled : nevertheless &c." Here, 
fought with each other for the as in other instances, the Syracu- 
water : a fact inconsistent with the sans showed no inclination to come 
stream being strong enough to to close quarters with the Athenians; 
" carry them away".] but were better pleased to see that 

2 [And the Syracusans &c. killed done by the Peloponnesian troops, 
the Athenians, as they were drink- whilst they themselves plied them 
ing, " and Confusedly crowded to- with missiles from a distance. Arn.] 
gether in the hollow of the river : * [" But no further slaughter &c. 
and the Peloponnesians especially And after this Gylippus" 


vii. sent also to pursue the three hundred which brake 
through their guards in the night ; and took them. 
That which was left together of this army to the 
public, was not much 1 ; but they that were con- 
veyed away by stealth were very many : and all 
Sicily was filled with them, because they were not 
taken, as those with Demosthenes were, by com- 
position. Besides, a great part [of these] were 
slain ; for the slaughter [at this time] was exceed- 
ing great, none greater in all the Sicilian war 2 . 
They were also not a few that died in those other 
assaults in their march. Nevertheless many also 
escaped, some then presently, and some by running 
away after servitude ; the rendezvous of whom was 

86. The Syracusians and their confederates 
being come together, returned with their prisoners, 
all they could get, and with the spoil, into the 
city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athe- 
nians and their confederates, they put them into 
the quarries 3 , as the safest custody. But Nicias 

1 [ u The portion of the army that tarn septum undique, nihil tarn 
was collected together in a body, tutuin ad custodias nee fieri nee 
was not much : but they that" &e.] cogitari potest. In has lautumias, 

2 [Hobbes has adapted his Ian- si qui publice custodiendi sunt, 
guage to the words " Sicilian war", etiam ex ceteris oppidis Siciliae de- 
The comparison is undoubtedly duci imperantur. Cic. ii. Verr. 5, 
weak: and some desire to read cited by Goell. In retaliation of 
" Grecian war".] this treatment of the Athenians, the 

8 [Lautumias Syracusanas omnes Syracusans taken by Thrasyllus at 

audistis, plerique nostis. Opus est the battle of Ephesus, were put into 

ingens, magnificum regum ac ty- the quarries of M unychia. But the 

rannorum. Totum est ex saxo in prisoners contrived to dig their way 

mirandam altitudinem depresso, et out through the rock : and escaped 

multorum opens penitus exciso, to Megara, where they, occasioned 

ideoque, quamquam barky aarov) the revolt of Nisaea, which Athens 

nihil tarn clausum ad exitus, nihil did not again recover.] 


and Demosthenes they killed, against Gylippus his vii. 
will. For Gylippus thought the victory would be 
very honourable, if, over and above all his other 
success, he could carry home both the generals of 
the enemy to Lacedaemon. And it fell out that 
one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest 
enemy, for the things he had done in the island 
and at Pylus ; and the other, upon the same occa- 
sion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had ear- 
nestly laboured to have those prisoners which were 
taken in the island, to be set at liberty ; by per- 
suading the Athenians to the peace. For which 
cause the Lacedaemonians were inclined to love 
him : and it was principally in confidence of that, 
that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But cer- 
tain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them 
for fear (because they had been tampering with 
him) lest being put to the torture he might bring 
them into trouble, whereas now they were well 
enough ; and others, especially the Corinthians, 
fearing he might get away by corruption of one or 
other, being wealthy, and work them some mis- 
chief afresh, having persuaded their confederates 
to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes 
near unto these, was he put to death : being the 
man that, of all the Grecians of my time, had least 
deserved to be brought to so great a degree of 
misery 1 . 

87- As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians 
handled them at first but ungently. For in this 
hollow place 2 , first the sun and suffocating air 

1 ["Deserved, for his study of every 2 [" For in a hollow, and many 
lawful virtue, to be brought &C.''] in small space, first the sun &c."] 


(being without roof) annoyed them one way : and 
on t ^ ie ^ ier side, the nights coming upon that 
A.c.418. heat, autumnal and cold, put them, by reason of 
the alteration, into strange diseases : especially 
doing all things, for want of room, in one and the 
same place ; and the carcasses of such as died of 
their wounds, or change 1 [of air] or other like 
accident, lying together there on heaps. Also the 
smell was intolerable : besides that they were 
afflicted with hunger and thirst. For for eight 
months together, they allowed no more but to 
every man a cotyle 2 of water by the day, and 
two cotyles of corn. And whatsoever misery is 
probable that men in such a place may suffer, they 
suffered. Some seventy days they lived thus 
thronged. Afterwards, retaining the Athenians, 
and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the 
army with them, they sold the rest, How many 
were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly : but 
they were seven thousand at the fewest. And 
this w r as the greatest action that happened in all 
this war, or at all, that we have heard of amongst 
the Grecians 3 : being to the victors most glorious, 

1 [" Or the change": of tempera- assault. " Marcellus, ut moenia 
ture above-mentioned.] ingressus, ex superioribus loeis 

2 [See iv. 16, note.] urbem, omnium ferine ilia tempes- 

3 [" Or, as appears to me, the tate puleherrimam, subjectam ocu- 
greatest even of the Hellenic actions lis vidit, illachrymasse dicitur, 
known by report". We have a de- partim guadio tantae perpetrate rei, 
scription by Livy of a moment, two partim vetusta gloria urbis. Athe- 
eenturies later than the present niensium classes demersa*, et duo 
time, when Syracuse, not as now ingentes exercitus cum duobus cla- 
exulting over a defeated besieging rissimis ducibus deleti, occurre- 
army, was on the point, after stand- bant; et tot bella cum Carthagi- 
ing a three years' siege, of tasting niensibus tanto cum discrimine 
the treatment of a city taken by gesta ; tot tarn opulent! tyranni 



and most calamitous to the vanquished. For 
being wholly overcome in every kind, and receiv- 
ing small loss in nothing, their army, and fleet, 
and all [that ever they had], perished (as they 
use to say) with an universal destruction 1 . Few 
of many returned home. And thus passed the 
business concerning Sicily. 


regesque Ea quum universa 

occurrerentanimo, subiretque cogi- 
tatio, jam ilia momento horae arsura 
omnia, et ad cineres reditura: prius- 
quam signa Achradinam admoveret, 
praemittit Syraeusanos, ut alloquio 
leni perlicerent hostes ad deden- 
dam urbern." xxv. 24. For the 
present, as at Athens the VCLVTIKOQ 
oxXoc, the authors of the victory of 
Suhuuis, and thence of the Athen- 
ian iiyepovia and dominion of the 
sea, established an unlimited and 
irresistible democracy, so did it 
happen here. But less than ten 
years' experience of their own inca- 
pacity for the task of government, 

drove them to make trial of dicta- 
tors : an experiment which at last 
ended in the tyranny of Dionysius: 
another example to be added to 
those of Theagenes of Megara (iv. 
66, note) and Peisistratus of Athens, 
of the people becoming the dupe of 
confidence placed in a demagogue 
for his merit of aTrk^na / ?rp6c 
rovg ir\ov0iov t hatred of the rich. 
See Arist. v. 4, 5.] 

1 [The loss is computed by Iso- 
crates at 40,000 soldiers, and 240 
triremes: by Boeckli, at 65,000 
soldiers. The narrative of Tliucy- 
dides shows a loss of 209 triremes. 







The revolt of the Athenian confederates and the offers made by 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the 
lower Asia, draw the Lacedaemonians to the war in Ionia and 
Hellespont. First in Ionia, and the provinces of Tissaphernes: 
who, by the counsel of Alcibiades and connivance of Astyochus, 
hindereth their proceedings. Alcibiade? in the meanwhile, 
to make way for his return into his country, giveth occasion of 
sedition about the government: whence ensued the authority of 
THE FOUR HUNDRED, under the pretext of THE FIVE THOUSAND: 
the recalling of Alcibiades by the army: and at length, by his 
countenance, the deposing again of THE FOUR HUNDRED, and end 
of the sedition. But in the meantime they lose Eubrca. 
Mindarus, the successor of Astyochus, finding himself abused 
by Tissaphernes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus into Helles- 
pont: and there presently loseth a battle to the Athenians 
before Abydos, being then summer and the twenty -first year 
of the war. 

1. WHEN the news was told at Athens, they 
believed not a long time, though it were plainly 
related and by those very soldiers 1 that escaped 
from the defeat itself, that all was so utterly lost as 
it was. When they knew it 3 they were mightily 

1 [" By the best or most credible Goell. " that all was at any rate 
of the soldiers that escaped" &c. so utterly lost 1 ' &c.] 


offended with the orators 1 that furthered the voy- \m. 
age : as if they themselves had never decreed it. ' " * 


They were angry also with those that gave out A.c4ia. 
prophecies 2 , and with the soothsayers: and with The rear ami 
whosoever else had at first by any divination put ITCmm^n 
them into hope that Sicily should be subdued. hetlriil * IUlc 

* J new* 

Every thing, from every place, grieved them ; and 
fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they 
were in, beset them round 3 . For they were not 
only grieved for the loss which both every man in 
particular and the whole city sustained, of so many 
men of arms, horsemen, and serviceable men, the 
like whereof they saw was not left : but seeing 
they had neither galleys in their haven, nor money 
in their treasury, nor furniture in their galleys, 
were even desperate at that present of their 
safety ; and thought the enemy out of Sicily would 
come forthwith with their fleet into Peineus, espe- 
cially after the vanquishing of so great a navy ; 
and that the enemy here would surely now, with 
double preparation in every kind, press them to 
the utmost both by sea and land, and be aided 
therein by their revolting confederates. Never- Th<> Athenians 
theless, as far as their means would stretch, it was 7,lr tolltWMl 
thought best to stand it out ; and getting mate- 
rials and money where they could have it, to make 
ready a navy, and to make sure of their confede- 
rates, especially those of Euboea; and to intro- 
duce a greater frugality in the city 4 , and to erect 

1 [That is,Demostratus ; and pro- called not fur from the city.] 
bably Pisander, ch. 49 : also Andro- 3 [" And these events bad changed 
cles, ch. 65. Goell.] their hopes into fear and the utmost 

2 [The people misinterpreted an consternation". Goell.] 

oracle from Dodona, SuceXiav ofia- 4 [That is, in respect of sacred 
v : overlooking a small hill so festivals, shows, and the pay of the 

Y 2 





The Grecians 


a magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should 
*""""' ""* be offered to preconsult of the business that passed. 

YBAR XIX. * r 

A.c.413. And they were ready, in respect of their present 
fear, (as is the people's fashion), to order every 
The end of the thing aright. And as they resolved this, so they 

T -i , AI^I ji 

did it. And the summer ended. 

2. The winter following, upon the great over- 
throw of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians 
were presently up against them. Those who 
before were confederates of neither side, thought 
fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the 
war, but to go against the Athenians of their own 
accord ; as having not only every one severally this 
thought, that had the Athenians prospered in 
Sicily they would afterwards have come upon them 
also, but imagined 1 withal that the rest of the war 
would be but short, whereof it would be an honour 
to participate. And such of them as were confe- 
derates of the Lacedaemonians, longed now more 
than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their 
great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the 
Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, 
to revolt ; as they that judged according to their 
passion, without admitting reason in the matter, 
that the next summer they were to remain with 
The hopes of the victory 2 . But the Lacedaemonians themselves took 
not on ]y f rom a jj jj^ but also principally 

jurors. Duk. The preconsultation 
operated as a veto upon moving any 
matter in the public assembly not 
first approved of by this council. It 
seems probable that this innovation 
was intended as a step to further 
changes of an oligarchical tendency, 
See Thirl, ch. xxvii.] 

1 [rjyovpwot: ora. Bekker, &c.] 

2 [ u As they that judged accord- 
ing to passion : and did not allow 
them a word to say as to their 
being able to hold out another sum- 
raer": that is, considered they had 
no chance of holding out. Arnold, 


from that, that their confederates in Sicily with 
great power, having another navy now necessarily 
added to their own 1 , would in all likelihood be 
with them in the beginning of the spring. And 
being every way full of hopes, they purposed 
without delay 2 to fall close to the war : making 
account, if this were well ended, both to be free 
hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athe- 
nians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put 
them into ; and also having pulled them down, to 
have the principality of all Greece now secure unto 

3. Whereupon Agis their king went out with a 
part of his army the same winter from Deceleia, and money 
levied money amongst the confederates for the 
building of a navy : and turning into the Melian 
gulf, upon an old grudge took a great booty from 
the QEtseans, w r hich he made money of 3 ; and 

1 [" To their former resources'', the inland parts of Thessaly. Al- 
The meaning is, that necessity had though they admitted a certain de- 
compelled the Sicilians to equip .i pen deuce on the Delphic oracle, 
fleet, which but for the Athenian and adopted the fables of Hercules, 
expedition they never would have yet from their geographical position 
done. Arn.] they lived in opposition and hosti- 

2 [" They purposed in earnest to lity to the Malians and Dorians. It 
fall" &c.] is probable, that the migration of 

8 ["Upon the old enmity between the Dorians to Peloponnesus is in 
them carried off the greater part of some way connected with thearrival 
their pillageable property, and of the ^Enianes in this region. It 
made money of it : and forced the was chiefly on this account that 
Acha?ans of Phthia" &c. The un- Sparta founded Heracleia in Tra- 
expected excursion left no time to chinia (iii. 92): which would doubt- 
drive off the cattle: which Agis less have caused the revival of an 
seized, and then restored to the important Doric power in this part 
owners for money. Am. TheJSni- of Greece, had not the jealousy of 
anes, or as they are called from the Thessalians and Dolopians, and 
dwelling about mount (Eta, the even of the Malians themselves, 
(Etseans, in early times inhabited been awakened at its first establish- 


viu. forced those of Pthiotis being Achaians, and others 
in those parts subjects to the Thessalians, (the 
Thessalians complaining and unwilling), to give 
them hostages and money. The hostages he put 
into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into 
TheLacedrcmon. the league. And the Lacedaemonians imposed 
flMtTlhlmiiRd upon the states confederate, the charge of building 
wldJremiy one hundred galleys : that is to say, on their own 
amon^t the state and on the Boeotians, each twenty- five ; on 

cities of league. J 

the Phoceans and Locnans, fifteen ; on the Co- 
rinthians, fifteen ; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, 
and Pellenians, ten ; and on the Megareans, Troe- 
zenians, and Hermionians, ten. And put all things 
else in readiness presently with the spring to begin 
the war. 

The Athenians 4. The Athenians also made their preparations, as 
anitonTratT^' they had designed ; having gotten timber and built 
their charges. ^eir nav y fa^ same w i n ter, and fortified the pro- 
montory of Sunium that their cornboats might come 
about in safety. Also they abandoned the fort in La- 
conia, which they had built as they went by for Sicily. 
And generally where there appeared expense upon 
anything unuseful, they contracted their charge. 
5. Whilst they were on both sides doing thus 1 , 

ment. Muell. i. 2. The " others in ai'oXfc. This country, and the towns 

those parts", must have been the of Larissa, Crannon,Pharsalus, and 

Perrhaebians to the north of Larissa, lolcus, the Thessalians had in their 

and the Magnesians to the east of own immediate possession : the cul- 

inount Pelion. For these were sub- tivation however being performed 

ject to the Thessalians, and were by their slaves the penestce, the an- 

called perio3ci, but had not ceased cient Pelasgo-^Eolian inhabitants, 

to be distinct nations : Thessaly Idem iii. 4.J 
itself comprehending the valley of ] [" And no less active than if 

the Peneus (the ancient &pyoQ iri- they were at the begihning of pre- 

XaoytKbv), and a district towards the paration for the war, there came this 

Pegasxan bay called by Herodotus winter unto Agis" &c.] 


there came unto Agis about their revolt from the 
Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Euboeans. 


Accepting the motion, he sent for Alcamenes the A.c.4is. 
son of Sthenelaidas and for Melanthus from Lace- offer u> revolt to 
daemon, to go commanders into Euboea. Whom, Agia * 
when he 1 was come to him with about three hun- 
dred freedmen, he was now about to send over. 
But in the meantime came the Lesbians, they also The Lesbians 
desiring to revolt : and by the means 2 of the rcv 
Boeotians Agis changed his former resolution, and 
prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of 
Euboea ; and assigned them Alcamenes, the same 
that should have gone into Euboea, for their 
governor 3 : and the Boeotians promised them ten 
galleys, and Agis other ten. Now this was done 
without acquainting therewith the state of Lace- 
daemon. For Agis, as long as he was about 
Deceleia with the power he had, had the law in his 
own hands, to send what army and whither he 
listed, and to levy men and money at his pleasure. 
And at this time, the confederates of him (as I may 
call them) did better obey him, than the confede- 
rates of the Lacedaemonians did them at home 4 : 
for having the power in his hands, he was terrible 
wheresoever he came. And he was now for the 
Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythraeans, they The chians and 
also desiring to revolt, went not to Agis, but to 

1 [" When they were come".] who was found no less oppressive 

8 [" The co-operation". The Les- than their old masters. Herrn. 39.] 

bians were akin to the Boeotians : 4 [" And at this time the allies 

see iii. 2, note.] did far more readily, as one may 

8 [" For harmost". The name of say, ohey him than the Lacedaemon- 

a Spartan officer appointed in those ians at home". For the power of 

states, which had hitherto heen the Spartan kings beyond the fron- 

under the Athenian government : tiers, see v. 60, note.] 


viii. the Lacedaemonians in the city : and with them 
YRAR xix wen t also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieu- 
A.c.413. tenant to kins; Darius in the low countries of Asia 1 . 

OL 01 4 

For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnes- 

* ians, and promised to pay their fleet. For he had 

- l ate ty begged of the king 2 the tribute accruing in 
iaiw come unto hi s own province ; for which he was in arrearage, 

because he could receive nothing out of any of the 
Greek cities by reason of the Athenians. And 
therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians, 
to receive his tribute the better, and withal to 
draw the Lacedaemonians into a league with the 
king : and thereby, as the king had commanded, 
to kill or take alive Amorges, Pissuthnes his bas- 
tard son, who was in rebellion against him about 
Caria 3 . The Chians therefore and Tissaphernes 
followed this business jointly. 

1 [" Darius son of Artaxerxes". upon by the king to pay the tribute 
Lower Asia, according to Herodo- accruing &c."] 

tus, was divided by Darius, son of 3 [Pissuthnes, the satrap of Ionia, 

Hystaspes, into three satrapies: had rebelled against Darius; and 

one called the province of Dascy- after maintaining himself with the 

Hum (i. 129), and comprehending aid of some Greek auxiliaries for 

the Hellespontine cities, Phrygia, some time against Tissaphernes 

Bitbynia, Paphlagonia, and Cuppa- and two other generals, had at last 

doeia: another, Ionia, /Eolis, Caria, been induced to surrender on so- 

Lycia, and Pamphylia : and a third lemn assurance of personal security, 

comprising only Mysia and Lydia. He was brought to Darius, and put 

But the two last were more gene- to death by a torture called the 

rally united under one governor ffirofof, and said to be the invention 

who resided at Sardis, and was of Darius himself. The intended 

called Satrap T&V caru>, or T&V victim was entertained with a ban- 

iTriOaXaooiw. This province ap- quet, and it was contrived that he 

pears sometimes to have had civil should full asleep. He tben sank 

and military governors distinct through a trap-door into a pit filled 

f mm each other : the aaTp&Trtjs and with cinders, where he rotted and 

the orparrtyos TUV Kcirw being dif- starved. This atrocity was probably 

ferent persons. Arn ] the cause of the rebellion of the son. 

2 [" For he had lately been called See Thirl, ch. xxvii.] 


6. Calligeitus the son of Laophon, a Magarean, 
and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, 
both banished their own cities and abiding with 
Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came also about 
the same time to Lacedaemon ; sent by Pharna- Hciiwpwitja. 
bazus to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he J^ e like 
also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities 
in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and 
be the first to draw the Lacedaemonians into league 
with the king : just the same things that were 
desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus 
and Tissaphernes treating apart 1 , there was great 
canvassing at Lacedsemon, between the one side 
that persuaded to send to Ionia and Chios, and the 
other that would have the army and fleet go first 
into the Hellespont. But the Lacedaemonians 
indeed approved best by much of the business of 
the Chians and of Tissaphernes. For with these 
co-operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend 
of Endius the ephore of that year in the highest 
degree : insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, 
Alcibiades his family received a Laconic name 2 . 
For Endius was called Endius Alcibiadis. Never- 
theless the Lacedsemonians sent first one Phrynis, 
a man of those parts 3 , to Chios, to see if the gal- 
leys they had were so many as they reported, and 
whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it 
was said to be. And when the messenger brought 

1 [" Now each side treating these Alcihiades, so again his son would 

matters apart, both those from Phar- he Alcibiades the son of Endius: 

nabazus and those from Tissa- and so, according to the Greek cus- 

phernes".] torn, the two names would alternate 

* [ u The Laconic name" : that is, through all generations. See Ar- 

Alcibiades, originally a Laconian nnld's note.] 
name. As Endius was the son of 3 [" One of the perioeci".] 


viii. back word that all that had been said was true, 
they received both the Chians and the Erythraeans 
presently into their league : and decreed to send 
them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from such 
places as the Chians named, no less than sixty 
already. And of these at first they were about to 
send out ten, with Melancridas for admiral 1 : but 
afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for 
Melancridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten 
galleys they went about the making ready of five 
only in Laconia. So the winter ended : and nine- 
teenth year of this war written by Thucydides 2 . 
xx. 7. In the beginning of the next summer, because 

A C 412 

OL.91.4.' the Chians pressed to have the galleys sent away, 

and feared lest the Athenians should get notice 
rmth to hasten what they were doing; ; (for all their ambassadors 

away the flectto J *=> ' \ . 

went out by stealth) ; the Lacedaemonians send 
away to Corinth three Spartans, to will them with 
all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus 
to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to 
Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready 
to go to Lesbos as the rest : the number of the 
galleys of the league which were then there, being 
forty wanting one. 8. But Calligeitus and Tima- 
goras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have 
no part in this fleet that went for Chios ; nor would 
deliver the money, twenty-five talents, which they 
had brought with them, to pay for their setting 
forth, but made account to go out with another 
fleet afterwards by themselves. When Agis saw 
that the Lacedaemonians meant to send first to 

1 [" The then admiral", ii.80, n.] adduced to show that (his book was 
3 [This expression, and the same written by Thucydides. See ch. 109, 
in ch. 60, are amongst the proofs note.] 


Chios, he resolved not of any other course himself; 

but the confederates assembling at Corinth went ' * 


to council upon the matter, and concluded thus : A.c.m. 

OL. 91 4 

that they should go first to Chios under the com~anor,iorfor'tiie 
mand of Chalcideus, who was making ready the ^uu^hich"^ 
five galleys at Laconia ; and then to Lesbos under ^, d which 
the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be sent 
thither by Agis; and lastly into Hellespont, in which 
voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of 
Rhamphias, should have the command ; and con- 
cluded to carry over the isthmus first the one half 
of their galleys, and that those should presently 
put to sea, that the Athenians might have their 
minds more upon those, than on the other half to 
be transported afterwards. For they determined 
to pass that sea openly ; contemning the weakness 
of the Athenians, in respect they had not any navy 
of importance yet appearing. As they resolved, so 
presently they carried over one and twenty galleys. 
9. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Co- 
rinthians were unwilling to go along before they 
should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian 
holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis was content, 
that they for their parts should observe the Isthmian 
truce ; and he therefore to take the fleet upon him- 
self as his own ! . But the Corinthians not agreeing to The 
that, and the time passing away, the Athenians got 
intelligence the easier of the practice of the Chians : 
and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, 
to accuse them of it. The Chians denying the 
matter, he commanded them for their better credit 

1 ["And that he should take upon pedition". "The Athenians got 
himself the responsibility of the ex- more intelligence of &c."] 




The Athenians 

a desert haven, 

to sen ^ along with him some galleys for their aid 
due by the league 1 : and they sent seven. The 
cause why they sent these galleys, was the many 
not acquainted with the practice ; and ihefew and 
conscious not willing to undergo the enmity of the 
multitude without having strength first, and their 
not expecting any longer the coming of the Lace- 
daemonians,, because they had so long delayed them. 
10. Iii the meantime the Isthmian games were 
celebrating, and the Athenians (for they had word 
, sent them of it) came and saw 2 ; and the business 

, t ' 

amithere besiege of the Chians grew more apparent. After they 
went thence, they took order presently that the 
fleet might not pass from Cenchreise undiscovered. 
And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians 
put to sea for Chios 3 under the conduct of Alca- 
menes. And the Athenians at first with equal 
number came up to them, and endeavoured to 
draw them out into the main sea 4 : but seeing 
the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned 
another way, the Athenians went also from them. 
For the seven galleys of Chios, which were part of 
this number, they durst not trust. But after- 
wards having manned thirty-seven others 5 , they 

1 [" He commanded them as a 
pledge of their fidelity to the league, 
to send some galleys". Duk. G61L] 

2 [" And the Athenians, the games 
(or the truce of the games) heing 
announced, sent theori to them". 
Goell. See i. 25, note.] 

3 [" With twenty-one ships".] 

4 [" And the Athenians, with 
equal number, first of all sailing up 
to them, then began to retreat to- 
wards the main sea". Arn. Gocll.] 

5 [" But afterwards manned others, 
so that the number in all was thirty- 
seven": that is, having manned six- 
teen additional ships. " It seems 
easier to adopt this interpretation of 
the words of Thucydides,than with 
Krueger to strike out the words ical 
TpioLKovTa : though, as he observes, 
they may have crept into the text 
from ch. 15, and if dmitted they 
would leave the context perfectly 
intelligible and probable". Thirl- 


gave chase to the enemy by the shore, and drave V1IL 
them into Peirseus in the territory of Corinth : (this 
Peiraeus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon 
the confines of Epidauria). One galley that was 
far from land, the Peloponnesians lost ; the rest 
they brought together into the haven. But the 
Athenians charging them by sea with their gal- 
leys, and withal setting their men a-land, mightily 
troubled and disordered them : brake their galleys 
upon the shore, and slew Alcamenes their com- 
mander. And some 1 they lost of their own. 

11. The fight being ended, they assigned a suffi- 
cient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of 
the enemy, and the rest to lie under a 2 little island 
not far oif : in which also they encamped, and sent 
to Athens for a supply. For the Peloponnesians 
had with them for aid of their galleys, the Corin- 
thians the next day 3 : and not long after, divers 
others of the inhabitants thereabouts. But when 
they considered that the guarding of them in a 
desert place would be painful, they knew not what 
course to take ; and once they thought to have set 
the galleys on fire : but it was concluded after- 
wards to draw them to the land, and guard them 
with their landmen till some good occasion should 
be offered for their escape. And Agis also, when 
he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a 
Spartan. The Lacedaemonians having been adver- 
tised of the departure of these galleys from the 

wall. Poppo and Arnold consider * [That is, some men.] 

the above the correct interpretation. 2 ["Under the little island".] 

Goeller takes the words in their 8 [" For there came to the Pelo- 

literal sensef that there were manned ponnesians the next day the Corin- 

thirty-seven additional ships* mak. thians, who were going to their ships 

ing in all fifty-eight.] to protect them", Arn. Goell.] 





The voyage of 


isthmus, (for the ephores had commanded Alca- 
menes, when he put to sea to send them word by 
a horseman 1 ), were minded presently to have sent 
away also the five galleys also that were in Laconia, 
and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with 
fa m Alcibiades. But afterwards, as they were 
ready to go out, came the news of the galleys 
chased into Peirseus : which so much discouraged 
them, in respect they stumbled in the very entrance 
of the Ionic war, that they purposed now, not 
only not to send away those galleys of their ow r n, 
but also to call back again some of those that were 
already at sea. 

12. When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with 
Endius and the rest of the ephores again, not to fear 
the voyage : alleging that they would [make haste, 
and] be there before the Chians should have heard 
of the misfortune of the fleet ; and that as soon as 
he should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily 
make the cities there to revolt, by declaring unto 
them the weakness of the Athenians and the dili- 
gence of the Lacedaemonians ; wherein he should 
be thought more worthy to be believed than 
any other. Moreover to Endius he said, that it 
would be an honour in particular to him, that 
Ionia should revolt and the king be made confede- 
rate to the Lacedaemonians by his own means 2 , and 
not to have it the mastery of Agis: for he was at 
difference with Agis. So having prevailed with 

1 [" And to the Lacedaemonians 
it was first of all reported that the 
ships had got to sea from the isthmus: 
fer the ephors had ordered Al came- 
ncs, when that should happen toscnd 

&c.): and they were minded &c.".] 
2 [" By his (Alcibiades) means": 
"for he (Alcihiades) was at dif- 
ference"&e. Goell. For the cause 
of this difference see ch. 44, note.} 



Endius and the other ephores 3 , he took sea with five viu. 
galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedsemon ; 
and made haste. 

13. About the same time came back from Sicily sixteen 
those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which, to 
having aided Gylippus in that war, were inter- ^X 
cepted by the way about Leucadia and evil en- from sidl y h y 

i , * * * i t the Athenians, 

treated by twenty-seven galleys of Athens, thatumvcinCormt 
watched thereabouts under the command of Hip- 
pocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as 
should return out of Sicily. For all the rest, saving 

1 [Of the origin of the office of 
the five ephori little is known. 
They were ancient Doric magis- 
trates : but hy whom or when insti- 
tuted, is uncertain. Their power 
seems to have originated in judicial 
functions : the basis being a super- 
intendence (whence their name, 
00|0oi, inspectors,) over the market. 
This was at Sparta no unimportant 
object of care: every Spartan bring- 
ing his corn to market to exchange 
for other commodities. This juris- 
diction received its first extension 
from the privilege of instituting 
scrutinies into the official conduct 
of all magistrates, except the ge- 
rontes : in the end, it usurped many 
of the functions of royalty. Thus, 
the ephors transacted business with 
foreign ambassadors, and dispatched 
their own abroad. In war, they 
sent out the troops on what day 
they deemed fit: and appear to 
have had even the power to deter- 
mine the number. The king, or 
the general to whom they entrusted 
the army, received from them in- 
structions how to act: they were 
recalled by their scytale, and sum- 

moned by them before a judicial 
tribunal. They had, it appears, at 
all times the management of the 
treasury : and as the finances of 
Sparta were continually on the in- 
crease, so the office of treasurer 
must have become more important. 
But it is evident that the power of 
the ephors was essentially founded 
on the supreme authority of the 
public assembly, which they had 
the privilege of convening and put- 
ting to the vote, and whose agents 
and plenipotentiaries they were. 
Unable to act for itself, it entrusted 
to the ephors, who were chosen 
from among the people on demo- 
cratic principles, a power similar 
to that exercised in so pernicious a 
manner by the demagogues of 
Athens. Plato and Aristotle com- 
pare their power to a tyranny : and 
in Greece the tyrant, it will be re- 
membered, generally arose out of 
the demagogue. Accordingly, the 
ephors reached the summit of their 
power, when they began to lead the 
public assembly. They are cen- 
sured by Aristotle (ii. 7.) for their 
corrupt habits and dissolute life: 




cbio and E 
thne revolt. 

one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Co- 
rinth before 1 . 

14. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, 
kept prisoner every man they met with by the 
way ; to the end that notice might not be given 
of their passage. And touching first at Corycus in 
the continent, where also they dismissed those 
whom they had apprehended ; after conference 
there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, 
that advised them to go to the city without sending 
them word before, they came upon the Chians sud- 
denly and unexpected. It put the commons into 
much wonder and astonishment : but the few had 
so ordered the matter beforehand, that an assembly 2 
chanced to be holden at the same time. And 
when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the 
same ; and told them that many galleys were coin- 
ing to them, but not that those other galleys were 
besieged in Peirseus ; the Chians first, and after- 
war( j s the Ery thrseans, revolted from the Athenians. 
After this they went with three galleys to Clazo- 
mense, and made that city to revolt also. And 

their mode of election was, he says, 
a mockery. They were the cause of 
the dissolution of the Spartan con- 
stitution : the decrees by which it 
was undermined, (particularly the 
law of the ephor Epitadeus, per- 
mitting the gift and devise of landed 
property), originated with them, 
And when Agis and Cleomenes en- 
gaged in a fruitless struggle with a 
degenerate age to restore the con- 
stitution of Lycurgus, they began 
with the overthrow of the ephors. 
See Muell. iii. 7.] 
1 ["-About this time were return- 

ing the sixteen galleys of the Pclo- 
ponnesians from Sicily, which had 
aided Gylippus in putting an end 
to the war. And being intercepted 
about Leucadia, and evil entreated 
&c, all but one escaped the Athen- 
ians and arrived at Corinth." Bek- 
ker, &c, Kvv8iairo\tpri(Ta<rai : vulgo, 

* [/3ovX//v, " the council": which 
is used in opposition to l*K\ri<ria, 
the assembly of the people: andira- 
plies that the constitution of Chios 
was oligarchical. An assembly was 
hardly the thing wanted.] 


the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the V in. 
continent, and there fortified Polichna 1 : lest they 
should need a retiring place from the little island 
wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had 
revolted, fell to fortifying, and making of prepara- 
tion for the war. 

15. This news of Chios was quickly brought to Th<- Athenian* 
the Athenians ; who conceiving themselves to be^TmUing 
now beset with great and evident danger, and}^ t f^^^ 
that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a thppxtr|in tif>siif 

. . , . state, and furnish 

city to revolt, would be no longer quiet, in this out afwt^iiu 
their present fear 2 decreed that those thousand tll(> momy 
talents, which through all this war they had 
affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating 
the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave 
their suffrages 3 to stir it, should now be used, and 
therewith galleys not a few manned. They decreed 
also to send thither out of hand, under the com- 
mand of Strombichides the son of Diotimus, eight 
galleys of the number of those that besieged the 
enemy at Peirseus ; the which, having forsaken 
their charge to give chase to the galleys that 
went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake 
them, were now returned : and shortly after also to 
send Thrasycles to help them with twelve galleys 
more, which also had departed from the same 
guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys 
of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peirseus 

1 [rtfv TroXi'xvav. A general nieni ; and thence in common 

name, which has become a proper speech, simply r?}> TroXi'xi'av, Borgo. 

one by usage ; like Hatn, Kirby Am. Clazomena% at this time an 

&c, in English ; or more like Borgo island, was by Alexander joined to 

in Italian : tb*e full name of the the continent by a mole. Goell.] 
place being properly TJ)V TroXixvav a [torXt/gewc : consternation.] 
rwv icXafrfimW, Borgo dei Clazo- s [*' As spake or put it to the vote'*.] 



viii. with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave 
the bondmen that served in them their liberty, and 
the chains to those that were free. And instead 
of all those galleys that kept guard l upon the gal- 
leys of the Peloponnesians, they made ready other 
with all speed in their places ; besides thirty more, 
which they intended to furnish out afterwards. 
Great w r as their diligence ; and nothing was of 
light importance that they w r ent about for the 
recovery of Chios. 

16. Strombichides in the meantime arrived 2 at 
Samos : and taking into his company one Samian 
galley, went thence to Teos, and entreated them 
not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also 
coming with twenty-three galleys from Chios : and 
with him also the land forces of the Clazomenians 
and Erythrseans 3 . Whereof Strombichides having 
been advertised, he put forth again before his 
arrival ; and standing off at sea, when he saw the 
many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards 
Samos, they following him. The land forces, the 
Teians would not at the first admit : but after this 
flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. 
And these for the most part 4 held their hands for 
a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from 
the chase : but when he stayed somewhat long, 
they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the 
wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians 
towards the continent ; wherein they were also 

1 ["That had left the guard": - menians and Erythneans moved 
" they manned and sent out with all along the shore": that is, by the 
speed others in their places".] side of Chalcideus. Arn. Goell.] 

2 [" With his eight galleys".] [And the land forces held their 
8 [TTopyct: "and at the same hand" &c. Bekker &c, ol moi: 

time the land forces of the Clazo- vulgo, oi \ 


helped by some few barbarians, that came down vin. 
thither under the leading of Tages, deputy lieute- 
nant of Tissaphernes. 

17- Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had 
chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the ma- 
riners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus, 
and left them in Chios ; instead of whom they 
manned with mariners of Chios both those and 
twenty galleys more : and with this fleet they went 
to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For 
the intention of Alcibiades, that was acquainted 
with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the 
fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus, and to 
turn these cities first 1 ; that the honour of it might 
be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, 
and (as he had promised) to Endius that set them 
out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt 
with the forces of the Chians only and of those 
galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these, for 
the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and 
arriving not much sooner than Strombichides and 
Thrasycles, (who now chancing to be present with 
[those] twelve galleys from Athens followed them 
with Strombichides), caused the Milesians to revolt. Miietu* 
The Athenians following them at the heels with re>rtlteth 
nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, 
lay at anchor at Lada 2 , an island over against 
the city. 

Presently upon the revolt of Miletus was made 

1 [" Was to bring over them (the revolted loniuns : sec Herod vi. 

Milesians) before the arrival of the 7-17. It is now joined to the con 

fleet from Peloponnesus''.] tinent by the mud of the Mseander, 

8 ['* Lade, the island" &c. The and its place marked only by a hill: 

scene of the sea- fight in 498 between and Miletus is no longer on the 

the Persians under Darius and the sea-shore.] 

Z 2 


Yin. the first league between the king and the Lacedae- 
' * monians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as fol- 


A.c.412. loweth : 

between 1 8. " The Lacedaemonians and their confederates 

mi- have ma ^ e a league with the king and Tissaphernes 
on these articles : 

" Whatsoever territory or cities the king pos- 
sesseth, and his ancestors have possessed, the same 
are to remain the king's. 

" Whatsoever money or other profit redounded 
to the Athenians from their cities 1 , the king and 
the Lacedaemonians are jointly to hinder, so as the 
Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither 
money nor other thing. 

" The king, and the Lacedaemonians and their 
confederates, are to make joint war against the 
Athenians. And without consent of both parts it 
shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the 
Athenians, neither for the king, nor for the Lace- 
daemonians and their confederates. 

" If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be 
enemies to the Lacedaemonians and their confede- 
rates : and if any shall revolt from the Lacedae- 
monians and their confederates, they shall in like 
manner be enemies to the king." 

19. This was the league. Presently after this the 
Chians set out ten galleys more, and went to Anaea : 
both to hearken what became of the business at 
Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to 
revolt. But word being sent them from Chalci- 
deus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand* 
with his army, they went thence to the temple of 

1 [" From these cities".] * [" At hand by land 11 .] 


Jupiter. [Being there] they 1 descried sixteen V ni. 
galleys more, which had been sent out by the 
Athenians under the charge of Diomedon after 
the putting to sea of those with Thrasycles : upon 
sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the 
rest towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians 
took, but empty, the men having gotten on shore : 
the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the 
Athenians went away again towards Samos. The Lebaiosana 
Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of Jrd3 rev " 
their fleet and with the land forces, caused first 
Lebedos to revolt, and then Ene : and afterwards 
returned, both with their fleet and landmen, every 
one to his own. 

20. About the same time, the twenty galleys of TI.O ivioponn. 
Peloponnesus, which the Athenians had formerly 2 ^" 1Viniills 
chased into Peirseus, and against whom they now r 
lay with a like number, suddenly forced their 
passage ; and having the victory in fight, took four 
of the Athenian galleys ; and going to Cenchreiae, 
prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and 
Ionia. At which time there came also unto them ASIV.K-IHW a.u 
from Lacedsemon for commander, Astyochus ; who lopolmLlttns/ 
was now admiral of the whole navy*. When the 

1 [" And they descry" &c. 3 [" To whom now belonged the 

Around the temple of Jupiter a entire (vavapxia) command of the 

small town had probably grown up, fleet": that is, of the fleet of the 

as at the more famous dibc itpbv allies, as well as of Sparta. In 

near the mouth of the Bosphorus. the fifth century A.C. a general 

The "land forces" mentioned a little demoralization, the fruit of the 

below, were those of the Clazome- extended limits of the foreign power 

nians and ErythraDans, said in eh. of Sparta, pervaded by degrees 

10 to have been admitted into Teos. every department of the state. Ex- 

Amold.3 . peditions in distant countries, be- 

3 L" Had as before mentioned yond seas especially, operated not 

chased": see ch. 10.] only to thwart the design of the 





A.C 412. 

Oi.91 4. 


Athenian wall 
at Teos. 

landmen were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes him- 
self came thither with his forces ; and he also de- 
molished the wall as much as was left standing, and 
went his way again. Not long after the going 
away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten 
galleys of Athens. And having made a truce with 
the Teians, that he also might be received, he put 
to sea again, and kept the shore to Erse, and 
assaulted it ; but failing to take it, departed. 

21. It fell out about the same time that the 
commons of Samos, together with the Athenians 
who were there with three galleys, made an insur- 
rection against the great men ; and slew of them 
in all about two hundred. And having banished 
four hundred more, and distributed amongst them- 
selves their lands and houses, (the Athenians hav- 
ing now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them 
their liberty), they administered the affairs of the 
city from that time forward by themselves, no more 
communicating with the Geomori 1 , nor permitting 
any of the common people to marry with them. 

legislator, by bringing individuals 
in contact with foreign manners 
and luxuries, but occasioned in 
many respects a total abandonment 
of it. From this source flowed a 
degree of self-seeking, the more 
dangerous that the possibility of it 
had not been contemplated in fram- 
ing the constitution. But the ne- 
cessity of sending to various coun- 
tries commanders independent of 
the king, ran counter to the consti- 
tution of Lycurgus. This begat 
new dignities: Hannosts for the con- 
quered cities, Navarchs and Epis- 
tolcis for the fleet : the lawful limits 

of which offices means were soon 
found to evade. And that characters 
such as Clearchus and Lysander, 
should under these circumstances 
he found not proof against the 
allurements of fame and ambition, 
is far less surprising than the same 
weakness in Pausanias, in whose 
time Sparta possessed more of the 
virtue of self-denial. Herm. 46.] 
1 [The same class as the yafi6pot 
of Syracuse : see vi. 36, note. " Nor 
permitting the common people either 
to give their children in marriage 
to them, or to marry from amongst 
them". Goell.] 


22. After this, the same summer, the Chians, as 
they had begun, persevering in their earnestness 
to bring the cities to revolt, even without the 
Lacedaemonians, [with their single forces] , and The cwa 
desiring to make as many fellows of their danger 

as they were able, made war by themselves with Athenians to the 

J 7 f J Lacedaemonians 

thirteen galleys against Lesbos : which was accord- with their single 

. i i 1 i i T i power: and cause 

mg to what was concluded by the Lacedaemonians, first Methymna, 
namely, to go thither in the second place, and^ lt MytiIeaeto 
thence into the Hellespont. And withal the land 
forces, both of such Peloponnesians as were pre- 
sent and of their confederates thereabouts, went 
along by them to Clazomenee and Cyme : these 
under the command of Eualas a Spartan, and the 
galleys, of Deiniades a man of the parts thereabouts l . 
The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that 
city to revolt first 2 

23. Now Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, 
having set forth as he intended from Cenchreise 3 , 
arrived at Chios. The third day after his coining 
thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos 
with twenty-five galleys of Athens : for Leon came 

1 [" Deiniadas, a perioccos". This Fran. Porta. "Then the Chians, 
is an unusual occurrence. But the leaving four galleys here for guard 
Spartans did not hold the naval ser- of the place, went to Mytilene with 
vice in much estimation : and more- the rest, and caused that city also 
over, the inhabitants of the inuri- to revolt". [The foregoing sentence 
time towns were more practised in is supplied by .'Emilius, not Fran- 
naval affairs than the Dorians of cis, Portus. Valla lias supplied the 
the interior. Even here it is not to sentence in nearly the same words, 
be supposed that the pericecos had The Greek is found in one MS. 
any Spartans under him : but that only. " And four ships are left be- 
like Gylippus, he was no more hind in it. And the rest again 
than a commander of the Chiaus. caused Mytilene to revolt".] 
See Muell. iii. 2.] 3 [ u Setting forth with four ships, 

3 It seeraeth that something is as he was preparing to do, from 

here wanting, and supplied thus by Ceuchreiae". See eh. 20.] 


vni. with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens 
afterwards 1 . Astyochus in the evening of the same 
day, taking with him one galley more of Chios, 
took his way toward Lesbos, to help it what he 
could : and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at 
Eressos. Here he heard that Mytilene was taken 
by the Athenians, even with the shout of their 
The Athenians voices. For the Athenians coming unexpected, 
retoverMytllem entered the haven 2 : and having beaten the galleys 
of the Chians, disbarked and overcame those that 
made head against them, and won the city. When 
Astyochus heard this, both from the Eressians and 
from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna 
with Eubulus ; which having been left there before, 
as soon as Mytilene was lost fled, and three of 
them chanced to meet with him, (for one was taken 
by the Athenians) ; he continued his course for 
Mytilene no longer : but having caused Eressos to 
revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, 
made them to inarch toward Antissa and Methymna 
by land*, under the conduct of Eteonicus ; arid he 
himself with his own galleys and those three of 
Chios, rowed thither along the shore, hoping that 
the Methymnaeans, upon sight of his forces, would 
Atyocims sv take heart and continue in their revolt. But when 

ing he eouU do m . . . 

no good at Lev in Lesbos all things went against him, he re-em- 
arnca l barked his army and returned to Chios, And the 
landmeu 4 that were aboard, and should have gone 
into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After 

1 [After Diomedon in ch. 19.] 4 [That is, the forces of " their 

4 [" As they were sailing unex- confederates thereabouts" (ch. 22), 

pectedly entering the haven".] who with the Peloponnesian laud- 

3 [" And anned (the inhabitants), ibrces had accompanied the Chian 

he sends the hoplita? of his own fleet in its expedition to Lesbos. 

ships to Antissa ike." Goell. Am.] Am. Goell.] 


this came to them six galleys to Chios, of those of 
the confederate fleet at Cenchreiee. The Athenians, 
when they had reestablished the state of Lesbos, 
went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazo- 
menians had fortified in the continent ; and brought 
them all back again into the city which is in the 
island, save only the authors of the revolt ; for 
these got away to Daphnus. And Clazomense re- The Athenians 
turned to the obedience of the Athenians. S^ 01 " " 

24. The same summer, those Athenians that with 
twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lada before Mile- 
tus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, 
slew Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian commander, chaicidcusiain. 
that came out against them but with a few ; and 
set up a trophy, and the third day after departed '. 
But the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as 
erected where the Athenians were not masters. 

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys The Athenian* 
that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by H 
sea from the isles called (Enussae, which lie before 
Chios, and from Sidussa arid Pteleum (forts they 
held in Erythrsea), and from Lesbos 2 . They that 
were aboard were men of arms of the roll, com- 
pelled to serve in the fleet 3 . With these they 
landed at Cardamyle ; and having overthrown the 
Chians that made head in a battle at Bolissus, and 
slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy 

1 ["Sailed across and set up a operations, made war with their fleet 

trophy 1 '.] upon Chios". Valla, Gucller: in- 

3 ["Leon and Diomedon, with sertinjjicaOtiXov, found in one MS.] 

<Ve., from the (Eutisstr, the islands 3 [The epibata?, usually chosen 

lying before Chios, and from Si- from the fourth class, were now, 

dusse and Vteleum, de&tnnjed the owing to the peculiar exigency of 

forts they possessed in Erythriea : the times, drawn from the higher 

and making Lesbos the base of their classes. GoelL Am.] 




Praise of the 

all the places of that quarter. And again they 
overcame them in another battle at Phanse, and in 
a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went 
out no more to fight : by which means the Athe- 
nians made spoil of their territory, excellently well 
furnished 1 . For except it were the Lacedaemoni- 
ans, the Chians were the only men that I have 
heard of, that had joined advisedness to prosperity ; 
and the more their city increased, had carried the 
more respect in the administration thereof to assure 
it. Nor ventured they now to revolt, (lest any 
man should think that, in this act at least, they 
regarded not what was the safest), till they had 
many and strong confederates with whose help to 
try their fortune ; nor till such time as they per- 
ceived the people of Athens (as they themselves 
could not deny) to have their estate after the de- 
feat in Sicily reduced to extreme weakness. And 
if through human misreckoning they miscarried in 
aught, they erred with many others : who in like 
manner had an opinion, that the state of the Athe- 
nians would quickly have been overthrown. 

Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their 
lands spoiled, some within undertook to make the 
city return unto the Athenians. Which though 
the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves 
stirred riot ; but having received Astyochus into 
the city with four galleys that were with him from 
Erythrse, they took advice together, how by taking 
hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them 
give over the conspiracy. Thus stood the business 
with the Chians. 

[" And from the Medan war until that time unravaged".] 


25. In the end of this summer a thousand five viir. 
hundred men of arms of Athens, and a thousand of ^^ xx 
Argos 1 , (for the Athenians had put armour upon - c ^ 
five hundred light-armed of the Argives), and of The Athenians 
other confederates a thousand more, with forty- MiiL 
eight galleys, reckoning those which were for ^f 
transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of 
Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides, came in 2 to 
Samos, and crossing over to Miletus encamped be- 
fore it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight 
hundred men of arms of their own, besides the 
Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus and 
some auxiliar strangers 3 with Tissaphernes (Tissa- 
phernes himself being also there with his cavalry) : 
and fought with the Athenians arid their confede- 
rates. The Argives, who made one wing of them- 
selves, advancing before the rest and in some 
disorder, in contempt of the enemy, as being loni- 
ans and not likely to sustain their charge, were by 
the Milesians overcome : and lost no less than 
three hundred of their men. But the Athenians, 
when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesi- 
ans, and then beaten back the barbarians and 
other multitude, and not fought with the Milesians 
at all, (for they, after they w r ere come from the 
chase of the Argives and saw their other wing 

1 [A thousand of Athens : fifteen the historian himself. The " Pelo- 
hundred of Argos : Bekk. &c.] ponnesians that came with Chalci- 
3 [" From Athens".] deus" must have been too few to 
8 [It is a question whether these offer any resistance to a 1000 heavy- 
were Greeks or barharians: proba- armed Athenians, being only the epi- 
bly however they were Greeks: Ar- batae of five ships : but the Pelopon- 
cadians, we may suppose, from Pe- nesian mercenaries of Tissaphernes 
loponnesus (see v. 29, note). The added considerably to their strength, 
word ZtviKbv describes them with " And some foreign (tiriKovpucbv) 
respect to Tissaphernes, and not to mercenaries of Tissaphernes". Arn.] 


vni. defeated, went into the town), sat down with their 
arms, as being now masters of the field, close under 
the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that 
on both sides the Ionics had the better of the 
Dorics. For the Athenians overcame the opposite 
Peloponnesians ; and the Milesians, the Argives. 
The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, 
the place being an isthmus, prepared to take in the 
town with a wall : supposing if they got Miletus, 
the other cities would easily come in. 

The Athenians 26. In the meantime it was told them about twi- 
" ing light, that the five and fifty galleys from Pelopon- 
nesus an d Sicily were hard by, and only not already 
come. For 1 there came into Peloponnesus out of 
Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates to help to 
consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, 
twenty galleys of Syracuse and two of Selinus : 
and the galleys that had been preparing in Pelo- 
ponnesus being then also ready, they were, both 
these and the other, committed to the charge of 
Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus 
the admiral : and they put in first at Eleus 3 , an 
island over against Miletus. And being advertised 
there that the Athenians lay before the town, they 
went from thence into the gulf of lasus, to learn 
how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibiades 
coming a horseback to Teichiussa of the territory 
of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Pelopon- 
nesian galleys lay at anchor, they were^ informed 

1 [" For of the Sikeliots, at the had been preparing and were now 

instigation mainly of Hermocrates ready. And both were committed to 

&c., there came of Syracusan gal- Theramenes of Laceda>mon c,"] 
leys twenty and of Selinuntian two, a [" At Leros, ike island" &c. 

and those from Peloponnesus, which Bekker &c,, Xpov: vulgo, 


by him of the battle : for Alcibiades was, with the 
Milesians and with Tissaphernes, present in it. 
And he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose 
what they had in Ionia and the whole business, to 
succour Miletus with all speed, and not to suffer it 
to be taken in with a wall. 27- According to 
this, they concluded to go the next morning and 
relieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word 
from Derus 1 of the arrival of those galleys, his col- 
leagues advising to stay and fight it out with their 
fleet, said that he would neither do it himself, nor 
suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he 
could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with 
them hereafter, when they should know against 
how r many galleys of the enemy, and with what 
additions to their own 2 , sufficiently and at leisure 
made ready, they might do it ; he would never, he 
said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness, 
(for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their 
navy give way upon occasion ; but by what means 
soever it should fall out, it would be a great base- 
ness to be beaten 3 ), be swayed to hazard battle 
against reason, arid not only to dishonour the state, 
but also to cast it into extreme danger ; seeing 
that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit 
with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor 
urged by precedent necessity, to undertake 4 , how 
then without constraint to seek out voluntary, dan- 
gers? Therefore he commanded them with all 

1 [Bekker e., \kpov : vulgo, $&- to have to compound, if they were 
pou.] bea ten, on any terms". Goell. Valla 

2 [" And with how many of their and Portus agree with Hohhes.] 
own against them" (the enemy's 4 [" Willingly, or at any rate only 
galleys).] on strong necessity, to undertake 

8 [ u But rather would it be base the enemy". Goell.] 


viii. speed to take aboard those that were wounded, 
nun x:T anc ^ their landmen and whatsoever utensils they 
A.c.412. brought with them ; but to leave behind whatso- 
ever they had taken in the territory of the enemy, 
to the end that their galleys might be the lighter : 
and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they 
had all their fleet together, to make out against 
the enemy as occasion should be offered. As 
Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution : 
and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but 
afterwards ; nor in this only, but in whatsoever 
else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians 
presently in the evening, with their victory unper- 
fect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos 
the Argivcs, in haste and in anger for their over- 
throw, went home. 

The Peiopotme*. 28. The Peloponnesians setting forth betimes in 
the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus 1 ; 
anc * sta y e d there one day. The next day they took 

rebel to theking, with them those galley s of Chios, which had for- 

whom they take _ . , ^, , . - , 

prisoner. merly been chased together with Chalcideus ; and 
meant to have returned to Teichiussa, to take 
aboard such necessaries 2 as they had left ashore. 
But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to 
them with his landmen, and persuaded them to set 
upon lasus, where Amorges the king's enemy then 
lay. Whereupon they assaulted lasus upon a 
sudden : and they within not thinking but they 
had been the fleet of the Athenians, took it. The 
greatest praise in this action was given to the 

1 [" After (the departure of the left on shore, when the fleet sailed 

Athenians) put in" &c. Goell.] in expectation of going into action. 

3 [oKtvrj: The masts, sails, and Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i. l.18; 

Egging; which had, as usual, been vi. 2. 27. Arn. See ch. 43.] 


Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard vm. 

son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the 

Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes, to 

carry him if he would to the king, as he had order 

to do. The city they pillaged ; wherein, as being 

a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great 

quantity of money. The auxiliary soldiers of 

Amorges, they received without doing them hurt, 

into their own army ; being for the most part 

Peloponnesians. The town itself they delivered to 

Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free 

as bond ; upon composition with him, at a Daric 

stater 1 by the poll. And so they returned to 

Miletus. And from hence they sent Pedaritus the 

son of Leon, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent 

hither to be governor of Chios, to Erythrse ; and 

with him, the bands that had aided Amorges by 

land ; and made Philip governor there in Miletus. The.dofti 

And so this summer ended. summer! 1 

29. The next winter Tissaphernes, after he had 
put a garrison into lasus, came to Miletus : and 
for one month's pay, which was promised on his 
part at Lacedsemon, he gave unto the soldiers 
through the whole fleet after an Attic drachma a 
man by the day. But for the rest of the time he 
would pay but three oboles, till he had asked the 
king's pleasure : and if the king commanded it, 
then he said he would pay them the full drachma. 

1 [The Daric stater was of gold, the didrachire was valued at 20 

and equivalent to twenty Attic drachmae of silver : so that in the 

drachmae. Schol. The Daric stater, inina there would he 5 staters, in 

as also that of Philip of Macedon, the talent 300 ; calculating the 

Alexander, and Lysimachus, was value of gold at ten times that of 

equal in value to the golden Attic silver. Boeckh. The same appears 

stater, or the Attic didrachme. And fromXenoph/Anab.i.7.18. Arn.] 


vin. Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermo- 
crates, general of the Syracusians, (for Theramenes 
was but slack in exacting pay, as not being gene- 
ral, but only to deliver the galleys that came with 
him to Astyochus), it was agreed that but for the 
five galleys that were over and above, they should 
have more than three oboles a man. For to fifty- 
five galleys he allowed three talents a month ; and 
to as many as should be more than that number, 
after the same proportion 1 . 

The Athenians 30. The same winter the Athenians that were 
' at Samos, (for 2 there were now come in thirty-five 
galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strom- 
bichides, and Euctemon, their commanders), having 
gathered together their galleys, as well those that 
had been at Chios as all the rest, concluded, distri- 
buting to every one his charge by lot, to go lie 
before Miletus with a fleet ; but against Chios, to 
send out both a fleet and an army of landrnen. 
And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, 
and Euctemon, with thirty galleys and part of 
those thousand 3 men of arms that went to Miletus, 

1 [*' It was agreed thai for every ship, the month's pay of each man 

5 ships, they should have somewhat would he 18 drachma;, or 3j oboks 

more than 3 oholi a man a day. a day.] 

For he gave 3 talents a month for 2 [" The Athenians having ga- 

5 ships : and to the rest, insomuch theved <Stc, as well &c as all the 

as there were more ships than this rent (for there were now &c)." 

numher (that is, for any number This wavS done in pursuance of the 

less than five), he was to give after aduee of Phrynichus (ch. 27), to 

the same rate." Goell. Vulgo, c assemble their fleet at Samos, and 

Trli/re i/af/c *' irwrffKovra : Bekker make sorties from time to time. 

&c. om. KCII TT. The alteration of 3 The distribution of the command 

oboles a man a day to 3 talents for by lot, was practised, where no one 

every 5 ships a month, would give of the generals was a&r<acparwp : see 

36 minae for each ship a month : instances in vi. 42, 62.] 

and reckoning 200 men to each * [See chap. 25, note.] 


which they carried along with them in vessels for V m. 
transportation of soldiers, according to their lot 
went to Chios : and the rest remaining at Samos 
with seventy-four galleys, were masters of the sea, 
and went 1 to Miletus. 

31. Astyochus, who was now 2 in Chios requiring 
hostages in respect of the treason, after he heard 
of the fleet that was come with Theramenes, and 
that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes 
were mended 3 , gave over that business : and with 
ten galleys of Peloponnesus and ten of Chios, went 
thence and assaulted Pteleum ; but not being able 
to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomense. 
There he summoned those within to yield : with 
offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians, 
that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus. And 
Tamos the deputy lieutenant 4 of Ionia, offered 
them the same. But they not hearkening there- 
unto, he made an assault upon the city, being un- 
walled : but when he could not take it, he put to 
sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself 

carried to Phocsea and Cume ; but the rest of the an 
fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and Drimyssa, 
islands that lie over against Clazomenae. After 
they had stayed there eight days in regard of the 
winds, spoiling and destroying, and partly taking 
aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay 
without, they went afterwards to Phocaea and 

1 [" Made a descent on".] " And with the ten galleys of Pe- 

3 ["At the time before men- loponnesus": that is, six that ar- 

tioned," ch. 24 : " as a precaution rived in ch. 23, and four brought 

against treason".] by Astyochus in ch. 24.] 

3 ["And that the affairs of the 4 [virapxoc must be the sub- 
league were in better plight" satrap.] 



viii. Cume to Astyochus. 32. While Astyochus was 
there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came unto 
! him, desiring to revolt 1 from the Athenians. And 
, as for him, they prevailed with him : but seeing 
to the Corinthians and the other confederates were 
unwilling in respect of their former ill success 
there, he put to sea for Chios. Whither after a 
great tempest his galleys, some from one place and 
some from another, at length arrived all. After 
this, Pedaritus, who was now 2 at Erythne, whither 
he was come from Miletus by land, came over with 
his forces into Chios. Besides those forces he 
brought over with him, he had the soldiers which 
were of the five galleys that came thither with 
Chalcideus and were left there, to the number of 
five hundred ; and armour to arm them. 

Now some of the Lesbians having promised to 
revolt 3 , Astyochus communicated the matter with 
Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it 
would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to 
revolt ; for that they should either get more con- 
federates, or failing, they should at least weaken 
and the Athenians. But they gave him no ear ; and 
for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him [plainly] 
CLIO*, disagree, fa should have none of them. 33. Whereupon 
Astyochus taking with him five galleys of Corinth, 
a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those 
of Laconia which he brought with him, went to- 
wards Miletus to his charge : mightily threatening 

1 [" Again to revolt". See ch. over" &c. The " five galleys" see 
22, 23.] in ch. 6, 8, 12, 17.] 

2 [" Who at the time before men- 8 [ Having announced their in- 
tioned (ch. 28) went hy land from tention to revolt" : " to go with 
Miletus, being at Erythra> passed the fleet".] 


the Chians, in case they should need him, not to VIIT. 
help them. 

When he was come to Corycus in Erythrsea, he 
stayed there. And the Athenians from Samos lay 
on the other side of the point, the one not knowing 
that the other was so near 1 . Astyochus, upon a letter 
sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that there were 
come certain Erythraean captives dismissed from 
Samos with design to betray Erythrse, went pre- 
sently back to Erythrse : so little he missed of 
falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus 
also went over to him ; and having narrowly en- 
quired touching these seeming traitors, and found 
that the whole matter was but a pretence which 
the men had used for their escape from Samos 2 , 
they acquitted them, and departed one to Chios, 
the other, as he was going before, towards Miletus. 

34. In the meantime, the army of the Athenians The Athenian 
being come about by sea from Corycus to Arginum, * 
lighted on three long-boats of the Chians ; which 3 
when they saw, they presently chased. But there 
arose a great tempest ; and the long-boats of Chios 
with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the 
Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them 
furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the 
city of Chios ; and the men that were aboard them 
were part taken, and part slain. The rest of the 

1 [" And the Athenians sailing 2 [That is, the men had per- 

with an army from Samos to Chios suaded the Athenians, that if they 

took up their station on the opposite had their liberty they could hring 

side of a hill ; separated from each Erythrac hack to them.] 
other without knowing it. But 3 [" And no sooner did they see 

Astyochus, upo'n a letter from Pent- them and give chace, than straight 

ditus reaching him at nightfall &c., a jreat tempest arose: and the 

went presently &c."J longboats &c." Goell.] 

A A 2 




The Athenians 

fleet escaped into a haven called Phoenicus, under 
Mimas : from whence they got afterwards 
to Lesbos, and there fortified 1 . 

35. The same winter Hippocrates setting out 
from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, 
nesiam, sent to commanded by Dorieus the son of Diogoras 2 with 

waft in the ships J 

of com from two others, and with one gallev of Laconia and one 
duf yp m of Syracuse, went to Cnidus. This city was now 
revolted from Tissaphernes": and the Peloponnes- 
ians that lay at Miletus hearing of it, commanded 
that, the one half of their galleys remaining for 
the guard of Cnidus, the other half should go about 
Triopium, and help to bring in the ships which 
were to come from /Egypt 4 . This Triopium is a 

1 [" And there began prepara- 
tions for the fortifieation": that is, 
for fortifying Delphinium (eh. 38). 

2 [Diagoras was of the royal 
family of Rhodes ; where the mo- 
narchy expired about (H>0 A.C. 
His sons had before the present 
time been condemned to death and 
banished by the Athenians, as heads 
of the aristocracy. Dorieus, one of 
them, is again condemned, and 
again escapes in ch. 84. The an- 
cient fortune of the Rhodians, 
which was owing to their adherence 
to the Doric customs and to their 
great commercial activity, was in- 
terrupted by the troubles of this 
war : in which democracy and aris- 
tocracy were alternately introduced 
by the Athenian and Lacedaemonian 
influence. Soon after this period 
(A.C. 408) the city of Rhodes was 
founded, and peopled with the inha- 
bitants of the three cities, Lindus, 
lalysus, andCameirus : see iii, 1 03, n. 

In 390 Rhodes was again recovered 
and made demoeratical by Athens : 
but in 391 the Spartan party was 
again uppermost, and the Social 
War finally put an end to Athenian 
influence. The Doric characteris- 
tics were retained here longer than 
in most other Doric states: cou- 
rage, constancy, with a haughty 
sternness of manners, and a certain 
temperance, which in a manner 
contrasted with their magnificence 
in meals, buildings, and all the arts. 
Muell. iii. 9.] 

3 [Popp. Goell. Arn. Thirl, virb 
TiffffatytpvovQ, " revolted from the 
Athenians through Tissaphernes". 
Vulgo et Bekk. &n6 r.] 

4 [** And they in Miletus hearing 
of it, bade that one-half &c., the 
other half, which were about Trio- 
pion, should attack and seize the 
corn ships from Egypt". That is, 
the Athenian corn ships : part of 
Egypt being at this time in revolt 
from Persia. Goell.] 


promontory of the territory of Criidus, lying out in vin. 
the sea and consecrated to Apollo. The Athen- 
ians, upon advertisement hereof, setting forth from 
Samos, took those galleys 1 that kept guard at 
Triopium : but the men that were in them escaped 
to land. After this they went to Cnidus, which 
they assaulted ; and had almost taken, being with- 
out wall. And the next day they assaulted it 
again ; but being less able to hurt it now than 
before, because they had fenced it better this 
night, and the men also were gotten into it that 
fled from their galleys under Triopium, they in- 
vaded 2 and wasted the Cnidian territory ; and so 
went back to Samos. 

36. About the same time, Astyochus being come They assault the 
to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had^^^"^ 
plenty of all things for the army. For they had H - 

not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had 
store of money yet remaining of the pillage of 
lasus. And the Milesians underwent the war with 
a good will. Nevertheless the former articles of 
the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes 
seemed 4 defective, and not so advantageous to them 
as to him. Whereupon they agreed to new ones, 
in the presence of Tissaphernes 6 , which were these: 

37. " The agreement of the Lacedaemonians and The second 
their confederates with king Darius and his chil- 1^^^. 
dren 6 , and with Tissaphernes, for league and amity |f f n p e a ^ a tbcking 
according to the articles following : 

"Whatsoever territories and cities do belong 

1 [" The six galleys that" &c.] 4 (_" Whilst Theramencs was still 

2 [They went away and wasted" there".] 

&c. Bekker &c, Airt\96vrtc : vul- c [The king's sons were probably 

go, l7T\06vrec.] named, in order that they might be 

3 [ Had still plenty" &c.] bound after their father's death. 

4 [" To the Peloponnesians'*] For the new king, it seems, was not 


viii. unto king Darius, or were his father's or his an- 
' * cestors', against these shall neither the Lacedse- 

YBAB XX. > <= 

A.c.4i2. momans go to make war, nor any way to annoy 
them : neither shall the Lacedaemonians nor their 
confederates exact tribute of any of those cities. 
Neither shall king Darius, nor any under his do- 
minion, make war upon or any way annoy the 
Lacedaemonians, or any of the Lacedaemonian con- 

" If the Lacedaemonians or their confederates 
shall need anything of the king, or the king of the 
Lacedaemonians or of their confederates: what they 
shall persuade each other to do, that if they do it, 
shall be good. 

" They shall both of them make war jointly 
against the Athenians and their confederates : and 
when they shall give over the war, they shall also 
do it jointly. 

" Whatsoever army shall be in the king's coun- 
try, sent for by the king, the king shall defray. 

" If any of the cities comprehended in the 
league made with the king, shall invade the king's 
territories, the rest shall oppose them and defend 
the king to the utmost of their power. If any city 
of the king's, or under his dominion, shall invade 
the Lacedaemonians or their confederates, the king 
shall make opposition and defend them to the 
utmost of his power." 

bound by his predecessor's acts, un- this article, only in the substitution 

less accepted by himself. Thus of foav for il\ov, property for pos- 

the treaties with Philip and Anti- session : " whatsoever belonged un- 

ochus were renewed with their sue- to", instead of " whatsoever they 

cessors. Livy xl. xlii. Arnold.] used to possess" : what territories 

1 [*' Nor their allies". This and belong to the king, being still left 

the former treaty (ch. 18) differ, in an open question. See again ch. 58.] 


38. After this accord made, Theramenes deli- V m. 
vered his galleys into the hands of Astyochus : ~^-* 
and putting to sea in a light-horseman, is no more A.c.4i 

1 OL.92. 1. 

Seen Theramenes 

The Athenians that were now come with their 
army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of a 
the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a 
place both strong to the land-ward, and that had 
also a harbour 2 for shipping, and was not far from 
the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as hav- 
ing been disheartened in divers former battles, and 
otherwise not only not mutually well affected, but 
jealous one of another; (for Tydeus 3 and his 
accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus 
for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in 
awe, but by force, and for a time) ; stirred not 
against them. And for the causes mentioned, not TV cua 
conceiving themselves, neither with their own 
strength nor with the help of those that Pedaritus 
had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they 
sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochus. 
Which when he denied them, Pedaritus sent letters 
to Lacedsemon complaining of the wrong. Thus 
proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. 
Also their fleet at Samos went often out against fcm to the 
the fleet of the enemy at Miletus : but when theirs 
would never come out of the harbour to encounter 
them, they returned to Samos and lay still. 

1 [" Sails away and is lost at 3 [" For the accomplices of Ty- 

sea". Thirl. u Sails away and dis- deus, the son of Ion, had now c, 

appears": fearing to be called to and the rest of the city was by force 

account at Sparta for complying reduced to an oligarchy". Whether 

with Tissapbernes about the pay. this Ion is the poet of Chios, one of 

Arn. GoelL] some celebrity, whose first tragedy 

8 ["Having harbours".] was represented in 453,is uncertain.] 


viii. 39. The same winter, about the solstice, went 
"YEAR xxT ou ' fr m Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty- 
A.c.412. seven galleys, which at the procurement of Calli- 
The gaiieys 'that geitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus were 
made read Y b y the Lacedaemonians for Pharna- 

et forth toward bazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes 


' and a Spartan : with whom the Lacedaemonians sent 
'"ent eleven Spartans more to be of council with Asty- 
ochus ; whereof Lichas the son of Arcesilaus was 
Ionia. one 1 . These had commission, that when they 

should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general 
care to order everything to the best, they should 
send away these galleys, either the same or more 
or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if 
they so thought fit ; and to appoint Clearchus the 
son of Rhamphias, that went along in them, for 
commander : and that the same eleven, if they 
thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his 
charge, and ordain Antisthenes in his place : for 
they had him in suspicion for the letters of Peda- 
ritus. These galleys holding their course from 
Malea through the main sea, and arriving at Melos, 
lighted on ten galleys of the Athenians : whereof 
three they took, but without the men, and fired 
them. After this, because they feared lest those 
Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos should 
give notice of their coming to those in Samos, (as 
also it fell out), they changed their course and 
went towards Crete: and having made their voyage 
the longer that it might be the safer, they put in 

They arrire at ^ A iJ?r t ,.. 

in Asia, at Caunus in Asia. JNow from thence, as being m 

1 [See Lichas, ch. 43, 84, and those in ii. 85, iii. 69*76, or even 
v. 50. The powers of these fy- in v. 63 : the reason of this strong 
/3ovXot arefar more extensive than of measure appears, perhaps, inch. 50,] 


a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet vm. 
at Miletus for a convoy. 

40. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same 
time, notwithstanding [their former repulse, and] The cwam 
that Astyochus \vas still backward, sent messen- A^^uE. ' 
gers to him, desiring him to come with his whole 
fleet to help them, being besieged : and not to 
suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all 
Ionia to be thus shut up by sea and ravaged by 
land, as it was. For the Chians having many 
slaves l , more than any one state except that of the 
Lacedaemonians, whom for their offences they the 
more ungently punished because of their number ; 
many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared 
to be settled in their fortifications, ran over pre- 
sently to them ; and were they, that knowing the 
territory so well, did it the greatest spoil* There- 
fore the Chians said he must help them, whilst 
there was hope and possibility to do it : Delphinium 
being still in fortifying and unfurnished 2 , and 
greater fences being in making both about their 

1 [The Chians had heen a trading slaves were not 200,000. It seems 
people from very early times : and certain, however, that their number 
are said to he the first of the Greeks was considerable enough to induce 
that regularly dealt in slaves. The the state to render their condition 
antiquity of slavery amongst them not only tolerable, but very little 
is proved by their slaves still retain- inferior to that of the citizens: 
ing the Homeric name QtpdirovTtc, Herm. ibid. It appears from He- 
signifying " those that wait on rodotus (vi. 37), that in earlier 
others", whether bond or free: which times slavery was known in no part 
had never been exchanged for the of Greece. It was the want of 
more common name dov\oQ. Arn. slaves that drew to the Nine-pipes 
The Athenians were probably not for water the daughters of the 
far behind the Chians : Hermann Athenian citizens, for violating 
( 114) calculating their slaves at whom the Pelasgi were expelled 
nearly 400,000 : though Mueller from Attica.] 
(Hi. 3) says that, in this war, their 3 [" Unfinished".] 


viii. camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it 
not before, because he would have made good his 
threats, yet when he saw the confederates were 
willing, he was bent to have relieved them. 

41. But in the meantime came the messenger 
from the twenty-seven galleys, and from the Lace- 
?"*. 80 f htowttft daemonian counsellors, that were come to Caunus 1 . 

in iii6 i>\ eniy- * 

seven gaiieys of Astyochus therefore esteeming the wafting in of 

Feloponuesiu J i -i r> i 

that lay at these galleys, whereby they might the more freely 
command the sea, and the safe coming in of those 
Lacedaemonians, who were to look into his actions, 
a business that ought to be preferred above all 
other, presently gave over his journey for Chios, 
and went towards Caunus. As he went by the 
coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis 2 , being unwalled, 
and thrown down by an earthquake which had 
happened there, the greatest verily in man's me- 
mory ; and rifled it, the inhabitants being fled into 
the mountains: and overrunning the country, made 
booty of all that came in his way, saving of free- 
men ; and those he dismissed. From Cos he went 
by night to Cnidus : but found it necessary, by 
the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men 
there, but to follow as he was after those twenty 
galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of 
the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood 
watching for those twenty-seven galleys that were 
come from Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus 

1 [" Came a message from Cau- Merops, by whom it was first 

nus, that the 27 galleys and the settled. The ancient inhabitants 

council of the Lacedaemonians are were called by the Greeks Merope*. 

at hand".] Some connect the name with the 

8 [" At Cos Meropis". Cos was Homeric epithet of a?0pu>7rot, pipo- 

said to be the daughter of the hero TT* g, articulate speakers. "The city 


himself was going to convoy in. For they at viii. 
Samos had had intelligence from Miletus 1 of their 
coming : and Charmirms was lying for them about 
Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia : 
for by this time he knew that they w r ere at Caunus. 
42. Astyochus, therefore, desiring to outgo the 
report of his coming, went as he was to Syme ; 
hoping to find those galleys out from the shore. 
But [a shower of] rain, together with the cloudi- 
ness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their 
course in the dark, and disordered them. 

The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the A 
left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, * ^Tt 
whilst the rest wandered yet about the island.!*" 
And thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put iat 
forth against them with tw r enty galleys 2 , supposing 
they had been the same galleys they were w r atching 
for from Caunus : and presently charging, sunk 
three of them and hurt others, and were superior 
in the fight, till such time as, contrary to their 
expectation, the greater part of the fleet came in 
sight, arid enclosed them about. They then betook 
themselves to flight : and with the loss of six 
galleys the rest escaped into the island of Teug- 
lussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After 
this the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidus, and 
joining with those seveu-and-twenty galleys that 
came from Caunus, went all together to Syme : and 
having there erected a trophy, returned again and 
lay at Cnidus. 

43. The Athenians, when they understood what 

being: un walled &c., he rilled &c."] 2 [With less than the twenty 
1 ["from* Melos. Bekk. &c.] gullcys": seech. 41.] 





ot their league. 

had passed in this battle, went from Samos with 
their whole navy to Syme. But neither went they 
out against the navy inCnidus, nor the navy there 
against them. Whereupon they took up the fur- 
niture of their galleys at Syme, and assaulted 
Loryina, a town in the continent ; and so returned 
to Samos. 

The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being 1 at 
Cnidus, was [now] in repairing arid refurnishing 
w ith g^ things as it wanted : and withal those 

eleven Lacedaemonians conferred with Tissaphemes 
(for he also was present) touching such things as 
they disliked in the articles before agreed on 2 , and 
concerning the war, how it might be carried for 
the future in the best and most advantageous mari- 
ner for them both. But Lichas was he that consi- 
dered the business more nearly ; and said, that 
neither the first league, nor yet the later by Thera- 
menes, was made as it ought to have been : and 
that it would be a very hard condition, that what- 
soever territories the king and his ancestors pos- 
sessed before, he should possess the same now r ' } ; 
for so he might bring again into subjection all the 
islands, and the sea, and the Locrians, and all as 
far as Bceotia ; and the Lacedaemonians, instead of 
restoring the Grecians into liberty, should put them 
into subjection to the rule of the Medes. There- 
fore he required other and better articles to be 

1 [" Being now at Cnidus".] ter, if whatsoever territory the king 

* [" Touching what had been al- &c had ever ruled, the same he 

ready done, if aught displeased should now claim as part of his 

All the 

them, and concerning the war &c."] 
3 [" It would be a serious mat- 

empire". "All the islands and 
Thessaly, and the Locri" c.] 


drawn, and not to stand to these : as for pay, in viri. 
the new articles they would require none 1 . But 
Tissaphernes chafing at this, went his way in 
choler : and nothing was done. 

44. The Pelopoimesians solicited by messengers 
from the great men of Rhodes, resolved to go 
thither: because they hoped it would not prove 
impossible, with their number of seamen and army 
of land soldiers, to bring that island into their 
power 2 ; and withal supposed themselves able, with 
their present confederates, to maintain their fleet 
without asking money any more of Tissaphernes. 
Presently therefore, the same winter, they put forth 
from Cnidus : and arriving in the territory of 
Rhodes, at Cameirus, first frighted the commons 
out of it, that knew not of the business ; and they 
fled 5 . Then the Lacedaemonians called together 
both these, and the Rhodians of the two cities 
Lindus and lelysus ; and persuaded them to revolt 
from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the nho<iesrevoiteth 
Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time, 
hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet 
from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them : 
and were seen in the main sea, too late, though 
not much 4 . For the present they went away to 
Chalce, and thence back to Samos ; but afterwards 
they came forth with their galleys divers times, 
and made war against Rhodes, from Chalce, Cos, 

1 [" Or at any rate not to stand 3 [" And arriving fir&t at Camei- 
to these : nor was pay wanted upon rus of Rhodes with 94 ships, 
any such terms".] frighted &c ; especially as the city 

2 [" Because they hoped to bring was un walled ; and they fled".] 
that island, one not inconsiderable 4 [" But being too late, though 
both for number of ships and land not much, they thereupon went 
forces, into their power".] away to Chalce".] 


vnr. and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no 
more to the Rhodians, but levy money amongst 
them to the sum of thirty-two talents : and other- 
wise for fourscore days that they lay there, having 
their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not 1 . 
A.c.412. 45. In this time, as also before the going of the 
Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the 
fiieth things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of 
Chalcideus and battle at Miletus, being suspected 
^Y the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having re- 
ceived letters from them from Lacedsemon to put 
him to death ; (for he was an enemy to Agis, and 
also otherwise not well trusted) : retired to Tissa- 
phernes first, for fear ; and afterwards to his power 
hindered 2 the affairs of the Peloponnesians. And 
He aiivisetit being in everything his instructor, he not only cut 
hOTtei'thdr shorter their pay, insomuch as from a drachma he 
pay: brought it to three oboles, and those also not con- 

tinually paid ; advising Tissaphernes to tell them, 
how that the Athenians, men of a long continued 
skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to 
their own, not so much for want of money, but 
lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent 
by superfluity, should disable their bodies by 
spending their money on such things as would 

1 [" And the Peloponnesians le- Sparta : which, whether well or ill 
vied of the Rhodians 32 talents, founded, was increased by his queen 
and drew up their ships and did Tirna?a calling, amongst her wo- 
nothing else for 80 days".] men, her infant son Leotychides by 

2 [" Endamaged with him (Tis- the name of Alcibiades. The Spar- 
saphernes) the affairs &c". Alci- tan government too was far from 
biades, during his stay at Sparta, being well pleased with the inffu- 
liad made an implacable enemy of ence of Alcibiades amongst the 
Agis. He is said to have excited Asiatic Greeks, though immediately 
his jealousy, by declaring himself subservient to its interest See 
ambitious of giving a king to Thirl, ch. xxviii.] 


weaken them, and others should quit the galleys viii. 
with the arrear of their pay in their captains' hands ~~ ' "^ 

* * * YEAR XX. 

for a pawn 1 : but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes A.c.iia. 

i / i t _ O L. 92. 1 . 

to give money to the captains of the galleys and and to corrupt 
to the generals of the several cities, save only those tiecaptams - 
of Syracuse, to give way unto it. For Hermocrates The integrity of 
[the general of the Syracusfans] was the only man, Hermocrtttes - 
that in the name of the whole league stood against 
it. And for the cities that came to require money, Aiciinades an. 
he would put them back himself, and answer them p^lV^to 
in Tissaphernes his name; and say, namely to the th ? cities * at 

* jy J call upon 1 inn for 

Chians, that they were impudent men, being the money, ami puts 

richest of the Grecian states and preserved by emo ' 

strangers, to expect nevertheless that others, for 

their liberty, should not only venture their persons, 

but maintain them with their purses : and to other 

states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their 

money before they revolted that they might serve 

the Athenians, not to bestow as much or more now^ 

upon themselves : and told them, that Tissaphernes, 

now he made war at his own charges, had reason 

to be sparing ; but when money should come down 

from the king he would give them their full pay, 

and assist the cities as should be fit. 46. More- H C 

over, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty 

to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the a " a afflict bolh 

y 9 sides. 

Phoenician fleet which was making ready, nor take 
more men 2 into pay, whereby to put the whole 
power both by sea and land into the hands of one : 
but to let the dominion remain divided into two, 
that the king, when one side troubled him, might 

1 [That is, leaving in their cap- captain to give leave of absence to 
tains' hands their arrears of pay : a the injury of the service. Goell.] 
pledge, which would induce the 2 [" More of the Grecians".] 


viii. set upon it with the other : whereas the dominion 
both by sea and land being in one, he will want by 
whom to pull down those that hold it, unless with 
great danger and cost he should come and try it 
out himself: but thus the danger would be less 
chargeable, he being but at a small part of the 
cost ; and he should wear out the Grecians one 
against another, and himself in the meantime re- 
, main in safety 1 . He said further, that the Athen- 
* ans were fitter to partake dominion with him than 
fitter ^ he1 Pf ^ ie th er * f r that they were less ambitious of 
subdue the power by land ; and that their speeches and ac- 

Grecians, . _ _ . , > / i 

tions tended more to the king s purpose : for that 
they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, 
that is to say, for themselves as touching the do- 
minion by sea, and for the king as touching the 
Grecians in the king's territories : whereas the 
Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, were come to set 
them free : and it was not likely but that they that 
were come to deliver the Grecians from the Gre- 
cians, will, if they overcome the Athenians, deliver 
them also from the barbarians. He gave counsel 
therefore, first to wear them out both ; and then, 
when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings 
of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out 
of his country. 

And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accord- 
ingly ; as far as by his actions can be conjectured. 
For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades, 
as his best counsellor in these affairs : and neither 

1 [" And the danger would be 2 [" And that they conducted 

less, to wear out the Greeks against the war on principles 'and with a 

each other, at less cost and with practice most conformable to the 

security to himself".] king's interest". Am.] 


paid the Peloponnesians their wages, nor would viir. 
suffer them to fight by sea : but pretending the ' "^ 

f J * YKAH xx. 

coming of the Phoenician fleet, whereby they might A 0.412. 
afterwards fight with odds J , he overthrew their bwi^himier 
proceedings, and abated the vigour of their navy, 
before very puissant ; and was in all things else 
more backward than he could possibly dissemble. 

47. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissa- 
phernes to this, whilst he was with them, partly 
because he thought the same to be indeed the best making show of 

, i /* i power with 

course ; but partly also, to make way for his own Tuwaphemes. 
return into his country : knowing that if he des- 
troyed it not, the time would one day come that 
he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. 
And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, 
was this : to make it appear unto them that he 
was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also came 
to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos Motion maie for 
saw what power he had with him, the captains of Aicii^dri?5n"i 
galleys and principal men there 2 : partly upon Al- depo ^ ngoftlie 
cibiades his own motion, who had sent to the 
greatest amongst them, that they should remember 
him to the best sort, and say that he desired to 
come home, so the government might be in the 
hands of a few, not of evil persons nor yet of the 
multitude that cast him out a ; and that he would 

1 [" With more than enough", stitution : for to this the army at 
Goell. Arn.] large had no inclination. Am. 

2 [What is said in the (irst in- " To remember him to the chief 
stance of " the soldiers", that is, of mcn".~] 

the army in general, becomes 8 [ u And not of the mischievous 

limited to the trierarehs and prin- and democratical party that cast 

cipal men, whtn mention is made him out". Hobbes seems to have 

of a regular design on mere politi- read v/i7ro\/Tv, " to war on their 

cal grounds to overthrow the con- side", for EvftTroXcrfveiv: "to come 







Conspiracy in 
the army at Sa- 
moa against tlie 
democracy of 

bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, [and to war 
on their side]: but chiefly of their own accords, 
had their minds inclined to the deposing of the 
popular government. 

48. This business was set on foot first in the 
camp ; and from thence proceeded afterwards into 
the city. And certain persons went over to Alci- 
biades out of Samos, and had conference with him. 
And when he had undertaken to bring to their 
friendship first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in 
case the government were taken from the people : 
for then, he said, the king might the better rely 
upon them : they that were of most power in the 
city, who also were the most toiled out 1 , entered 
into great hope both to have the ordering of the 
state at home themselves, and victory also over the 
enemy. And when they came back to Sainos, they 
drew all such as were for their purpose into an 
oath of conspiracy with themselves : and to the 
multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades 
might be recalled and the people put from the 
government, the king would turn their friend and 
furnish them with money. 

Though the multitude were grieved with this 
proceeding for the present, yet for the great hope 
they had of the king's pay they stirred not. But 
they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they 
had communicated thus much to the multitude, 
fell to consideration, anew and with more of their 
complices, of the things spoken by Alcibiades. 
And the rest thought the matter easy, and worthy 

home and share in the government".] thens, which were thrown princi- 
1 [That is, with the public bur- pally on the rich. Goell.] 


to be believed : but Phrynichus, who yet was 
general of the army, liked it not ; but thought, as 
the truth was, that Alcibiades cared no more for A.c.4i2! 
the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any phnnichus u 
other aim in it, but only by altering the govern- S^Aic 
ment that then was to be called home by his asso- biados - 
ciates : and said, " they were especially to look to 
this, that they did not mutiny for the king 1 , who 
could riot very easily be induced (the Peloponnes- 
ians being now as much masters at sea as them- 
selves, and having no small cities within his domi- 
nions) to join with the Athenians, whom he trusted 
not ; and to trouble himself, when he might have 
the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never 
did him hurt: as for the confederate cities to 
whom they promise oligarchy, in that they them- 
selves do put down the democracy," he said, " he 
knew full well, that neither those which were 
already revolted would the sooner return to, nor 
those that remained be ever the more confirmed 
in their obedience thereby : for they would never 
be so willing to be in subjection either to tlie few 
or to the people, as they would be to have their 
liberty, which side soever it were that should give 
it them : but would think, that even those which 
are termed the good men\ if they had the govern- 
ment, would give them as much to do as the peo- 
ple, being contrivers and authors to the people of 
doing those mischiefs against them, out of which 
they make most profit unto themselves : and that 
if the few had the rule, then they should be put to 

1 [ u And saw! that for themselves not easy for the king (the Pelopon- 
they had especially to see to it, that uesians heing &c.) to join" &c.] 
there be no sedition: that U was 2 [icaXodc K&yaBoi>g. Seeiv.40,n.] 

B B 2 



viii. death unheard, and more violently than by the 
former ; whereas the people is their refuge, and 
moderator of the others' insolence. This," he said, 
" he was certain that the cities thought ; in that 
they had learned the same by the actions them- 
selves : and that therefore what was yet pro- 
pounded by Alcibiades, he by no means approved 1 ." 
49. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, 
not only approved the present proposition, but 
also made preparation to send Pisander- and others 
ambassadors to Athens : to negociate concerning 
the reduction of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the 
democracy, and the procuring unto the Athenians 
the friendship of Tissaphernes. 

50. Now Phrynichus knowing that an overture 
was to be made at Athens for the restoring of 
Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would embrace 
it ; and fearing lest being recalled he should do 
him a mischief (in regard he had spoken against 
it) as one that would have hindered the same : be- 
He writes secret took himself to this course. He sends secret let- 
1 c ^ 8toAstyo " ters to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian general, who 
was yet 3 about Miletus, and advertised him that 
Alcibiades undid their affairs, and was procuring 
the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians : 
writing in plain terms the whole business, and de- 
siring to be excused if he rendered evil to his 
enemy with some disadvantage to his country. 

The treason of 

1 [" And that he at all events was feeling in the affair of the Hennes- 
not pleased with aught that Alcibi- busts.] 

ades even at the present time was 

2 [Peisander had been one of the 
most active in stirring the public 

a [In r6rt : " yet at the time be- 
fore mentioned" : oh. 42. All this 
took place before the Peloponnes- 
ians sot out for Rhodes in ch, 44.] 


Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of VHI. 
revenge against Alcibiades, especially when he was 
not in his own hands 1 . And going to him to Mag- 
nesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them what Ast y c > ms ft p- 

. 111 peacheth him to 

advertisement he had received from Samos, and 
made himself the appeacher. For he adhered, as 
was said, to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, both 
in this and in divers other matters : which was 
also the cause that concerning the pay, when the 
abatement was made, he was not so stout in op- 
posing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon 
Alcibiades sendeth letters presently to those that 
w T ere in office at Sarnos, accusing Phrynichus of 
what he had done, and requiring to have him put 
to death. Phrynichus perplexed with this dis- 
covery, and brought into danger indeed, sends 
again to Astyochus, blaming what was past as not ^ 
well concealed : and promised now to be ready to liishands - 
deliver unto him the whole army at Samos to be des- 
troyed : writing from point to point, (Samos being 
unwalled), in what manner he would do it ; and 
saying, that since his life was brought in danger, 
they could not blame him though he did this or 
any other thing, rather than be destroyed by his 
most deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed 
unto Alcibiades. 51. But Phrynichus having had Thedvi<v of 
notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters 
of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come 2 , 
he anticipates the news himself: and tells the 
army, that whereas Samos was un\valled and the 
galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come 

1 [ But Astyochus was not think- as heretofore, within his reach : but 
ing of punishing Alcibiadcs, espe- going" c.] 
dally as he no longer put himself, * [" Were all but arrived".] 




Alcibiades en- 

nes to the part of Athenians. 
the Athenians. 

and assault the harbour 1 : that he had sure intelli- 
gence hereof, and that they ought therefore with 
all speed to raise a wall about the city, and to put 
garrisons into other places thereabouts 2 . Now 
Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his 
own power to see it done. They then fell to wall- 
ing ; whereby Samos (which they meant to have 
done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled 
in. Not long after came letters from Alcibiades, 
that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and 
that the enemy purposed to invade the harbour 
where they lay 3 . But now they thought not Alci- 
biades worthy to be believed, but rather that hav- 
ing foreseen the design of the enemy, he went 
about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus 
as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no 
hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that 
which Phrynichus had told them of before. 

52. After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline 
and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the 
For though Tissaphernes feared the 
Peloponnesians, because their fleet was greater 
than that of the Athenians ; yet if he had been 
able 4 , he had a good will to have been persuaded 
by him ; especially in his anger against the Pelo- 
pounesians, after the dissension at Cnidus, about 
the league made by Theramenes ; (for they were 
already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about 

1 [" The naval camp".] 
8 [" To fortify the city and take 
other precautions".] 

3 [" Meant to attack them''.] 

4 [That is, to become a friend of happened the quarrel, wherein that 
the Athenians." especially when which &c." See eh. 43.] 

he saw the difference at Cnidus with 
the Peloponnesians about the treaty 
of Theramenes. For now about this 
time, they being in -Rhodes, had 


this time in Rhodes). Wherein that which had vin. 
been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the 
coming of the Lacedaemonians was to restore all 
the cities to their liberty, was now verified by 
Lichas ; in that he said, it was an article not to be 
suffered, that the king should hold those cities 
which he and his ancestors then or before had 
holden. Alcibiades therefore, as one that laboured 
for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to 

53. The Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos Pisander getteth 
with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were ^conS wkh 
making their propositions to the people : and ^dti^e him 
related unto them summarily the points of their and <* com. 

i - i - -11 i , , i / i 11 mission to treat 

business, and principally this ; " that if they would *itu Alcibia 
call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the govern- 
ment to remain in the hands of the people in such 
manner as it did, they might have the king for 
their confederate, and get the victory of the Pelo- 
ponnesians". Now when many opposed that point 
touching the democracy ; and the enemies of Al- 
cibiades clamoured withal, that it would be a 
horrible thing he should return by forcing the 
government 1 , when the Eumolpidse and Ceryces 2 

1 [" That lie should return, who inilies besides these are mentioned, 
had violated the laws".] in which public rites were heredi- 

2 Eumolpidic, a family descended tary : as the Eteohutadap, Thaulo- 
from Eumolpus, the author at nidoe, &c. Goell. In every family 
Athens of the Mysteries of Ceres, of the Kerukes, the father had his 
This family had the chief authority son solemnly enrolled in the sacred 
in matters that concerned those order as soon as he had passed his 
r it cs> Ceryces, heralds in war, boyhood, having first made oath 
ambassadors in peace. Suidas. that he was his true son, to prevent 
They pronounced all formal words the intermixture of any strange 
in the ceremonies of their religion, blood. At Sparta, the sacred order 
and were a family descended from of the Kerukes and /iayecpot, coofts, 
Ceryx son of Mercury. [Other fa- were strictly hereditary. Am.] 


VHI. bare witness against him concerning the mysteries 
for which he fled, and prohibited his return under 
their curse : Pisander, at this great opposition and 
querimony, stood out, and going amongst them took 
out one by one those that were against it, and asked 
them ; " whether, now that the Peloponnesians 
had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they 
themselves had, and confederate cities more than 
they, and were furnished with money by the king 
and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, 
they had any other hope to save their state but by 
persuading the king to corne about to their side". 
And they that were asked having nothing to an- 
swer, then in plain terms he said unto them : 
" This you cannot now obtain, except we administer 
the state with more moderation, and bring the 
power into the hands of a few, that the king may 
rely upon us. And we 1 deliberate at this time, 
not so much about the form, as about the preserva- 
tion of the state ; for if you mislike the form 2 , you 
may change it again hereafter. And let us recall 
Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring 
this to pass." The people hearing of the oligarchy, 
took it very heinously at first : but when Pisander 
had proved evidently, that there was no other way 
of safety, in the end, partly for fear and partly 
because they hoped again to change the govern- 
ment, they yielded thereunto. So they ordered, 
that Pisander and ten others should go and treat 
both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, as to them 
should seem best. Withal, upon the accusation of 

cused by Pisun- 

1 [ u And un less we deliberate &c : 2 [That is, "any of these present 
and unless we recall" &c.] alterations". 1 


Pisander against Phrynichus, they discharged both vin. 
Phrynichus and Scironides. his fellow-commis- ' h 


siouer, of their command : and made Diomedon A.c.4i2. 
and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now a c r, J^iiiis.' 
the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and ^.m^md! bw 
said he had betrayed lasus and Amorges, was only 
this : he thought him a man unfit for the business 
now in hand with Alcibiades. 

Pisander, after he had gone about to all those 
combinations 1 , (which were in the city before, for 
obtaining of places of judicature and of command), 
exhorting them to stand together and advise about 
deposing the democracy ; and when he had dis- 
patched the rest of his business, so as there should 
be no more cause for him to stay there 2 : took sea 
with those other ten to go to Tissaphernes. 

55. Leon and Diomedon arriving the same A.c.iii. 
winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against meaon'wor up 
Rhodes ; and finding there the Peloponnesian gal-{^" 
leys drawn up to land, disbarked and overcame in 
battle such of the Rhodians as made head ; and 
then put to sea again and went to Chalce. After 
this they made sharper war upon them from Cos 3 . 

1 [i;vw/io<rtac, sometimes called own state. And accordingly Lysan- 

ruipc(<rc, societies or clubs : already der,in his choice of the 30 tyrants, is 

mentioned in iii. 82. These were said to have been guided by no prin- 

naturally the icsort of the weaker ciple of either aristocracy or wealth, 

of the two political parties : and but simply by the clubs.] 

accordingly the first trace of them a ['* And having arranged other 

appears in the time of Cimon, when matters (tTri rocjj irapovcriv) against 

the aristocracy was on the decline, the present democracy, so that there 

Their professed object was to give should be no longer delay: took 

each other mutual support in elec- sea" &c. Schol. Goell.] 

tions and in suits in the courts of 3 [" And carried on the war 

law : their real object, to overthrow thence (from Chalce) rather than 

the democracy, by the aid, if need from Cos". Bekk. <Scc , jtaXXov % IK : 

be, of the foreign enemy, and at the v ulgo om. /. It appears in ch/60, 

expense of the independence of their that the Athenians had taken up 


vni. For from thence they could better observe the 
" YEAB xx ^ Pelopomiesian navy when it should put off from 
A E .c.4iT.' the land. 

Oi 02 1 

Chios distressed, In this while there arrived at Rhodes Xenophon- 
tif eS^dl. tidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, 
to advertise them that the fortification of the 
Athenians there was now finished : and that unless 
they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, 
the state of Chios must utterly be lost. And it 
w r as resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus in the 
meantime, with the whole power both of his own 
auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault 
upon the fortification which the Athenians had 
made about their navy : part whereof he won, and 
had gotten some galleys that were drawn a-land. 
But the Athenians issuing out upon them, first put 
to flight the Chians, and then overcame also the 
rest of the army about Pedaritus : and slew Peda- 
ritus himself, and took many of the Chians prison- 
ers and much armour 1 . 5G. After this the Chians 
were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly : 
and great famine was in the city. 

Pisander, and the other Athenian ambassadors 
that went with him, when they came to Tissa- 
phernes, began to confer about the agreement. 
But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, 
because he stood in fear too much of the Pelopon- 
RMS tames *> nes ^ ans > an d had a purpose besides, as Aicibiades 
the Athenians- himself had taught him, to w r eaken both sides fyet 

side, demands -, _ , . ,., / * m 

di. morej), betook himself to this shift: that Tissa- 
phernes should break off the treaty by making to 
the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seemed 

their station at Chalcc. Arnold.] many of the Chians, and took much 
1 [" And slew Pedaritus and armour".] 


that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing 1 : vin. 
Tissaphernes for fear ; and Alcibiades, for that *~ AI [ xx 
when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, A.CUIL 
[though the offers were never so great] , he was pear t 
unwilling to have the Athenians think he could {^ 
not persuade him to it, but rather that he wa s hUowDcredit - 
already persuaded and willing, and that the Athen- 
ians came not to him with sufficient offers. For 
Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissa- 
phernes, though he were also present, made unto 
them such excessive demands, that though the 
Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part 
of them, yet it must have been attributed to them 
that the treaty went not on 2 . For they demanded, 
first, that all Ionia should be rendered : then 
again, the adjacent islands and other things: which 
the Athenians stood not against. In fine, at the 
third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be 
found unable to make good his word, he required, 
that they should suffer the king to build a navy, 
and sail up and down by their coast 3 wheresoever 

1 [" And it seeins to me that this Diodorus and Plutarch to havebeen 

same thing was also the object of concluded between the Athenians 

Tissapherues".] and Persia after Cimon's victories, 

3 [" For Alcibiades, speaking on A. C. 450 ; whereby it was provided, 

behalf and in the presence of Tis- that no king's ship of war should 

sapherues, made such excessive de- sail beyond Phaselis and the Cy- 

mands, that the Athenians, though anean or Chelidonian islands. Ar- 

conceding in a great measure what- nold seems inclined to give some 

ever he asked, were nevertheless the credit to the treaty upon which 

side that brake off the conference".] Haack remarks, that Thucydides 

3 [Bekker, Arnold, Thirlwall, - makes no mention of it in i. 112, 

kavroV) " his own", the king's coast, where he relates the expedition and 

Goeller and others -.laurJv, the coast death of Cimon : whilst Hennann 

" of themselves", that is, of Persia ( 39) contents himself with refer- 

and the Athenians. This touches ring to the authorities on both sides; 

the question of the treaty said by calling it u the so-called Cimoman 


viii. and with what number soever of galleys he himself 
should think good. Upon this the Athenians 
w r ould treat no longer, esteeming the conditions 
intolerable and that Alcibiades had abused them, 
and so went away in a chafe to Samos. 

57- Presently after this, the same w r inter, Tissa- 
11 phernes went to Caunus, with intent both to bring 
the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and also, (as 
soon as he should have agreed unto new articles, 
such as he could get), to give the fleet their pay ; 
and not to fall directly out with them : for fear lest 
so many galleys wanting maintenance, should either 
be forced by the Athenians to fight and so be 
overcome, or, emptied of men, the business might 
succeed with the Athenians according to their own 
desire without him. Besides he was afraid 1 , lest 
looking for maintenance they should make spoil in 
the continent. In consideration and foresight of 
all which things, he desired to counterpoise the 
Grecians 2 . And sending for the Peloponnesians, he 
gave them their pay ; and now made the third 
league, as followeth : 
be'tween 'Vi^a 58. " In the thirteenth year of the reign of 

peace". Thirlwall however treats is supposed to refer to this treaty of 
it as an undoubted fabrication. Cimon. u Which the Athenians 
Goeller observes, that whether that not opposing, at last at the third 
story be true or not, and supposing meeting, fearing \c., he required 
the Athenians on this occasion to S:c. Then indeed the Athenians 
deliver up to the king all Ionia, it would concede no more, but con- 
was still important to them to ceiviug they were trifled with and 
restrain him from menacing the abused by Alcibiades, went away 
islands with his fleet: for which S:c."] 
reason he prefers lavr&v. The pas- l [" Especially afraid".] 
sage in Livy, xxxiii. 20 : " Nephe- 2 [" In consideration" &c., con- 
lida, promontorium Cilicia?, incly- formably to his design of counter- 
turn ftedereantiquo Atheniensium'': poising the Grecians, sending" &c.] 


Darius, Alexippidas being ephor in Lacedaemon, vm. 
agreement was made in the plain of Mseander. ' * 

* ' YK\R XX. 

between the Lacedaemonians and their confederates A c.4ii. 
on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes 1 Berne's ' 

and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, con- lvl ^ nnerialw - 
cerning the affairs of the king, and of the Lacedae- 
monians and their confederates. 

" That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to 
the king, shall be the king's still 2 : and that con- 
cerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the 
king to do whatsoever he shall think meet. 

" That the Lacedaemonians and their confede- 
rates shall not invade any the territories of the 
king to barm them ; nor the king, the territories 
of the Lacedaemonians or their confederates. 

" If any of the Lacedaemonians or their confede- 
rates shall invade the king's country to do it hurt, 
the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall 
oppose it : and if any of the king's country shall 
invade the Lacedaemonians or their confederates to 
do them hurt, the king shall oppose it. 

" That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates 
agreed on 3 , maintain the present fleet till the king's 
fleet arrive. 

1 [Hieramenes is said to have the Peloponnesian fleet. The rate 

married a sister of Darius.] of pay specified at Sparta appears, 

8 [" That the king's territory, so from ch. 2l>, to have heen a drachmc 

far as it lies in Asia, belongs to the a day. But after the present treaty 

king". Another expression intended the Peloponnesians, it seems, con- 

to evade the question, what is or is tented themselves with the ordinary 

not the king's territory : see ch. 18, allowance: for Xenophon, Hell. i. 5, 

37.] speaks of a contract whereby the 

3 [jeard r& Svyicei/wra: " accord- king had engaged to give half a 

ing to the original treaty". It is not drachme a day. Kreuger supposes 

clear wheflier this refers to the rate that this was the rate always im- 

of pay, or only to the general under- plied, when no particular sum was 

taking inentionel in ch. 5, to pay expressed. Thirl, ch. xxviii.] 


viu. u That when the king's navy shall be come, the 
Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall main- 
tain their own navy themselves, if they please : or 
if they will have Tissaphernes to maintain it, he 
shall do it ; and that the Lacedaemonians and their 
confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissa- 
phernes whatsoever money they shall have received 
of him '. 

" When the king's galleys shall be arrived, both 
they and the galleys of the Lacedaemonians and 
their confederates shall make the war jointly, 
according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemon- 
ians and their confederates shall seem good : and 
if they will give over the war against the Athen- 
ians, they shall give it over in the same manner." 

59. Such were the articles. After this Tissa- 
phernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phoeni- 
cian fleet, according to the agreement, and to do 
whatsoever else he had undertaken : desiring to 
have it seen, at least, that he went about it. 
taken by 60. In the end of this winter, the Boeotians took 
Oropus by treason. It had in it a garrison of 
Athenians-. They that plotted it, were certain 
Eretrians and some of Oropus itself; who were 
then contriving the revolt of Eubcca. For the 
place being built to keep Eretria in subjection 3 , it 
was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, 
but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the 
rest of Eubcea. Having 4 Oropus in their hands 

1 [Received, that is, after the 3 [" For the place being iraine- 
arrival of the king's fleet. Goeller, diately opposite to Eretria, it was 
Arnold, Thirlwall.] impossible &c."] 

2 [Took Oropus " though garri- 4 [ u Having then Oropus &c., the 
soned by Athenians'*.] Eivlriaus come to Rhodes" &c.] 


already, they came to Rhodes to call the Pelopon- vm. 
nesians into Euboea. But the Peloponnesians had 
a greater inclination to relieve Chios now dis- 
tressed : and putting to sea, departed out of 
Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were 
come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian 
fleet in the main sea going from Chalce. And 
neither side assaulting other, they put in, the one 
fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus : for the Pelo- 
ponnesians saw they could not pass to relieve 
Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter ; 
and the twentieth year of this war written by 

61. The next summer, in the beginning of the ^FARXXI. 
spring, Dercylidas a Spartan was sent by land into 
Hellespont with a small army, to work the revolt 
of Abydos, a colony of the Milesians. And the TI -chian^^t 
Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at "ui"^ a !w e ihat 
a stand how to help them, were compelled by the bl * Ni|1J?tltl thein - 
pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. 
Now whilst Astyochus lay at Rhodes, they had 
received into the city of Chios, after the death of 
Pedaritus, one Leon a Spartan, that came along 
with Antisthenes as a private soldier 1 : and with 
him twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, 
whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one 
of Ansea, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. 
Whereupon the Chians issuing forth with the whole 

1 [" The Chians had, after the of an inferior officer in the Spartan 

death of Pedaritus, received as com- naval service, like iirurroXcdc : but 

raander Leon, a Spartan from Mi- this the scholiast denies. Perhaps 

letus, who came with Antisthenes it only signified one who sailed with 

as epibates"". The meaning here of the admiral, to be ready for any spe- 

rpibatex (iii, 95, note) is doubtful, cial service which might need a Spar- 

Kreuger supposes it to be the title tin. Arn., Antisthenes, see ch. 39.] 




Abydos and 




force of the city, seized a certain place of strength : 
and 1 put forth thirty-six galleys against thirty- two 
of the Athenians, and fought. After a sharp fight, 
wherein the Chians and their associates had not 
the worst, and when it began to be dark, they 
retired again into the city. 

62. Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived 
now in Hellespont from Miletus by land, Abydos 
revolted to him and to Pharnabazus : arid two days 
after revolted Lainpsacus. Strombichides having 
intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios 
with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians : those 
being also of that number which transported his 
men of arms. And when he had overcome the 
Lampsacenes that came out against him, and taken 
Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout 
of their voices, and made prize of all the goods 
they found and of the slaves, he placed the freemen 
there again : and went against Abydos. But when 
that city neither yielded nor could be taken by 
assault, he crossed over from Abydos to the oppo- 
site shore : and in Sestos, a city of Chersonesus, 
possessed heretofore by the Medes% he placed a 
garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont. 

63. In the meantime not only the Chians had 
the sea at more command, but Astyochus also and 
the army at Miletus, having been advertised of 
what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombi- 
chides and those galleys with him were gone 
away, took heart. And Astyochus going to Chios 
with two galleys, fetched away the galleys that 

1 [" And at the same time".] at that memorable time by the 
1 [Popp. Gotll. Arn. rort : " held Mcdc>h"(i.Hi>). Vulgot't Ueltk. t 


were there 1 : and with the whole fleet now together \ in. 
went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, 
by reason of their jealousy one towards another, 
came not against him, he went back again to 
Miletus. For it was about this time that the 
democracy was put down at Athens 2 . 

For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassa- The 
dors that had been with Tissaphernes, were come 
to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet better ^ g aud his fel - 
in the army, and also provoked the principal men 
of the Samians to attempt with them the erecting 
of the oligarchy ; though there were then an insur- 
rection amongst them against the oligarchy. And xi.e author* of 
withal the Athenians at Samos, in a conference LrtveXiweout 
amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alci- S^h" d 
biades would not, to let him alone ; for indeed they stat with their 

' private means for 

thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy : themselves. 
but for themselves, seeing they were already en- 
gaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the 
business from a relapse, and withal to sustain the 
war, and to contribute money and whatsoever else 
was needful with alacrity, out of their private 
estates ; and no more to toil for other than them- 
selves 3 . 64. Having thus advised, they sent Pisan- 

1 [Not all the ships ; for the Chi- up in Athens at the end of Febru- 

ans would not have parted with ary or the beginning of March, 

their own : it seems therefore that Goell.] 

Icon's squadron only can be re- * [" And at the same time their 

ferred to. Thirl.] Athenian partisans at Samos cousi- 

9 [** For about this time, and still dered amongst themselves, that they 

earlier, the democracy had been put had best let Alcibiades alone; since 

down at Athens". Bekk. &c., icare- he would not join them: (for that 

\i\vro: vulgo, jf<mXi''iro. It was in he was no lit man to come into an 

the month of April that Astyochus oligarchy); and to depend on them- 

sailed to Samos: and the govern- selves, being already engaged &c., 

meat of the Four Hundred was set to see that affairs suffer no relapse, 



vui. der with half the ambassadors presently home, to 
YEA'xr fN w the business there ; with command to set 
AC.4U. U p the oligarchy in all the cities they were to touch 
at by the way : the other half they sent about \ 
some to one part [of the state] and some to an- 
other. And they sent away Diotrephes to his 
charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go 
governor of the cities upon Thrace. 

The Athenians He, when he came to Thasos, deposed the people. 
And within two months at most after he was gone, 
*ke Thasians fortified their city : as needing no 

from them. longer an aristocracy with the Athenians 2 , but ex- 
pecting liberty every day by the help of the Lace- 
daemonians. For there were also certain of them 
with the Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athen- 
ians : and these 3 practised with such in the city as 
were for their purpose, to receive galleys into it 
and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for 
them just as they would have it : that that estate 
of theirs 4 was set up without their danger, and that 
the people was deposed that w r ould have withstood 
it. Insomuch as at Thasos it fell out contrary to 
what those Athenians thought, which erected the 
oligarchy : and so, in my opinion, it did in many 
other places of their dominion. For the cities 
now grown wise 5 , and withal resolute in their pro- 
ceedings, sought a direct liberty ; and preferred 

and with alacrity to contribute &c., 3 [** With all their might".] 

at men toiling no longer for other 4 [" That the city was set up".] 

than themselves."] 6 [ffv$po<rvvtiv \apovvat : " as- 

1 [" Toother subject places".] suming a sober wary spirit": with 

2 [That is, the aristocracy of Tha- regard to the means of effecting 
sos had no need of the aristocracy their object. The phrase is very 
of Athens.] singular and obscure. Thirl.] 


not before it that outside of a well-ordered govern- vin. 
ment, introduced by the Athenians. " ' 

7 * YEAR XXI. 

65. They with Pisander, according to the order A.CUII. 

J . , . . , Oi,.02 1. 

given them, entering into the cities as they went The proceeding 
by, dissolved the democracies : and having in some ^tti^lfptiS 
places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they oli g rch y- 
came to Athens : and found the business, for the 
greatest part, dispatched to their hands by their 
accomplices before their coming. For certain 
young men combining themselves, had not only 
murdered Androcles privily, a principal patron of 
the popular government, and one that had his hand 
the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades : (whom 
they slew for two causes ; for the sway he bare 
amongst the people ; and to gratify Alcibiades, 
who they thought would return and get them the 
friendship of Tissaphernes) : but had also made 
away divers men unfit for their design in the same 
manner. They had withal an oration ready made, 
which they delivered in public, wherein they said, 
that there ought none to receive wages but such 
as served in the wars 1 , nor to participate of the 
government more than five thousand ; and those, 
such as by their purses and persons were best able 
to serve the commonwealth. 66. And this with 

1 ["They openly too held Ian- the further innovation of paying the 

guage, preconcerted amongst them, citizens that attended the assembly 

that none ought to receive wages, (iii. 59, note). This, together with 

but such &c." The pay of the the pay of the jurors (v. 18, note), 

army and navy, a highly necessary magistrates, senators &c., was now 

measure of Pericles (i. 141, note), abolished: which at once operated 

first placed arms in the hands of to exclude from the magistracies 

such as were necessitated to gain and judicial offices the classes with- 

their daily brea'd. In the course of out property. The former however 

this war, either by Cleon or an un- was revived after the fall of the 30 

known Callistratus, was introduced tyrants.] 


vni. * the most carried a good shew : because they that 
would set forward the alteration of the state, were 
to have the managing of the same 1 . Yet the people 
and the Council of the Bean met still ; but de- 
bated nothing, save what the conspirators thought 
fit : nay, all that spake were of that number, and 
had considered before what they were to say 2 . Nor 
would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, 
because they saw the combination was great : and 
if any man did, he was quickly made away by one 
convenient means or other ; and no inquiry made 
after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted against 
any that was suspected. But the people were so 
quiet and so afraid, that every man thought it gain 
to escape violence, though he said never a word. 
Their hearts failed them, because they thought the 
conspirators more indeed than they were : and to 
learn their number, in respect of the greatness of 
the city and for that they knew not one another, 
they were unable 3 . For the same cause also was 
it impossible for any man that was angry at it, to 
bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them 
that conspired 4 : for he must have told his mind, 
either to one he knew not, or to one he knew and 
trusted not. For the populars approached each 

1 [" This was thrown out as a was considered beforehand by the 

bait to the many: for as for the conspirators".] 

powers of government, the authors 3 [" And to find out the conspi- 

of the re volution meant to keep them rators, a thing impossible for the 

to themselves". The 400 were all greatness of the city, their igno- 

chosen by Peisander and his party: ranee of each other also put it out 

the 5000 were never to be named of their power".] 

at all. The " council of the bean" 4 [" For the same cause, one that 

was the senate : chosen by the bean, was aggrieved couFd not even com- 

that is, by ballot.] plain to any one, thereby to repel 

8 [" And all that was to be said, him that was plotting against him."] 


other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought viii. 
him of the plot. For indeed there were such 
amongst them, as no man would have thought 
would ever have turned to the oligarchy : and 
those were they that caused 1 in the many that 
diffidence ; and by strengthening the jealousy of 
the populars one against another, conferred most 
to the security of tlwfew. 

67. During this opportunity, Pisander and they 
that were with him, coming in fell in hand pre- 
sently with the remainder of the business. And 
first they assembled the people, and delivered their 
opinion, for ten men to be chosen with power 
absolute to make a draught of laws ; and having 
drawn them, to deliver their opinion at a day 
appointed before the people, touching the best form 
of government for the city. Afterwards, when 
that day came, they summoned the assembly to 
Colonus 2 : which is a place consecrated to Neptune 
without the city, about two furlongs oflF. And 
they that were appointed to write the laws, pre- 
sented this, and only this : Tliat it should be law- 
ful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion 
lie pleased; imposing of great punishments upon 
whosoever should either accuse any that so spake 
of violating the laws 8 , or otherwise do him hurt. 

1 [" Most of all caused".] was afterwards, as in most demo- 

2 [" They enclosed the assembly cratic states, the theatre, mostly 
at&e. about ten stadia off". The that of Dionysus in the Peirasus. 
Scythians, or foreign mercenary po- (Herm, 1*28). The present assem- 
lice, used to enclose the place of bly was held without the city, that 
assembly with a red rope, as well to is, beyond the influence of the slaves 
exclude non-voters as to confine the and metoaci, who would have fa- 
voters till the business was finished, voured any disturbance.] 

The ordinary place of assembly, 3 [ v< Should either prosecute by 
originally the Pnyx within the city, ypa<pn irapavopw, or should other- 


viii. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded, 

'YEABXXI* " ^ at not ^J ma gi strac y f ^ e f rm before used, 

A.c.411. might any longer be in force, nor any fee belong 

The form of the unto it : but that five Prytanes might be elected, 

new oligarchy. an( j j^gg fi ve choose a hundred, and every one of 

this hundred take unto him three others: and 
these four hundred entering into the council-house, 
might have absolute authority to govern the state 
as they thought best, and to summon the five 
thousand as oft as to them it should seem good". 

68. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander: 
who was also otherwise openly the forwardest to 
put down the democracy. But he that contrived 
the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, 
The praise of and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon: a 
man or v j rtue not i n f er i or to any Athenian of his 

time, and the ablest of any man both to devise 
well, and also to express well what he had devised: 
and though he came not into the assemblies of the 
people, nor willingly to any other debatings, because 
the multitude had himin jealousy for the opinion they 
had of the power of his eloquence ; yet when any man 
that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of jus- 
tice or in the assembly of the people, came to him 
for his counsel, this one man was able to help him 
most. The same man, when afterwards the govern- 
ment of THE FOUR HUNDRED went down and was 
vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, 
when his life was in question for that business 1 , the 
best of any man to this day. Phrynichus also 

wise do him hurt And thereupon it having established (the Four Hun- 

was openly propounded, that no ma- dred)". Thueydidesjs said to have 

gistracy" <Scc. See iii.43, note.] been a disciple of Antiphon : a sup- 

1 [" When called in question for position which receives countenance 


shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, vin. 
and that more earnestly than any other ; because 

he feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted A.CUU. 
with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus; other author of 
and thought in all probability, that he would never the oligarcby * 
return to live under the government of tliefew. 
Arid this man, in any matter of weight, appeared 
the most sufficient to be relied on 1 . Also Thera- 
menes the son of Agnon, an able man both for 
elocution and understanding, was another of the 
principal of those that overthrew the democracy. 

So that it is no marvel if the business took 
effect, being by many and wise men conducted, 
though it were a hard one. For it went sore with 
the Athenian people, almost a hundred years after 
the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of 
their liberty : having not only not been subject to 
any, but also for the half of this time been inured 
to dominion over others. 

69. When the assembly, after it had passed these The Fou 
things no man contradicting, was dissolved ; then jJ^L 
afterwards they brought THE FOUR HUNDRED i^to ^"^ 
the council-house in this manner. The Athenians hundred 

from the terms in which he is here his assassination, ch. 92. The ca- 
spoken of. He is also said to have reer of the person next named, 
been the Grst orator who wrote Theramenes, son of Haguon, is re- 
speeches for bis clients, or opened markahle. He will he found before 
a school of rhetoric. He is sent, in long; deserting to the democracy, 
ch. 90, with Phrynichus and others He was one of the promoters of the 
on an embassy to Sparta: for this prosecution of the ten generals for not 
he was tried and lost his life : his recovering their own dead after their 
property was confiscated, bis body victory at Arginus. He was after- 
refused burial in Attica, and his wards one of Lysander's 30 tyrants: 
family declared an/iot.] and was finally put to death for his 
1 [" And for this dangerous busi- opposition to the headlong measures 
ness, after that he entered upon it, of Critias, the leader of the extreme 
he appeared the ablest of all". See party amongst the thirty,] 


viii. were evermore partly on the walls, and partlyat their 
arms in the camp, in regard of the enemy that 

A.c.411. i a y a t Deceleia 1 . Therefore on the day appointed, 
the council of they suffered such as knew not their intent, to go 
forth as they were wont. But to such as were of 
the conspiracy, they quietly gave order not to go 
to the camp itself 2 , but to lag behind at a certain 
distance : and if any man should oppose what was 
in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They 
to whom this charge was given, were [the] An- 
drians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such 
of the colony of ^Egina which the Athenians had 
sent thither to inhabit 3 , as came on purpose to this 
action with their own arms. These things thus 
ordered, THE FOUR HUNDRED, with every man a 
secret dagger, accompanied with one hundred and 
twenty young men of Greece 4 , whom they used for 
occasions of shedding of blood, came in upon the 
Counsellers of the Bean, as they sat in the council- 
house, and commanded them to take their salary 
and be gone : which also they brought ready with 
them, for the whole time they were behind 5 , and 

1 [" The Athenians, in regard of the upper hand in the war, and re 

the enemy at Deceleia, were all of storing (as in fact they did at the 

them evermore, some upon the end of the war) the /Eginetae whom 

walls, and some on station where they had dispossessed of their 

the arms were piled. On this day, estates. Arn.] 

therefore, they suffered" &c. As 4 [Supposed to be called Gre- 

soon as the assembly was dissolved, dans, to distinguish them from the 

those that were not in the conspi- Scythians, of whom the ordinary 

racy, were allowed to disperse as police of Athens was composed, 

usual after the parade.] They were probably members of 

8 [" Not to go exactly to the sta- some of the aristocratical clubs al- 

tion of the arms".] ready noticed : see ch. 54. Arn.] 

3 [These new settlers peculiarly 5 [" For the remainder of the cur- 
dreaded the Peloponuesians getting rent year".] 


paid it to them as they went out. 70. And the 
rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet 1 . 
THE FOUR HUNDRED being now entered into 
the council-house, created Prytanes amongst them- 
selves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices 
to the gods, all that were before usual at the 
entrance upon the government. And afterwards 
receding far from that course which in the admi- 
nistration of the state was used by the people, 
saving that for Alcibiades his sake they recalled 
not the outlaws, in other things they governed the 
commonwealth imperiously : and not only slew 
some, though not many, such as they thought fit 
to be made away, and imprisoned some, and con- 
fined others to places abroad ; but also sent heralds 
to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was then 
at Deceleia, signifying that they would come to 
composition with him ; and that now he might 
better treat with them, than he might before with 
the uncoristant people. 71- But he, not imagining 
that the city was yet in quiet nor willing so soon 
to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather that| oa98imlut ' but 
if they saw him approach with great forces they 
would be in tumult, not yet believing fully but that 
some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave 
no answer at all to those that came from THE FOUR 
HUNDRED, touching the composition : but having 
sent for new and great forces out of Pelopon- 
nesus, came down himself not long after, both 
with the army at Deceleia and those new comers, 

1 [" And when the council went mutinied not, but rested quiet: then 
out in this manner without opposi- the Four Hundred being entered 
tion, and the rest of the citizens into the council-house &c. M ] 



viii. to the Athenian walls : hoping that they would 
fall into his hands according to his desire, at least 
the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at 
the very first shout of their voices, in respect of 
the tumult that in all likelihood was to happen 
both within and without the city. For, as for the 
long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely 
to be found upon them, he thought he could not 
fail to take them 1 . But when he came near, and 
the Athenians were without any the least alteration 
within ; and had with their horsemen which they 
sent out, and a part of their men of arms and 
of their light-armed and of their archers, over- 
thrown some of his men that approached too 
near, and gotten some arms and bodies of the 
slain : rectified thus, he withdrew his army again. 
And himself, and such as were with him before, 
stayed in their places at Deceleia ; but as for those 
that came last, after they had stayed awhile in the 
The Four Hun- country, he sent them home again. After this THE 
FOUR HUNDRED, notwithstanding their former 
repulse, sent ambassadors unto Agis anew : and he 
now receiving them better, by his advice they sent 
ambassadors also to Lacedsemon about an agree- 
ment, being desirous of peace. 
- 72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to 
satisfy the army: and to tell them, "that the 
oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the 
city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole 

1 [" Hoping either that their ceed, even with the very first at- 
agitation would render them more tack, in taking the long walls, in 

on to p 
cure a peace, 


the army. 

submissive to their (the Pelopon- 
nesians') purpose, or that in the 
confusion likely to be found both 
within and without he might sue- ruv yap p. r.] 

regard of their deserted state for 
the same reason". Goellt Am. rfjc 
: vulgoet Bekk. 


state : and that they which had their hands in it vin. 
were five thousand, and not four hundred only 1 ; 
notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of 
warfare and employment abroad, never assembled, 
of how great consequence soever was the matter 
to be handled, so frequent as to be five thou- 
sand there at once" 2 . And having in other things 
instructed them how to make the best of the 
matter, they sent them away immediately after the 
government was changed : fearing, as also it fell 
out, lest the seafaring multitude would not only 
not continue in this oligarchical form themselves, 
but the mischief beginning there would depose 
them also. 

73. For in Samos there was a commotion about The oligarchy 
the oligarchy already: and this that followeth, hap- ^by 
pened about the same time that THE FOUR HUN- pulars 
DRED were set up in Athens. Those Samians that 
had risen 3 against the nobility, and were of the 
people's side, turning when Pisander came thither, 
at the persuasion of him and of those Athenians in 
Samos that were his accomplices, conspired toge- 
ther to the number of three hundred, and were to 

1 [ u And that the government assembly. But in the first place, 
was in the hands of 5000, and not that is not said : but only that 5000 
400 only."] did not attend the assembly. And 

2 [It is observed that this could next, the assertion is not that of 
not be true, because some decrees, Thucydides, but of Pisander and his 
as ostracism and all privilcyia, re- party : and most probably an exag- 
quired a majority, or at all events geration. Of the citizens however, 
the presence, of 6000 citizens. It whose gross number is reckoned at 
is also observed that it does not about 20,000, a fourth part would 
appear how so large a proportion be a large proportion to assemble on 
of the citizens could be absent on any but very important occasions.] 
foreign service, as to leave at home 3 [r<5 : " at the time before- 
no more than 5000 to attend the mentioned";? see ch, 21.] 


viii. have assaulted the rest as populars. And one 
Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow 1 , who, not for any fear 
of his power or for any dignity, but for wickedness 
of life and dishonour he did the city, had beeu 
banished by ostracism, they slew : abetted therein 
both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and 
by other Athenians that were amongst them, w r ho 
had given them their faith. And together with these, 
they committed other facts of the same kind : and 
were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side. 
But they having gotten notice thereof, made known 
the design both to the generals, Leon and Diome- 
don ; (for these being honoured by the people, 
endured the oligarchy unwillingly) ; and also to 
Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whereof one was cap- 
tain of a galley, and the other captain of a band 
of men of arms 2 , and to such others continu- 
ally as they thought stood 3 in greatest opposition 
to the conspirators : and required of them that 
they would riot see them destroyed, and Samos 

dvQpuTrov: an epi- under another name, 
thet implying that he was capable Syracuse also. It is spoken of by 
of any baseness. He labours under Aristotle (iii. 1), v. H) with some ap- 
the charge not only of political pro- probation, not only as a check on 
fligacy, but of private dishonesty in the dangerous power of individuals, 
the exercise of his trade of a lamp- but also as some security against 
maker. Thirl, ch. xxxii. There is a the people resorting to more violent 
tradition that it was by an intrigue measures to rid themselves of ub- 
of Alcibiades that ostracism was noxious persons. He adds however 
applied to Hyperbolus, and that it that the people knew not how to 
answered its intended purpose : use their weapon : instead of look- 
ostracism was thereby rendered con- ing to the common weal, trraauur- 
teraptible, and fell into disuse rucoJ^ ixpwvro rdi$ 6<rrpaKtffpoiG 
(Herm. 164). It is an invention iii. 0.] 

attributed to Cleisthenes: it was 2 [" Captain of the hopjites".] 

afterwards adopted by the demo- * [" And to such others as they 

cracies of Argos and Megara, and thought stood always".] 


alienated from the Athenians, by the only means of 
which their dominion had till this time kept itself 
in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to 
the soldiers, and exhorted them one by one not to 
suffer it ; especially to the Paralians, who were all 
Athenians and freemen, come thither in the galley 
called Paralus, and had always before been enemies 
to the oligarchy 1 . And Leon and Diomedon, 
whensoever they went forth any whither, left them 
certain galleys for their guard : so that when the 
three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the 
Samians, with the help of all these, and especially 
of the Paralians, had the upperhand : and of the 
three hundred slew 7 thirty. Three of the chief 
authors they banished : and burying in oblivion 
the fault of the rest, governed the state from that 
time forward as a democracy. 

74. The Paralus, and in it Chsereas the son of The army cnd 
Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been nifj Sri* iwn^ 
forward in the making of this change, the Samians agai ? 5t ** oli 

, e ' garchyatSamos: 

and the soldiers dispatched presently away to <* fairing that 
Athens, to advertise them of what was done : for th^in y 
they knew not yet, that the government was in the ^ J ttt 
hands of THE FOUR HUNDRED. When they arrived, 
THE FOUR HUNDRED castsome two orthree of these 
of the Paralus into prison : the rest, after they had 
taken the galley from them and put them aboard 
another military galley, they commanded to keep 

1 [" Especially to tbe Paralians, iii. 17, r.ole), was strongly disposed 

the crew of the ship (Paralus); all to democracy : but the Paralians, 

Athenians and freemen, and ever at receiving higher pay, had a still 

all times hostile to oligarchy, even stronger interest than the rest in 

before its appearance". The whole upholding the maritime dominion, 

vavruc6c #x^' ^ e g rcater P&rt f and therefore also the democracy, 

whom were slaves, (i. 141, note; of Athens.] 


vur. guard about Eubcea. But Chsereas, by some means 
YJUB xxr or ot ^ er g ett i n g presently away, seeing how things 
A.CUII.' went, came back to Samos; and related to the 
army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating 
it to the utmost : as that they punished every man 
with stripes, to the end that none should contra- 
dict the doings of those that bore rule ; and that 
their wives and children at home were abused ; 
and that they had an intention further to take and 
imprison all that were of kin to any of the army 
which was not of their faction, to the intent to kill 
them if they of Samos would not submit to their 
authority. And many other things he told them, 
adding lies of his own. 75. When they heard 
this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon 
the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such 
of the rest as were partakers of it. Yet afterwards, 
being hindered by such as came between 1 and 
advised them not to overthrow the state, the 
enemy lying so near with their galleys to assault 
them ; they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus 
the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these were 
the principal authors of the change), determining 
now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a de- 
mocracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially 
of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could devise 2 : 
both that they should be subject to the democracy 
and agree together ; and also that they should 
zealously prosecute the war against the Pelopon- 
nesians ; and withal be enemies to THE FOUR HUN- 
DRED, and not to have to do with them by ambas- 

1 [" By those between (the two the moderate men. Goeller.] 
extreme parties)": that is to say, ly 2 [See v. 18, note.] 


sadors. The same oath was taken by all the viit. 
Samians that were of age ; and the Athenian sol- 
diers communicated with them their whole affairs, 
together with whatsoever should succeed of their 
dangers 1 : for whom and for themselves, they made 
account there was no refuge of safety ; but that if 
either THE FOUR HUNDRED or the enemy at Mile- 
tus overcame them, they must needs perish. 

76. So there was a contention at this time : one 
side compelling the city to a democracy ; the other, 
the army to an oligarchy. And presently there 
was an assembly of the soldiers called : wherein 
they deprived the former commanders, and such 
captains of galleys as they had in suspicion, of their 
charge ; and chose others, both captains of galleys 
and commanders, in their places ; of which Thra- 
sybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood 
up and encouraged one another, both otherwise, ! 

and with this: " that they had no cause to be T l st f te at 

J home by coin pa - 

dejected for the city's revolting from them; for * ot -their 
they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken * eng * 
them, who were not only the greater part, but also 
every way the better provided 2 . For they having 
the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities 
subject unto them to pay in their money as well 
now, as if they were to set out from Athens itself. 
And that they also had a city, namely Samos, no 
weak one ; but even such a one, as when they 
were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion 
of the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of 
the war, was the same it was before 3 ; and that 

1 ["Made common cause with * ["The better able to provide 
them as to the result of the present themselves". Goell. Am.] 
dangerous crisis".] 3 [ u For that they both had Sa- 


viii. they should be better able to provide themselves of 
things necessary, having the navy, than they should 
ke t ^ iat were at home in the city. And that they 
at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peirseus, 
both formerly by the favour of them at Samos 1 : 
and that now also, unless they restore them the 
government, they shall again be brought to that 
pass, that those at Samos shall be better able to 
bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be 
to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle and 
worth nothing, which was conferred to the over- 
coming of the enemy by the city; and a small 
matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had nei- 
ther any more silver to send them, (for the soldiers 
shifted for themselves), nor yet good direction, 
which is the thing for which the city hath the com- 
mand of the armies. Nay, that in this point they 
erred which were at Athens ; in that they had 
abrogated the laws of their country : whereas they 
at Samos did both observe the same themselves, 
arid endeavour to constrain the other to do so 
likewise 2 . So that such of them in the camp as 
should give good council, were as good as they in 
the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would de- 
cree his security and his return, would with all his 
heart procure the king to be their confederate. 

mos for their city, &c.: and were his nine months' siege of Samos to 

able to defend themselves from the Agamemnon's ten years' siege of 

enemy from this place as hereto- Troy, appears to have had a narrow 

fore". The allusion of taking the escape of coming home with a dif- 

domiuion of the sea from Athens, is ferent tale.] 

to the events of i. 116: where Peri- l [" Of themselves, stationed as 

cles, notwithstanding the honours an advanced guard at Samos".] 

he received on his return from that * [" And wilt endeavour to force 

expedition, and his comparison of them (the Athenians) to do so".]' 

Athenians battle: 


And that which is the main thing, if they failed of viir. 
all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could 
not fail of many places to retire to, in which they 
might find both city and territory." 

77- When they had thus debated the matter in 
the assembly and encouraged one another, they 
made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was 
necessary for the war 1 . Arid the ten ambassadors 
which were sent to Samos from THE FOUR HUN- 
DRED, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither 
they w r ere come already, stayed still there. 

78. About the same time also, the soldiers of upon the mur- 
the Peloponnesiari fleet at Miletus murmured ^7" 
amongst themselves, that Astyochus and Tissa- Ast . vot ' hU8 hp 

J goeth to Samos 

phernes overthrew the state of their affairs. Asty- to the 
ochus in refusing to fight ; both before, when their An "~'""" u " 
own fleet was stronger 2 , and that of the Athenians 
but small ; and also now, whilst they w r ere said to 
be in sedition, and their fleet divided ; and in ex- 
pecting the Phoenician fleet, in fame, not in fact to 
come from Tissaphernes 3 : and Tissaphernes, in 
that he not only brought not in that fleet of his, 
but also impaired theirs by not giving them their 
pay, neither fully nor continually : and that they 
therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to 
hazard battle. This was urged principally by the 

79. Astyochus and the confederates, when they 
heard of the murmur, and had in council resolved 
to fight, especially after they were informed that 

1 [ u They set themselves also to yet in greater strength": greater, 

preparing for. war with no less that is, than now.] 

alacrity".] 8 [" They were running the risk 

9 [* Whilst they were themselves of perishing by delay".] 





who refuse it. 

The Athenians 
offer battle to the 
and they refuse 

The Peloponnes- 
ians send part of 
their fleet to- 

Saraos was in a tumult : putting forth with their 
whole fleet to the number of one hundred and 
twelve sail, with order given to the Milesians to 
march by land to the same place, went to Mycale. 
But the Athenians, being come out from Samos 
with their fleet of eighty-two galleys, and riding 
now at Glauce of the territory of Mycale, ([for] in 
this part [toward Mycale] Samos is but a little 
way from the continent), when they descried the 
Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, put in 
again to Samos : as not esteeming themselves a 
sufficient number, to hazard their whole fortune 
on the battle. Besides, they stayed for the coming 
of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid (for 
they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to fight) 
with those galleys that went from Chios against 
Abydos 1 : for they had sent unto him before. So 
these retired into Samos. And the Peloponnesians 
putting in at Mycale, there encamped : as also did 
the land-forces of the Milesians, and others of the 
country thereabouts. The next day, when they 
meant to have gone against Samos, they received 
news that Strombichides with his galleys was ar- 
rived out of Hellespont : and thereupon returned 
presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the 
other side, with the addition of these galleys, went 
to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, 
intending to fight : but when nobody came out 
against them, they likewise went back to Samos. 

80. Immediately after this, the same summer, 
the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out 

1 [ For these galleys see ch. 62. gence that they in Miletus were in- 
" Besides, having previous intelli- tending to fight, they stayed" &c.] 


against the enemy, as holding themselves with 
their whole fleet too weak to srive them battle, and 


were now at a stand how to get money for the 

/ i * 11 i 

maintenance of so great a number of galleys ': 
sent Clearehus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty ^TiTtim^ 
galleys, according to the order at first from Pelo- otlly le " gdlley8 - 
ponnesus 2 , to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharna- 
bazus himself had sent for, and promised to pay 
them : but they were advertised besides by am- 
bassadors, that Byzantium had a purpose to revolt. 
Hereupon these Peloponnesian galleys having put 
out into the main sea, to the end that they might 
not be seen as they passed by ; and tossed with 
tempests, part of them, which were the greatest 
number, and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, 
and came afterwards to Miletus again ; but 
Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont 
by land, arid had the command there : and part 
under the charge of Helixus, a Megarean, which 
were ten sail, went safely through into the Helles- 
pont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after 
this, when they of Sainos heard of it, they sent 
certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose them, 
and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts : and 
there followed a small fight between them of eight 
galleys to eight, before Byzantium. 

81. In the meantime, they that were in autho- 
rity at Samos, and especially Tbrasybulus, who 
after the form of government changed was still of 

1 [" The same summer, the Pe- the enemy, being at a stand how 
loponnesians, immediately after &c, especially as Tissaphernes paid 
their declining; to put to sea, as badly: send Clearchus with forty 
being now in their opinion too weak galleys" &c. Goell.] 
to engage with the united force of a [See this order in chap. Sf).] 

D D 2 


vin. the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in 
an assembly persuaded the soldiers to the same. 
And when they had decreed for Alcibiades both 
his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes 
and fetched Alcibiades to Samos : accounting it 
their only means of safety, to win Tissaphernes 
from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assem- 
bly being called, Alcibiades complained of and 
lamented the calamity of his own exile, and speak- 
ing much of the business of the state gave them 
no small hopes of the future time : hyperbolically 
magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to 
the end that both they which held the oligarchy at 
home might the more fear him, and so the conspi- 
racies 1 dissolve, and also those at Samos the more 
honour him and take better heart unto themselves ; 
and withal, that the enemy might object the same 
to the utmost to Tissaphernes 2 , and fall from their 
present hopes. Alcibiades therefore, with the 
greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissa- 
phernes had undertaken to him, that as long as he 
had anything left, if he might but trust the Athen- 
ians they should never want for maintenance ; no, 
though he should be constrained 3 to make money 
of his own bed ; and that he would fetch the Phoe- 
nician fleet, now at Aspendus, not to the Pelopon- 
nesians but to the Athenians : and that then only 
he would rely upon the Athenians, when Alcibiades 
gene, called home should undertake for them 4 . 82. Hear- 

"*" ing this and much more, they chose him presently 

i : " the clubs".] 8 [" At last be constrained".] 

9 [" That the enemy might to the 4 [" Should undeHake to him 

utmost be embroiled with Tissa- (Tissaphernes)", Bekker&c.,a6ry: 
phernes". Goell Am.] 


for general together with those that were before ; vin. 
and committed unto them the whole government 
of their affairs. And now there was not a man 
that would have sold his present hopes, both of 
subsisting themselves 1 and being revenged of THE 
FOUR HUNDRED, for any good in the world : and 
were ready even then, upon those words of his, 
contemning the enemy there present, to set sail for 
Peiraeus. But he, though many pressed it, by all 
means forbade their going against Peirseus, being to 
leave their enemies so near : but since they had 
chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tis- 
saphernes first, and to dispatch such business with 
him as concerned the war. And as soon as the 
assembly brake up, he took his journey accord- 
ingly : to the end that he might seem to communi- 
cate everything with him, and for that he desired 
also to be in more honour with him, and to show 
that he was general, and a man capable to do him 2 
good or hurt. And it happened to Alcibiades, 
that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and 
Tissaphernes with the Athenians. 

83. When the Peloponnesians that were at Mile- The 
tus, heard that Alcibiades was gone home ; whereas ^1*" 
they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they ^ 
much more accused him 3 . For it fell out, that 
when at the coming of the Athenians with their 
fleet before Miletus they refused to give them 
battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal 
slacker in his payment ; and besides that he was 
hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake 4 , the 

1 [*' Of saving themselves".] 3 [ u Were much more ill-dis- 

1 [" To do him now good" &c. posed towards him". Duk. Goel!.] 

Bekker &c , tf$n : vulgo om.] 4 [" Became slacker in his pay- 


viii. soldiers now, meeting in companies apart, reck- 
oned up one to another the same matters which 
they had noted before, and some also, men of value 
and not the common soldier alone, recounted this 
withal ; how they had never had their full stipend ; 
that the allowance was but small, and yet not con- 
tinually paid ; and that unless they either fought, 
or went to some other place where they might 
have maintenance, their men would abandon the 
fleet ; and that the cause of all this was in 
Astyochus, who for private lucre gave way to the 
Mutiny agaimt humour of Tissaphernes. 84. Whilst these were 
U p 011 this consideration, there happened also a 
certain tumult about Astyochus. For the mariners 
of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much 
they were a multitude that had greater liberty than 
the rest, with so much the stouter importunity they 
demanded their pay. And he not only gave them 
somewhat an insolent answer, but also threatened 
Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers 
under himself, and lift up his staff against him. 
When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like 
seamen indeed, all at once ; and were running 
upon Astyochus to have stricken him. But fore- 
seeing it, he fled to an altar ; and was not stricken, 
but they were parted again 1 . The Milesians also 

take in the fort 

rnents: arid added to the hatred not,like that of the Athenians and Pe- 

they bore him even before this on loponnesians, manned with slaves. 

account of Alcibiades. And the " And he not only gave them a 

soldiers meeting &e."] somewhat insolent answer and used 

1 [** For the multitude (the ma- threats, but against Dorieus, as he 

riners) of the Syracusans and Thu- spake in behalf of his men, he lifted 

riaus, being for the most part free- up his staff.*' The custom of car- 

men, therefore with the stoutest rying sticks was common to the 

importunity &c." Their navy was Spartans with the Dorians of lower 


took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by Tissa- viii. 
phernes, having privily assaulted it ; and cast out ' ' "^ 

r > o r J YKAII xxi. 

the garrison that was within it. These things ACUII. 
were by the rest of the confederates, and especially madeLheircity 
by the Syracusians, well approved of: but Lichas byTiS8aphernes ' 
liked them not ; saying, it behoved the Milesians, 
and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, 
to have obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, 
and till such time as the war should have been well 
dispatched to have courted him. And the Mile- 
sians, for this and other things of this kind, were 
offended with Lichas : and afterwards when he 
died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried 
in that place where the Lacedaemonians then pre- 
sent w r ould have had him. 

85. Whilst they were quarrelling 1 about their 
business with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Min- 

darus cometh in from Lacedaemon to succeed char . . 

army, and Asty- 

Astyochus in his charge of the fleet: and as soon <><* g 
as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus 
departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent 2 a 
Carian, named Gauleites, one that spake both the 
languages, both to accuse the Milesians about the 
fort, and also to make an apology for himself: 
knowing that the Milesians went principally to 
exclaim upon him ; arid that Hermocrates went 

Italy. Muell. iv. 2. See Herod. l [" In this sort".] 

iii. 137, where the Crotonians attack 2 [ u Sent as ambassador". The 

rolffi <ricvraX0i(n the Persians laying Carians generally understood Greek, 

hands on Democedes. u When the and also acted as interpreters to the 

multitude of the soldiers saw it, Persians. Mardonius sends a Ca- 

they as well indeed as the sailors rian to consult the oracles of 

raised a cry and ran upon Asty- Greece: and Cyrus has Carian in- 

ochus &c: he was not however terpreters at his court See Valck- 

stricken indeed, but &c."] eiwer ad Herod, viii. 133. Goell.] 


viii. with them, and would bewray how Tissaphernes 
~ *" undid the business of the Peloponnesians with 

YIUR xxi. * 

A.C.4H Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For he was 

OL, 93. 1. -11 i * . i i 

continually at enmity with him about the payment 
of the soldiers' wages : and in the end, when Her- 
mocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other 
commanders of the Syracusian fleet, namely, Pota- 
mis, Myscon, and Demarchus, were arrived at 
Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him 
being an outlaw, than before ; and accused him 
amongst other things, that he had asked him 
money, and because he could not have it became 
his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates and 
the Milesians w r ent their way to Lacedsemon. 

Alcibiades by this time was come back from 
Tissaphernes to Samos. 86. And those ambassa- 
toeicnaethe dorsof THE FOUR HUNDRED, which had been sent 

change at Athens 

out before 1 to mollify and to inform those of Samos, 
came from Delos now, whilst Alcibiades was pre- 
sent. An assembly being called, they w^ere offering 
.to speak. But the soldiers at first would not hear 
them ; but cried out to have them put to death, for 
that they had deposed the people : yet afterwards 
with much ado they were calmed, and gave them 
hearing. They declared, " that the change had 
been made for the preservation of the city, not to 
destroy it, nor to deliver it to the enemy ; for they 
could have done that before now r , when the enemy 
during their government assaulted it 2 : that every 
one of THE FIVE THOUSAND was to participate of 
the government in their turns 3 : and their friends 

1 [rort : see ch, 72, 77.] 3 [" That all should in their turn 

5 [The assault by Aftis in ch. 7 1 .] partake (or be) of the 5000". Arn.] 


were riot, as Chsereas had laid to their charge, vin. 
abused ; nor had any wrong at all, but remained 
every one quietly upon his own." Though they 
delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers 
believed them not 1 , but raged still; and declared 
their opinions, some in one sort some in another, 
most agreeing in this to go against Peirseus. And 
now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and prin- 
cipal man in doing service to the commonwealth 2 . 
For when the Athenians at Samos were carried 
headlong to invade themselves : in which case 
most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed 
himself of Ionia and Hellespont : [it was thought 
that] he was the man that kept them from it. 
Nor was there any man at that time able to have 
held in the multitude, but himself. He both made 
them to desist from the voyage, and rated off from 
the ambassadors those that were in their own par- 
ticular incensed against them. Whom also he sent 
away, giving them their answer himself: "That 
he opposed not the government of THE FIVE 
THOUSAND, but willed them to remove THE FOUR 
HUNDRED, and to establish the council that was 
before of five hundred : that if they had frugally 
cut off any expense, so that such as were employed 
in the wars might be the better maintained, he did 
much commend them for it." And withal he ex- 
horted them to stand out, and give no ground to 
their enemies : for that as long as the city held 
out, there was great hope for them to compound 3 ; 

1 J" Gave heed to them none the state inferior to no man". Goell.] 

more".] . 3 [" There was great hope they 

["Appeared then for the first might also com pose their own dif- 
timt' to have done service to the 




at A8pendi. 

but if either part miscarry once, either this at 
Samos or the other at Athens, there would none 
be left for the enemy to compound withal 1 . 

There chanced to be present also the ambassa- 
dors of the Argives, sent unto the popular faction 
of the Athenians in Samos, to assist them. These 
Alcibiades commended, and appointed to be ready 
when they should be called for : and so dismissed 
them. These Argives came in with those of the 
Paralus, that had been bestowed formerly 2 in the 
military galley by THE FOUR HUNDRED, to go 
about Eubcea, and to convoy Lsespodias, Aristo- 
phon, and Melesias, ambassadors from THE FOUR 
HUNDRED, to Lacedsemon. These as they sailed 
by Argos, seized on the ambassadors 3 , and delivered 
them as principal men in deposing of the people 
to the Argives : and returned no more to Athens, 
but came with the galley they then were in to 
Samos, and brought with them these ambassadors 
from the Argives. 

. 8/. The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the 
time 4 that the Pelopoimesians w r ere offended with 
kim most, both for the going home of Alcibiades 
and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticiz- 
ing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear 
himself to them concerning his accusations, made 
ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phceni- 

1 [" Even when their differences 
shall be composed, there will no 
longer be any hope": that is, recon- 
ciliation will come too late.] 

2 [rore : see ch. 74.] 

3 [" About Eubo3a. And as they 
(the Paralians) were carrying the 
Athenian ambassadors sent by the 

400 to Lacedaemon, Lscspodias &c, 
as they sailed by Argos they laid 
hands on the ambassadors, and" 
&c. Vulgo, o'i iTTft^y) kykvovTO : 
Bekker &c., om. 01.] 

4 [" Tissaphernes about this time 
of the same summer, when the Pe- 
loponnesians c."] 


cian fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him : vin. 
saying that he would substitute Tamos his deputy 
lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet 1 whilst 
himself was absent. 

This matter is diversly reported : and it is hard conjectures of 
to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus, 
and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For 
it is known that one hundred and forty- seven sail 
of Phoenicians were come forward as far as Aspen- 
dus : but why they came not through, the conjec- 
tures are various. Some think it was upon design 
(as he formerly 2 intended) to wear out the Pelo- 
ponnesian forces : for which cause also Tamos, 
who had that charge, made no better, but rather 
worse payment than himself. Others, that having 
brought the Phoenicians as far as Aspendus, he 
might dismiss them for money : for he never meant 
to use their service 3 . Some again said, it w r as 
because they exclaimed so against it at Lacedae- 
mon : and that it might not be said he abused them, 
but that he went openly to a fleet really set out. 

For my own part, I think it most clear that it The opinion of 
was to the end to consume and to balance the the aulhor ' 
Grecians, that he brought not those galleys in : 
consuming them, in that he went thither and de- 
layed the time ; and equalizing them, in that 
bringing them to neither he made neither party 
the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the 
war, it is manifest he might have been sure to have 
done it. For if he had brought them to the 
Lacedaemonians, in all reason he had given them 

1 [" His "deputy to pay the army 3 [" For in no case (whether he 
so long as &c."] got money or not) did he mean to 

2 [* c Actually did intend".] use their service." Goell.] 


vm. the victory, who had a navy already 1 rather equal 
than inferior to that of their enemies. But that 
which hurt them most 2 , was the pretence he 
alleged for not bringing the fleet in. For he said, 
they were not so many sail as the king had or- 
dained to be gotten together. But sure he might 
have ingratiated himself more in this business, by 
dispatching it with less of the king's money, 
than by spending more 3 . But whatsoever was his 
purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and was 
with the Phoenicians : and by his own appoint- 
ment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedae- 
monian, with him with two galleys, as to take 
charge of the fleet. 

Aicibiude, 88. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes 

T^phtnws was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen 
wuit" tiwflect, S a ^ e Y s 5 promising to those at Samos a safe and 
goetu after him, great benefit; which was, that he would either 

to make the Pe- . . . 

bring those Phoenician galleys to the service of the 

la" stayed for Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the 
l-takes Peloponnesians : knowing, as is likely, the mind of 
Tissaphernes by long acquaintance, that he meant 
not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he 
could, to procure him the ill will of the Pelopon- 
nesians for the friendship shown to himself and to 
the Athenians, that he might thereby the better en- 
gage him to take their part. So he presently put 
to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and Caunus 
upwards 4 . 

1 [" Who indeed, even as it was, 3 ["By not spending much of 

were lying opposite to the Athenians the king's money, and by effecting 

with a navy rather equal" &c.] the same matters with Less".] 

8 [" But what bewrayed him 4 [That is, towards the centre of 

most". Bckker &c., Kara<}npf.~] the Persian government. Am ] 


89. The ambassadors of THE POUR HUNDRED viit. 
being returned from Satnos to Athens, and having ' " xx ~* 
related what they had in charge from Alcibiades : AC 411. 
how that he exhorted them to hold out, and not seduum at " 
give ground to the enemy ; and that he had great t hVJhangeofthe 
hopes to reconcile them to the army, and to over- oli g arch y int ae - 

* J 5 mocracy again. 

come the Peloponnesians : whereas many of the 
sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discon- 
tented, and would gladly, if they could have done 
it safely, have quitted the business, they were now 
a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And 
already they had their meetings apart, and did cast 
aspersions on the goverrnent ; and had for their 
ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals 
and such as bare office amongst them, as Thera- 
raenes the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates the son 
of Scellius, and others, who though they were par- 
takers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet 
feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at 
Samos ; and joined in the sending of ambassadors 
to Lacedsemon, because they were loth, by singling 
themselves from the greater number, to hurt the 
state, not that they dismissed the state into the 
hands of a very few : but said, that THE FIVE 
THOUSAND ought in fact to be assigned, and not 
in voice only, and the government to be reduced 
to a greater equality. And this was indeed the 
form pretended in words by THE FOUR HUNDRED. 
But the most of them, through private ambition, Ambition of the 
fell upon that, by which an oligarchy made out of ^ 
a democracy is chiefly overthrown 1 . For at once 

1 [Theramenes, Aristocrates, and state, but being in real fear of the 
others, " wbo were partakers with army at Samos and Alcibiades, and 
the foremost of the affairs of the of the ambassadors sent to Lacedae- 




throweth their 

viii. they claimed every one, not to be equal, but to be 
far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when 
election is made, because a man is not overcome 
by his equals, he can better brook it 1 . But the 
great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion 
they had that the oligarchy was not like to last, 
was it that most evidently encouraged them : and 
thereupon they every one contended who should 
most eminently become the patron of the people. 

90. But those of THE FOUR HUNDRED that 
were most opposite to such a form of government, 
and the principal of them ; both Phrynichus, who 
had been general at Samos and was ever since 2 at 
difference with Alcibiades ; and Aristarchus, a man 
that had been an adversary to the people both in 
the greatest manner and for the longest time ; and 
Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest 
power, not only formerly, as soon as they entered 
into authority, and afterwards when the state at 
Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to 
Lacedsemon and bestirred themselves for the oli- 
The oiigarchais garchy 3 , and built a wall in the place called Eetio- 

mon, lest without the authority of 
the majority (of the oligarchy) they 
should do the state some mischief, 
avowed frankly, not indeed that 
they were desirous of ridding them- 
selves of the domination of a nar- 
row oligarchy, but that the 5000 
ought to be constituted in reality 
and not in name only, and a more 
equal politeia established. Such 
was their political pretence in words. 
But the most of them through pri- 
vate ambition were intent upon 
that, by which" &c. Goell. They 
feared, or affected to fear, that the 

ambassadors sent to Lacedaernon 
had some secret instructions from 
the small minority who had assumed 
all the powers of government, to 
concert measures for betraying the 
city into the enemy's hand. Thirl, 
ch. xxviii.] 

1 [" A man more easily brooks 
want of success, as being the result 
of inferior deserts". Goell.] 

8 [TOTS : " who was at difference 
&c. at the time of his command at 

3 [" For peace". Bekk. &c., rjv 
6/AoXoytay : vulgo, rrjv 


neia: but much more afterwards, when their V in. 
ambassadors were come from Samos. and that - ' s 


they saw not only the populars, but also some A.c4ii. 
others of their own party thought trusty before, to fortifythe mouth 
be now changed. And to Lacedsemon they sent ^ 
Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten others with all 
possible speed, as fearing their adversaries 1 both 
at home and at Samos, with commission to make 
a peace with the Lacedaemonians on any tolerable 
conditions, whatsoever or howsoever : and in this 
time went on with the building of the wall in 
Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The 
scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by 
Theramenes 2 [the son of Agnon], was not so much 
to keep out those of Samos, in case they should 
attempt by force to enter into Peirseus, as at their 
pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and 
the land-forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia 
is the pier 3 of the Peiraeus, close unto which is the 
mouth of the haven. And therefore they built 
this wall so to another wall that was built before 
to the continent, that a few men lying within it 
might command the entrance. For the end of 

1 [" The state of affairs".] the point where the mole touched 

2 [" And those with him 1 '.] the ordinary line of coast, intended 

3 [ u Is a pier &c." The city to cover the place from an enemy 
walls being carried down to either attacking from without. The " new 
side of the harbour's mouth, were wall" was to secure their fort on 
prolonged thence across the mouth the mole from an attack from Pei- 
upon moles, until a passage only rasus or the interior of the harbour, 
was left in the middle for two or And the object was to isolate Eetio- 
three triremes abreast between two neia like a castle, cut off from the 
towers, the opening of which might harbour by the new wall, as it was 
be further secured by a chain, from the country on the outside by 
Leake's Topography of Athens. the old wall. The city might now at 
The " old wall" ran inland from any time be reduced byfaurine. Ar.] 




against their 
iortilyiiifr in 

each wall was brought to the tower upon the 
[very] mouth of the haven 1 , as well of the old 
wall towards the continent as of the new which 
was built within it to the water. They built also 
an open ground-gallery, an exceeding great one 
and close to their new wall within Peiraeus : and 
were masters of it, and constrained all men as 
well to bring thither their corn which they had 
already come in, as to unload 2 there whatsoever 
should come in afterward ; arid to take and sell it 
from thence. 

91. These things Theramenes murmured at long 
before : and when the ambassadors returned from 
Lacedsemon without compounding for them all in 
general, he gave out that this wall would endanger 
the undoing of the city. For at this very instant 
there happened to be riding on the coast of Laco- 
nia forty-tw T o galleys, amongst which were some 
of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and 
some Sicilians 8 ; set out from Peloponnesus at the 
instance of the Euboeans, bound for Eubcea and 
commanded by Hegesandridas the son of Hege- 
sander, a Spartan. And these Theramenes said 
were coming, not so much towards Eubcea, as 
towards those that fortified in Eetioneia : and that 
if they were not looked to, they would surprise 
the city 4 . Now some matter might indeed be 

1 [" Which was narrow".] 

2 [IZaipeiaQcu. Locus Athenis 
erat laipi<ric dictus : quod illic 
exemias navibus aut curribus sar- 
cinas seponerent. Hudson.] 

3 [" All this then was denounced 
by Theramenes both long before, 
and again when the ambassadors 

returned &c.: saying, that this wall 
would endanger &c." " Riding at 
Las in Laconia" ** some from Ta- 
rentum and Locri, Italiots and 

4 [" If they were not looked to, 
they (in the city) would be destroyed 
ere they were aware".] 


gathered also from those that were accused : so 

that it was not a mere slander. For their prin- ~ ' * 

1 T YKAR XXl< 

cipal design was, to retain the oligarchy with A.CUII. 
dominion over their confederates: but if they The scope of the 
failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys and 
of the fortification, to have subsisted free them- 
selves : if barred of that, then rather than to be 
the only men to suffer death under the restored 
democracy, to let in the enemy ; and without either 
navy or fortification to have let what would have 
become of the city, and to have compounded for the 
safety of their own persons 1 . 92. Therefore they 
went diligently on with the fortification, wherein 
were wickets and entries and back ways for the 
enemy : and desired to have it finished in time. 
And though these things were spoken but amongst 
a few before and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, murcere * 
after his return from his Lacedaemonian ambas- 
sage, was by a certain watchman 2 wounded 
treacherously in the market-place when it was 
full, as he went from the council-house, and not 
far from it fell instantly dead, and the murtherer 
gone ; and that one of his complices, an Argive, 
taken by THE FOUR HUNDRED and put to the 
torture, would confess no man of those named to 
him, nor anything else saving this, that many men 
used to assemble at the house of the captain of 

1 (" To let in the enemy, and would confess the name of no one 

compound for the city, to do as it as the instigator, nor aught else 

might without walls or ships, so save this &c." By the Peripolarrh , 

that they at least might have secu- Goeller understands, not the " cap- 

rity for their own persons". Goell.] tain of the watch", but the prefect 

3 [" By one of the peripoli ; of the ephebi, that is, of the peri- 

and the murderer escaped, but his poli : though the name peripolarch 

accomplice, an Argive, taken c., belonged equally to both.] 


viii. the watch and at other houses : then at length, 
- ' * because this accident bred no alteration, Thera- 


A.C.4H. menes and Aristocrates, and as many other, either 

OL. 92 1 

' of THE FOUR HUNDRED or out of that number, as 
were f the same faction, proceeded more boldly 

against the rest ^o assault the government. For now also the fleet 

oftheFour . 

Hundred. being come about from Lacoma , and lying upon 
the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon 
^Egina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged, that 
it was improbable that those galleys holding their 
course for Euboea, would have put in at ^Egina 
and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, 
unless they had been sent for by such men as he 
had ever accused of the same : and that therefore 
there was no reason any longer to sit still. And 
in the end, after many seditious and suspicious 
speeches, they fell upon the state in good earnest. 
For the soldiers that were in Peirseus employed in 
fortifying Eetioneia, (amongst whom was also 
Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his 
band with him 2 ), seized on Alexicles, principal 
commander of the soldiers under THE FOUR 
HUNDRED, an eminent man of the other side : and 
carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. As 
soon as the news hereof was brought unto THE 
FOUR HUNDRED, who chanced at the same time 
to be sitting in the council-house, they were ready 

1 [" From Las."] And there aided them in this, inore- 

2 ["For the soldiers &c., amongst over, one Hermon, commander of 
whom was Aristocrates, a taxiarch, the peripoli stationed at Munychia : 
at the head of his own 0vX) (vi. 08, and what was more, the hulk of the 
n.), seized on Alexicles, a general hoplites assented to it all. As soon 
of the oligarchy and much given to as the news hereof* was brought 
the clubs (firai/oovc), and carrying &c/ ; Bekker c., traipovc : vulgo, 
him into a house kept him in hold. 


all of them presently to have taken arms l , threat- vm. 
ening Therameiies and his faction. He to purge 
himself was ready to go with them and to help to 
rescue Alexicles : and taking with him one of the 
commanders who was also of his faction, went 
down into Peirseus. To help him went also Aris- 
tarchus, and certain horsemen of the younger sort. 
Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the 
city they thought Peirseus was already taken ; and 
him that was laid in hold, slain : and in Peiraeus, 
they expected every hour the power of the city to 
come upon them. At last the ancient men, stop- 
ping them that ran up and down the city to arm 
themselves ; and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the 
city's host, being then there, going boldly and close 
up to every one he met, and crying out unto them 
not to destroy their country when the enemy lay 
so near waiting for an advantage : with much ado 
quieted them, and held their hands from spilling 
their own blood. Theramenes coming into Peirteus, 
(for he also had command over the soldiers), made 
a shew by his exclaiming of being angry with 
them : but Aristarchus and those that were of the 
contrary side, were extremely angry in good ear- 
nest. Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their 
business, and repented not a jot of what they had 
done 2 . Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought 

1 [" They were ready, all but for the arms, and Thucydides &c., 
such as were dissatisfied with the who was there, being active in stop- 
state of things, to run to the arms ping every man he met &c., they 
(that is to say, where they were became pacified and held <Scc. And 
piled) : threatening, &c." Theramenes coming to .Peirseus, 

2 [*' But the ancient men with being himself also a general, made 
difficulty hindering those that were a shew <Scc. : but Aristarchus arcd 
running about the city and making those opposed to the multitude were 

E E 2 


vni. tliis fortification were made to any good end, and 
TAB xxT" wither it were not better to have it demolished. 
A.c.411. And he answered, that if they thought good to 
demolish it, he also thought the same. At which 
The sobers pnii word they presently got up, both the soldiers and 
m also man y others of Peireus, and fell a digging 
down of the wall. Now the provocation that they 
used to the multitude, was in these words : " that 
whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be 
HUNDRED, ought also to set himself to the w r ork 
in hand." For notwithstanding all this, they 
thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the 
name of THE FIVE THOUSAND ; and not to say 
plainly whosoever will have the sovereignty in the 
people: lest THE FIVE THOUSAND should have 
been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to 
some or other of them, might do hurt to the busi- 
ness through ignorance. And for this cause it was 
that THE FOUR HUNDRED would neither let THE 
FIVE THOUSAND be extant, nor yet let it be known 
that they were not. For to make so many partici- 
pant of the affairs of state, they thought was a 
direct democracy : but to have it doubtful, would 
make them afraid of one another. 

93. The next day, THE FOUR HUNDRED, though 
out of order ^ yet met together in the council- 
house, and the soldiers in Peirseus, having enlarged 
Alexicles whom they had before imprisoned, and 
quite razed the fortification, carne into the theatre 

in high wrath. But the hoplites Bekker &c,, r(f 7r\r/0 : vulgo, r<j> 

went to work most of them all the a\tj0ei. 

same, and listened to nothing:, and J [*' In perturbation as they 

asked Theramenes whether &c." were, yet " &c.] 


of Bacchus near to Munychia, and there sat down 
with their arms : and presently, according as they 
had resolved in an assembly then holden, marched 
into the city, and there sat down again in the 
temple of Castor and Pollux 1 . To this place came 
unto them certain men elected by THE FOUR HUN- 
DRED, and man to man reasoned and persuaded 
with such as they saw to be of the mildest temper, 
both to be quiet themselves and to restrain the 
rest : saying, that not only THE FIVE THOUSAND 
should be made known who they were, but that out 
of these such should be chosen in turns to be of THE 


think good : and entreating them by all means 

that they would not in the meantime overthrow 

the city, and force it into the hand of the enemy. 

Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, 

after many reasons alleged to many men, grew 

calmer : and feared most 2 the loss of the whole 

city. And it was agreed betwixt them, that an A day appointed 

assembly should be held for making of accord JXwtato tnt' 

in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned. of agreement. 

1 [" And piled their anus, and already established at Amy else, 

held an assembly : and it being so Therapne, and other places : and 

resolved, marched straightway to was perhaps founded in the ancient 

the city, and there piled their arms Peloponnesian worship of the great 

in the Anaceium." The Anaceium gods or Cabin, which in time be- 

was the temple of Castor and Pol- came transferred to the human 

lax, so called from their Pelopon- Tyndarida;. Their images were 

nesian name avarec, one the mean- two upright beams with two others 

ing of which is not settled (see laid across them, called SoKava: 

Plut. Thes.). The worship of the one or both of their statues accum- 

Tyndarida? is not of Dorian origin, panied every military expedition, 

although they were considered as according as one or both of the 

the leaders cf the Spartan army. It kings went with the army. See 

was found by the Dorians at the time Muell. ii. 10.} 

of their entrance into Peloponnesus 3 [" Feared very much."] 




The battle be 

94. When they came to the temple of Bacchus, 
and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came 
news that Hegesandridas with his forty-two galleys 
came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis. 
And now there was not a soldier 1 but thought it 
the very same thing that Theramenes and his party 
had before told them, " that those galleys were to 
come to the fortification", and that it was now 
demolished to good purpose. But Hegesandridas, 
perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the 
coast of Epidaurus and thereabouts: but 'it is 
likely that in respect of the sedition of the Athen- 
ians he stayed in those parts, with hope to take 
hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was, 
the Athenians as soon as it was told them, ran 
presently with all the power of the city down to 
Peiraeus : less esteeming their domestic war than 
that of the common enemy, which was not now far 
off, but even in the haven 2 . And some went aboard 
the galleys that were then ready, some launched 
the rest ; and others ran to defend the walls and 
mouth of the haven. 

95. But the Peloponncsian galleys being now 3 
t g one by an d gotten about the promontory of Su- 

n * um > cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasise, 
and put in afterwards at Oropus. The Athenians 
with all speed, constrained to make use of tumult- 

1 [Popp. Goell. Am. : r&v iro\- 
Xcov, " and every one of the many 
thought" : vulgo et Bekk. ruv 

at the very mouth of their harbour." 
The sense required seems to be that 
of Arnold : " seeing that a foreign 
war, greater than their domestic 
one, was not far off, hut " &c.] 

3 [" Sailing by, and doubling the 
foreign enemy, was not far off but promontory " &c.] 

8 [Literally, " As their domestic 
war, greater than that from their 


uary forces 1 , such as a city in time of sedition might vin. 
afford, and desirous with all haste to make good 
their greatest stake, (for Eubcea, since they were 
shut out of Attica, was all they had), sent a fleet 
under the command of Timocharis to Eretria. 
Which arriving, with those galleys that were in 
Eubcea before, made up the number of six-and- 
thirty sail. And they were presently constrained 
to hazard battle : for Hegesandridas brought out 
his galleys from Oropus, when he had first there 
dined. Now Oropus is from Eretria about three- 
score furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians 
also, as the enemy came towards them, began to 
embark : supposing that their soldiers had been 
somewhere near unto the galleys. But it fell out 
that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, 
not in the market; (for by set purpose of the 
Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall 
upon the Athenians that embarked slowly before 
they were ready, and force them to come out and 
fight 2 , nothing was there to be sold) ; but in the 
utmost houses of the city. There was besides a 
sign set up at Eretria, to give them notice at 
Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athen- The Athenians 
ians drawn out by this device 3 , and fighting before defeated - 
the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless 
for a while : but afterwards they turned their 
backs, and were chased ashore. Such as fled to 
the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, 

1 [ " Raw and undisciplined Eubwa, cut off' as Attica was, was 

forces, as would be the case the every thing to them): sent" &c.] 
city being- in sedition and they 2 [" Just as they were".] 
wishing to send speedy aid in a 3 ["Putting to sea in this un- 

inatter of the last importance : (for prepared state".] 


viii. were handled most cruelly, and slaughtered by 
them of the town ; but such as got to the fort in 
Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved them- 
selves : and so did so many of their galleys as got 
to Chalcis. 

The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twen- 
ty-two Athenian galleys with the men, whereof 
some they slew and some they took prisoners, 
erected a trophy : and not long after having caused 
all Euboea to revolt, save only Oreus, which the 
Athenians held with their own forces 1 , they settled 
the rest of their business there. 
The lamentable 96. When the news of that which had happened 
Euboea was brought to Athens, it put the Athen- 
f * ans * n * ^ e g reatest astonishment that ever they 
had been in before. For neither did their loss in 
Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at 
any time so much affright them as this. For now 
when the army at Samos w r as in rebellion, when 
they had no more galleys nor men to put aboard, 
when they were in sedition amongst themselves 
and in continual expectation of falling together by 
the ears : then in the neck of all arrived this great 
calamity ; wherein they not only lost their galleys, 
but also, which was worst of all, Euboea, by which 
they [had] received more commodity than by Attica. 
How then could they choose but be dejected ? But 
most of all they were troubled, and that for the 
nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the 
enemy should take courage and come immediately 
into Peiraeus, now empty of shipping : of which they 

1 [" For of this the Athenians there by Pericles after -the last re- 
held possession themselves '\ The covery of the island in 445. See i. 
Athenian cUruchi,oi settlers planted 114. Arnold.] 


thought nothing wanting, but that they were not vnr. 
there already. And had they been anything ad- VEAR X x7 
venturous, they might easily have done it: and AXMH. 
then 1 , had they stayed there and besieged them, 
they had not only increased the sedition, but also 
compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia to the {^^f 
aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though cutiorl of the 

J . victory they had 

enemies to the oligarchy; and in the meantime come toPeiram*. 
gotten the Hellespont, Ionia, the Islands, and all 
places even to Eubcea, and, as one may say, the 
whole Athenian empire into their power. But the 
Lacedaemonians, not only in this but in many other l 
things, were most commodious enemies to the Atbenittns - 
Athenians to war withal. For being of most dif- 
ferent humours ; the one swift, the other slow ; the 
one adventurous, the other timorous ; the Lacedae- 
monians gave them great advantage, especially 
when their greatness was by sea. This was evi- 
dent in the Syracusians : who being in condition 
like unto them, warred best against them. 

97- The Athenians upon this news made ready, The Athenians 
notwithstanding, twenty galleys; and called a 
assembly, one then presently in the place called 
Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other 

J . i i i -i T Four Hundred, 

times: in which having deposed THE FOUR HUN- andspttinguptiie 

,1 i 1,1 * , Five Thousand. 

DRED, they decreed the sovereignty to THE FIVE 
THOUSAND ; of which number were all such to be, 
as were charged with arms : and from that time 
forward to salariate no man for magistracy ; with 
a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary, 
to be held for an execrable person. There were 

1 ["And then had they, either by the city, or stayed and besieged them, 
lyinc 1 off the Peineus raised to a they had forced the fleet, though 
still greater height the sedition of enemies &c., to come away &c."] 




also divers other assemblies held afterwards ; 
wherein they elected law-makers, and enacted 
other things concerning the government 1 . And 
now first (at least in my time) the Athenians 
seem to have ordered their state aright: which 
consisted now of a moderate temper, both of tlie 
few and of the many. And this was the first 
thing, that after so many misfortunes past made 
the city again to raise her head. 

They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, 
and those that were in exile with him : and send- 
ing to him and to the army at Samos, willed them 
to fall in hand with their business. 

98. In this change Pisander and Alexicles, and 
such as were with them, and they that had been 
principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew 
themselves to Deceleia. Only Aristarchus (for it 

betray ethCEnoe. c ] iance( J ^j J )e ^ad c h ar g e o f the Soldiers) took 

with him certain archers of the most barbarous 2 , 
and went with all speed to GSnoe. This was a 
fort of the Athenians in the confines of Boeotia ; 
and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received 

They recall 

Most of the 
oligarchical^ fly 
to the enemy. 


1 [" Wherein they made framers 
of the constitution, and passed other 
votes for establishing thepolitcia:" 
i>ojio0rac, corresponding to the 
Kvyypaftic of the oligarchy in ch.07. 
Arn. *' And at the first, the Athen- 
ians seem, within my time at least, 
to have ordered their affairs better 
by far than at any other time". Thu- 
cydides here, as in ch. 89, seems to 
use the word iro\irtia in the same 
sense in which it is used by Aris- 
totle (Hi. 5): '6rav Si rb irXijQoG 
irpbe rb KOIVQV TroXtrevijrot Wfi^cpoi', 

KoXilrat rb KOIVOV ovofia iraffaiv TUV 
TToXirtiuiv, 7roXiTta. And the chief 
requisite of Aristotle's politeia is 
also found in the present Athenian 
constitution : dibmp KOT& ra\)ri\v 
ri\v 7ro\iTeiav KVpt&rctTOv rb irpofro- 
XJLIO>I/, /cat fjurk-^ovffiv CIVTTJC ot - 
KTijfiBvoi rd oTrXa.] 

2 [Designat ministros publicos, 
qui ro^orat Athenis vocabantur. 
Erant enim hoc genus fere barbari: 
unde et Scythae dicti. Duker. They 
were at first 300: afterwards raised 
to 1200. Herm. 129.] 


by the garrison of (Enoe 1 ) was by voluntary Co- vin. 
rinthians, and by some Boeotians by them called in 
to aid them, now besieged. Aristarchus therefore 
having treated with these, deceived those in (Enoe : 
and told them, that the city of Athens*had com- 
pounded with the Lacedsemonians, and that they 
were to render up the place to the Boeotians ; for 
that it was so conditioned in the agreement. 
Whereupon, believing him as one that had autho- 
rity over the soldiery, and knowing nothing because 
besieged, upon security for their pass theyjgave,up 
the fort. So the Boeotians receive CEnoe : and the 
oligarchy and sedition at Athens cease. 

99. About the same time of this summer,Vhen 



none of those whom Tissaphernes at his"going*to 
Aspendus had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian 
navy at Miletus, did it ; and seeing neither the 
Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes came 2 to them; cianflcetcame 

-i i not, resolves to 

and seeing rhilip, that was sent along with him, go to Phama. 
and also another, one Hippocrates a Spartan that 
was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus the 
general, that the fleet was not to come at all and 
in every thing Tissaphernes abused them ; seeing 
also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was 
willing, upon the coming to him of their fleet, for 
his own part also as well as Tissaphernes, to' cause 
the rest of the cities within his own province to 
revolt from the Athenians : then at length, Min- 
darus hoping for benefit by him 3 , w r ith goodjorder 

1 ["And owing to an accident 2 ["No signs hitherto of either 

which befell them (the Corinthians) &c. coming".] 

of the slaughter hy those in (Enoe 3 [Seeing that Pharnabazus had 

of some of their men returning from sent &c., "and like Tissaphernes, 

Deceleia, was besieged by Ace. 11 ] was eager himself too to bring the 




.yllu. in the 
meantime out- 

goe* him, ami 

watches for his 

by t 

and sudden warning, that the Athenians at Samos 
might not be aware of their setting forth, went 
into the Hellespont with seventy-three galleys, 
besides sixteen which the same summer were gone 
into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part 1 of 
Chersonnesus. But tossed with the wind she was 
forced to put in at Icarus : and after he had stayed 
there through ill weather some five or six days, he 
arrived at Chios. 

100. Ttirasyllus having been advertised of his 
departure from Miletus, he also puts to sea from 

S amQS ^{^ fi ve an d fifty sa jl . haStillg tO be 111 tllC 

* " 

Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was 

. ~. . - t 11 i 

in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there, 
he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos and in the con- 
tinent over against it, that the fleet of the enemy 
might riot remove without his knowledge : and he 
himself going to Methymna, commanded provision 
to be made of meal, and other necessaries ; intend- 
ing, if they stayed there long, to go from Lesbos 
and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eres- 
sos was revolted from Lesbos 2 , he purposed to go 
thither with his fleet : if he could, to take it in. 
For the most potent of the Methymnsean exiles 
had gotten into their society about fifty men of 
arms 3 out of Cume, and hired others out of the 

fleet, and make the remaining cities 
of his own government to revolt, 
hoping to get something by it : 
then indeed Mindarus, with good 
order &c., went" &c.] 

1 ["A considerable part". For 
the 16 galleys, see ch. 102. The 
Hellespont and Bosporus, the great 
thoroughfare of Greek commerce, 
became at this time the principal 

tbeatre of the war: it was observed 
by Agis, that the issue of the 
struggle would depend on the corn- 
maud of it. Thirl, ch. xxix.] 

2 [" Kressos of Lesbos had re- 
vohed". eVc.] 

8 [" For the most potent Ace. had 
brought over from Cume about 50 
heavy -armed volunteers : and had 
hired others 


continent : and with their whole number in all 
three hundred, having for their leader Anaxarchus 
a Theban, chosen in respect of their descent from 
the Thebans 1 , first assaulted Methymna. But 
beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison 
that came against them from Mytilene, and again 
in a skirmish without the city driven quite away, 
they passed by the way of the mountain to Eressos, 
and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore in- 
tended to go thither with his galleys, and to assault 
it. At his coming he found Thrasybulus there also 
before him, with five galleys from Samos : for he 
had been advertised of the outlaws coming over ; 
but being too late to prevent them, he went to 
Eressos and lay before it at anchor. Hither also 
came two galleys of Methymna, that were going 
home from the Hellespont : so that they were in 
all threescore and seven sail, out of which they 
made an army, intending with engines, or any 
other way they could, to take Eressos by assault 2 . 
101. In the meantime, Mindarus and the Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet that was at Chios, when they had 
spent two days in victualling their galleys, and had J 
received of the Chians three Chian tessaracoste 
a man, on the third day put speedily off from 

1 [" Anaxander a Theban: ships must have been five, to make 

their relationship to the Thebans": 67 in all.] 

see iii. 2, note. Bekk. &C M dvagav- * A te&saraco&te seemeth to have 

fyoC : vulgo, dvagapgou.] been a coin amongst the Chians, 

3 [" To these were added two ships and the fortieth part of some greater 

returning from the Hellespont, and coin. [Like the Errai ^awat&c. If 

the Methymnajan ships; so that it was the fortieth part of the stater, 

they were in all &c.: with the land- its value would be about 3 oboli : 

forces of which they prepared, with and the whole would be 3 days' pay, 

engines &c." The Melhymna>an at 8 oboli a-day. Am.] 


vi ir. Chios : and kept far 1 from the shore, that they 
YEAR xxi HH&h* not &M amongst the galleys at Eressos. 
A.C.4H. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the 

Oi*. 92 2. 

continent side : and putting in at a haven in Cra- 
terei 2 , belonging to the territory of Phocaea, and 
there dining, passed along the territory of Cume, 
and came to Arginusae in the continent over 
against Mytilene, where they supped. From 
thence they put forth late in the night, and came 
to Harmatus, a place in the continent over against 
Methymna : and after dinner going a great pace 
by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and other the 
towns in those parts, came before midnight to 
Rhoeteium ; this now is in Hellespont 3 . But some 
of his galleys put in at Sigeium, and other places 
The Athenians ^ 2 - The Athenians that lay with eighteen gal- 

with j eys at Sestos, knew that the Peloponnesians were 

eighteen galleys J * * 

teai out of the entering into the Hellespont by the fires, both 
n- those which their own watchmen put up, and by 

man Y which appeared on the enemies' shore : 
and therefore the same night in all haste, as they 
were, kept the shore of Chersonnesus towards 
Elseus, desiring to get out into the wide sea and 
to decline the fleet of the enemy : and went out 
unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydos 4 , 
though these had warning before from the fleet of 
their friends that came on, to watch them narrowly 
that they went not out. But in the morning, 
being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus and 

1 [" Kept no* far c." Bekk. &c., 8 [" Carteria". Bekker 

06 irtXayi/w: vulgo, om. oi>. If * [" And were then in* the Hel- 

tlicy left Lesbos on the left hand, lespont".] 

they were not far from the shore.] 4 (\See chap. 90.] 


chased by him, they could not all escape, but the VHI. 
most of them got to the continent and into Lem- 
nos ; only four of the hindmost were taken near 
Elaeus : whereof the Peloponnesians took one with 
the men in her, that had run herself aground at 
the temple of Protesilaus ; and two other without 
the men ; and set fire on a fourth, abandoned upon 
the shore of Imbros. 

103. After this they besieged Elaeus the same 
day, with those galleys of Abydos which were with 
them 1 , and with the rest, being now altogether 
fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not 
yield, they went away to Abydos. 

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their The Athenian* 
spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet 
could have gone by without their knowledge, and } 
attended at leisure the assault of Eressos : when 
now they knew they were gone, immediately left 
Eressos and hasted to the defence of Hellespont. 
By the way they took two galleys of the Pelopon- 
nesians, that having ventured into the main more 
boldly in following the enemy than the rest had 
done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athen- 
ians. The next day they came to Elaeus, and 
stayed : and thither from Imbros came unto them 
those other galleys that had escaped from the 
enemy. Here they spent five days in preparation 
for a battle 2 . 

104. After this, they fought in this manner. 
The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their 
galleys one by one, towards Sestos. The Pelopon- 
nesians also, when they saw this, brought out 
their fleet against them from Abydos. 

1 [" Which joined them".] * [ u For the battle".] 


viir. Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in 

VKAK xx r length, the Athenians along the shore of Cherson- 
A.a4ii. nesus, beginning at Idacus and reaching as far as 
The Athenians Arrhiana, threescore and six 1 galleys: and the 
Peloponnesians, from Abydos to Dardanum, four- 
score an d s * x2 galley 8 - In the right wing of the 
Peloponnesians, were the Syracusians : in the other, 
Mindarus himself, arid those galleys that were 
nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had 
the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right : and the 
rest of the commanders, every one the place 
assigned him. 

Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the 
first onset, and with their left wing to over-reach 
the right wing of the Athenians and keep them 
from going out 3 , and to drive those in the middle 
to the shore which was near. The Athenians, who 
perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut 
off their way out, put forth the same way that they 
did, and outwent them : the left wing of the 
Athenians was also gone forward by this time be- 
yond the point called Cynos-sema 4 . By means 
whereof that part of the fleet which was in the 
middest became both weak and divided, especially 
when theirs was the less fleet : and the sharp and 
angular figure of the place about Cynos-serna, took 
away the sight of what passed there from those 
that were on the other side. 

105. The Peloponnesians therefore, charging 

1 [Bekk.&e.,"76": vulgo,"86."] from getting out": that is, out of the 

8 [Vulgo et Bekk. " 68": Goell. strait.] 

"88" AID. Thirl. " 86". See chap- 4 [So called from Hecuba, who 

ter 103.] was changed into a dog and died 

3 [ u To keep them, if they could, there. See Eurip. Hecuba,1245-55.] 


this middle part, both drave their galleys to the viir. 
dry land: arid being far superior in fight, went "T^T" 
out after them and assaulted them upon the shore. A cm. 

Oi 92 U 

And to help them neither was Thrasybnlus able 
who was in the right wing, for the multitude of 
the enemies that pressed him ; nor Thrasyllus in 
the left wing, both because he could not see what 
was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema, and 
because also he was kept from it by the Syracu- 
sians and others, lying upon his hands no fewer in 
number than themselves. Till at last the Pelopon- 
nesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one 
galley some another, fell into some disorder in a 
part 1 of their army. And then those about Thra- 
sybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys 
sought now no more to go beyond them, turned 
upon them ; and fighting put them presently to 
flight'^: and having also cut off from the rest of 
the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians, of that 
part that had the victory, as were scattered abroad, 
some they assaulted 3 , but the greatest number they 
put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians 
also, whom those about Thrasyllus had already 
caused to shrink, when they saw the rest fly fled 

106. This defeat being given, and the Pel opon- The courage of 

, . ^ , M , n A A the Athenians 

nesians having for the most part escaped first to erected with am 
the river Pydius 4 , and afterwards to Abydos : victoiy - 
though the Athenians took but few of their galleys, 

1 [" A considerable part".] straight to flight".] 

2 [" And then Thrasyhulus, de- 3 [" They beat them, and the 
sisting now from the attempt to greatest part" &c.] 

outgo the kft wing of the Pelopon- 4 [Bekker &c., psiSwv: vul^o, 
nesians, turned and attacked the irvhov. Nothing is known of either 
ships opposed to him, and put them name.] 

yoL. ix. FF 


VIIT. (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to 
the enemy a short retreat), yet the victory was the 
most seasonable to them that could be. For having 
till this day stood in fear of the Peloponriesian 
navy, both for the loss which they had received by 
little and little and also for their great loss in 
Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves, 
or to think highly any longer of the naval power 
of their enemies. The galleys they took were 
these : eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia 
two 1 , of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, 
one a-piece. Of their own they lost fifteen. 

When they had set up a trophy in the promon- 
tory of Cynos-sema, and taken up the wrecks, and 
given trace to the enemies to fetch away the 
bodies of their dead : they presently sent away a 
galley with a messenger to carry news of the vic- 
tory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming 
in of this galley hearing of their unexpected good 
fortune, were encouraged much after their los$ in 
Eubcea and after their sedition : and conceived 
that their estate might yet keep up, if they plied 
the business courageously. 

The Athpnians 107 ' The fourth day after this battle, the Athen- 
' i ans ^ iat were m Sestos having hastily prepared 2 

gaiiey s of the their fleet, went to Cyzicus, which was revolted: 

Pelopoimesiaua, J 

and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys 
come from Byzantium riding under Harpagium 
and Priapus, set upon them : and having also over- 
come those that came to their aid from the land, 
took them 3 . Then corning to Cyzicus, being 

1 [ u And of Bceotia two".] men on shore, took the -ships": for 

2 [ t; Repaired".] ' the ships, see eh. 80. At Harpag- 

3 ["And having overpowered the turn is said to have taken place the 


an open town, they brought it again into their vin. 
own power ; and levied a sum of money amongst " ' * 
them. A.c.411." 

The Peloponnesians 1 in the meantime going from The reioponnei 
Abydos to Elaeus, recovered as many of their gal- lomVonheL 
leys [formerly] taken as remained whole: the $ ***"*** 
rest, the Elseusians [had] burnt. They also sent They send for 
Hippocrates and Epicles into Eubcea, to fetch away ^^dn-das 
the fleet that was there. outofEuua. 

108. About the same time also, returned Alci- Aidbiades 
blades to Samos with his thirteen galleys 2 from A^^ fnm 
Caunus and Phaselis : reporting that he had di- Sam 8 - 
verted the Phoenician fleet from coming to the 
Peloponnesians, and that he had inclined Tissa- 
phernes to the friendship of the Athenians more 
than he was before. Thence manning out nine 
galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money of 
the Hallicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. Being 
now almost autumn, he returned to Samos 3 . 

The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, 
the Antandrians (who are ^Eoliaus) received into risen of xL^" 
the city men of arms 4 from Abydos by land through j^ 
mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them 
by Arsaces, a deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes. 
This Arsaces having feigned a certain war, not 
declared against whom, had formerly called out 

rape (apiray^) of Ganymede.] to Samos. And Tissaphernes, when 

1 [" But the Peloponnesians too he heard of the sailing of the Polo- 
&c." The Athenians had left their ponnesian ships from Miletus to the 
prizes at Elseus, which was their Hellespont, returned from Aspen- 
station before the battle.] dus to Ionia. Whilst the Pelo- 

2 [See ch. 88.] ponnesians were in the Hellespont, 
8 [" Having so done, and esta- the Antandrians &c. n ] 

Wished a governor in Cos, being 4 [" Whom they had transported 

now almost autumn he returned from Abydos &c."] 

F F 2 

8 OUt of 



viii. the chiefest of the Delians (the which in hallowing 
of Delos by the Athenians were turned out, and 
had planted themselves in Adramyttium) to go 
with him to this war : and when under colour of 
amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he 
observed a time when they were at dinner, and 
having hemmed them in with his own soldiers 
murdered them with darts. And therefore, for 
this act's sake fearing lest he might do some 
unlawful prank against them also, and for that he 
had otherwise done them injury 1 , they cast his 
garrison out of their citadel. 

109. Tissaphernes, hearing of this, being the 
ac t of the Peleponnesians as well as that at Miletus 

r the favour of or fa a t at Cnidus ; (for in those cities his garrisons 

the Peloponnes- ' v 

iaiw. had also been cast out in the same manner ) ; and 

conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, 
and fearing lest they should do him some other 
hurt ; and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus 
should receive them, and with less time and cost 
speed better against the Athenians than he had 
done : resolved to make a journey to them in the 
Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at 
Antandros, and to clear himself of his accusations 
the best he could, as well concerning the Phoeni- 
cian fleet as other matters. And first he put in at 
Ephesus, and offered sacrifices to Diana 3 . 

1 ["And for that he imposed 3 [The great goddess of the Ephe- 
upon them other intolerable griev- sians. The many-sided divinity of 
ances, they cast &c."] Ephesus was much less a Grecian 

2 ["Tissaphernes, seeing that this than an Asiatic goddess, and was 
too was the work of the Pelopon- intimately allied with the leading 
nesians, and not only that at Mile- personages of the Persian theology. 
tus and Cnidus : for &c." For the Thirl, ch. xxix. See iii. 104, the 
garrison at Miletus, see ch. 84.] latter part of the note.] 



When the winter following this summer shall be vin. 
ended, the one-and-twentieth year fof this war! " * 

, .. . 1,1 J The end of the 

shall be complete . 

tieth summer. 

1 [Goeller considers this last sen- 
tence as spurious : because, if genu- 
ine, Tbucydides, when he wrote it, 
must either have abandoned the 
idea of continuing the history, or 
have noted the year for fear of for- 
getting it. The whole of this eighth 
book has been denied by some of 
the ancient writers, all later than 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to be 
the work of Thucydides : and has 
been variously ascribed to his 
daughter, to Thcopoinpus, and to 
Xenophon : to the latter, owing to 
his own history being, as was sup- 
posed, connected with that of Thu- 
cydides by the phrase with which 
it commences, ptTd. ravra. One 
of the main arguments adduced 
against its authenticity, is the ab- 
sence in this book of all speeches. 
To this it is replied, that the pur- 
pose for which the speeches are in- 
troduced in the former books, the 
description of the characters, man- 
ners and civil constitutions of the 
belligerent nations, was already 

answered : and that of the charac- 
ters that appear in this book, except 
Alcibiades, already sufficiently de- 
scribed, none are of any great note : 
and that at Athens with the entrance 
of the oligarchy vanished all liberty 
of speech. Goeller observes that 
this latter part of the history is 
certainly less highly finished : yet, 
but for the absence of speeches, the 
critics would not readily have ad- 
j udged it to be less perfect than the 
rest : and he adds " ultimuin librum 
Thucydidis esse, vix jam a quo- 
quam duhitatur". With respect to 
the supposition of Xenophon being 
the author of this book, and that his 
own history beginning with /iera 
ravra is an immediate continuation 
of it ; it is observed by Mr. Thirl- 
wall, that it is certain that an inter- 
val of five or six weeks must have 
intervened between the last event 
here related and that with which 
Xenopbon's narrative opens : and 
that it seems clear that the begin- 
ning of his work has been lost. 




ABAH, a city of the Loerians of Opus, 
confining on Hiampolis, which is a city of 
Phocts. Pans, in Phoe. 

ARDKRA, a city situate next beyond the 
river Nestus, towards the wist. Strab. \ii. 
Kpit. Nestus a ri ver of the territory of Ab- 
dera. Herod. ui. 

ABYDON, a city on the entrance of Hel- 
lespont, between Lampsacus and Ilium, 
equally distant from both. In sight of 
Ilium, and is distant from the mouth of 
the river -ICsepus by sea TOO furlongs. 
Strab. xiii. 

ACAXTHUP, a city near to the isthmus 
of mount Athos, and (as in Strtib. \ii. Kp.) 
in the bay of Singus. But it appeareth by 
Herod, vii. that it lieth on the other side, 
in the bay of Strynion ; where he saith, 
that the isthmus of mount Athos is of 12 
furlongs length, and reacheth from Acan- 
thus to the sea that lieth before Torone. 
And in another place of the same book 
he saith, that the fleet of Xerxes sailed 
through the ditch (which Xerxes had 
caused to be made through the said isth- 
mus) from Acanthus, into the bay, in 
which are these cities, Singus, &e. 

ACARNANIA, a region in Greece, divided 
fromKpirus bvthe bay of Ambraeia. Polyb, 
iv. It reacheth from Ambraeia to the ri\er 
Achelous ; and is divided from the ^Ktoli- 
ans by Achelous. Strab. x. 

AciivKUM, a city of Troas, opposite to 
the isle Tenedos, Strab. xiii. 

ACHAIA, a region of Peloponnesus, con- 
fining on Elis, Arcadia, and Sicyonia : 
bounded on one side with Elis, at the pro- 
montory of Araxus, and on the other side 
with the territory of Sieyon. Strab. viii. It 
hath in it 12 cities in this order, begin- 
ning at that part which conftneth on Sicy- 
onia: Pellene, JEgine, VEgffs Bum, Helicc, 
-<Egiiim, Khypes, Patra% Pharas Olenus, 

Dyme, Tritsea, Herod, i. Strab. ix. It is 
also a part of Thes*aly, in which are the 
PhlhioUe. Herod, vii. Strab. ix. 

ACHARNJE, a town of Attica, distant 

from Athens about 60 furlongs; Thuc. ii: 

and lieth toward the north of it, as may be 

collected out of the narration of the jour- 

, ney of Archidamus with his army. Ib. 

! ArHKLors, a river that riseth in the 

| mountain Pindus, and running through the 

i territories of Agneis and Amphilochia, 

and by the city of Stratus, divideth the 

maritime parts of Actirnania from ^tolia. 

Strab. x. Achelous riseth in Pindus, and 

! runneth through Dolopia, Agneis, Amphi- 

! lochia, by the city of Stratus, and by the 

| city (Knoiiis into the sea. Thuc. ii. extrem. 


a lake which issueth into the sea, near unto 
Chcimerinni, a promontory of Thesprotis: 
and into this lake falleth the river Ache- 
ron. Thuc. i. ACHERON cometh out of the 
lake Achcrttsifl, into the haven Glycys. Str. 
\ii, Acheron cometh out of Molossis, and 
falleth into the lake Acherusia, which Livy 
calleth the bay of Thesprotis : Liv. viii. 

ACRIJK, a city of Laconia; between it 
and G>thium the rher Kurotaa goeth out 
into the sea. Str. viii. From Helos, which 
is at the mouth of Eurotas, it is 30 furlongs 
distant, and from the promontory of Tse- 
narus 230 furlongs. Pans, in Lacon. 

ACRITAS, a promontory joining- to the 
territory of Met hone, and is the beginning 
of the bay of Messenia, Strab. viii. 

THOON. ACROTHOI are the people of a city 
in the territory of Acte, in which Acte is 
the mountain Athos. Thuc.iv. ACROTHOS 
is a promontory of mount Athos, towards 
the bay of Strynion. And ACROTHOON a 
city hTthe same. Herod, vii. Instead of this 
Acrothos and Acrothoon, PtoJomy hath 



Athosa, a city and promontory. ACROTON, 
a town on the top of mount Athos. PI in. iv. 
ACTK is that territory wherein standeth 
the mountain Athos, disjoined from the 
continent by a ditch made by the king of 
Persia, ami hath in it these cities: Sane, 
Dion, Thyssus, Cleome, Acrothoi, Olo- 
phyxus. Thuc. iv. 

ACTIUM. a temple of Apollo, upon the 
shore. It is situate where the bay of Am- 
bracia is narrowest, Pol. iv. In the; mouth 
of the bay of Ambracia, not fur from Anac- 
toriunu Strab. x. 

TKxrs The BAY of Adramyttiuin (taken 
in the, greatest extent) begin neth at the 
promontory of I>ectus, and endeth at the 
promontory of Came, \\hich i* opposite to 
Malea of Lesbos. And the buy ot* Adra- 
myttium (properly *>o called) lgimieth at 
the promontory of Gargura, and endeth at 
the promontory of Pyrrha, And the CITY 
of Adramyttiiim is within the promontory 
of Pvrrhal Strab. xiii. 

JEi>npsA, a city of Eub.ra, over nspiirist 
Opus, a city oft he Jjocrians. Strab. ix. 

,/EDKSSA, a city of Macedonia, in the 
way called by Strabo, Ignatia, from Ajx>l- 
lonia and Dyrrachium (or Epidamnus) to 
Thessaloniea (or Tin Tine): aiul lieth be- 
tween Thessaloniea and the KordiaiiN. 
Strab. \ii. j 

..KujE, a city of Eubira, opposite to the ; 
mouth of the riterCcphi.v*us. Strab. ix. It j 
is also the name of a city of Achaia in IV- 
toponneMis, betw een Hefice and Hum. He- 
rod, i: Pans. Aehuie. It is the name uKo of 
another city in ^Entia, Iving up from the \ 
sea behind tfie territory ofCtune. Strab. xiii. \ 

^KuiNA. rm inland over uuainst Epidmi- ' 
rus, in the Saronian buy. Strab. \iii. i'aus. > 
Corinth. * \ 

-EwiR. t a c-ity of Arhain, IMI*\<C-II Pel- 
lene and -*K<^jr t HenMl. i. Strab. ix: oppo- 
site to Parnas>us PoKb. iv A No a rify 
of I.e?>bo<, where the island is narrowest | 
l>otwtM-n the buy oi' Pyrrha and the oth'-r j 
Kea. Strub. xiii. i 

,.E<;rrifM. a town in yEtolia, amongst [ 
the hills, 8O furiiiu^s distant from the s*a. 
Thuc. iii. 

JKoirtf, a city of Achaia, between He- 
lice and Ilh^'jx^s Hrrud. i. Strab. ix: dis- 
tant from Patri? IOO furlori^H. PUUH Ach. 

JKtio* pt /TAMOS, a river in the Thnu-mn 
Chcrsonnc-us, distant from Sst<s 15 fur- 
longs. X-n. (}ri.c. ii. 

/KMATJIIA, a region of Macedonia, 
placed by Ptolemy lxrtvriMn Th*H>aly and 
tbe river Axiu*. 

, a mountain uf Thrace, which 

of I^' 

divideth it almost in the middest, and 
roacheth from the Panonian mountains to 
Pontus fjuxinus. Strab. vii. 

U^NIA, a city in the bay of Therm*, last 
in order from Potidaa towards Therme. 
Herod, vii. It is distant from Thessalon- 
ica (which is the same with Therme) 12O 
furlongs, and opposite to Pydna. L.iv. xliv. 

uEstis, a city between the river Hebma 
and the bay of Melas (/. p. the Black Hay). 
Herod. \5i. Appian. Civil, iv. 

wiEsiANKs, a(ireek nation inhabiting in 
mount (Kta, part of them above the ^Eto- 
liuns: that i>, so a the yEtolians are bc- 
t>><M'ii tlu'in ami tln s*n. They In^nler on 
the Locri EpieiH-inides, in such manner as 
the .Etolian,> doim the I^KTI Oxohf. Strab. 
ix. x. 

^EoLis, a (Jreek nation inhabiting by 
the >ea-side in A*iii, from th i promontory 
to the ri>er Heroins. Strab. xiii. 
s, a ri\er in Troas, rising out of 
mount Idu, falling into Propontis, in that 
part which i nearest to Xt-leia, alxut 7<K) 
furlong!* from Alndos b\ Mn. Strab. xiii. 

/ETHKA, a city of Laconia, not far from 
Thurinm, as may be gathered out of 
Thuc. i. 

/KTOLIA, a rej^ion divided from the 
Acarnani.'tiis, on the parts towards the sca 
by the ri>er Acheloiis: confining on the 
t-a^t, ttifh the I^K-rians ralle<i ( >/o!a*. On 
the north it hath the Athatuanes, and part 
of the /liiiinn k s. Strab. x. .1'tolia, Jxicris, 
Phoi'is, and Ri^tia are di^ide<I frr>m each 
other b\ parallel lines, drawn from the 
west northwards. Id. ix. 

AIIORA. a citv near to the Thracian 
('ln'r^imnesu**. % rhe> thut go to it from 
N-th**, |ave Cardiufin the left hancL He- 
rod, \ it, when* he descriln th the vray of 
the Persian army 

AK/, a n*gion north of Acarnania. 
Tle rucr Ach'lius rising out of tho 
motintntn Pindns, pas-veth first through 
1 >o!opin, then through A gneis, and lastly 
through Acarnnnia, by the city of Stratus 
and the citv of (Eneias, into the seu. Strab. 
x : Thuc. iit Mib (in. 

A<;KIANKH, a nation dwelling at the 
head of the rier Strvmon, in the moun- 
tain Rhodope. Strnb. Ep. vii. extrem. 
Thurvdides (ii.)He>mHh to place them also 

Aj-AixoMKNK, a city of Macedonia by 
the river Erignon. Hirab. vii.. Also a city 
of H<t>otia, near tho lake Copal*. 

AMACMON, a rher of Macedonia, It 
riftcth out of the mountains called Cana- 
Invit, according to Ptolotny : Eivy hath 


Elyinea, a city by the river Aliacmon, 
near the mountains which he calleth Cam- 
bunii, which an? likely to be the same. 
Liv. xlii. It inixeth waters with Lydius, 
the confluent of which two rivers divide 
Bottia from Macedonia. Herod, vii. 

ALMOPIA, a region of Macedonia, of 
whose situation 1 find nothing but in Pto- 
lomy's Tables, who putteth it between 46 
and 47 deg. long, and between 41 and 4*2 
deg. lat. l"l ol. Tab. x. Kurope. 

ALONNKSI-R, a little island lying before 
Magnesia of Thessaly. Strab. ix. Also a 
city in the Chcrsonncsus of Krythnca, be- 
tween Casystus and the promontory Ar- 
gennum. Strab. xiv. 

ALOPK, a city of the Locri Kpicncniidcs, 
distant from Klateiaof Phocis 12O furlongs: 
from Cviius, the haven of the Opuntians, 
HO furlongs. Strab. ix. 

Ai.piiKf'9, a river of Peloponnesus, ris- 
ing in the territory of Megalopolis near 
unto the springs of 1 Kurotas (Strab. A Hi.), 
divideth Luconia from Megalapolis, ami 
from Tcgea. Pans. An*. It runs bv Hcnra. 
Id. ib. : 1'olyb. iv. It goeth out into the 
ea near Olympia. Stnib. viii. Pausanias 
naith it goeth out above C\ llene, the haven 
of the Kleians ; but it is contrary to all 
other, both ancient and modern, geo- 

AL.YZKA, a city on the sea-const of Acnr- 
nania, between the city Palvre and the 
promontory of Crithota. Strab. x. 


BRACIA in a city in the bottom of the Ani- 
bracian bay, upon the river Araethus, a 
little remote from the sea. Strah. vii. The 
AMIIHACIAN H\v divideth Kpirus from 
Acaruuuiu, Polyb. iv 

AMOHCOS, an island, one o*'lhe SponuK s. 
Strab. x. 

A MPKL.i'9, a promontory ofTorono. He- 
rod. \ii. 

AMPIUI.OCUIA, a region lying north of 
Aenniauia, south of Dolopia: through it 
runneth the r'ner Achelous. Strab x. 

AMPHIPOLIS, called formerly the Nine- 
ways^ a cit^ situate on the river Stryinon, 
the river running on both sides it; 25 fur- 
longs from Kion. Ibrod. \ii: Thuc. iv. 

AMPIIISHA, a city of the Loerians called 
Oxolic, confining on the territory of Crissn. 
llcrnd. viii: Strab. ix. Distant from Del- 
phi P2O furlongs. Pans. Phoc. 

AMVCI.^:, a city of J.aconia,20 furlongs 
from Sparta <ow ante the sea. Polyb. iv. 

ANA<TORII T M, city of Acarnania, within 
tlu gulf of Ambrncia, 40 furlongs from 
Actium (Strab. x.), in the mouth of the 
Ambmciun bay. Thuc. i. 


, a city in Asia, by the sea-side 
over against the isle Samos. Thuc. iv. 

ANAPUS, a river of Acarnania, men- 
tioned bv Thucydides (ii). It should seem 
by the lii.story that it runneth between 
Stratus and (Eneias. Livy (xlii) mentioneth 
a river thereabout also called Peletarus: it 
nay be it is the same. 

AN APH K, an island not far from Thera. 
Strab. x. 

AXDA.VIA. a city of Messenia, on the 
confines of Arcadia. Pans. Messen. 

ANIIROS, uu island, one of the Cyclades. 
Strab. x. Vide ( '\clades. 

ANTAXDRO.S, a city of Troas, Herod, v: in 
the bay of Adramyttium, properly so called, 
Strab. xiii: under mount Ida, Thuc iii. 

ANTHKDON, a city of Borotia, on the 
shore opposite to Eulxra, the utmost on 
that shore towards Loeris. Strab. ix. 

A.VTHK31U8, a territory in Macedonia, 
not far from Grcstonia, as may be gathered 
out of Thuc. ii. 

AXTHI:XA, a city of the territory of Cy- 
nuria, Thuc v: at the foot of the hill Par- 
net hus. Pans. Cor. 

AXTICVRA, a city of Phocis upon the 
sea-side, next after Crissa towards Jfreotia, 
Strab. ix. Also a city of the Melians upon 
the river Spercheius. Id. 

AxriKKHit M, which is called also RHI- 
I:M ^loiACHiticrM, is that promontory 
which with the opposite promontory of 
Achaia called Kliium, compn-hendeth the 
strait of the Oiss;ean (or Corinthian) bay, 
of five furlongs breadth. Strab. viii. It 
is near to the city Moh cria, Stnib. ix: and 
to the east of it. Id. x. 

ANTISSA, a citv of 1/esbos, between the 
promontory of Sigriiim and the city Me- 
thymnti, Strab xiii. 

'ANTIT \xr.s a nation whom Strabo 
calleth Atintunes,nnd placeth in the moun- 
tains of Kpirus. Strab. vii. Appianus hath 
also Atintanes; and Liivy (xlv) maketh 
them as an addition to the fourth part of 
Macedonia, in the division of that kingdom 
bv Paulas /Kinilius. So that it may be 
gathered that the Atintanes, whom Thu- 
cvdides cnllefh Antitanes, and numbcreth 
Hinonnst Kpirotical nations, are situate on 
the con tines of Kpirus and Macedonia, 

Aors, a ri\er of Illvris. After Kpidam- 
nus (saith Stratw, des\ribing the sea-coast 
touards Kpirus) are the rhers Apsus and 
Aous. Strab \ii. Near to it standeth Apol- 
lonia, Ib. Plutarch hath Anins instead of 
it, in the life of Ctroar. In this river it 
was that he took boat to cross the Ionian 
sea unknown, and was forced back by 



APHRODISIA, a town of Laeoniu, near 
the sea-side. Thuc. iv. 

APHYTIS, a city in Pallene, Herod, vii. 
Thtic. i: between Potida>a and Mende. 
Strab. Ep. vii. extrem. 

APIDANUS, a river of Aohaia in Thes- 
saly. Herod vii. It falleth into Peneus. 
Id. It runneth by Pharsalus. Strab. viii. 

APODOTI, a nation, part of the /Btoliaiis, 
nearest to the sea. Thuc. iii. 

APOL.LONIA, a city of Illyris, in the Ion- 
ian gulf, Herod, ix: upon the river Aous, 
60 furlongs from the sea. Strab. vii. Also 
a city between Thernie and Ainphipolis. 
Itin. Peutinger; Itin. Antonini. A Chal- 
eidic eity. Athen. viii. 

APSUS, a river of Illyris, between Epi- 
damnus and Apollonia. Strab. vii. 

ARACTHCTS, a river of Epirus, rising out 
of the hill Stympha, in the territory of the 
Parorici (perad venture the same with Pa- 
raiuei), and running by the city of Ambra- 
eia into the Ambracian bay. Strub. vii. 

ARAXUS, a promontory in the confines 
of Eiis and Areadia. Strab. viii. 

ARCADIA, a region of Peloponnesus, in 
the middest of it ; bounded with Elis, 
Achuia, Argolica, and Messenia. Strab. viii. 

A RGENNUM, a promontory of Ery thnra in 
Asia, lying out between Alonnesus and the 
city Ery three, opposite to and distant 60 
furlongs from Pobidcum a promontory of 
Chins. Strab. xiv. 

AHGINUSJB, are three islands lying near 
to the promontory of Cane in ^Kolis, op- 
posite to Malea, a promontory of Lesbos. 
Strab. xiii. 

ARCILUS, a city by the sea-aide, west 
of the river Strymon, Herod, vii: not far 
from Amphipohs. Thuc. iv. 

ARGOS, ARGOLICA. ARGOS is a city of 
Argeia, much celebrated in history: it 
standeth from the sea 40 furlongs. Pans. 
Cor. In all maps that I have yet seen, it 
is placed unreasonably far from the sea: 
but it appears by the beginning of Herod, 
i, where he speaketh of the women of 
Argos that came down to the sea-side to 
the ships of the Pho3nicians ; and by 
Thuc. ix, where he relateth that the Ar- 
gives were building walls to reach unto 
the sea from their city; that it cannot be 
farther from it than is by Pausanias set 
down. ARGOLICA connneth on Laconia, 
Arcadia, Isthmus. Strab. viii. 

philochia, upon the side of the bay of 
Ambracia. Thuc. ii. Twenty-two miles 
from Ambracia. Liv. xxxviii. 

ARN^E, a city of the Chalcideans near 
Acanthus, as it seemeth by Thuc. iv. 

AHNE, a city of Thessalv, Thuc. i: in 
that part of Thessaly which is called Es- 
tiotis. Strab. ix. 

ARRHIANJE, a place in thoThracianCher- 
sonnesus, opposite to Abydos. Thuc. viii. 

ARNISSA, a city of Macedonia, on the 
confines of JLyncus. Thuc. iv. 

ARTEMISHTM, a temple of Diana by the 
sea-side in Eub<ra, at the straits of it, not 
fur from Thermopylae. Herod, vii. Famous 
for a battle by sea, fought there between 
the Grecian and Persian ileet. 

ASINE, a maritime city in Argolica (or 
Argeia), the first in the bay of Hermione. 
Strab. viii. Also a maritime eity of Mes- 
senia, and the first in the bay of Messenia, 
Strab. viii: between the promontory 
Acritus and the city Colonides, 40 fur- 
longs from each. Pans. Mes. Also a city 
of Laconia, by the sea-side, between To3- 
narus the promontory, and Gythium. 
Strab. v iii. Also a city of Laeonia, near 
Curdamyle. Herod, viii. 

ASOPLJS, a river running between Pla- 
tcea and Thebes. Thue. ii. It divideth the 
territory of the Platienns from that of the 
Thebans, and runneth within 10 furlongs 
of Thebes. Pans, in B<eot. According to 
Strabo, it runneth into the sea by Tana- 
gnt. Strab. ix. But according to Ptolomy, 
Cephisus, and Asopus, and I^menus meet 
all in JSoeotia: and Asopus passing through 
Attica, entereth into the sea by the pro- 
montory Cynosura. Ptol. Tab. x. Jt is 
also the name of a river rising about 
Phlius in Peloponnesus, and entering into 
the sea near Corinth. Pans, Cor. It is 
also the name of a city in Laconia, by the 
sua side, distant from the promontory 
Onugiuithos 200 furlongs, and from the 
eity Acriie 60 furlongs. Pans. Lac. 

ASTACUS, a maritime city of Aearnania, 
between the promontory Crithota and 
mouth of the river Achelous. Strab. x. 

ASTERIA, an island between Ithaca and 
Cephallenia. Strab. x. 

ASTYPALJEA, an island, one of the Spo- 
rades, lying far within the main sea. Strab. 
x. Also a promontory of the territory of 
Hindus, in Asia. Strab. xiv. 

ATALANTE, a little island in the bay of 
Opus, between Euboea and Bo?otia, over 
against the city of Opus. Strab. ix. Thuc.ii. 

ATARNEUB, a eity of Jfiolis, over against 
Lesbos. Herod, i. Between Pitane and 
Adramyttium. Strab. xiii. 

ATHAMANES, a nation inhabiting on the 
north of the jEtolians, the last of the Epi- 
rotes. Strab ix. Above the ^tolians, that 
is, more remote from the sea than th 
Id. x. 



renowned city of Greece, situate in Attica, 
about 40 furlongs from Peineus and the 
vsea. Strab. ix. Thuc. ii, 

ATHOS, a famous mountain in the Cher- 
sonnesus called Acte, abutting on the 
./Egean sea. Thuc. iv. And beginning at 
the ditch made by Xerxes of 12 furlongs 
length, between Acanthus and the sea op- 
posite to Torone. Herod. vii. 

ATRAX, a city of Thessaly, by which 
Venous runneth before it comes toLarissa. 
Strab. ix. 

ATTICA, a famous region of Greece, 
bounding on the territory of Megara, on 
the shore over against Salamis, Strab. ix: 
and on the territory of the Ifcuotions by 
sea at Oropus. Id. By land, at Panactum, 
Thuc. v: at CEnoe, Id. ii: at Hysia, Id. ii. 

AULIS, a village in Bojotia, of the terri- 
tory of Tanagra, by the sea-side, 30 fur- 
longs from Delium. Strab. ix. 

AULON, a place near the sea-side, in the 
bay of Strymon, near which the Lake 
Bolbe issueth into the sea, and is some- 
where between Arno of Chalcidea and 
Argilus, as may be gathered out of 
Thuc. iv. 

Axius, a river of Macedonia, rising in 
the mountain Scardus. Ptolomv. It di- 
videth Bottia from Mygdonia. iterod. vii. 
It falloth into the bay of Therme, between 
Therme and Pella. Strab. Kp. vii. 

AZORUS, a city of IVra-bia, Liv. xliv. 

BERMIUS, a mountain of Macedonia. 
Herod, viii. At the foot whereof staudeth 
the city Bcrrho?a, Strnb. Kp. vii. 

BERRHCEA, a citv of Macedonia between 
Pydna, from which it is distant 17 miles, 
and Thessalonica or Therme, from which 
it is distant 51 miles. Itin. Ant. Pii. 

BISALTIA, a region of Macedonia, near 
the river Strymon, containing the city of 
Argilus, and the country about it. Herod, 

BISTONIS, a lake in Thracia, close by the 
city Dicspa. Herod, vii. 

BIEA, a city of Laconia, between the 
promontories of Onugnathos and Malea. 
Strab. viii. Directly opposite to Cythera, 
in the utmost part of the bay of Boea, 
which begins at Onugnathos, and ends at 
Malea, The territory of Bo?a joineth to 
that of Epidaurus Limera. Paus. Lac. 

B(EOTiA, a region of Greece between 
Attica and i?hocis, reaching from sea to 
sea. Strab. ix. 

BOIUM, a city of Doris. Thuc.i. Strab. ix. 

BOLBE, a lake in Mygdonia. Thuc. i. 
A lake not far from Olynthus. Herod, viii. 

It is called Bolyce by Athen. viii. It goeth 
out into the sea by Aulon and Bromiscus, 
which are two places between Arne in 
Chalcidea, and Amphipolis. Thuc. iv. 

BOLISSUS, a place in Chios. Thuc. viii. 

BOMK, a town of the vEtolians towards 
the Melian bay. Thuc. iii. 

region of Macedonia, lying to the sea, di- 
vided from Mygdonia by the river Axius, 
and from Macedonia by the confluent of 
the rivers Ali ac rn on and Lydius. Herod.vii. 

BRANCHIAE, a town where there was a 
temple of Apollo, on the Milesian shore. 
Herod, vii. Between the promontory of 
Posideum, and the city Miletus. Strab. xiv. 

BRAUIIONT, a town of Attica, between 
Prasia* and Marathon, on the sea-side, to- 
wards EubaMi. Strab. ix. 

BRILKSSTS, a mountain in Attica, be- 
tween Eleusis and Aeharoie. Thuc. ii. 

BROMISCUS, a town near the sea, between 
Acanthus and Argilus. Thuc. iv. 

BITDORUH. a promontory of the island 
Salamis, lying out towards Megara. Schoi. 
ad Thuc. ii. 

BUPHRAS, a mountain of Messenia, about 
Pylos. Thuc. iv. 

BURA, a city of Achaia, between Helice 
and JKgira?, distant from Helice 00 fur- 
longs, and from ./Egine 72 furlongs. Paus. 

BYZANTIUM, called now Constantinople, 
situate at the entrance of the Bosphoms. 
Strab. xii. 

CATCUS, a river of Asia, which passing 
by Pergamus, falleth into the bay of Elsta, 
inyEolis, between Elsea and Pi tan e. Strab. 


CALAUIUA, an island in the bay of Her- 
mione, lying just before Trcrzen. Strab. viii. 

C ALLIES, a town of the JEtoliuns, towards 
the Melian bay. Thuc. iii. 

CALYDON, a city of the ^tolians, near 
the sea, upon the river Evenus. Strab. x. 

CAMBUNII, mountains of Macedonia, 
between it and Perjebia. Liv xlii. xiiv. 

CAMEIROS, a city of the Dorians in Asia. 
Herod, i. It standeth in the island Rho- 
dus. Strab. xiv. Thuc. viii. 

CANJE, a city and promontory of ^Eolis, from El$ea towards Ionia 100 fur- 
longs, and as much from Malea, a promon- 
tory of Lesbos to which it is opposite. 
Strab. xiii. 

CANASTR/EA, a promontory of Pellene. 
Herod, vii : Strab. Ep. vii : Liv. xliv. 

CAPHAREUS, a haven ot Euboea, on the 
outside, not far from Ger.estus. HerocL vii. 
a city of Arcadia, not far from 



Orchomemis. Polyb. iv. The river Ladoa 
runneth between it and Psophis. Pans. Arc. 
CARDAMYLE, a city of Laeonia, between 
Pharas and Leuctra, oy the sea-side, in the 
Messenian bay, Strab. viii : distant from 
the promontory of Tomanis 400 furlongs. 
Pans. Lac. It is also a city in the island 
Chios. Thnc. viii. 

CARDIA, a city in the isthmus of the 
Thracian Chersonesus, upon the sea-side 
in the Black Bay (or bay of Melas). 
Herod, vi. 

CARPATFIUS, in island in that sea, which 
called from it Mare Carpathium, hath to 
the north, the sea called Icarium ; to the 
south, the .^Egyptian sea ; to the west, the 
Cretic and African seas. Strab. x. extrein. 

CARY^E, a town in Arcadia, between 
Orchomenus and Phenenm, in the confines 
of both, distant from Pheneum 60 furlongs. 
Pans. Arc. 

CARYSTCB, a city of Eubora, at the foot 
of the mountain < >cha. Strab. x. Muratho, 
a city of Attica, is equally distant from it 
and Athens. Pans. Att. 

CASOS, an island in the Carpathian sea, 
from Carpathus 80 furlongs, and from 
Sammonium, a promontory of Crete, 25O ; 
in quantity 80 furlongs about. Strab. x. 

CASYSTCS, a haven in the Chersonesus 
of Krythrsea, at the foot of the mountain 
Corycus. Strab. xiv. 

CAUNUS, a maritime city of Lycia, sub- 
ject to the Rhodians, by the river Calbis. 
Strab. xiv. 

CAYSTRUS, a river of Asia, falling into 
the sea at Ephesus, so as the mouth of it 
is the haven of the Ephesians. Strab. xiv. 
When the lonians made a journey against 
Sardcis, they left their fleet at Coressus, 
and then went up by the river Caystrus, 
and then over the mountain Tmolus, and 
so to Sardes. Herod, v. 

CECROPIA, a region of Attica, between 
the hills Parnethus and Brilessus. Thuc. ii. 

CECRYPHALEIA, a place mentioned in 
Thuc. i. Pliny hath the island Cecry- 
phalus opposite to Epidaurus, and distant 
from it 6 miles. The Scholiast and Steph- 
anus put it in the west parts of Pelopon- 
nesus falsely. 

CBNEUM, a promontory of Eubrea, oppo- 
site to the promontory of Cnemides of the 
Locrians, and to Thermopylae. Strab. ix. 

CfiNCHREiJB, a haven of the Corinthians, 
on the side of the isthmus that lieth to- 
wards Athens. Thuc viii. Cenchreiae on 
one side, and Lecheeum on the other, con- 
tain the isthmus. Pans. Cor. 

CEOS, an island, one of the Cyclades, the 
nearest to the bland Helena. Strab. x. 

CKPHAULENIA, an island over against 
Acarnania, distant from Leucadia 10 fur- 
longs, Strab. x. Thuc. ii . and hath in it 4 
cities, Pale, Same, Prone, Cranii. Thuc. ii. 
CEPHISSUS, a river, which rising about 
Lihea, a ci y of Phocis, and going by 
Klateia, Daulia, and Phanotis, cities of 
Phocis, and Cha>roneia and Coroneia, cities 
of B<x>otia, falleth into, at Coroneia, and 
tilleth the lake called Copais. Afterwards 
an earthquake opening the way, it went 
on to the sea, and entered it at Larymna, 
a town of Btvotia, opposite to ./Kgae of 
Eubu?a. Strab. ix. Also a river of Attica, 
rising in the territory of Eleusis, and fall- 
ing into the sea by Peirams. Pans, Att. 

CERA UN IT, mountains of Epirus, on the 
sea side, in the entrance of the Ionian 
gulf. Strab. vii. 

CERA UN us, a town between Cnidus and 
Ilalioaniassus, from whence also the bay 
there is culled theCeraunianbay. Strab.xiv. 
CKRDYL.IUM, a hill of the Argilians, be- 
yond Strymon, near Arnphipolis. Thuc. ii. 
CERCINK, a mountain between Thracia 
and Macedonia: the same divideth the 
Pu'onians from the Sintians. Thuc. iv. 

CKSTRINK, a region of Epirus, divided 
from Thesprotis by the river Thyanis. 
Thuc. i. The Chaonians and Thesprotians 
have all the sea coast from the mountains 
called Ceraunii to the Ambracian bay : 
therefore Cestrine seemeth part of tne 
Chaonians. Strab. vii. Called Cestrine 
from Cestrinas the son of Helenus. Paus. 

CH>ERONEIA, a city of Ifcpotia confining 
on Phocis, 20 furlongs distant from Pano- 
peus or Phanotis, and situate upon the 
river Cephissus. Paus. Phoc. Strab. ix. 

CHAISE, an island, one of the Sporades, 
distant from Telos 8() furlongs, and from 
Carpathus 400 furlongs. Strab. x. 

CHAI.CEDON, a city of Bithjnia, over 
against Byzantium, Strab. xii : in the 
mouth of Pontus Kuxinus. Id. ; Thuc. iv. 
CHALCIS, a city of Eubcea, at the Euri- 
pus. Herod, vii: Strab. x. Also a city 
of vEtolia, upon the river Evenus, on the 
east side of it, Strab. x : beneath Calydon, 
Id. ix. 

CHALCIDEA, a region joining to Thrace, 
containing most of the towns upon or near 
the sea, from the mouth of the river Stry- 
mon to Potidwa in Pallene. This may 
be gathered out of Thucydides. It was 
so named, for that they were* colonies of 
Chalcis in Eutxca, ei trier immediate or 

CHALLytfi, the people of a city of the 
Locri Ozolw. Thuc. id. 



CHAONIA, a maritime region of Epirus, 
beginning at the mountains called Ceraunii, 
and together with Thesprotis reaching as 
far as the Ambracian bay. Strab. vii. It 
is divided from Thesprotis by the river 
Thyanis. Thuc. i. 

CHEIIDORUS, a small river of Macedonia, 
which rising in Grestonia, runneth into 
the river Axius. Herod, vii. 

CHEIMERIUM, a promontory of Epirus, 
between the islands called Sybota and the 
mouth of the river Acheron, Strab. vii. 
Vide Acheron. 

CHELONATA, a promontory of Elis, be- 
tween the promontories of Araxus and 
Icthys. Strab. viii. 

CHERSONNESUS signifieth any portion of 
land that is almost environed with the sea: 
but for the most part, when there is no 
word added to determine the signification, ) 
it is here that territory of Thrace, which ! 
is included with these three seas, Propon- 
tis, Hellespont, and the Black Bay, Melas, 
Strab. vii. ep. In the isthmus of this 
Chersonnosus standeth the city Cardia, at 
the side towards the Black Bay , and Pactya 
on the part towards Propontis. Herod, vi. 
CHIOS, now called Scio, an island and 
city of the loniuns, Herod, i : distant from 
Lesbos about 400 furlongs, and 900 fur- 
longs in circuit. Strab. xiii. 

CHRUSIS, a part of Mygdonia so called. 

CHRYROPOUS, a vilLigo of the Chalce- 

donians, in the mouth of Pontus. Strab. xii. 

CIMOLIS, an island, one of the Cj'cladws. 

Vide Cyelades. It Heth west of Sicinus, 

Pholegandros, and Lagusa. Strab. x. 

CIRRHA, a city of Phocis in the Co- 
rinthian bay, ovor against Sic von, Strab. 
ix : distant from Delphi CO furlongs : from 
Delphi to Cirrha runs the river Plistus. 
It is the haven or town of shipping for 
Delphi. It connneth upon Locris. Pans. 
Phoc. He maketh it the same with 
Crissa. Vide Crissa. 

CITARIUS, a mountain of Macedonia, 
joining to Olympus, out of which riseth 
the river Eu rotas. Strab. Ep. vii. 

CITH JERON, a mountain ot Attica. When 
the Persian camp under Mardonius lay 
about Asopus in the territory of Plataea, 
the army of the Grecians that were en- 
camped at the foot of Cithferon, were 
opposite to them. Herod, ix. Plateea is 
between Cithseron and the city of Thebes. 
Stri,b. ix. 

CITIUM, a city of Cyprus. 
CLAROS, an island, one of the Sporades. 
Ex Ortelii thesauro. Also a city belong- 
ing 1 to the Colophonians, Pans. Ach. ; 

between the mouth of the rhor Oaystrus 
and the city of Colophon. Strab. xi\. 

CLAZOMEN.*, an Ionic city in Lydia, 
Herod, i : situate in the Chersonnesus of 
Erythreea, confining on the Erythraans, 
these being within, the Clazomemans with- 
out, the Chersonnesus. Between Clazo- 
rneiiae and Teos, across the isthmus it is 
but 50 furlongs ; but round about by sea, 
1000 furlongs. Presently without the 
isthmus, where it is narrowest, stands Cla- 
zornente. Strab. xiii. Before it lie 8 little 
islands. Id. xiv. 

CLEITOR, a city of Arcadia, between 
Psophis and Caphya?. Polvb. iv. It con- 
fineth on tlie territory of Pheneum, to- 
wards the east. Paus. Arc. 

CL.EON.I-:, a city of Argeia, between Argos 
and Corinth, confining on the Phliasians. 
Paus. Cor. Also a city in the territory 
where mount Athos standeth. Herod, vii. 
Time. iv. 

CNEMIDES, a promontory of Locris, dis- 
tant from Cynus, the haven of the Opuri- 
tians, towards Thermopylae 50 furlongs. 
[ Strab. ix. 

I CNIDUS, a city of the Dorians in Asia, 
j by the sea called Triopiuni. Herod, i. On 
the north it hath the CVraunian bay : on 
j the south, the Khodian sea. Strab. \i\. 
I COLONJF., an upland city of Hellespont, 
j in the territory of Lampsacus. Strab. xiii. 
j Also a maritime city of Troas, 140 fur- 
j longs from Ilium between Hamaxitus and 
I^arissa. Id. xiii. 

COLONIDES, a maritime city of Messc- 
nia, between A sine and the mouth of the 
ri\er I'auiisiis, distant from Asine 40 fur- 
longs. Pans. Mes. 

COLOPHON, an Ionic city in Lydia, He- 
rod, i: between Ephesus and Lebedos: 
from Lebedos 20 furlongs ; from Ephesus 
70 furlongs. Strab. xiv. 

far from Torone. 1 hue. v. 

COPJE ET <>)PAis LACUS. Copue is a 
city of Bo?otia, situate on the north part 
of the lake Copals. Strab. ix. Paus. Bowt. 
CORASSIJE, two little islands on the west 
of the island Patmos. Strab. x, 

CORCYHA, now called Corfu, an island 
over against Epirus, whose east pans are to the islands called Sybota, and 
west parts to the haven called Onchimus. 
Strab. vii. 

CORESSUS, a town of the territory of 
Ephesus, by the sea-side, near to the 
mouth of the river Caystrus. Herod, v. 

CORINTH us, a famous city, near the 
isthmus of Peloponnesus. 

CORONEIA, a city of Boeotia, upon the 



river Cophisus, where it entereth into the 
lake Copais, and not far from the hill 
Helicon. Strab. ix. 

CORONTJE, a city of Acarnania. Time. iv. 

CORTYTA, a town near the sea in Laeo- 
nia. Thuc. iv. 

CORYCUS, a mountain in the Cherson- 
nesus of Ery three, between Teos and Ery- 
thrce. Strab. xiii. 

CORYPHASIUM, a promontory of Messe- 
nia, distant from Methone 100 furlongs: 
in this promontory stood the fort of Pylus. 
Paus, Mes. 

Cos, an island with a city in it of the 
same name. It belonged to the Dorians 
of Asia. Herod, i. Called Cos Meropidis 
(Thuc. viii.), because inhabited of old by 
the Meropians. It lyeth in the Carpathian 
sea, Strab. x : opposite to Termerium, a 
promontory of the Mindians. Id. xiv. 

CRANAON, a city in the champaign of 
Thessaly. Strab. ix. The same may be 
gathered out of Liv. xlii. 

CRANII, a people of Cephallenia. Thuc. ii. 
About the strait of that island. Strab. x. 

CRATEREI, a haven near the city of 
Phocrea, in ^Eolis. Thuc. \iii. 

CREN^E, i. e. the Wells, a place in Acar- 
nania, not far from Argos. Time, iii. 

CREUSA, a sea-town of Ikeotia, upon 
the bay of Crixsa, belonging to the city 
Thespiee. Strab. ix. Puux. Bu-ot. 

town of Phocis, between Cirrha and An- 
ticyra, from which the bay of Corinth is 
called also the Cris.sosan bay. Strab. ix. 
This bay is called now the bay of Lcpunto. 

CRYTHOTA, a promontory of Acarnania, 
lying out into the sea, between the city 
Alyzea, and the mouth of the river Ache- 
lous. Strab. x. 

CROCYLJUM, a town in yKtolia, of the 
region inhabited by the Apodoti. Thuc. iii. 

CROMMYON, a town in the isthmus of 
Corinth, Thuc. iv. Pans. Cor. : between 
Scho?nus and the rocks called Scironides, 
and confineth on Megaris. Strab. viii. 

CYCLADKS, islands in the vKga?an sea, 
so called, for that the^r lie round about 
the island Delos. Their number and or- 
der, according to Strabo, is this : Helena, 
Ceos, Cythnus, Seriphus, Melos, Siphnus, 
Cimolis, Prepesintnus, Gleams, Kaxos, 
Paros, Synis, Myconus, Tenos, Andros, 
Gyams. Strab x. 

CYLLENE, a sea-town of Eiis in Pelo- 
ponnesus, belonging to the city of Elia, 
and where their shipping lajr, 60 furlongs 
distant from Arexus : Strab. viii : and from 
Elis 120 furlongs. Paus. ii. Eli ae. Also a 
mountain, the highest in Peloponnesus, on 

the confines of Arcadia and Achaia, near 
Pheneum. Paus. Arc. 

CUME, a city of JEolis, on the sea-coast, 
Herod, i : the hist of the maritime cities of 
yEolis, towards Ionia, as may be gathered 
out of Strab. xiii. 

CYNOS-SEMA, a promontory of the Thra- 
cian Chersonnesus, not far from Abydos : 
Time, viii : over against the mouth of the 
river Rhodius, which falleth into the sea 
between Abydos and Dardanum. Strab. 

CYNUS, a town of Locris, upon the sea 
towards Eub<ea, belonging to the city of 
Opus, distant from the promontory Cne- 
innles 50 furlongs, in the entrance of the 
bay of Opus. Strab. ix. Liv. xxviii. 

CYNURIA, a territory on the bonier be- 
tween Argeia and Laeonia, toward the sea- 
side, containing the cities Thyrea and 
Anthena. Thuc. v. Paus. Cor. 

CYPHANTA, a maritime town of Laco- 
uia, distant from Xarex on one side 16 
furlongs, from Prasito on the other 20O. 
Paus. Lac. 

CYPSKLA, a castle in Parrhasia, a terri- 
tory of Arcadia, uar to Sciritis of Laco- 
nia. Thuc. v. 

CYRRHITS, a city of Macedonia, not far 
from Pel la. Thuc. ii. C^rrhesta*, that is, 
the people of Cyrrhiis are placed there- 
abouts by Pliny (i\ ). 

CYTINITM, a city of Doris on the side 
of Parnassus. Thuc. iii : Strab. ix. 

CYTHERA, an island opposite to Malea, 
a promontory of Lnconin, and distant from 
it 40 furlongs: Strab. viii: opposite di- 
rectly to the city Boca, Paus. Lac. In it 
are two cities, Cythera and Scandeia, 
Thuc. iv. Paus. Lac. 

CYTHNUS, an island, one of the Cyelad\s. 
Vide Cyclades, 

CYZICUS, an island and city in Propon- 
tis : Strab. xii : distant from /eleia, which 
is a city near the sea on the river ./Esepus, 
190 furlongs. Id. xiii. 

NIIS is a city on the sea-side, from Abydos 
70 furlongs, between it and Rhtrteiutn. 
Stnib. xiii. It confineth on Abydos. Herod, 
vii. DARDANUM is a promontory between 
Abydos and Dardanus. Strab. xiii. 

DASCYLI, a region of Bithynia, lying 
upon Propontis. Ptolemy and Strabo 
mention the town Dascyclos, or l>ascylium, 
which Strabo saith standeth upon the lake 
Dascylitis, by the river Rhindacus. Strab. 
xii. It was a province subject to the Per- 
sians in the time of Xerxes, and governed 
by Megabatos, his Lieutenant. Thuc. L 

DAUHA, a city of Phocis, on the east 
of Delphi, upon the river Cephissus, and 
at the foot of Parnassus. Strah. ix. Paus. 

DECELEIA, a town in Attica, in the way 
between Oropus and Athens, distant from 
Athens 120 furlongs, and not much more 
from Bui'otia. Thuc. vii. 

DELI DM, a temple of Apollo, by the 
sea-side in the territory of Tanagra: Time, 
iv. Paus. Bcvot. : opposite to Chaleis of 
Eubcea. Herod, vi. 

DELOS, an island, and in it a city with a 
temple consecrated to Apollo. Time. iii. 
It is distant from Andros 15 miles, and as 
many from Myconus. Plin. iv. 

DELPHI, a city of Phocis, famous for 
the temple and oracle of Apollo. It 
atandeth at the foot of the hill Parnassus : 
Herod, viii : on the south part of the hill : 
Strab. ix : threescore furlongs from the 
sea, Paus. Phoc. 

DELPHINIUM, a town in the isle Chios, 
not far from the city Chios, and by the 
sea-side. Time. viii. 

DERC/EJ, a people of Thrace. 

Die* A, a city of Thrace, between Ab- 
dera and Maronea Herod \ii. 

DICTIDII, a people in Mount Athos. 
Thuc. viii. 

DION, a city, and in it a temple of Ju- 
piter, standing at the bca-sidc, at the foot 
of Olympus. Thuc. iv. Strah. Epit. vii. 
Also a city in Mount Athos. Time, iv. 

DOBKRUS, a city of Pieonia, at the foot 
of Ccrcine. Thuc. ii. 

DOLICHE, a city of the Perrhjpbians, not 
far from the mountains called Cambunii. 
Liv. xliv. 

DOLOPIA, a region on the south side of 
the hill Pindus, on the north of the Am- 
philochians, and confining on Phthiotis of 
Thessaly. Strab. ix. x. 

DORIS, a region confining on the Meli- 
ans, and with a narrow corner running in 
between them and Phocis. Herod, viii. It 
lieth on the east part of Parnassus, and 
divideth the Locrians called ()zola>, from 
the Locrians called Opuntians. It was 
called Tetrapolis, because it contained 
these four cities, Erineus, Boium, C^ti- 
xrium, and Pindus. Strab. ix. The Dorians 
are also a nation in Asia, by the sea-side, 
joining to Caria, of which were numbered 
the inhabitants of the islands Rhodes and 
Cos, and the cities Cnidus and Hak'car- 
nassus. Strab,. xiv. 

DORISCUS CAMPUS, a large champaign 
by the side of the river us in Thrace, 
where Xerxes passing on towards Greece, 
mustered his mighty army. Herod, vii. 

INDEX. 447 

DRABESCUS, a city of Edonia, beyond the 
river Strymon. Thuc. i. 

DRECANUM, a promontory of the island 
Cos, distant from the city Cos 200 fur- 
longs. Strab. xiv. 

DRTMYRSA, an island lying before Cla- 
zomeim*. Thuc. viii. Liv. xxx\iii. Vide 

Dnoi, a people of Thrace. 

DYME, a city of Achaia, the nearest to 
the coniincs of Elis. Strab. viii. Pans. Ach. 

ECHINADES, islands lying in and out 
before the mouth of the river Achelous. 
Thuc. iii. Strab. x. 

EDONIA, a region of Thrace, lying to 
the river Strymon and the sea : it had in 
it Amphipolis, Drabescus, and other cities -. 
Thuc. i : by which the situation thereof 
may be sufficiently understood. 

EIDOMENE, a city of Macedonia, not far 
from Doberus. Thuc. ii. Plin. iv. 

EION, a city of Thrace, on the river 
Strymon. Herod, vii. In the mouth of 
Strymon, 25 furlongs from Amphipolis. 
Thuc. iv. 

EL.EA, a sea town in JEolis belonging 
to the city of Pergamus, distant from the 
mouth of the river Caicus towards Ionia, 
12 furlongs ; and from Cause 1UO furlongs. 
Strab. xiii. 

ELATEIA, a city of Phocis, by the river 
Cophissus, confining on the Locrians. 
Strab. ix. Paus. Phoc. It stamleth in the 
straits of the Phocean mountains. Id, 

ELEUTHEKJ-:, a town of Attica, between 
Eleusis and Plattea, on the border of At- 
tica. Pans. Att. Idem Brcot. 

ELEUS, a city of Chersonnesus to the 
north of Leinnos. Herod, vi. 

ELEUSIS, a sea-town of Attica: Strab. 
viii : on the confines of Megaris. Paus. 

ELIS. Elis and Messenia are two re- 
gions that take up the west part of Pelo- 
ponnesus. Elis is bounded on the north 
by the promontory Araxus, and divided 
from Messenia in the parts towards the 
hea, bjr the river Neda. Strab. ^iii. Elis, 
the principal city thereof, is distant from 
the sea 120 furlongs, and from Olympia 
almost 30(). Paus. Eliac. extrem. 

ELI.OMENITS, a town in Ncritum of the 
territory of Lcucadia, Thuc. iii. 

ELYMIOTJS, ELIMEIA. A nation of Ma- 
cedonia, which Ptolemy placeth on the 
sea-side upon the Ionian gulf. Livy hath 
the city Elimeia at the foot of the moun- 
tains Cauibunii, and by the river Aliac- 
mon. Liv. xlii. 

EMBATUS, a town of Erythnea, Time. 



iii : on the part toward Lesbos, as may be 
probably conjectured by the history. 

ENIPEUS, a river of Thessaly, which 
falleth into the river Peneus. Herod, vii. 
But first it receiveth into itself the water 
of Apidanus, that passeth by Pharsalus. 
Strab. viii. It riseth in the mountain 
Othrys. Id ib. 

EORDIA, a region of Macedonia, between 
the Lyncestians and Thessalonica (or 
Therma), 'in the way called Ignatia, that 
leadeth from Epidamnus to Thessalonica. 
Strab. vii. 

EPHESUS, an Ionic city in Lvdia: He- 
rod, i: at the mouth of the river Cais- 
tus, on the side towards Mycale. Strab. 

EPHYRE, a city of Thesprotis, upon the 
river Thyamis. Strab. vii. Thuc. i. Also 
a city of Agraeis. Strab. vii. x. 

EPIDAMNUS, a city afterwards called 
Dyrrachium, now Dnrazzo, situate on the 
Ionian gulf, amongst the Taulantii, Illyri- 
nns, Thuc. i: next without the bay called 
lihizicus. Strab. vii. 

EPIDAURUS, a city of Argeia by the sea- 
side, in the inmost part of the Saroiiian 
bay. Strab. viii. 

EPIDAURUS LIMERA, a maritime city of 
Laconia, in the bay of Argos, 300 furlongs 
from the promontory of Malea. Pans. Lac. 

ER.E, a city in Erythram, between Teos 
and Casystus. Strab. xiii. 

ERESSUS, a city in the isle Lesbos, be- 
tween Pyrrha and the promontory Sigrium. 
Strab. xiii. 

ERETRTA, a city of Eub<ra, between 
Chalcis and Gerestus : Strab. x : opposite 
to Oropus in Attica. Id. ix. 

ERIGON, a river of Macedonia, arising 
in Illyris and falling into the river Axius. 
Liv. xxxix. Strab. vii. 

ERINEUS, a city of Doris. Thuc. i : 
Strab. ix. Also a haven in the territory of 
Rhypes in Achaia. Thuc. vii. Paus. Ach. 

ISRYTHRxE, an Ionic city. Herod, i. 
It standeth in the midst of the Cherson- 
nesus, between the promontory Argennum 
and the mountain Mimas, and before it lie 
certain islands called Hippi. Strab. xiii. 
Also a town in the confines of Attica, not 
far from Plataea. Thuc. iii. Herod, ix. 

ESTIOTIS, a region of Thessaly, confin- 
ing on the mountains Olympus and Ossa. 
Herod, i. It is the west part of Thessaly, 
and lieth between mount Pindus and the 
upper Macedonie. Strab. ix. 

EUBOEA, an island lying opposite to the 
continent of Attica, and Boeotia, and Lo- 
cris, extending from Sunium as far as 
The length of it is reckoned 

from the promontory Ceneum to the pro- 
montory Gera'stus. CONCAVA EUBCE^E, is 
all that shore that is from the Euripus to 
Gcnestus. Strab. x. Herodotus maketh 
it to be on the other side of the island. 
Herod, vii. It seems therefore that CON- 
CAVA EUBO3J3 is not the proper name of a 
place, but an appellation signifying any 
hollow bending of the shore. 

E VENUS, a river, which rising amongst 
the Boii, a nation of ^Etolia, runneth by 
Chalcis and Calydon, and then bending 
toward the west by Pleuron, into the sea. 
Strab. x. 

EUROTAS, a river of Laconia, rising in 
the territory of Megalopolis, and passing 
by the city of Lacedsemon, on the east 
side of it, talleth into the sea near Helos, 
between Gythium and Acria\ Strab. viii. 
Also a river of Thessalv, rising out of the 
hill Ci tarius. and falling into the river 
Pen ens. Strab. vii. Ep. 

EURYTANKB, a nation of TRtolians, one 
of the three. Apodoti, being those that 
dwelt toward the sea; Ophionei, those 
toward the Melians: Thuc. iii. Kury- 
tanes therefore must be those toward 
AgriEis and Athamania. 

GAL.CPSUS, a city not fur from Torone. 
The fleet of Xerxes compassing the pro- 
montory of Ampelus, passed by these 
cities : Torone, Galepsus, Sermylu, &c. 
Herod, vii. 

GAPSKLUS, a city of Thrace, not far 
from Amphipolis. Thuc. iv. Ortelius 
thinketh it the same with Galepsus : but 
it is more probable by the history to be 

GARGARA, a promontory in Asia, 260 
furlongs within the promontory of Lcctus, 
and is the beginning of the bay of Adra- 
myttiirn, properly so called. Strab. xiii. 

'GERESTUS, a promontory of Euboea. 
Grnestus and Petalia are opposite to 
Sunium, a promontory of Attica. Strab. x. 
Genrstus is between the city Styra and 
Eretria. Id. x. 

GKHANKIA, a hill in Megaris, near the 
entrance of the Isthmus. Thuc. i. Paus. 

GLAUCE, a city in Ionia, near the moun- 
tain Mycale. Thuc. viii. 

GIOONUS, a promontory not far from 
Potidaea. Thuc. ii. Herod, vii. 

GOMPHI, a city of Thessalv, in the re- 
gion called Estiotis . Strab { ix : near to 
the springs of Peneus. Plin. iv. The near- 
est of the Thessalian cities to Epirus. Liv. 

GONNUS, a city of the Pcrrhtebians 13 



Thessaly, at the foot of Olympus : Strab. 
ix. : in the entrance to Tempe : Polyb. 
xviL Liv. xliv.: 20 miles distant from 
Larissa. Liv. xxxvi. Gonnus is in the 
entrance out of Macedonia through the 
Perrhtebians into Thessaly. Herod, vii. 

GORTYNIA, a city of Macedonia, not far 
from the hill Cercine. Thuc. ii. 

GRANICUS, a river in Hellespont, rising 
in Mount Ida near unto Scepsis, and fall- 
ing into Propontis, between the city Pri- 
apus and the mouth of the river JEsepus. 
Strab, xiii. 

GRESTONIA, a region of Macedonia, 
joining to Mygdonia, in which riseth the 
river Chedorus. Herod, vii. 

GYARUS, a small island, one of the Cy- 
clades. Vide Cyclades. 

GYRTON, a city of Perrhaebia, at the 
foot of Olympus Strab. ix : before Gon- 
nus to such as come out of Macedonia 
by the mountains called Cambunii. Liv. 

GYTHIUM, a city of Laconia, the har- 
bour of the Lacedtemonian shipping, be- 
tween A sine and Acrite Strab. viii : dis- 
tant 230 furlongs from the promontory of 
Taenarus. Paus. Lac. 

BONI, HAL.ICE PAUSANJ^:. A maritime 
town of Argeia, in the bay of Hermione : 
Strab. viii: between Asine and Henni- 
one, 250 furlongs from Asine. Paus. Cor. 

HALIARTUS, a city of Boeotia, by tho side 
of the lake Copais, towards Helicon. Strab. 
ix. It confineth on the territory of Thes- 
pise. Paus. Boeot. 

HALICARNASSITS, a city of the Dorians 
in Asia. Herod, i. In the bottom of the 
Cerauiiian bay. Strab. xiv. 

HAUMUS, a town of Atticn, next after 
Phaloron, towards the promontory of Su- 
nium. Strab. ix. In this town was Thu- 
cydides born, the author of this history. 

HALISARNA, a town in the island Cos, 
near unto the promontory of Lacter. 
Strab. xiv. 

HAMAXITUS, a city of Troas, under the 
promontory of Lectus. Strab. xiii. 

HARMATTJS, a city in the continent, over 
against Methymna of Lesbos. Thuc. viii. 

HAEPAGIUM, a place on the confines of 
Priapus and Cyzicus. Strab. xiii. 

HEBRUS, a river of Thrace, falling into 
the sea between JEnus and Doriscus. 
Herod, vii. 

HELENA, an island, one of the Cyclades, 
adjacent to the continent of Attica, and 
extending from Sunium to Thoricus. 
Strab. x. 


HELICO, a city of Achaia, on the sea- 
side between -/KjSfium and Bura, distant 
from ^Egium 40 mrlongs. Paus. Ach. 

HELOS, a Laconic city, by the side of 
the river Eurotas, not far from the sea : 
Strab. viii: distant from Gythium 100 
furlongs, and from Acrise 30. Paus. Lac. 

HER^A, a city of Arcadia, in the con- 
fines of Elis, upon the river Alpheus. 
Polyb. iv. Paus. Arc. It confineth on 
Megalopolis ; and the river Ladon runneth 
within 15 furlongs of it. Paus. Arc. 

HERACLEIA, a city of the Melians, built 
by the Lacedaemonians, within the strait 
of Thermopylae, distant from it 40 fur- 
longs, and from the sea 20. Thuc. iii. 
Strab. ix. Also a city in the bay of Lat- 
mus, between Miletus and Pyrrha, distant 
from Pyrrha 100 furlongs. Strab. xiv, 
Also a city of Sintii, a people of Mace- 
donia, called Ileracleia Smtica. Liv. xiv. 

HERMIONE, a maritime city in Argia, 
between Asine and Truezen. Strab. viii. 
Paus. Cor. From it is named the bay of 
Hermione, which hath in it in order tnese 
three cities : Asine, Hermione, Trcezen. Id. 
But Strabo seemeth to make the bay of 
Hermione to begin at the promontory 
Scyllieum,and to end at Epidaurus. Quaere. 

HERMUS, a river dividing ^olis from 
Ionia. Strab. xiv. It runneth through the 
plains that lie before the city Sardis, and 
entereth the sea by Phocaea. Herod, i. 

HESSII, the people of a city of the Locri 
Ozohe. Thuc. iii. 

HESTI^A, a city of Eubrea, not far from 
the promontory Ceneum. Strab. x. The 
territory of Ilestiaea is called Ilostiotis, 
and is over against Thessaly, as may ap- 
pear out of Herod vii. 

HY JEI, the people of a city of the Locri 
Ozohe. Thuc. iii. 

HYAMPOJLIS, a city of Phocis, confining 
on Abas, a city of the Locrians of Opus. 
Paus. Phoc. 

HYSI^E, a town of Attica, on the confines 
of Plateeis. Herod, ix. Thuc. iii. Vide 
OEnoe. Also a town of Argeia, on the con- 
fines of Tegea, in the way between Tegea 
and Argos. Paus. Cor. 

IASUS, a maritime city of Asia, situate 
in an island near to the continent : Strab, 
xiv : in that bay which on the side to- 
wards Miletus hath Posideum for bound, 
and on the other side the city Mindus. 
Polyb. xvi. The bay is called Sinus Bar- 
gileaticus. Id. 

ICARUS, or ICARIA, an island on the 
west of the isle Samos : Strab. x. distant 
from it 10 furlongs. Id. xiv, 




ICTHYS, a promontory of Elis, near the 
city of Pheia. Thuc. ii. Vide Pheia. 

tens, an island lying before Magnesia. 

IDA, a mountain of Asia, extending 
from Lectus and the places on the Adra- 
myttian bay, to the city Zeleia by Pro- 
pontis. Strab xii. 

ID AC us, a place in the Thracian Cher- 
sonnesus, opposite to Abydos and Darda- 
nus. Thuc. viii. 

IDOMENJE, two hill tops so called, be- 
tween Ambracia and Argos Amphilochi- 
cum. Thuc. iii. 

IEL.YSUS, a city in the island of Rhodes, 
between Cameirus and the city of Rhodes. 
Strab. xiv. 

ILIUM STVE TROTA, a famous city in 
Asia, 170 furlongs from Abydos, standing 
from the sea towards the mountain Ida. 
Strab. xiii. 

IMBROS, an island not far from the 
Thracian Chersonnesus. Thuc. viii. It is 
distant from Lemnos 22 miles, and from 
the isle Samothrace, that lieth before the 
river Ilebrus, 32 milos. Plin. iv. 

IOL.CUS, a maritime town of Thessaly, 
in the Pegossean bay, not far from Derne- 
trias. Liv. iv. 

IONTA, a region inhabited by the Gre- 
cians in Asia, by the sea-side, reaching 
from Posideurn, a promomontory of Mile- 
tus, on the south, to Phoca>a and the 
mouth of the river Ilermus on the north. 
Strab. xiv. 

IONIAN GULF. The Ionian gulf, or the 
Ionian sea, is the utmost part of the Adri- 
atic sea, beginning at the Cerauniaii moun- 
tains. Strab. vii. 

los, an island on the coast of Crete, 
equally distant from Therasia and Anaphe. 
Strab. x. 

IPNENSES, the people of a city of the 
Locri Ozolse. Thuc. iii. 

ISMARIS, a lake in Thrace, between 
Stryma and Maronea. Herod, vii. 

ISTONE, a hill in the isle Corcyra. Thuc. 

ITHACA, an island over against Cephalle- 
nia, and near to it. Strab. x. 

ITHOME, a hill in Messenia, near the 
sea, and on it a city, which was afterward 
the citadel of the city Messcne, that was 
built after the Peloponnesian war by 
Epaminondas. Paus. Mes. 

LACONIA, a region of Peloponnesus, con- 
fining on Messenia, Argeia, and Arcadia : 
Strab. viii : divided from the territory of 
Megalopolis of Arcadia by the river Al- 
pheus. Paus. Arc. 

LACTER, the most southern promontory 
of the isle Cos. Strab. xiv. 

LACED;EMON, the head city of Laconia, 
on the west side of the river Eurotas, re- 
mote from the sea, beneath the mountain 
Taygetus. Strab. viii. Polyb. v. 

LADE, a small island lying before the city 
Miletus. Herod, vi. Thuc. viii. Paus. Att. 

LADON, a river rising in tho territory of 
Cleitor in Arcadia, passing by the border 
of Ileraea, and falling into the river 
Peneus in Elis near to Pylus. Paus. Arc. 
et El. ii. 

LAGIJSA, an island on the west of the 
island los. Strab. x. 

LAMPSACUS, a maritime city in Hclles- 

Sont, from Abydos towards Propontis 
istant 170 furlongs. Strab. xiii. 

LAODICEA, a town of the territory of 
Orestis in Arcadia. Thuc. iv. 

LAIUSSA, a city of Thessaty, on the river 
Peneus. Strab. ix. Also a city of Troas, 
between Achamm and Colomr. Strab. xiii. 

Latmus, a mountain at the bottom of the 
bay of Latmus, which bay beginneth at 
Posideum in the territory of Miletus, and 
endeth at the promontory of Pyrrha, be- 
tween which places, by the short 1 , it is 200 
furlongs, and straight over but 30. Strab. 
iv. Latmus is also an island in those parts, 
as apponri'th by Thuc. ii : but I can find 
no mention of it in any other author. 

LAURIUM, a mountain and town in 
Attica not far from Sunium, between 
Sunium and Athens. Pans. Att. The 
Athenians had silver mines in this moun- 
tain. Thuc. Iferod. 

JjjRjEi, a nation dwelling on the river 
Strvnion, and the border between Thrace 
and Macedonia. Thuc. ii. 

LEBEDOS, an Ionic city in Lydia : He- 
rod, i : situate on the sea-side, between 
Collophon and Teos, distant from each 120 
furlongs. Strab. xiv. 

LECH^EUM, a haven of the Corinthians 
in the Crisswan or Corinthian bay. Be- 
tween Lechaeum and Cenchreiae is con- 
tained the Corinthian isthmus. Paus. Cor. 

LECTUS, a city and promontory of Troas, 
the beginning of the bay of Adramyttium. 
Strab. xiv. 

LEMNOS, an island in the -ZEgean sea, 
on the east of the mountain Athos, so as 
the shadow of the mountain falleth some- 
times upon it. Plin. iv. Strab. vii. Ep. 

LEPREUM, a city of Elis, 40 furlongs 
from the sea : Paus. El. ii : on tho con- 
fines of Arcadia. Thuc. v. 

LEROS, an island, one of the Sporadcs, 
near to Patmos. Strab. x. 



LESBOS, an island over against JEolis in 
Asia, distant from Lemnos, Tenedos, and 
Chios, almost equally ; loss than 500 fur- 
longs from the farthest of them. It reaeh- 
eth in length between Lectus and Came 
5GO furlongs, and is in compass 1100 fur- 
longs. Strab. xiii. 

LEUCAS, a peninsula, distant from Ac- 
liiim 240 furlongs : Strab. x : now an 
island, and called Santa Maura. 

LEUCTRA, a town in Rwotia, between 
Platsea and Thespiou. Strab. ix. Also a 
town of Laconia in the Messenian bay, 
between Thurides and Cardamyle, distant 
from Cardamyle 60 furlongs, and from 
Tamarus 340. Strab. viii. Pans. Lac. 

LEUCIMNA, the most eastern promontory 
of the isle Corcyra, opposite to the islands 
called Sybota. JStrab. vii. 

LII^EA, a city of Phocis, distant from 
Delphi by Parnassus 180 furlongs. Paus. 

LiMNiEA, a city on the confines of 
Agrseis, on the west to the river Aehelous, 
as may be gathered out of Thuc. iii. 

LJNDII, a city of the island Khodes, 
situate on the right hand to them that sail 
from the city of Khodes southward. Strab. 

Lissus, a small river of Thrace, between 
Mesembria and Stryma. Herod, vii. 

LOCRI, a nation of Greece, whereof one 
part, called Loeri O/ola;, inhabit on the 
west of Parnassus, and confine on ^Ktolia : 
Strab. ix : and the other part, culled 
Locri Opuntii, are divided from the Ozohe 
by the mountains Parnassus and the re- 
gion of Doris. Id. ix. Part of the Opun- 
tians are called Epicrieinides, for that they 
dwell near the promontory called Cue- 

LORYMA, a city in the opposite conti- 
nent to Rhodes, between Cnidus and 
Physcus, where the shore beginneth to 
turn northward : Strab. xiv : distant 20 
miles from Rhodes. Liv. xiv. 

LYC/EUM, a mountain in Arcadia, near 
to the confines of Laconia and Megalopolis, 
I'aus. Arc. : not far from Tegea. Strab. 

LYCNIDUS, a city of Illyris, on the con- 
fines of Macedome, in the Ignatian way 
that leadeth from Apollonia to Therme. 
Strab. vii. 

LYDIUS, a river of Macedonie. Lydius 
and AHacmon meeting in one, divide Bot- 
tiaea from Macedonie. Herod, vii. 

LYNCUS, a region and city of the upper 
Macedonia: the people are called Lyn- 
chesti by Tlmcydides (iv), and placed by 
Strubo in the way between Epidamnus and 

Thermo, which he calls the Ignatian way. 
Strab. vii. 

MACEDONIA, a famous kingdom, bor- 
dered with Thracia, Kpirus, Illyris, and 

MADYTUS, a city in the Thracian Cher- 
sonnesus. Between Sestos and Madytus 
is the shortest cut over the Hellespont, of 
not above 7 furlongs. Herod, vii. 

MEANDER, a river of Caria: the mouth 
of it is 53 furlongs from Pyrrha, the be- 
ginning of the Latmian bay. Strab. xiv. 

M&DI, a people of Thrace, bordering on 
Macedonie. Polyb. Thuc. ii. 

M^KNALIA, a terrritory of Arcadia, be- 
longing to the city Maenalus, which city is 
about 70 furlongs from Megalopolis. Paus. 

MAGNESIA, a city of Thessaly, the ter- 
ritory whereof extemleth from the moun- 
tain Ossa and the lake Bo^beis to the 
mountain Pelion. Strab. ix. Before the 
continent of Magnesia lieth the island 
Scyathus. Herod, vii. Also a city of Ionia 
called Magnesia on Maeander, above the 
city of Myus. Strab. xiv. 

MALEA, a promontory of Laconia, be- 
tween which and Tacnarus is compre 
hended the Laconian bay. Strab. viii. Also 
the most southern promontory of Lesbos, 
opposite to Cana*. Strab. xiii. 

MANTINEI A, a city of Arcadia, confining 
on Argeia, Tegea, Methydrium, and Orcho- 
menus. Paus. Arc. 

MARATHON, a town in Attica, over 
against Eretria of Eubtt-a: Herod, vi : be- 
tween Rhamnus and Brauron, Strab. ix : 
equally distant from Athens and from 
Carystus in Eubo^a. Paus. Att. 

MARATHUSA, an island lying before 
Cla/omence. Thuc. viii. VideClaxomerup. 

MARONEA, a city of Thrace, Iving to 
the TEgean sea. Xerxes, after he had 
passed the river Lissus, went on toward 
Greece by these cities, Maronea, Diceea, 
Abdera, &c. Herod, vii. 

MECYIJERNA, a maritime town in the 
bay of Torone, serving for the shipping of 
the city Olynthus. Strab. Epit. vii. The 
fleet of Xerxes being come about Ampelus, 
(this is a promontory near Torone), passed 
by those cities, Torone, Galepsus, Sermyla, 
Mecyberna, &c. Herod, vii. 

MEJ>EON, a city of Amphilochia, on the 
west of the river Achelous. The army of 
the Peloponnesians having passed the river 
Achelous, out of ^Etolia, went on into 
Agrseis by these cities in order, Phytia, 
Medeon, and Liiimaea. Thuc. iii. 

MEGALOPOLIS, a city of Arcadia, built 



after the Peloponnesian war by Epami- 
nondas. The territory thereof connneth 
on Laconia, Messenia, Heraea, Orchome- 
nus, Mantinein, and Tegea. It standeth 
on the river Helisson, not far from Al- 
pheus. Paus. Arc. 

' MEOARA, a city con6ning with Attica 
at Eleusis, distant from the sea 18 furlongs. 
Paus. Att. Strab. viii. 

MELAS, a river and a bay into which it 
entereth, on the west of the Thracian 
Chersonnesus. Herod, vii. 

MELENA, a promontory of the island 
Chios, over against the isle Psyra. Strab.xv. 
The MELJENSES are next to Thessaly 
southward. Strab. viii. The MELIAN BAY 
beginneth at the promontory Cnemides. 
Id. ix. 

MELITIA, a city of Thessaly, near the 
river Enipeus, Strab. ix: between Phar- 
salus and Heracleia. Thuc. iv. 

MELOS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclades : distant from the promon- 
tory Scyllaeum 700 furlongs. Strab. x. 

MENDE, a city in the Chersonnesus of 
Pallene, Herod, vii: between Aphrytis and 
Scione. Strab. Epit. vii. 

MESSEMBRIA, a maritime city of Thrace, 
near Doriscus, the last on the shore of 
Doriscus towards the west. Herod, vii. 

MESSENIA, a region on the west part of 
Peloponnesus, confining on Elis, Arcadia, 
and Laconia, divided from Elis on the 
parts to the sea, by the river Neda, and 
confining with Laconia at Thurides. Strab. 
viii. Paus. Mess. Of the Messian bay, 
the first town is Asine, the last Thurides. 
Id. viii. The city of Messina was built 
after the Peloponnesian war, by Epami- 
nondas, under the hill Ithome. Paus. Mess. 
Vide Ithome. 

METHONE, a city of Macedonia, 40 fur- 
longs from Pydna. Strab. Epit. vii. Also 
a city in Argia, between Epidaurus and 
Troazen, Stab. viii. situate in a Cherson- 
nesus, belonging to the Tra-zenians. Paus. 
Cor. Strabo calleth it Methana. Also a 
maritime city of Messenia, between the 
promontories Coryphasium and Acritas. 
Strab. viii. Paus. Cor. Pausanius calleth 
it Mothone. It is now called Modeno. 

MESSAPH, the people of a city of the 
Locri Ozalae. Thuc. h. 

METHYDRICM, a city of Arcadia, con- 
fining on Mantineia, distant from Megalo- 
polis 170 furlongs. Paus. Arc. 

METHYMNA, a city of Lesbos, between 
the promontories Sigrium and Malea, dis- 
tant from Malea 340 furlongs, and from 
Sigrium 210. Strab. xiii. 

MILETUS, an Ionic city of Caria, the 
'arthermost towards the south : Herod, i : 
next to Posideum, in the Latmian bay. 
Strab. xiv. 

MIMAS, a hill in the Chersonnesus of 
Erythrcea, between the cities Erythrse 
and Cl a/omen 8B. Strab. xiii. 

MINDUS, a maritime city of Caria, be- 
tween the promontory of Astypalaea and 
the city lasus. Strab. xiv. 

MINOE, an island, as Thucydides; a pro- 
montory, as Strabo saith : that maketh 
Niscea a haven. Strab. ix. Thuc. ii. 

MYTILENE, the chief city of Lesbos, 
situate between Methymna and Malea, 
distant from Malea 70 furlongs, from 
Came 120 furlongs. Strab. xiii. 

MOLOSSIANS, a people of Epirus, Thuc. 

i : dwelling by the river Acheron. Liv. viii. 

MOLYCREIA, a city of the Locri Ozolte, 

on the sea-side, next to Antirrhium, on 

the part toward Evenus. Paus. Phoc. 

MUNYCHIA, a promontory of Attica, 
which, with Peireceus, made the harbour of 
the Athenian shipping, with three fair 
havens within it. Strab. ix. 

M YC ALE, a promontory over against the 
isle Samos. Herod, i. A mountain near 
to Prieno, opposite to Samos, which with 
Posideum, a promontory of Samos, maketh 
the strait 7 furlongs over. Slrab. xiv. 

MYCALESSUS, a city of Boeotia, between 
Thebes and Chalcis of Euboaa. Paus. Boeot* 
Time. vii. 

MYCEN&:, a city once the head of Argeia, 
on the left hand to those that go from 
Cleone to Argos, distant from Argos 50 
furlongs. Strab. viii. Paus. Cor. 

MYCONUS, an island, one of the Cyclades* 
Vide Cyclades. 

MYGDONIA, a region of Macedonia, di- 
vided from Bottiaea by the river Axius, 
and reaching unto Pallene. Herod, vii. 

MYLASA, an upland city of Caria, nearest 
to the sea at Physcus. Strab. xiv. 

MYONNKSUS, a maritime city of Ionia, 
between Teos and Lebedos. Strab. xiv. 

MYRCINUP, a city of the Edonians in 
Thrace, by the river Strymon. Herod, v. 
MY u s, an Ionic city, 30 furlongs 
above the mouth of the river Maeander. 
Strab. xiv. Also a city of the Locri Ozolse, 
near Amphissa, and 30 furlongs more re- 
mote from the sea* Paus. Phoc. 

NAUPACTUS, a city of th Locri Ozola*, 
near to Antirrhium, within the Crisseean 
bay ; Strab. ix : and next to it is Ocan- 
thea: Paus. Phoc. 

NAUPLIA, a city of Argeia, in the Argive 



bay, next after Temenium, towards the 
promontory Scyllaeum. Strab. viii. 

NAXOS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cylades. 

NEDA, a river of Peloponnesus, rising 
in the mountain Lyceeum : Paus. Are- 
and passing through Messcnia. Id. lUess. 
It dhideth the maritime parts of Eiis and 
Messenia. Strab. viii. 

NEMEA, a forest and town: the forest 
between Cleonee and Phlius : Strab. viii : 
the town between Cleouas and Argos. 
Paus. Cor. 

NERITUM, the Chersonnesus of Leucas, 
since cut off and made an island by the 
Corinthians. Strab. x. 

NESTUS, a river of Thrace, that goeth 
out into the sea, near to the city Abdeni : 
Herod, vii : on the west side of Abdera. 
Strab. Ep. vii. 

NIS^EA, the haven -town to the city of 
Megara. Pegre and Nisea comprehend 
the isthmus, and are distant from each 
other 120 furlongs. Strab. viii. On the 
east of the island Minoe. Id. ix. 

NISYHA, an island, one of the Sponides, 
60 furlongs from the isle Cos, and as many 
from the isle Telos: in compass 80 fur- 
longs. Strab. x. 

NONACIUS, a city of Arcadia, to the west 
of Pheneum, and inclining to the right 
hand. Paus. Arc. 

NOTIUM, a town on the sea-side, belong- 
ing to the Colophonians, and distant from 
Colophon 2 miles. JLiv. xxxvii. Also a 
place in the isle Chios, between the pro- 
montory Melena and the haven Phane ; 
distant from the city Chios by land 60 fur- 
longs, by sea 300. Strab. xiv. 

NYMPHEUM, a promontory of Mount 
Athos, towards the bay of Singus. Strab. 
Ep. vii. 

OCHE, a mountain, the greatest of Eu- 
bcoa, near to the city Carystus. Strab. x. 

ODOMANTI, a people of Thrace, near the 
mountain Pangepum. Herod, vii. 

ODRYSJE, a people of Thrace. Thuc. ii. 

GBANTHEI, a maritime city of the Locri 
Oaoue : Paus. Phoc : over against ^Egine 
of Achaia. Polyb. iv. 

(ENEIAS, a city of Acarnania, by the 
sea-side, opposite to the promontory 
Araxus, in Peloponnesus, and confining 
on JEtolia: Polyb. iv : on the east side 
of the river Achelous, at the mouth of it. 
Strab. x. 

(ENEON, a city of the Locri Ozolae, not 
for from Nauj>aotus, as may be gathered 
out of Thuc. lii. 

GENOE, a town on the border of Attica, 

towards Boeotia. Thuc. ii. CEnoe and 

sifc, the last of the towns of Attica, 
towards Boeotia, on that part which is 
remotest from Chalcis and Euboea. Her. v. 
CENOPIIYTA, a place in Bccotia : Thuc. 
ii : but whereabouts, I cannot find. 

(ENUSSA, certain islands upon the coast 
of Chios. Herod, i. Thuc. iii. 

(ETA, a mountain near Thermopylae. 
That part which is near Thermopylae for 
about 20 furlongs, is properly called CEta : 
though the ^ hole tract from Thermopylae, 
as far as the bay of Ambracia, be com- 
monly also called CEta. Strab. ix. 

(EZYME, a city of the Eidonians : Thuc. 
iv . beyond the river Strymon, and by the 
sea-side, according to Ptolemy. 

OLEAIUTS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclades. 

OL^NUS, a city of Achaia, between Pa- 
trse and Dyme at the mouth of the river 
Peirus. Pans. Ach. 

Oia'-ra, a castle by the side of the bay of 
Ambrocia, near to Argos Amphilochicum. 
Thuc. iii. 

OLPE, a city of the Locri Ozolae : Thue. 
iii : but whereabouts I know not. 

OLGPHYXUvS, a city in Mount Athos. 
Herod, vii. 

OL.YMPTA. a place in Elis, with a temple 
dedicated to Jupiter, upon the side of the 
river Alpheus, distant from the sea 80 
furlongs. Strab. viii. 

OLYMPUS, a mountain, which is the 
bound of Thessaly on the north, and of 
Macedonia on the south. Between it and 
the mountain Ossa, in a narrow valley, 
runneth the river Pencus. Herod, vii. 
Paus. El. ii. 

OLYNTHUS, a city of the Bottiaeans 
driven out of Bottiaea by the Macedonians. 
Herod, viii. The Bottineans driven out of 
Bottisea seated themselves on the borders 
of the Chalcideans towards Thrace. Thuc. 
ii. Olynthus statideth somewhat remote 
from the sea, and about 60 furlongs from 
Potidam. Id. ii. Mecyberna, which stand- 
eth on the bay of Torone, served them for 
the place of shipping. Strab. Ep. vii. 

ON UGN ATHOS, a promontory of Lacouia, 
between which and Melea is the city and 
bay of Boea. Paus. Lac. 

OPHIONEI, a people of JEtolia, toward 
the Melian gulf. Thuc. iii. 

OPUS, the chief city of the Locri Opuntii, 
distant from, the sea 15 furlongs, opposite 
-ZEdepsa in Euboea. Strab. ix. 

ORCHOMENUS, a city of Boeotia, confin- 
ing on Phocia, through the territory 
whereof the river Cephissus pasaeth from 
Chteroneia into the lake Copiaa. Strab. ix.; 



Pans. Boeot. Also a city of Arcadia, con- 
fining on Mantiiieia and Pheneum. Paus. 

ORESTIS, a region of Macedonia, con- 
fining 011 Epirus : Thuc. ii : not far from 
Elymeaa. Liv. xxxi. 

'ORESTIUM, or ORESTASIUM, a city of 
Arcadia, in the way between Sparta and 
the isthmus : Herod, ix : and between 
Megalopolis and Tegea, Paus. Arc. 

ORE us, a city of the Hestiajans, in Eu- 
brca : Thuc. i. Strab. ix : not far from 
the promontory of Cenea : Id. ix. r l he 
first city of Euboea 011 the left hand to 
them that come from the bay of Deme- 
trias, or Pagasscari bay, toward Chalcis 
Liv. ix. 

ORNE^E, a city of Argeia on the borders 
of the Phliasian and Sicyonian territories. 
Paus. Cor. 

OROBUE, a city of Euboea, not far from 
^Ega?. Strab. ix. 

OROPUS, a maritime town in Attica, to- 
wards Eubo?a, and opposite to Eretria. 
Strab. ix. It is distant from Eretria 60 
furlongs. Thuc. viii. 

OSSA, a mountain of Thessaly. Between 
Ossa and Olympus, in a narrow valley, 
runneth the river Pencus. Herod, vii. 

OTHRYS, a mountain bounding Thessaly 
on the south. JJerod. vii. It hath on the 
north side the Phthiotae, but reacheth also 
to the Dolopians. Strab. ix. 

PACTOLUS, a river of Asia the less, ris- 
ing in the mountain Tmolus, and falling 
into the river Hermus. Strab. xiii. It 
runneth through the market-place of Sar- 
dcs. Her. v. 

PACTYA, a city standing in the isthmus 
of the Thracian Chersonnesus, towards 
Propontis. Herod, vi. 

PuEONiA, a region of Macedonia, reach- 
ing on one side to the river Strymon: 
Herod, v: on the other side to the river 
Axius. Pans. El. i. princip. 

PALE, a city of Cephallenia, in the 
narrow part thereof, near to the bay. 
Strab. x. 

PALYRE, a maritime city of Acarnania, 
between Leucas and Aly/ea. Strab. x. 

PAMISSUS, a river of Messenia, rising 
between Thurium and Arcadia, and falling 
into the sea in the middest of the Mes- 
senian bay. Strab. viii. 

PANACTUM, a town in Attica, on the 
confines of Boaotia. Thuc. v. 

PANJEI, a people of Thrace. Thuc. ii. 

PANGJSUM, a mountain of Thrace, above 
the region called the Pierian bay. Thuc. ii. 
Vide Pierian bay. 

PANOPEUS, the same with Phanotis 
Vide Phanotis. 

PANORMUS, a haven of Achaia, near to 
Rhium : Thuc. ii : opposite to Naupactus: 
Polyb. iv: distant from Kliiurn within 
the Crissa>an bay 15 furlongs. Strab. ix. 
Also a town in the territory of Miletus. 
Thuc. viii. 

PARASIA, a city of Thessaly. Thuc. i. 
Whereabouts in Thessaly, I find not. 

PARAUJEI, a nation of Epirus, near to 
the Molossians. Thuc. ii. Plut Gra-c. 
quflpst. xiii. xxvi. 

PARIUM, a maritime city of Hellespont, 
between Lampsacus and Priapus. Strab. 

PARNASSUS, a mountain, on whose west 
part are the L<ocri Ozolaj : east part, the 
PhdDceans and Dorians: and which ex- 
tcndeth to the mountains that run along 
from Thermopylae to the Ambracian bay, 
and meeteth with them at a right angle. 
Strab. ix. 

PARNETIIUS, a hill in Peloponnesus, 
wherein are the bounds of Argeia, Tegea, 
and Laconia. Pans, in Cor. Also a hill in 
Attica. Thuc. ii. 

PAROS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclades. 

PARRHASJA, a city and territory of Ar- 
cadia, bordering upon Laconia. Thuc. v. 

PATMOS, an island, one of the Sporades, 
on the west of Icarus. Strab. x. 

PATR,?E, a maritime city of Achaia, dis- 
tant from Khium 50 furlongs, from Ole- 
nus 80 furlongs. Paus. Ach. Strab. \ii. 

PEG JE, a city in the mountainous part of 
Meguris, Paus. Ach. Pegaj and Nisaea 
comprehend the Corinthian isthmus. 
Strab. viii. 

PEAS^EA, a city of Thossaly, in the 
IVgassuan bay. Herod, vii. 

PEIRAJCE, a small territory on the con- 
fines of Attica and Bouotia, near to Oropus. 
Thuc. ii. 

PELASGIOTIS. a region of Thessaly, be- 
tween Estiotis and the territory of Mag- 
nesia. Strab. ix. 

PELE, an island lying before Clazo- 
inenae. Thuc. viii. Vide Clazomenae. 

PELION, a mountain in the territory of 
Magnesia in Thessaly, joined to the moun- 
tain Ossa. Herod, vii. 

PELLA, a city of Macedonia, wherein 
Alexander the Great was born. It standeth 
in a lake between the rivers Axius and 
Lydius. Strab. Ep. vii. 

PEIXENE, a city of Achaia, confining on 
Sicyonia and Pheneum, distant from the 
sea 60 furlongs, and from JEtgiuaa 120 
furlongs. Paus. Ach. Also a peninsula of 



Macedonia, between the bay of Torone and 
the bay of Thermo. Herod, vii. Thuc. iv. 

PELAGONIA, a region of Macedonia, to- 
ward Illyris. lAv. xiv. 

PELOPONNESUS, that part of Greece 
within the isthmus of Corinth, now called 

PENKUS, a river of Thessaly, rising in 
the mountain Findus, near to Macedonia : 
Strab. vii ; running by Larissa, and 
thence through Tempe into the sea. Id. ix. 
It divideth Ossa from Olympus with a 
narrow valley, and receiveth into it the 
rivers Apidanus, En i pens, and others. He- 
rod, vii. Also a river of Peloponnesus, 
between the promontory Ghelonata and 
the town Cyllene. Strab. viii. 

PEPARKTHUS, an island that lieth before 
Magnesia, Strab. ix. 

PCRGAMUS, a city of the Pierians of 
Thrace, under the mountain Panganim. 
Herod, vii. Also an JEolic city, 120 fur- 
longs from the sea, by the side of the river 
Caicus. Strab. xiii. 

PERINTHUS, a maritime city of Thrace, 
on the side of Propontis. 

PERRHJTSBI, a people of Thessaly that 
inhabit the mountainous country about 
Olympus, from the city At rax as far as 
to Tempo, and the city Gyrton. Strab. 
ix. Out of Macedonia into Thessaly 
there lieth a way through the Perrhiebi 
by the city Gonnus. Herod, vii. 

Pi.TAL.iA, a promontory of Eubrea, 
against which lie the islands called also 
Petnlias, opposite to the promontory Su- 
nium in Attica. Strab. x. 

PHACIUM, a city of Thessaly, between 
Pharsalus and P>ion. Thuc. iv. 

PHAGRES. PFIAGRES iu Thucydides, 
NTPHACRES in Herodotus, a city of the 
Pierians, between Pangsoum and the sea. 
Thuc. ii. Herod, vii. 

PHALERON, a maritime town of Attica, 
between Peiraeus and Halimus. Strab. viii. 
It was heretofore the haven of Athens, 
Paus. Att.: distant from Athens 20 fur- 
longs. Id. Arc. 

PHAN^, a haven in the isle Chios, I<ivy 
xliv : between the promontory Posideum 
and the shore called Notium. Strab. xiv. 

PHANOTIS, a city of Phocis, upon the 
river Cephissus, Strab. ix : the same with 
Panopeus, distant 20 furlongs from Chae- 
roneia in Boeotia. Paus. Phoc. 

PHAR^E, a city in the Messenian bay, 
next after Cardamyle, westward : Strab. 
viii : above it, within the land, are Thu- 
lium and Anthea, 80 furlongs distant from 
it. Paus. Lac. Also a city of Achaia, upon 
the river Peirus, distant from Patroi 150 

furlongs, from the sea, 70 furlongs. Paus. 

PHARSAT.US, a city of Thessaly, by the 
river Apidanus. Strab. viii. 

but in Livy BAPHYRUS, a river of Mace- 
donia, falling into the sea near to the city. 
Dion. Liv. 

PHEIA, a city of Elis, between the 
mouth of the river Alpheus and the pro 
montory Icthys. Strab. viii. 

PHENEUM, a city of Arcadia, confining 
on Pellone and TEgirao, cities of Achaia, 
and on Stymphalus, Nonacris, and Cleitor, 
cities of Arcadia. Paus. Arc. 

PHERJE, a city of Thessaly, near the 
lake Bobbeis. and confining on Pelion and 
the territory of Magnesia. Strab. ix. 

PHII/B, a town of Attica, confining on 
Tauagra of Bo?otia. Strab. ix. 

PuTvius, a city near the head of the 
river Asopus in Achaia, the territory 
whereof is enclosed as it were in a circle 
with the territories of Sicyon, Cleone, and 
Stymphalus. Strab. viii. 

PUOC^RA, an Ionic city in I/ydia, at the 
mouth of the river Hermes, Herod, i : the 
bound of Ionia that way. Strab. xiv. 

PHOCIS, a region of Greece, between 
the L,oori Oxohe and Bouotia. ./Etolia, 
Locris, Phocis, Ba i otia, lie parallel one to 
another. The Phocamns inhabit the east 
side of Parnassus, Strab. ix : and extend 
by the sea-side from Cirrha to Anticyra. 
Paus. Phoc. 

PHOSNICUS PORTUS, a haven in Mes- 
senia, near the promontory Acritas, be- 
tween it and the city Methone. Pans. 
Mess. Also a haven in the peninsula 
Erythmea, under the hill Mimas. Thuc. viii. 

PHOLOGANDROS, an island to the west 
of the island los. Strab. x. 

PHRYGII, a place in Attica, near Acharna?. 
Thuc. ii. 

PHYGAJ^CA, a- city of Arcadia, on the 
confines of Messenia, Polyb. iv : upon the 
river Lyra ax, which falleth into the river 
Neda. Paus. Arc. 

PRYRCUS, a castle not far from Lepreuni 
in Elis. Thuc. v. 

PHYSCA, a city of Macedonia. Thuc. ii. 
Ptolomy placeth it about the river Cheda- 
ruj, not far from the river Axius. 

PHYSCUS, a maritime city of Caria, be- 
tweeu Loryma and Caunus, opposite to 
Rhodes. Strab. xiv. 

PHYTIA, a city on the west side of the 
river Achelous, not far out of the way 
from Stratus into Agreeis, as may be ga- 
thered out of Thuc. iii. 

PIERIA, a maritime city of Macedonia, 



touching on one side the river Peneus, 
Strab. ix : and on the other side the conflu- 
ent of the river ,Lydius and Aliacmon, where 
begins Botticea, according to Herod, vii. 

FIERIUS SINUS, a tract of land between 
the mountain Pangeum and the sea, in 
which standeth the city Phagres. Thuc. 
ii. Pergamus and Niphagres, towns of the 
Pierians, under the hill Panga^um, on the 
west of the river Nestus. Herod, vii. 

PINDUS, a mountain hounding Thessaly 
on the west. Herod, vii. It hath on the 
south the Dolopians ; on the north, Mace- 
donia, Strab. ix. Also a city of the re- 
gion called Doris, one of the four for which 
it was called Tetrapolis, and standeth 
above Erineus. Strab. ix. 

PEIRJEUS, a town and haven of Attica, 
serving for the shipping of Athens, in the 
middest between Pegse and Sunium, Strab. 
viii : distant from Athens 40 furlongs. 
Thuc.ii. AUo a desert haven in the terri- 
tory of Corinth, the utmost towards Epi- 
daurus. Thuc. viii. 

PIRESIA, a city of Thessaly, near the 
mouth of the river Peneus. Ex interprete 
Orphei Argonaut. 

PITANE, an ^Eolic city in the shore of 
Asia, Herod, i : between Atarnous and 
the mouth of the river Caicus. Strab. xiii. 
Also a city of Messenia, on the confines of 
Elis. Strab. viii. 

PLAT/EA, a city of Bceotia, 70 furlongs 
from Thebes. Between these cities run- 
neth the river Asopus. Thuc. ii. Pans. 
Boeot. It standeth between Mount Cithne- 
ron and Thebes, near the confines of Attica 
and Megaris. Strab. ix. 

PLEURON, a city of /Etolia, between 
Chalcis and Calydon, upon the river Eu- 
enus, on the sea-side, west of Chalcis and 
the mouth of the river. Strab. x. 

POLICHNA, a town in the continent of 
Asia, near to Clazomcna?. Thuc. vii. 

POLIS, a village of the Locri Ozolse. 
Thuc. iii. 

POSII>EUM, a temple dedicated to Nep- 
tune : and because those temples were for 
the most part in promontories and places 
open to the sea, divers promontories have 
been so called. There is Posideum a pro- 
montory of Chios, opposite to the promon- 
tory of Argennum in Erj'thrae, and between 
the city Chios and the haven Phanne. 
Strab. xiv. Also a promontory of the Mi- 
lesians, the utmost of Ionia southward. 
Strab. xiv. Also a promontory of Samos, 
which with Mycale in the continent, make 
the strait there of 7 furlongs over. Strab. 
xiv. Also a promontory of Pallene, near 
the city of Mende. Thuc. v, Of two pro- 

montories that are in Pallene, (Canastnea 
being one), this is the lesser. Livy xliv. 
Also a temple in the Corinthian isthmus, 
where were celebrated the Isthmian games. 

POTIIXSJA, a city in Pallene, Herod, vii : 
in the ver^ isthmus of it. Thuc. i. Casan- 
drea is a city in the strait that joineth Pal- 
lene to Macedonia, enclosed on one side 
with the Toronaean bay; on the other, 
with the Macedonian sea. Liv. xliv. Cas- 
sandrea was formerly called Potidaea. 
Strab. Epit. vii. 

POTIDANIA, a city of vEtolia, on the con- 
fines of the Locri Ozolae. Thuc. iii, 

PUASIJR, a maritime city of Laconia, in 
the bay of Argos, Strab. viii. Pans. Lac. : 
the last Laconian city towards Argos, and 
distant from Cyplmnta 200 furlongs. Paus. 
Lac. Also a town in Attica, by the sea- 
side towards Eubcra, between Thoricus 
and Brauron. Strab. ix. 

PHEPESTNTHUS, an island one of the Cy- 
clades. Vide Cyclades. 

PRIAPUS, a city lying upon Propontis* 
between Lampsacus and the river Grani- 
cus. Strab. xiii. 

PRIENE, an Ionic city in Caria, Herod, 
i: between the mouth of Mfoander and the 
mountain Mycale. Strab. xiv. 

PROCONNESUH, an island in Propontis, 
over against the shore that is between 
Parium and Priapus. Strab. xiii. 

PRONE, a city of Cephallenia. Thuc. ii, 
Strab. x. 

PROPONTIS, the wea between Hellespont 
and Pontus Euxinus. Strab. ii. 

PROSCHION, a city of ^Etolia, not far 
from Pleuron, but more remote from the 
sea. Strab. x. 

PROTE, an island over against Messenia, 
not far from Pylus Thuc. iv, 

PSYRA, an island, distant 50 furlongs 
from Mcl&no, a promontory of Chios. 
Strab. xliv. 

P3YTTAJ/EA, an island between the con- 
tinent of Attica and the isle Salamis. He- 
rod, vii. 

PSOPHIS, a city of Arcadia, in the west 
parts thereof, towards Achaia and Elis. 
Polyb. iv. 

PTEL.EUM, a town on the sea-side in 
Erythraea. Thuc. viii. 

PIITHIOTIS, the south part of Thessaly, 
reaching in length to mount Pindus, arid 
in breadth as far as Pharsalus. Strab. ix. 

PTYCHIA, a small island, near to the 
Corcyra. Thuc. iv. 

PYDNA, a Macedonian city in Pieria, 
Strab. Epit. vii : opposite to ^Enea. Livy . 

PYLUS, a city or Messenia, in the pro- 
montory Coryphasium, distant from Me- 

thone 100 furlongs. Paus. Mes. Thuc. iv. v. 
Also a city of Elis, at the confluent of Pe- 
aeus and Ladon. Paus. El. ii. 

PYDIUS, a river between Abydos and 
Dardanus. Thuc. viii. It seemeth to be 
the same which Strabo calleth Rhodius. 
Vide Rhodius. 

PYRRHA, a promontory of Asia the less, 
which with Gargara, another promontory, 
distant from it 120 furlongs, maketh the 
bay of Adrarnyttium, properly so called. 
Strab. xiii. Also a city of -Lesbos, on the 
sea-side towards Greece, distant from My- 
tilene, which is on the other sea, 80 fur- 
longs. Strab. xiii. Also a city of Ionia, in 
the Latmian bay. Strab. xiv. 

RHAMNUS, a maritime town of Attica, 
between Marathon and Oropus, distant 
from Marathon 60 furlongs. Paus. Att. 

RHEITI, certain brooks of salt water, 
supposed to come from the sea between 
Attica and Kulxra, under ground, as from 
the higher sea, and rising in Attica, to fall 
into the Saronian bay, as a lower sea, be- 
tween PeiraBUS and Kleujsis. Paus. Att. et 

RHENEIA, an island, 4 furlongs distant 
from Delos. Strab. x. It lieth before De- 
los, as Sphacteria before Pylus. Paus. 
Mes. extrein. Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, 
tied it to Delos with a chain. Thuc. iii. 

RHIUM, a promontory of Achaia, be- 
tween Patra* and TKgium, which with An- 
tirrhium, maketh the strait of the Corin- 
thian (or Crissacan) bay, of 5 furlongs over. 
Strab. viii. Rhium Achaicum and Antir- 
rhium, (which is also called Rhium Moly- 
chricum), are the jaws of the Corinthian 
bay. JLiv. xxviii. 

RHODOPE, a mountain of Thrace. 

RHODIUS, a river in the Hellespont, be- 
tween Abydos and Dardanus. Strab xiii. 

RHODUS, an island in the Carpathian 
sea, 920 furlongs in compass, inhabited by 
the Dorians. Strab. xiv. 

RHCETEIUM, a city of Hellespont, Thuc. 
viii: on the sea-side between Dardanum 
and Sigeium. Strab. xiii. 

RHYPES, a city of Achaia, 30 furlongs 
from JEgiiim. Paus. Ach. 

SALA, a city of the Samothracians, in 
the shore of Doriscus. Herod, vii. 

SALAMIS, an island adjacent to Eleusis 
of Attica. Strab. viii. Paus. Att. 

SAME, a city on the island Cephallenia, at 
the passage between it and Ithaca. Str. x. 

SAMIA, a city of Elis, a little above Sa- 
micum, between which cities runneth the 
river Anigrus. Paus. El. i. 


INDEX. 457 

SAMICUM, a maritime city of Elis, the 
first beyond the river Ncda, at the mouth 
of the river Anigrus. Paus. El. i. 

SAMINTIIUS, a town of Argeia, in the 
plains of Argos towards Nemea. Thuc. v. 

SAMOTHRACIA, an island in the ^Egean 
sea, over against the mouth of the river 
Ilebrus. Plin. iv. 

SAMOS, an Ionic island and city of the 
same name. The island is 600 furlongs 
about, and Posideum a promontory thereof, 
not above 7 furlongs from the continent. 
The city standeth on the south part of it, 
at the sea-side. Strab. xiv. 

SANE, a city in Pallene. Herod, vii. 
Strab. vii. Also a city by the side of the 
ditch made by Xerxes, in Mount Athos, 
without the same, and to the bay of Singus. 
Herod, vii. Thuc. 4. 

SARDES, the chief city of the Lydians, 
situate under the hill Tmolus. Strab. xiii. 
Through it runneth the river Pactolus. 
Herod, v. 

SCAMANDER, a river of Troas, rising in 
mount Ida. Simoeis and Scamander meet 
in a feu, and then go out into the sea by 
one channel at Sigeium. Strab. xiii. 

SCANDARIUM, a promontory of the island 
Cos, near the city Cos, opposite to Terra e- 
rium, a promontory of the continent. Strab. 

ScANDEiA,a city in the island of Cythera. 
Pans. Lac. 

SCEPSIS, a city of Troas, in the highest 
part of mount Ida. Strab. xiii, 

SCIONE, a city in Pallene, Herod, vii: 
between Mende and Sane. Strab. vii. Ep. 

SCIRITIS, the territory of Scirus, a La- 
conian town on the confines of Parrhasia 
in Arcadia, near to Cypsela. Thuc. i. 

SCHCENOS, a haven of the territory of 
Corinth, at the narrowest part of the isth- 
mus, between Cenchreiaj and Crommyon. 
Strab. viii. 

SCOLCS, a city of Chalcidea, not far from 
Olynthus. Strab. ix. 

SCOMIUS, a mountain in Thrace, out of 
which riseth the river Strymon. Thuc. ii. 

SCYATHUS, an island in the ^Egean sea, 
lying before the territory of Magnesia, 
Strab. ix. Between Scyatnus and the con- 
tinent there is a narrow strait, Herod, vii. 

ScYULasuM, a promontory of Pelopon- 
nesus, the bound of the bay of Argos to 
wards Corinth. Strab. viii. 

SCYROS, an island in the -3Sgean sea, 
lying over against the continent of Mag- 
nesia: Strab. ix: between Eubcea and 
Lesbos. Plin. iv. 

SEIXASIA, a town in Laconia, between 
Lacedsemon and the hill Parnethus, which 

H H 



is the bound of Laconia and Argeia, Paus. 

SELYMBRIA, a city of Thrace, by the 
side of Propontis. 

SEPIAS, a promontory of Magnesia, He- 
rod, vii. : the beginning of the Pegasaean 
bay. Ptol. 

SERIPHUS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclades. 

SERRIUM, a promontory ; the utmost 
westward of the shore of Doriscus in 
Thrace. Herod, vii. 

SERMYLA, a city of Chalcidea, upon the 
Toronaean bay. The navy of Xerxes being 
come about the promontory Am pel us, 
passed by these cities, Torone, Galepsus, 
Sermyla, &c. Herud. vii. 

SESTOS, a city of the Thracian Cher son - 
nesus, 30 furlongs from Abydos, but nearer 
to Propontis than Abydos is. Strab. xiii. 

SICINUS, an island not far from Melos, 
on the west of the island los. Strab. x. 

SICYON, a city of Peloponnesus, between 
Corinth and Achaia, distant 100 furlongs 
from Phlius. Paus. in Cor. 

SLDUSSA, a town by the sea-side in 
Erythrapa. Thuc. viii. 

SIGEIUM, a city and promontory of Tro- 
as, at the mouth of the river Scamander. 
Strab. xiii. 

SIORIUM, the most northern promontory 
of the isle Lesbos, between Eressos and 
Antissa. Strab. xiii. 

SIMOEIS, a river of Troas, which run- 
ning into a fen, joineth there with the river 
Scamander. Strab. xiii. 

town and bay taking name from it, be- 
tween mount Athos and Torone. Herod, 

SINTTI, a people about Amphipolis : Liv. 
xliv : divided from Preonia by the moun- 
tain Cercine. Thuc. ii. 

SIPH.E, a city of Boeotia, upon the Cris- 
ssean bay. Paus. Bceot. 

SIPHNUS, an island, one of the Cyclades, 
Vide Cyclades. 

SMYRNA, a maritime city of Asia, in the 
bay called from it the bay of Smyrna 
beyond Clazomenae towards JEolis. Strab 

SOUUM, a maritime town of Acarnania 
Thuc. ii. Schol. 

SPARTA, the same with Lacedaemon. 
Strab. x. Vide Lacedaemon. 

SPARTOLUS, a city of the Bottiaeans, on 
the border of the Chalcideans. Thuc. ii. 

SPERCHEIUS, a river that riseth in Do- 
lopia, at a mountain called Tymphestus, 
and falleth into the Melian bay, 10 fur- 
longs within Thermopylae. Strab. ix. 

SPHACTERIA, a little island lying before 
Pylus of Messenia. Thuc. iv. Paus. Mes. 

SPORADES, islands upon the coast of Ca- 
ria and of Crete. Strab. viii. 

STAGEIRUS, a city in the bay of Strymon, 
between Argilus and Acanthus. Herod, vii. 

STRATUS, a city of the Amphilochians 
in Acarnania, upon the river Achelous, 
Thuc. iii: 200 furlongs from the river's 
mouth. Strab. x. 

STROPHADES, islands over against Mes- 
senia, about 400 furlongs from the conti- 
nent. Strab. viii. 

STRYMA, a city on the coast of Thrace, 
next after Mesembria, towards Macedonia. 
Herod, vii. 

STRYMON, a river dividing Thrace from 
Macedonia. It riseth in the hill Seomius. 
Thuc. ii. It passeth by Amphipolis, on 
both sides of it, and falleth into the sea at 
the city Eion. Herod, vii. It is said to rise 
out of the mountain Rhodope. Strab. vii. 
Ep. But it is probable that the hill Sco- 
mius is part ot Hhodope. 

STYMPHALUS, a city of Arcadia, con- 
fining on the territory of Phlius. Paus. 
Arc. Strab. viii. 

STYRA, a city in Eubcea, near to the city 
Carystus. Strab. x. 

SUNIUM, a promontory and town in At- 
tica, towards Eubo?a, between the Saronian 
bay and the sea towards Eubota, Strab. x: 
and distant from Kubo?a 300 furlongs. Id. x. 

SYBOTA, islands between Leucimne, a 
promontory of Corey ra, and the continent. 
Strab. vii. Thuc. i. Also a haven by the 
promontory of Cheimerium, in the same 
continent. Thuc. i. 

SYME, an island over against the conti- 
nent of Caria, between Loryraa and Cni- 
dus. Strab. xiv. 

SCYROS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclades. 

T^ENARUS, a promontory of Laconia, be- 
tween theLacoman and the Messenian bays. 
Paus. Lac. Also a maritime city of La- 
conia, in the Messenian bay, distant from 
Ttenarus the promontory 40 furlongs. 
Paus. Lac. 

TAN AGRA, a city of Boeotia, confining on 
Attica, 30 furlongs from Aulis, a haven on 
the Eubcean sea. Strab. ix. 

TAULANTII, a people of Ulyris, about 
Dyrrachiuin (or Epidamnus). Strab. vii. 
Thuc. i. 

TAIGETDS, a mountain of Laconia, be- 
ginning at the sea, above Thurides* and 
reaching up towards Arcadia, as far as 
Amyclac and Laced&mon. Strab. viii. 

TEGEA, a city of Arcadia, between Ar- 



gos and Laccdeemon. Thuc. v. Herod, vi. 
Polvb. iv. The territory thereof confineth 
with the Argives at Hysiee, with Laconia 
at the river Alpheus, and with the terri- 
tory of Thyrea at the hill Parnethus. Paus. 
Arc. These cities of Peloponnesus, Argos, 
Tegea, and Mantineia, though much cele- 
brated in history, are placed with little 
consideration of any history, in all the 
maps that I have hitherto seen. 

TEICHIUSSA, a castle of the Milesians in 
the bay of lasus. Thuc. viii. 

TELOS, an island over against Triopium. 
Herod, vii. A narrow island, in circuit 140 
furlongs, adjacent to Cnidus. Strab. x. 

TEMENIUM, a town in Argeia, distant 
from Argos 26 furlongs, Strab. viii: from 
Nauplia 50 furlongs. Paus. Cor. 

TEMPE, a pleasant valley between the 
mountains Ossa and Olympus: through it 
runneth the river Peneus. Herod, vii. 
Strab. ix. Liv. xliv. 

TENEDOS, an island in circuit about 80 
furlongs, opposite to the continent of Tro- 
as, at Acheeum, between Sigeium and La- 
rissa, and distant from it 40 furlongs. 
Strab. xiii. 

TENOS, an island, one of the Cyclades. 
Vide Cyclados. 

TEOH, a maritime city of Ionia, situate 
in the very isthmus of the Erythraean Cher- 
sonnesus, distant from Lebedos 120 fur- 
longs. Strab. xiv. 

TERMERIUM, a promontory of the Min- 
dians, opposite to the isle Cos. Strab. xiv. 

TEUGL.USSA, an. island not far from Ha- 
licarnassus. Thuc. viii. 

THASOS, an island upon the coast of 
Thrace, half-a-day'e> sail from Amphipolis. 
Thuc. iv. 

THEB;E, the principal city of Bwotia, 
situate near the rivers Isnienus and Aso- 
pus, Strab. ix: distant fromPlato>a70 fur- 
longs. Thuc. ii. 

THERA, an island on the coast of Crete, 
distant from a promontory thereof called 
Dion, 70 furlongs. Strab. x. 

THERASIA, a small island near to Thera. 
Strab. x. 

THERME is a city in the bottom of the 
Thermsean bay ; and the THERMJEAN BAY 
is presently within Pellene. Herod, vii. 

THERMOPYL^B. the strait entrance into 
Greece out of Thessaly, of about half an 
acre/s breadth, between the mountain (Eta 
and the Melistn bay. Called Thermopylae 
from hot waters that rise there, which the 
Grecians call Thermce: and from gates 
made there by the Phoceans in old time, 
which they call Pylse. Herod, vii, This 

strait is distant from Chalcis in Euboeas 
530 furlongs. Strab. ix. 

THESPLS;, a city of Bceotia, under mount 
Helicon, on the confines of the city Aliar- 
tus. Paus. Boeot Near to the Crissaean 
bay. Strab. ix. 

THESPROTIS, a maritime region of Epi- 
rus, bordering on the Ambraciotes and 
Leucadians. Herod, viii. The Chaones 
and Thesproti have the whole coast, from 
the Ceraunian mountains to th bay of 
Ambracia. Strab. vii. 

THESSALJA, a region of Greece, con- 
tained within the mountains Olympus, 
Ossa, Pelion, (which is to the sea), Othrys 
and Pindus, Herod, vii: where he layeth 
out the bounds of Thessaly exactly. 

THORICUS, a maritime town of Attica, 
toward the Eubomn sea, next beyond the 
promontory Sunium. Strab. ix. Vide 

THRACIA, a kingdom bordering on 
Macedonia, at the river Strymon, de- 
scribed at large by Thuc. ii. 

or THRIO, a town of Attica, between 
Athens and Eleusis, over against Salamis. 
The fields belonging to it are called Thri- 
asii campi, and the shore Thriasium lit us. 
Strab. ix. Herod, viii. 

THRONIUM, a city of Locris, upon the 
Meliaii bay, between the promontory 
Cneinides and Thermopylae. Strab. ix. 

THURIDES. a city in tlie Messenian bay, 
the first towards the east, distant from the 
promontory Tamarus 70 furlongs. Paus. 

THURIUM, a city of Laconia, 80 fur- 
longs above Phara\ Paus. Mess. 

TIJYAMUS, a river of Epirus, dividing 
Thesprotis from Cestrine. Thuc. i. 

THYAMUS, a hill on the confines of 
Agrseis and Amphilochia, not far from 
Argos Amphilochicum. Thuc. iii. 

THYREA, a maritime city, in the bay of 
Argos, in the territory called Cynuria. 
It confineth on Argeia and Laconia, Thuc. 
v: and on the territory of Tegea. Paus. 

THYSSUS, a city in mount Athos. Thuc. 
iv. Herod, vii. 

TEICHIUM, a city of ^Etolia, in the part 
inhabited by the Apodoti. Thuc. vii. 

TEITHOREA, a city in the top of Parnas- 
sus, called also Neon, 80 furlongs from 
Delphi. Paus. Phoc. 

TMOLUS, a mountain between the river 
Caystrus and the city of Sardes. Herod, v. 
Sardes standeth at the foot of Tmolus, and 
out of this hill riseth the river Pactolus. 
Strab. xiii. 



TOLOPHON, a city of the Locri Ozolaj. 
Thuc. iii. 

TOMEUS, a hill near to Pylus in Mes- 
senia. Thuc. iv. 

TORONE is a Chalcidic city, between the 
Singitic and Toronwan bays, near the 
promontory Ampelus. Herod, vii. The 
place of the Toroiuean bay is understood 
out of Livy xliv; where he saith thatCas- 
sandrea(orPoti<Uea)standeth between the 
Macedonian sea and the bay of Torone. 

TRAGIA. an island near to Sainos, 
Thuc. i. TRAOJE^:, islands about Miletus. 
Strab. xiv. 

TRIOPIUM, a promontory of the Cni- 
dians. Thuc. viii. Vide Cnidus. 

TRIPODISCUS, a village of Megaris. 
Thuc. iv. 

TRIT^EA, a city of Achaia, remote from 
the sea, distant from Thane 120 furlongs. 
Paus, Aeh. Also a city of the Locri 
Ozoke. Thuc iii. 

TROAS, a territory of Asia the 

on the side of the ^Egoean sea, between 
^Kolis and Hellespont. Strab. xiii. 

TROSZEN, a maritime city of Argeia, the 
utmost in the bay of Hcrzmonc, Strab. viii : 
confining on Epidauria, Pans. Cor. 

TROIA. Vide Ilium. 

TROGILIUM, a promontory, and foot of 
the mountain Myeale, over against the 
isle Samos, which with Posideum, a pro- 
montory of that isle, maketh the strait 
there 7 furlongs over. Strab. xiv. 

ZACYNTHUS, an island over against Pe- 
loponnesus. Strab. x. No weal led Xante. 

ZARCX, a maritime city of Laconia, dis- 
tant on one side from Kpidaurus Limera 
100 furlongs, and from Cyphanta on the 
other side, 16 furlongs. Pans. l^ae. 

XKLEIA, a city umler mount Ida, toward